11 cifs/smb3 client fixes, including some restructuring to allow disabling less secure algorithms, and 2 for stable

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Merge tag '5.15-rc-smb3-fixes-part1' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6

Pull cifs client updates from Steve French:
 "Eleven cifs/smb3 client fixes:

   - mostly restructuring to allow disabling less secure algorithms
     (this will allow eventual removing rc4 and md4 from general use in
     the kernel)

   - four fixes, including two for stable

   - enable r/w support with fscache and cifs.ko

  I am working on a larger set of changes (the usual ... multichannel,
  auth and signing improvements), but wanted to get these in earlier to
  reduce chance of merge conflicts later in the merge window"

* tag '5.15-rc-smb3-fixes-part1' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
  cifs: Do not leak EDEADLK to dgetents64 for STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED
  cifs: add cifs_common directory to MAINTAINERS file
  cifs: cifs_md4 convert to SPDX identifier
  cifs: create a MD4 module and switch cifs.ko to use it
  cifs: fork arc4 and create a separate module for it for cifs and other users
  cifs: remove support for NTLM and weaker authentication algorithms
  cifs: enable fscache usage even for files opened as rw
  oid_registry: Add OIDs for missing Spnego auth mechanisms to Macs
  smb3: fix posix extensions mount option
  cifs: fix wrong release in sess_alloc_buffer() failed path
  CIFS: Fix a potencially linear read overflow
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2021-08-31 09:22:37 -07:00
commit 9c849ce86e
30 changed files with 485 additions and 763 deletions

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@ -4629,6 +4629,7 @@ W: http://linux-cifs.samba.org/
T: git git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6.git
F: Documentation/admin-guide/cifs/
F: fs/cifs/
F: fs/cifs_common/
COMPACTPCI HOTPLUG CORE
M: Scott Murray <scott@spiteful.org>

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@ -348,8 +348,15 @@ config NFS_V4_2_SSC_HELPER
source "net/sunrpc/Kconfig"
source "fs/ceph/Kconfig"
source "fs/cifs/Kconfig"
source "fs/ksmbd/Kconfig"
config CIFS_COMMON
tristate
default y if CIFS=y
default m if CIFS=m
source "fs/coda/Kconfig"
source "fs/afs/Kconfig"
source "fs/9p/Kconfig"

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@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_LOCKD) += lockd/
obj-$(CONFIG_NLS) += nls/
obj-$(CONFIG_UNICODE) += unicode/
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSV_FS) += sysv/
obj-$(CONFIG_CIFS_COMMON) += cifs_common/
obj-$(CONFIG_CIFS) += cifs/
obj-$(CONFIG_SMB_SERVER) += ksmbd/
obj-$(CONFIG_HPFS_FS) += hpfs/

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@ -4,19 +4,16 @@ config CIFS
depends on INET
select NLS
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_MD4
select CRYPTO_MD5
select CRYPTO_SHA256
select CRYPTO_SHA512
select CRYPTO_CMAC
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
select CRYPTO_AEAD2
select CRYPTO_CCM
select CRYPTO_GCM
select CRYPTO_ECB
select CRYPTO_AES
select CRYPTO_LIB_DES
select KEYS
select DNS_RESOLVER
select ASN1
@ -85,33 +82,6 @@ config CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY
If unsure, say Y.
config CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
bool "Support legacy servers which use weaker LANMAN security"
depends on CIFS && CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY
help
Modern CIFS servers including Samba and most Windows versions
(since 1997) support stronger NTLM (and even NTLMv2 and Kerberos)
security mechanisms. These hash the password more securely
than the mechanisms used in the older LANMAN version of the
SMB protocol but LANMAN based authentication is needed to
establish sessions with some old SMB servers.
Enabling this option allows the cifs module to mount to older
LANMAN based servers such as OS/2 and Windows 95, but such
mounts may be less secure than mounts using NTLM or more recent
security mechanisms if you are on a public network. Unless you
have a need to access old SMB servers (and are on a private
network) you probably want to say N. Even if this support
is enabled in the kernel build, LANMAN authentication will not be
used automatically. At runtime LANMAN mounts are disabled but
can be set to required (or optional) either in
/proc/fs/cifs (see Documentation/admin-guide/cifs/usage.rst for
more detail) or via an option on the mount command. This support
is disabled by default in order to reduce the possibility of a
downgrade attack.
If unsure, say N.
config CIFS_UPCALL
bool "Kerberos/SPNEGO advanced session setup"
depends on CIFS

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@ -250,9 +250,6 @@ static int cifs_debug_data_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY
seq_printf(m, ",ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
seq_printf(m, ",WEAK_PW_HASH");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX
seq_printf(m, ",CIFS_POSIX");
#endif
@ -929,14 +926,6 @@ cifs_security_flags_handle_must_flags(unsigned int *flags)
*flags = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMSSP;
else if ((*flags & CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2) == CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2)
*flags = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2;
else if ((*flags & CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLM) == CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLM)
*flags = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLM;
else if (CIFSSEC_MUST_LANMAN &&
(*flags & CIFSSEC_MUST_LANMAN) == CIFSSEC_MUST_LANMAN)
*flags = CIFSSEC_MUST_LANMAN;
else if (CIFSSEC_MUST_PLNTXT &&
(*flags & CIFSSEC_MUST_PLNTXT) == CIFSSEC_MUST_PLNTXT)
*flags = CIFSSEC_MUST_PLNTXT;
*flags |= signflags;
}

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@ -147,8 +147,6 @@ static int cifs_swn_send_register_message(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg)
goto nlmsg_fail;
}
break;
case LANMAN:
case NTLM:
case NTLMv2:
case RawNTLMSSP:
ret = cifs_swn_auth_info_ntlm(swnreg->tcon, skb);

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@ -358,14 +358,9 @@ cifs_strndup_from_utf16(const char *src, const int maxlen,
if (!dst)
return NULL;
cifs_from_utf16(dst, (__le16 *) src, len, maxlen, codepage,
NO_MAP_UNI_RSVD);
NO_MAP_UNI_RSVD);
} else {
len = strnlen(src, maxlen);
len++;
dst = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dst)
return NULL;
strlcpy(dst, src, len);
dst = kstrndup(src, maxlen, GFP_KERNEL);
}
return dst;

