x86/cpu: Move arch_smt_update() to a neutral place
arch_smt_update() will be used to control IPI/NMI broadcasting via the shorthand mechanism. Keeping it in the bugs file and calling the apic function from there is possible, but not really intuitive. Move it to a neutral place and invoke the bugs function from there. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190722105219.910317273@linutronix.de
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@ -18,4 +18,6 @@ int ppro_with_ram_bug(void);
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static inline int ppro_with_ram_bug(void) { return 0; }
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#endif
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extern void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void);
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#endif /* _ASM_X86_BUGS_H */
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@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
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#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
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void arch_smt_update(void)
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void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
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{
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/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
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if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
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@ -1945,3 +1945,12 @@ void microcode_check(void)
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pr_warn("x86/CPU: CPU features have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect.\n");
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pr_warn("x86/CPU: Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
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}
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/*
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* Invoked from core CPU hotplug code after hotplug operations
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*/
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void arch_smt_update(void)
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{
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/* Handle the speculative execution misfeatures */
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cpu_bugs_smt_update();
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}
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