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@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <crypto/arc4.h>
#include "../cifs_common/arc4.h"
#include <crypto/aead.h>
int __cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
@ -250,87 +250,6 @@ int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
}
/* first calculate 24 bytes ntlm response and then 16 byte session key */
int setup_ntlm_response(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc = 0;
unsigned int temp_len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
char temp_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
if (!ses)
return -EINVAL;
ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(temp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->auth_key.response)
return -ENOMEM;
ses->auth_key.len = temp_len;
rc = SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM response, error: %d\n",
__func__, rc);
return rc;
}
rc = E_md4hash(ses->password, temp_key, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NT hash, error: %d\n",
__func__, rc);
return rc;
}
rc = mdfour(ses->auth_key.response, temp_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
if (rc)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM session key, error: %d\n",
__func__, rc);
return rc;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
int calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt,
char *lnm_session_key)
{
int i, len;
int rc;
char password_with_pad[CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE] = {0};
if (password) {
for (len = 0; len < CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE; len++)
if (!password[len])
break;
memcpy(password_with_pad, password, len);
}
if (!encrypt && global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT) {
memcpy(lnm_session_key, password_with_pad,
CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
return 0;
}
/* calculate old style session key */
/* calling toupper is less broken than repeatedly
calling nls_toupper would be since that will never
work for UTF8, but neither handles multibyte code pages
but the only alternative would be converting to UCS-16 (Unicode)
(using a routine something like UniStrupr) then
uppercasing and then converting back from Unicode - which
would only worth doing it if we knew it were utf8. Basically
utf8 and other multibyte codepages each need their own strupper
function since a byte at a time will ont work. */
for (i = 0; i < CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE; i++)
password_with_pad[i] = toupper(password_with_pad[i]);
rc = SMBencrypt(password_with_pad, cryptkey, lnm_session_key);
return rc;
}
#endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
/* Build a proper attribute value/target info pairs blob.
* Fill in netbios and dns domain name and workstation name
* and client time (total five av pairs and + one end of fields indicator.
@ -780,9 +699,9 @@ calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses)
return -ENOMEM;
}
arc4_setkey(ctx_arc4, ses->auth_key.response, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
arc4_crypt(ctx_arc4, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, sec_key,
CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
cifs_arc4_setkey(ctx_arc4, ses->auth_key.response, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
cifs_arc4_crypt(ctx_arc4, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, sec_key,
CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
/* make secondary_key/nonce as session key */
memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);

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@ -399,7 +399,6 @@ cifs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
clear_inode(inode);
cifs_fscache_release_inode_cookie(inode);
}
static void
@ -438,15 +437,9 @@ cifs_show_security(struct seq_file *s, struct cifs_ses *ses)
seq_puts(s, ",sec=");
switch (ses->sectype) {
case LANMAN:
seq_puts(s, "lanman");
break;
case NTLMv2:
seq_puts(s, "ntlmv2");
break;
case NTLM:
seq_puts(s, "ntlm");
break;
case Kerberos:
seq_puts(s, "krb5");
break;
@ -1755,7 +1748,6 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION
MODULE_VERSION(CIFS_VERSION);
MODULE_SOFTDEP("ecb");
MODULE_SOFTDEP("hmac");
MODULE_SOFTDEP("md4");
MODULE_SOFTDEP("md5");
MODULE_SOFTDEP("nls");
MODULE_SOFTDEP("aes");

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@ -114,8 +114,6 @@ enum statusEnum {
enum securityEnum {
Unspecified = 0, /* not specified */
LANMAN, /* Legacy LANMAN auth */
NTLM, /* Legacy NTLM012 auth with NTLM hash */
NTLMv2, /* Legacy NTLM auth with NTLMv2 hash */
RawNTLMSSP, /* NTLMSSP without SPNEGO, NTLMv2 hash */
Kerberos, /* Kerberos via SPNEGO */
@ -634,7 +632,6 @@ struct TCP_Server_Info {
struct session_key session_key;
unsigned long lstrp; /* when we got last response from this server */
struct cifs_secmech secmech; /* crypto sec mech functs, descriptors */
#define CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_LANMAN 0 /* wct == 13, LANMAN */
#define CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_UNENCAP 1 /* wct == 17, but no ext_sec */
#define CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED 2 /* wct == 17, ext_sec bit set */
char negflavor; /* NEGOTIATE response flavor */
@ -1734,16 +1731,8 @@ static inline bool is_retryable_error(int error)
/* Security Flags: indicate type of session setup needed */
#define CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN 0x00001
#define CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM 0x00002
#define CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 0x00004
#define CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 0x00008
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
#define CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN 0x00010
#define CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT 0x00020
#else
#define CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN 0
#define CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT 0
#endif /* weak passwords */
#define CIFSSEC_MAY_SEAL 0x00040 /* not supported yet */
#define CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP 0x00080 /* raw ntlmssp with ntlmv2 */
@ -1751,32 +1740,19 @@ static inline bool is_retryable_error(int error)
/* note that only one of the following can be set so the
result of setting MUST flags more than once will be to
require use of the stronger protocol */
#define CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLM 0x02002
#define CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2 0x04004
#define CIFSSEC_MUST_KRB5 0x08008
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
#define CIFSSEC_MUST_LANMAN 0x10010
#define CIFSSEC_MUST_PLNTXT 0x20020
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
#define CIFSSEC_MASK 0xBF0BF /* allows weak security but also krb5 */
#else
#define CIFSSEC_MASK 0xB70B7 /* current flags supported if weak */
#endif /* UPCALL */
#else /* do not allow weak pw hash */
#define CIFSSEC_MUST_LANMAN 0
#define CIFSSEC_MUST_PLNTXT 0
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
#define CIFSSEC_MASK 0x8F08F /* flags supported if no weak allowed */
#else
#define CIFSSEC_MASK 0x87087 /* flags supported if no weak allowed */
#endif /* UPCALL */
#endif /* WEAK_PW_HASH */
#define CIFSSEC_MUST_SEAL 0x40040 /* not supported yet */
#define CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMSSP 0x80080 /* raw ntlmssp with ntlmv2 */
#define CIFSSEC_DEF (CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP)
#define CIFSSEC_MAX (CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN | CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2)
#define CIFSSEC_AUTH_MASK (CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 | CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN | CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT | CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP)
#define CIFSSEC_MAX (CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2)
#define CIFSSEC_AUTH_MASK (CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 | CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP)
/*
*****************************************************************
* All constants go here
@ -1940,10 +1916,6 @@ static inline char *get_security_type_str(enum securityEnum sectype)
return "Kerberos";
case NTLMv2:
return "NTLMv2";
case NTLM:
return "NTLM";
case LANMAN:
return "LANMAN";
default:
return "Unknown";
}

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@ -14,13 +14,7 @@
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include "smbfsctl.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
#define LANMAN_PROT 0
#define LANMAN2_PROT 1
#define CIFS_PROT 2
#else
#define CIFS_PROT 0
#endif
#define POSIX_PROT (CIFS_PROT+1)
#define BAD_PROT 0xFFFF
@ -505,30 +499,8 @@ typedef struct negotiate_req {
unsigned char DialectsArray[1];
} __attribute__((packed)) NEGOTIATE_REQ;
/* Dialect index is 13 for LANMAN */
#define MIN_TZ_ADJ (15 * 60) /* minimum grid for timezones in seconds */
typedef struct lanman_neg_rsp {
struct smb_hdr hdr; /* wct = 13 */
__le16 DialectIndex;
__le16 SecurityMode;
__le16 MaxBufSize;
__le16 MaxMpxCount;
__le16 MaxNumberVcs;
__le16 RawMode;
__le32 SessionKey;
struct {
__le16 Time;
__le16 Date;
} __attribute__((packed)) SrvTime;
__le16 ServerTimeZone;
__le16 EncryptionKeyLength;
__le16 Reserved;
__u16 ByteCount;
unsigned char EncryptionKey[1];
} __attribute__((packed)) LANMAN_NEG_RSP;
#define READ_RAW_ENABLE 1
#define WRITE_RAW_ENABLE 2
#define RAW_ENABLE (READ_RAW_ENABLE | WRITE_RAW_ENABLE)

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@ -498,19 +498,12 @@ extern int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *, struct TCP_Server_Info *, __u32 *);
extern int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
__u32 expected_sequence_number);
extern int SMBNTencrypt(unsigned char *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *,
const struct nls_table *);
extern int setup_ntlm_response(struct cifs_ses *, const struct nls_table *);
extern int setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *, const struct nls_table *);
extern void cifs_crypto_secmech_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server);
extern int calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *);
extern int generate_smb30signingkey(struct cifs_ses *);
extern int generate_smb311signingkey(struct cifs_ses *);
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
extern int calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey,
bool encrypt, char *lnm_session_key);
#endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
extern int CIFSSMBCopy(unsigned int xid,
struct cifs_tcon *source_tcon,
const char *fromName,
@ -547,11 +540,8 @@ extern int check_mf_symlink(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
struct cifs_fattr *fattr,
const unsigned char *path);
extern int mdfour(unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int);
extern int E_md4hash(const unsigned char *passwd, unsigned char *p16,
const struct nls_table *codepage);
extern int SMBencrypt(unsigned char *passwd, const unsigned char *c8,
unsigned char *p24);
extern int
cifs_setup_volume_info(struct smb3_fs_context *ctx, const char *mntopts, const char *devname);

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@ -42,10 +42,6 @@ static struct {
int index;
char *name;
} protocols[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
{LANMAN_PROT, "\2LM1.2X002"},
{LANMAN2_PROT, "\2LANMAN2.1"},
#endif /* weak password hashing for legacy clients */
{CIFS_PROT, "\2NT LM 0.12"},
{POSIX_PROT, "\2POSIX 2"},
{BAD_PROT, "\2"}
@ -55,10 +51,6 @@ static struct {
int index;
char *name;
} protocols[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
{LANMAN_PROT, "\2LM1.2X002"},
{LANMAN2_PROT, "\2LANMAN2.1"},
#endif /* weak password hashing for legacy clients */
{CIFS_PROT, "\2NT LM 0.12"},
{BAD_PROT, "\2"}
};
@ -66,17 +58,9 @@ static struct {
/* define the number of elements in the cifs dialect array */
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
#define CIFS_NUM_PROT 4
#else
#define CIFS_NUM_PROT 2
#endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
#else /* not posix */
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
#define CIFS_NUM_PROT 3
#else
#define CIFS_NUM_PROT 1
#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
#endif /* CIFS_POSIX */
/*
@ -475,89 +459,6 @@ cifs_enable_signing(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, bool mnt_sign_required)
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
static int
decode_lanman_negprot_rsp(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, NEGOTIATE_RSP *pSMBr)
{
__s16 tmp;
struct lanman_neg_rsp *rsp = (struct lanman_neg_rsp *)pSMBr;
if (server->dialect != LANMAN_PROT && server->dialect != LANMAN2_PROT)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
server->sec_mode = le16_to_cpu(rsp->SecurityMode);
server->maxReq = min_t(unsigned int,
le16_to_cpu(rsp->MaxMpxCount),
cifs_max_pending);
set_credits(server, server->maxReq);
server->maxBuf = le16_to_cpu(rsp->MaxBufSize);
/* set up max_read for readpages check */
server->max_read = server->maxBuf;
/* even though we do not use raw we might as well set this
accurately, in case we ever find a need for it */
if ((le16_to_cpu(rsp->RawMode) & RAW_ENABLE) == RAW_ENABLE) {
server->max_rw = 0xFF00;
server->capabilities = CAP_MPX_MODE | CAP_RAW_MODE;
} else {
server->max_rw = 0;/* do not need to use raw anyway */
server->capabilities = CAP_MPX_MODE;
}
tmp = (__s16)le16_to_cpu(rsp->ServerTimeZone);
if (tmp == -1) {
/* OS/2 often does not set timezone therefore
* we must use server time to calc time zone.
* Could deviate slightly from the right zone.
* Smallest defined timezone difference is 15 minutes
* (i.e. Nepal). Rounding up/down is done to match
* this requirement.
*/
int val, seconds, remain, result;
struct timespec64 ts;
time64_t utc = ktime_get_real_seconds();
ts = cnvrtDosUnixTm(rsp->SrvTime.Date,
rsp->SrvTime.Time, 0);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "SrvTime %lld sec since 1970 (utc: %lld) diff: %lld\n",
ts.tv_sec, utc,
utc - ts.tv_sec);
val = (int)(utc - ts.tv_sec);
seconds = abs(val);
result = (seconds / MIN_TZ_ADJ) * MIN_TZ_ADJ;
remain = seconds % MIN_TZ_ADJ;
if (remain >= (MIN_TZ_ADJ / 2))
result += MIN_TZ_ADJ;
if (val < 0)
result = -result;
server->timeAdj = result;
} else {
server->timeAdj = (int)tmp;
server->timeAdj *= 60; /* also in seconds */
}
cifs_dbg(FYI, "server->timeAdj: %d seconds\n", server->timeAdj);
/* BB get server time for time conversions and add
code to use it and timezone since this is not UTC */
if (rsp->EncryptionKeyLength ==
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE)) {
memcpy(server->cryptkey, rsp->EncryptionKey,
CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
} else if (server->sec_mode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT) {
return -EIO; /* need cryptkey unless plain text */
}
cifs_dbg(FYI, "LANMAN negotiated\n");
return 0;
}
#else
static inline int
decode_lanman_negprot_rsp(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, NEGOTIATE_RSP *pSMBr)
{
cifs_dbg(VFS, "mount failed, cifs module not built with CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH support\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
#endif
static bool
should_set_ext_sec_flag(enum securityEnum sectype)
{
@ -626,16 +527,12 @@ CIFSSMBNegotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
server->dialect = le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->DialectIndex);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Dialect: %d\n", server->dialect);
/* Check wct = 1 error case */
if ((pSMBr->hdr.WordCount < 13) || (server->dialect == BAD_PROT)) {
if ((pSMBr->hdr.WordCount <= 13) || (server->dialect == BAD_PROT)) {
/* core returns wct = 1, but we do not ask for core - otherwise
small wct just comes when dialect index is -1 indicating we
could not negotiate a common dialect */
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto neg_err_exit;
} else if (pSMBr->hdr.WordCount == 13) {
server->negflavor = CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_LANMAN;
rc = decode_lanman_negprot_rsp(server, pSMBr);
goto signing_check;
} else if (pSMBr->hdr.WordCount != 17) {
/* unknown wct */
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
@ -677,7 +574,6 @@ CIFSSMBNegotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
server->capabilities &= ~CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
}
signing_check:
if (!rc)
rc = cifs_enable_signing(server, ses->sign);
neg_err_exit:
@ -2101,6 +1997,7 @@ cifs_writev_complete(struct work_struct *work)
else if (wdata->result < 0)
SetPageError(page);
end_page_writeback(page);
cifs_readpage_to_fscache(inode, page);
put_page(page);
}
if (wdata->result != -EAGAIN)

View File

@ -3684,38 +3684,6 @@ CIFSTCon(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
*bcc_ptr = 0; /* password is null byte */
bcc_ptr++; /* skip password */
/* already aligned so no need to do it below */
} else {
pSMB->PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
/* BB FIXME add code to fail this if NTLMv2 or Kerberos
specified as required (when that support is added to
the vfs in the future) as only NTLM or the much
weaker LANMAN (which we do not send by default) is accepted
by Samba (not sure whether other servers allow
NTLMv2 password here) */
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
if ((global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN) &&
(ses->sectype == LANMAN))
calc_lanman_hash(tcon->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
ses->server->sec_mode &
SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ? true : false,
bcc_ptr);
else
#endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
rc = SMBNTencrypt(tcon->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
bcc_ptr, nls_codepage);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM rsp. Error: %d\n",
__func__, rc);
cifs_buf_release(smb_buffer);
return rc;
}
bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
/* must align unicode strings */
*bcc_ptr = 0; /* null byte password */
bcc_ptr++;
}
}
if (ses->server->sign)

View File

@ -377,6 +377,8 @@ static void cifsFileInfo_put_final(struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_file)
struct cifsLockInfo *li, *tmp;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
cifs_fscache_release_inode_cookie(inode);
/*
* Delete any outstanding lock records. We'll lose them when the file
* is closed anyway.
@ -882,8 +884,10 @@ int cifs_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
if ((cinode->oplock == CIFS_CACHE_RHW_FLG) &&
cinode->lease_granted &&
dclose) {
if (test_bit(CIFS_INO_MODIFIED_ATTR, &cinode->flags))
if (test_bit(CIFS_INO_MODIFIED_ATTR, &cinode->flags)) {
inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime = current_time(inode);
cifs_fscache_update_inode_cookie(inode);
}
spin_lock(&cinode->deferred_lock);
cifs_add_deferred_close(cfile, dclose);
if (cfile->deferred_close_scheduled &&
@ -4170,6 +4174,10 @@ static vm_fault_t
cifs_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct page *page = vmf->page;
struct file *file = vmf->vma->vm_file;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
cifs_fscache_wait_on_page_write(inode, page);
lock_page(page);
return VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
@ -4235,13 +4243,16 @@ cifs_readv_complete(struct work_struct *work)
(rdata->result == -EAGAIN && got_bytes)) {
flush_dcache_page(page);
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
} else
SetPageError(page);
unlock_page(page);
if (rdata->result == 0 ||
(rdata->result == -EAGAIN && got_bytes))
cifs_readpage_to_fscache(rdata->mapping->host, page);
else
cifs_fscache_uncache_page(rdata->mapping->host, page);
got_bytes -= min_t(unsigned int, PAGE_SIZE, got_bytes);

View File

@ -57,12 +57,9 @@ static const match_table_t cifs_secflavor_tokens = {
{ Opt_sec_krb5p, "krb5p" },
{ Opt_sec_ntlmsspi, "ntlmsspi" },
{ Opt_sec_ntlmssp, "ntlmssp" },
{ Opt_ntlm, "ntlm" },
{ Opt_sec_ntlmi, "ntlmi" },
{ Opt_sec_ntlmv2, "nontlm" },
{ Opt_sec_ntlmv2, "ntlmv2" },
{ Opt_sec_ntlmv2i, "ntlmv2i" },
{ Opt_sec_lanman, "lanman" },
{ Opt_sec_none, "none" },
{ Opt_sec_err, NULL }
@ -221,23 +218,12 @@ cifs_parse_security_flavors(struct fs_context *fc, char *value, struct smb3_fs_c
case Opt_sec_ntlmssp:
ctx->sectype = RawNTLMSSP;
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmi:
ctx->sign = true;
fallthrough;
case Opt_ntlm:
ctx->sectype = NTLM;
break;
case Opt_sec_ntlmv2i:
ctx->sign = true;
fallthrough;
case Opt_sec_ntlmv2:
ctx->sectype = NTLMv2;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
case Opt_sec_lanman:
ctx->sectype = LANMAN;
break;
#endif
case Opt_sec_none:
ctx->nullauth = 1;
break;
@ -1266,10 +1252,17 @@ static int smb3_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
ctx->posix_paths = 1;
break;
case Opt_unix:
if (result.negated)
if (result.negated) {
if (ctx->linux_ext == 1)
pr_warn_once("conflicting posix mount options specified\n");
ctx->linux_ext = 0;
else
ctx->no_linux_ext = 1;
} else {
if (ctx->no_linux_ext == 1)
pr_warn_once("conflicting posix mount options specified\n");
ctx->linux_ext = 1;
ctx->no_linux_ext = 0;
}
break;
case Opt_nocase:
ctx->nocase = 1;

View File

@ -47,11 +47,8 @@ enum cifs_sec_param {
Opt_sec_krb5p,
Opt_sec_ntlmsspi,
Opt_sec_ntlmssp,
Opt_ntlm,
Opt_sec_ntlmi,
Opt_sec_ntlmv2,
Opt_sec_ntlmv2i,
Opt_sec_lanman,
Opt_sec_none,
Opt_sec_err

View File

@ -176,29 +176,34 @@ void cifs_fscache_release_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode)
auxdata.last_change_time_nsec = cifsi->vfs_inode.i_ctime.tv_nsec;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: (0x%p)\n", __func__, cifsi->fscache);
/* fscache_relinquish_cookie does not seem to update auxdata */
fscache_update_cookie(cifsi->fscache, &auxdata);
fscache_relinquish_cookie(cifsi->fscache, &auxdata, false);
cifsi->fscache = NULL;
}
}
static void cifs_fscache_disable_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode)
void cifs_fscache_update_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode)
{
struct cifs_fscache_inode_auxdata auxdata;
struct cifsInodeInfo *cifsi = CIFS_I(inode);
if (cifsi->fscache) {
memset(&auxdata, 0, sizeof(auxdata));
auxdata.eof = cifsi->server_eof;
auxdata.last_write_time_sec = cifsi->vfs_inode.i_mtime.tv_sec;
auxdata.last_change_time_sec = cifsi->vfs_inode.i_ctime.tv_sec;
auxdata.last_write_time_nsec = cifsi->vfs_inode.i_mtime.tv_nsec;
auxdata.last_change_time_nsec = cifsi->vfs_inode.i_ctime.tv_nsec;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: (0x%p)\n", __func__, cifsi->fscache);
fscache_uncache_all_inode_pages(cifsi->fscache, inode);
fscache_relinquish_cookie(cifsi->fscache, NULL, true);
cifsi->fscache = NULL;
fscache_update_cookie(cifsi->fscache, &auxdata);
}
}
void cifs_fscache_set_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
cifs_fscache_disable_inode_cookie(inode);
else
cifs_fscache_enable_inode_cookie(inode);
cifs_fscache_enable_inode_cookie(inode);
}
void cifs_fscache_reset_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode)
@ -310,6 +315,8 @@ void __cifs_readpage_to_fscache(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
struct cifsInodeInfo *cifsi = CIFS_I(inode);
int ret;
WARN_ON(!cifsi->fscache);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: (fsc: %p, p: %p, i: %p)\n",
__func__, cifsi->fscache, page, inode);
ret = fscache_write_page(cifsi->fscache, page,
@ -334,3 +341,21 @@ void __cifs_fscache_invalidate_page(struct page *page, struct inode *inode)
fscache_wait_on_page_write(cookie, page);
fscache_uncache_page(cookie, page);
}
void __cifs_fscache_wait_on_page_write(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
{
struct cifsInodeInfo *cifsi = CIFS_I(inode);
struct fscache_cookie *cookie = cifsi->fscache;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: (0x%p/0x%p)\n", __func__, page, cookie);
fscache_wait_on_page_write(cookie, page);
}
void __cifs_fscache_uncache_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
{
struct cifsInodeInfo *cifsi = CIFS_I(inode);
struct fscache_cookie *cookie = cifsi->fscache;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: (0x%p/0x%p)\n", __func__, page, cookie);
fscache_uncache_page(cookie, page);
}

View File

@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ extern void cifs_fscache_get_super_cookie(struct cifs_tcon *);
extern void cifs_fscache_release_super_cookie(struct cifs_tcon *);
extern void cifs_fscache_release_inode_cookie(struct inode *);
extern void cifs_fscache_update_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode);
extern void cifs_fscache_set_inode_cookie(struct inode *, struct file *);
extern void cifs_fscache_reset_inode_cookie(struct inode *);
extern void __cifs_fscache_invalidate_page(struct page *, struct inode *);
extern void __cifs_fscache_wait_on_page_write(struct inode *inode, struct page *page);
extern void __cifs_fscache_uncache_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page);
extern int cifs_fscache_release_page(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp);
extern int __cifs_readpage_from_fscache(struct inode *, struct page *);
extern int __cifs_readpages_from_fscache(struct inode *,
@ -76,6 +79,20 @@ static inline void cifs_fscache_invalidate_page(struct page *page,
__cifs_fscache_invalidate_page(page, inode);
}
static inline void cifs_fscache_wait_on_page_write(struct inode *inode,
struct page *page)
{
if (PageFsCache(page))
__cifs_fscache_wait_on_page_write(inode, page);
}
static inline void cifs_fscache_uncache_page(struct inode *inode,
struct page *page)
{
if (PageFsCache(page))
__cifs_fscache_uncache_page(inode, page);
}
static inline int cifs_readpage_from_fscache(struct inode *inode,
struct page *page)
{
@ -123,6 +140,7 @@ static inline void
cifs_fscache_release_super_cookie(struct cifs_tcon *tcon) {}
static inline void cifs_fscache_release_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode) {}
static inline void cifs_fscache_update_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode) {}
static inline void cifs_fscache_set_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode,
struct file *filp) {}
static inline void cifs_fscache_reset_inode_cookie(struct inode *inode) {}
@ -133,6 +151,11 @@ static inline int cifs_fscache_release_page(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp)
static inline void cifs_fscache_invalidate_page(struct page *page,
struct inode *inode) {}
static inline void cifs_fscache_wait_on_page_write(struct inode *inode,
struct page *page) {}
static inline void cifs_fscache_uncache_page(struct inode *inode,
struct page *page) {}
static inline int
cifs_readpage_from_fscache(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
{

View File

@ -2297,6 +2297,7 @@ cifs_revalidate_mapping(struct inode *inode)
{
int rc;
unsigned long *flags = &CIFS_I(inode)->flags;
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(inode->i_sb);
/* swapfiles are not supposed to be shared */
if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode))
@ -2308,11 +2309,16 @@ cifs_revalidate_mapping(struct inode *inode)
return rc;
if (test_and_clear_bit(CIFS_INO_INVALID_MAPPING, flags)) {
/* for cache=singleclient, do not invalidate */
if (cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_RW_CACHE)
goto skip_invalidate;
rc = cifs_invalidate_mapping(inode);
if (rc)
set_bit(CIFS_INO_INVALID_MAPPING, flags);
}
skip_invalidate:
clear_bit_unlock(CIFS_INO_LOCK, flags);
smp_mb__after_atomic();
wake_up_bit(flags, CIFS_INO_LOCK);

View File

@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ int get_symlink_reparse_path(char *full_path, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
*/
static int
initiate_cifs_search(const unsigned int xid, struct file *file,
_initiate_cifs_search(const unsigned int xid, struct file *file,
const char *full_path)
{
__u16 search_flags;
@ -451,6 +451,27 @@ error_exit:
return rc;
}
static int
initiate_cifs_search(const unsigned int xid, struct file *file,
const char *full_path)
{
int rc, retry_count = 0;
do {
rc = _initiate_cifs_search(xid, file, full_path);
/*
* If we don't have enough credits to start reading the
* directory just try again after short wait.
*/
if (rc != -EDEADLK)
break;
usleep_range(512, 2048);
} while (retry_count++ < 5);
return rc;
}
/* return length of unicode string in bytes */
static int cifs_unicode_bytelen(const char *str)
{

View File

@ -799,30 +799,16 @@ cifs_select_sectype(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, enum securityEnum requested)
}
case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_UNENCAP:
switch (requested) {
case NTLM:
case NTLMv2:
return requested;
case Unspecified:
if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2)
return NTLMv2;
if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM)
return NTLM;
break;
default:
break;
}
fallthrough; /* to attempt LANMAN authentication next */
case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_LANMAN:
switch (requested) {
case LANMAN:
return requested;
case Unspecified:
if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN)
return LANMAN;
fallthrough;
default:
return Unspecified;
}
fallthrough;
default:
return Unspecified;
}
@ -877,7 +863,7 @@ sess_alloc_buffer(struct sess_data *sess_data, int wct)
return 0;
out_free_smb_buf:
kfree(smb_buf);
cifs_small_buf_release(smb_buf);
sess_data->iov[0].iov_base = NULL;
sess_data->iov[0].iov_len = 0;
sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER;
@ -947,230 +933,6 @@ sess_sendreceive(struct sess_data *sess_data)
return rc;
}
/*
* LANMAN and plaintext are less secure and off by default.
* So we make this explicitly be turned on in kconfig (in the
* build) and turned on at runtime (changed from the default)
* in proc/fs/cifs or via mount parm. Unfortunately this is
* needed for old Win (e.g. Win95), some obscure NAS and OS/2
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
static void
sess_auth_lanman(struct sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc = 0;
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
char *bcc_ptr;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
char lnm_session_key[CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE];
__u16 bytes_remaining;
/* lanman 2 style sessionsetup */
/* wct = 10 */
rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 10);
if (rc)
goto out;
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
(void)cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 &= ~SMBFLG2_UNICODE;
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
/* no capabilities flags in old lanman negotiation */
pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
/* Calculate hash with password and copy into bcc_ptr.
* Encryption Key (stored as in cryptkey) gets used if the
* security mode bit in Negotiate Protocol response states
* to use challenge/response method (i.e. Password bit is 1).
*/
rc = calc_lanman_hash(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ?
true : false, lnm_session_key);
if (rc)
goto out;
memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)lnm_session_key, CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
} else {
pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = 0;
}
/*
* can not sign if LANMAN negotiated so no need
* to calculate signing key? but what if server
* changed to do higher than lanman dialect and
* we reconnected would we ever calc signing_key?
*/
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Negotiating LANMAN setting up strings\n");
/* Unicode not allowed for LANMAN dialects */
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -
(long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
if (rc)
goto out;
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
/* lanman response has a word count of 3 */
if (smb_buf->WordCount != 3) {
rc = -EIO;
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount);
goto out;
}
if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid);
bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf);
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
if (bytes_remaining == 0) {
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
} else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) {
++bcc_ptr;
--bytes_remaining;
}
decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
sess_data->nls_cp);
} else {
decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
sess_data->nls_cp);
}
rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data);
out:
sess_data->result = rc;
sess_data->func = NULL;
sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
}
#endif
static void
sess_auth_ntlm(struct sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc = 0;
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
char *bcc_ptr;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
__u32 capabilities;
__u16 bytes_remaining;
/* old style NTLM sessionsetup */
/* wct = 13 */
rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 13);
if (rc)
goto out;
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
/* calculate ntlm response and session key */
rc = setup_ntlm_response(ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLM authentication\n",
rc);
goto out;
}
/* copy ntlm response */
memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
} else {
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0;
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength = 0;
}
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
if (sess_data->iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++;
}
unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
} else {
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
}
sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -
(long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
if (rc)
goto out;
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
if (smb_buf->WordCount != 3) {
rc = -EIO;
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount);
goto out;
}
if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid);
bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf);
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
if (bytes_remaining == 0) {
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
} else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) {
++bcc_ptr;
--bytes_remaining;
}
decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
sess_data->nls_cp);
} else {
decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
sess_data->nls_cp);
}
rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data);
out:
sess_data->result = rc;
sess_data->func = NULL;
sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
}
static void
sess_auth_ntlmv2(struct sess_data *sess_data)
{
@ -1675,21 +1437,6 @@ static int select_sec(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct sess_data *sess_data)
}
switch (type) {
case LANMAN:
/* LANMAN and plaintext are less secure and off by default.
* So we make this explicitly be turned on in kconfig (in the
* build) and turned on at runtime (changed from the default)
* in proc/fs/cifs or via mount parm. Unfortunately this is
* needed for old Win (e.g. Win95), some obscure NAS and OS/2 */
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
sess_data->func = sess_auth_lanman;
break;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
case NTLM:
sess_data->func = sess_auth_ntlm;
break;
case NTLMv2:
sess_data->func = sess_auth_ntlmv2;
break;

View File

@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1
/*
* fs/smb2/smb2maperror.c
*
* Functions which do error mapping of SMB2 status codes to POSIX errors
*

View File

@ -18,13 +18,13 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <crypto/des.h>
#include "cifs_fs_sb.h"
#include "cifs_unicode.h"
#include "cifspdu.h"
#include "cifsglob.h"
#include "cifs_debug.h"
#include "cifsproto.h"
#include "../cifs_common/md4.h"
#ifndef false
#define false 0
@ -38,126 +38,29 @@
#define SSVALX(buf,pos,val) (CVAL(buf,pos)=(val)&0xFF,CVAL(buf,pos+1)=(val)>>8)
#define SSVAL(buf,pos,val) SSVALX((buf),(pos),((__u16)(val)))
static void
str_to_key(unsigned char *str, unsigned char *key)
{
int i;
key[0] = str[0] >> 1;
key[1] = ((str[0] & 0x01) << 6) | (str[1] >> 2);
key[2] = ((str[1] & 0x03) << 5) | (str[2] >> 3);
key[3] = ((str[2] & 0x07) << 4) | (str[3] >> 4);
key[4] = ((str[3] & 0x0F) << 3) | (str[4] >> 5);
key[5] = ((str[4] & 0x1F) << 2) | (str[5] >> 6);
key[6] = ((str[5] & 0x3F) << 1) | (str[6] >> 7);
key[7] = str[6] & 0x7F;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
key[i] = (key[i] << 1);
}
static int
smbhash(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *key)
{
unsigned char key2[8];
struct des_ctx ctx;
str_to_key(key, key2);
if (fips_enabled) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "FIPS compliance enabled: DES not permitted\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
des_expand_key(&ctx, key2, DES_KEY_SIZE);
des_encrypt(&ctx, out, in);
memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
return 0;
}
static int
E_P16(unsigned char *p14, unsigned char *p16)
{
int rc;
unsigned char sp8[8] =
{ 0x4b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25 };
rc = smbhash(p16, sp8, p14);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = smbhash(p16 + 8, sp8, p14 + 7);
return rc;
}
static int
E_P24(unsigned char *p21, const unsigned char *c8, unsigned char *p24)
{
int rc;
rc = smbhash(p24, c8, p21);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = smbhash(p24 + 8, c8, p21 + 7);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = smbhash(p24 + 16, c8, p21 + 14);
return rc;
}
/* produce a md4 message digest from data of length n bytes */
int
static int
mdfour(unsigned char *md4_hash, unsigned char *link_str, int link_len)
{
int rc;
struct crypto_shash *md4 = NULL;
struct sdesc *sdescmd4 = NULL;
struct md4_ctx mctx;
rc = cifs_alloc_hash("md4", &md4, &sdescmd4);
if (rc)
goto mdfour_err;
rc = crypto_shash_init(&sdescmd4->shash);
rc = cifs_md4_init(&mctx);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init md4 shash\n", __func__);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init MD4\n", __func__);
goto mdfour_err;
}
rc = crypto_shash_update(&sdescmd4->shash, link_str, link_len);
rc = cifs_md4_update(&mctx, link_str, link_len);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with link_str\n", __func__);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update MD4\n", __func__);
goto mdfour_err;
}
rc = crypto_shash_final(&sdescmd4->shash, md4_hash);
rc = cifs_md4_final(&mctx, md4_hash);
if (rc)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md4 hash\n", __func__);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not finalize MD4\n", __func__);
mdfour_err:
cifs_free_hash(&md4, &sdescmd4);
return rc;
}
/*
This implements the X/Open SMB password encryption
It takes a password, a 8 byte "crypt key" and puts 24 bytes of
encrypted password into p24 */
/* Note that password must be uppercased and null terminated */
int
SMBencrypt(unsigned char *passwd, const unsigned char *c8, unsigned char *p24)
{
int rc;
unsigned char p14[14], p16[16], p21[21];
memset(p14, '\0', 14);
memset(p16, '\0', 16);
memset(p21, '\0', 21);
memcpy(p14, passwd, 14);
rc = E_P16(p14, p16);
if (rc)
return rc;
memcpy(p21, p16, 16);
rc = E_P24(p21, c8, p24);
return rc;
}
@ -186,25 +89,3 @@ E_md4hash(const unsigned char *passwd, unsigned char *p16,
return rc;
}
/* Does the NT MD4 hash then des encryption. */
int
SMBNTencrypt(unsigned char *passwd, unsigned char *c8, unsigned char *p24,
const struct nls_table *codepage)
{
int rc;
unsigned char p16[16], p21[21];
memset(p16, '\0', 16);
memset(p21, '\0', 21);
rc = E_md4hash(passwd, p16, codepage);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NT hash, error: %d\n",
__func__, rc);
return rc;
}
memcpy(p21, p16, 16);
rc = E_P24(p21, c8, p24);
return rc;
}

7
fs/cifs_common/Makefile Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
#
# Makefile for Linux filesystem routines that are shared by client and server.
#
obj-$(CONFIG_CIFS_COMMON) += cifs_arc4.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CIFS_COMMON) += cifs_md4.o

23
fs/cifs_common/arc4.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
/*
* Common values for ARC4 Cipher Algorithm
*/
#ifndef _CRYPTO_ARC4_H
#define _CRYPTO_ARC4_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#define ARC4_MIN_KEY_SIZE 1
#define ARC4_MAX_KEY_SIZE 256
#define ARC4_BLOCK_SIZE 1
struct arc4_ctx {
u32 S[256];
u32 x, y;
};
int cifs_arc4_setkey(struct arc4_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len);
void cifs_arc4_crypt(struct arc4_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned int len);
#endif /* _CRYPTO_ARC4_H */

View File

@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* Cryptographic API
*
* ARC4 Cipher Algorithm
*
* Jon Oberheide <jon@oberheide.org>
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include "arc4.h"
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
int cifs_arc4_setkey(struct arc4_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len)
{
int i, j = 0, k = 0;
ctx->x = 1;
ctx->y = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
ctx->S[i] = i;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
u32 a = ctx->S[i];
j = (j + in_key[k] + a) & 0xff;
ctx->S[i] = ctx->S[j];
ctx->S[j] = a;
if (++k >= key_len)
k = 0;
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cifs_arc4_setkey);
void cifs_arc4_crypt(struct arc4_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned int len)
{
u32 *const S = ctx->S;
u32 x, y, a, b;
u32 ty, ta, tb;
if (len == 0)
return;
x = ctx->x;
y = ctx->y;
a = S[x];
y = (y + a) & 0xff;
b = S[y];
do {
S[y] = a;
a = (a + b) & 0xff;
S[x] = b;
x = (x + 1) & 0xff;
ta = S[x];
ty = (y + ta) & 0xff;
tb = S[ty];
*out++ = *in++ ^ S[a];
if (--len == 0)
break;
y = ty;
a = ta;
b = tb;
} while (true);
ctx->x = x;
ctx->y = y;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cifs_arc4_crypt);
static int __init
init_cifs_common(void)
{
return 0;
}
static void __init
exit_cifs_common(void)
{
}
module_init(init_cifs_common)
module_exit(exit_cifs_common)

197
fs/cifs_common/cifs_md4.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Cryptographic API.
*
* MD4 Message Digest Algorithm (RFC1320).
*
* Implementation derived from Andrew Tridgell and Steve French's
* CIFS MD4 implementation, and the cryptoapi implementation
* originally based on the public domain implementation written
* by Colin Plumb in 1993.
*
* Copyright (c) Andrew Tridgell 1997-1998.
* Modified by Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com) 2002
* Copyright (c) Cryptoapi developers.
* Copyright (c) 2002 David S. Miller (davem@redhat.com)
* Copyright (c) 2002 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au>
*
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include "md4.h"
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
static inline u32 lshift(u32 x, unsigned int s)
{
x &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
return ((x << s) & 0xFFFFFFFF) | (x >> (32 - s));
}
static inline u32 F(u32 x, u32 y, u32 z)
{
return (x & y) | ((~x) & z);
}
static inline u32 G(u32 x, u32 y, u32 z)
{
return (x & y) | (x & z) | (y & z);
}
static inline u32 H(u32 x, u32 y, u32 z)
{
return x ^ y ^ z;
}
#define ROUND1(a,b,c,d,k,s) (a = lshift(a + F(b,c,d) + k, s))
#define ROUND2(a,b,c,d,k,s) (a = lshift(a + G(b,c,d) + k + (u32)0x5A827999,s))
#define ROUND3(a,b,c,d,k,s) (a = lshift(a + H(b,c,d) + k + (u32)0x6ED9EBA1,s))
static void md4_transform(u32 *hash, u32 const *in)
{
u32 a, b, c, d;
a = hash[0];
b = hash[1];
c = hash[2];
d = hash[3];
ROUND1(a, b, c, d, in[0], 3);
ROUND1(d, a, b, c, in[1], 7);
ROUND1(c, d, a, b, in[2], 11);
ROUND1(b, c, d, a, in[3], 19);
ROUND1(a, b, c, d, in[4], 3);
ROUND1(d, a, b, c, in[5], 7);
ROUND1(c, d, a, b, in[6], 11);
ROUND1(b, c, d, a, in[7], 19);
ROUND1(a, b, c, d, in[8], 3);
ROUND1(d, a, b, c, in[9], 7);
ROUND1(c, d, a, b, in[10], 11);
ROUND1(b, c, d, a, in[11], 19);
ROUND1(a, b, c, d, in[12], 3);
ROUND1(d, a, b, c, in[13], 7);
ROUND1(c, d, a, b, in[14], 11);
ROUND1(b, c, d, a, in[15], 19);
ROUND2(a, b, c, d, in[0], 3);
ROUND2(d, a, b, c, in[4], 5);
ROUND2(c, d, a, b, in[8], 9);
ROUND2(b, c, d, a, in[12], 13);
ROUND2(a, b, c, d, in[1], 3);
ROUND2(d, a, b, c, in[5], 5);
ROUND2(c, d, a, b, in[9], 9);
ROUND2(b, c, d, a, in[13], 13);
ROUND2(a, b, c, d, in[2], 3);
ROUND2(d, a, b, c, in[6], 5);
ROUND2(c, d, a, b, in[10], 9);
ROUND2(b, c, d, a, in[14], 13);
ROUND2(a, b, c, d, in[3], 3);
ROUND2(d, a, b, c, in[7], 5);
ROUND2(c, d, a, b, in[11], 9);
ROUND2(b, c, d, a, in[15], 13);
ROUND3(a, b, c, d, in[0], 3);
ROUND3(d, a, b, c, in[8], 9);
ROUND3(c, d, a, b, in[4], 11);
ROUND3(b, c, d, a, in[12], 15);
ROUND3(a, b, c, d, in[2], 3);
ROUND3(d, a, b, c, in[10], 9);
ROUND3(c, d, a, b, in[6], 11);
ROUND3(b, c, d, a, in[14], 15);
ROUND3(a, b, c, d, in[1], 3);
ROUND3(d, a, b, c, in[9], 9);
ROUND3(c, d, a, b, in[5], 11);
ROUND3(b, c, d, a, in[13], 15);
ROUND3(a, b, c, d, in[3], 3);
ROUND3(d, a, b, c, in[11], 9);
ROUND3(c, d, a, b, in[7], 11);
ROUND3(b, c, d, a, in[15], 15);
hash[0] += a;
hash[1] += b;
hash[2] += c;
hash[3] += d;
}
static inline void md4_transform_helper(struct md4_ctx *ctx)
{
le32_to_cpu_array(ctx->block, ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->block));
md4_transform(ctx->hash, ctx->block);
}
int cifs_md4_init(struct md4_ctx *mctx)
{
memset(mctx, 0, sizeof(struct md4_ctx));
mctx->hash[0] = 0x67452301;
mctx->hash[1] = 0xefcdab89;
mctx->hash[2] = 0x98badcfe;
mctx->hash[3] = 0x10325476;
mctx->byte_count = 0;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cifs_md4_init);
int cifs_md4_update(struct md4_ctx *mctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
{
const u32 avail = sizeof(mctx->block) - (mctx->byte_count & 0x3f);
mctx->byte_count += len;
if (avail > len) {
memcpy((char *)mctx->block + (sizeof(mctx->block) - avail),
data, len);
return 0;
}
memcpy((char *)mctx->block + (sizeof(mctx->block) - avail),
data, avail);
md4_transform_helper(mctx);
data += avail;
len -= avail;
while (len >= sizeof(mctx->block)) {
memcpy(mctx->block, data, sizeof(mctx->block));
md4_transform_helper(mctx);
data += sizeof(mctx->block);
len -= sizeof(mctx->block);
}
memcpy(mctx->block, data, len);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cifs_md4_update);
int cifs_md4_final(struct md4_ctx *mctx, u8 *out)
{
const unsigned int offset = mctx->byte_count & 0x3f;
char *p = (char *)mctx->block + offset;
int padding = 56 - (offset + 1);
*p++ = 0x80;
if (padding < 0) {
memset(p, 0x00, padding + sizeof(u64));
md4_transform_helper(mctx);
p = (char *)mctx->block;
padding = 56;
}
memset(p, 0, padding);
mctx->block[14] = mctx->byte_count << 3;
mctx->block[15] = mctx->byte_count >> 29;
le32_to_cpu_array(mctx->block, (sizeof(mctx->block) -
sizeof(u64)) / sizeof(u32));
md4_transform(mctx->hash, mctx->block);
cpu_to_le32_array(mctx->hash, ARRAY_SIZE(mctx->hash));
memcpy(out, mctx->hash, sizeof(mctx->hash));
memset(mctx, 0, sizeof(*mctx));
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cifs_md4_final);

27
fs/cifs_common/md4.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
/*
* Common values for ARC4 Cipher Algorithm
*/
#ifndef _CIFS_MD4_H
#define _CIFS_MD4_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#define MD4_DIGEST_SIZE 16
#define MD4_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE 64
#define MD4_BLOCK_WORDS 16
#define MD4_HASH_WORDS 4
struct md4_ctx {
u32 hash[MD4_HASH_WORDS];
u32 block[MD4_BLOCK_WORDS];
u64 byte_count;
};
int cifs_md4_init(struct md4_ctx *mctx);
int cifs_md4_update(struct md4_ctx *mctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len);
int cifs_md4_final(struct md4_ctx *mctx, u8 *out);
#endif /* _CIFS_MD4_H */

View File

@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ enum OID {
OID_spnego, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.2 */
OID_IAKerb, /* 1.3.6.1.5.2.5 */
OID_PKU2U, /* 1.3.5.1.5.2.7 */
OID_Scram, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.14 */
OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */
OID_sha1, /* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
OID_id_ansip384r1, /* 1.3.132.0.34 */
@ -104,6 +107,10 @@ enum OID {
OID_authorityKeyIdentifier, /* 2.5.29.35 */
OID_extKeyUsage, /* 2.5.29.37 */
/* Heimdal mechanisms */
OID_NetlogonMechanism, /* 1.2.752.43.14.2 */
OID_appleLocalKdcSupported, /* 1.2.752.43.14.3 */
/* EC-RDSA */
OID_gostCPSignA, /* 1.2.643.2.2.35.1 */
OID_gostCPSignB, /* 1.2.643.2.2.35.2 */