x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. The index can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area. Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it to access the p->thread.tls_array. Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561524630-3642-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
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@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
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#include <linux/user.h>
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#include <linux/regset.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <asm/desc.h>
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@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
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struct user_desc __user *u_info)
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{
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struct user_desc info;
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int index;
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if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
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return -EFAULT;
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@ -227,8 +229,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
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if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
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return -EINVAL;
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fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
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&p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
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index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
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index = array_index_nospec(index,
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GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1);
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fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
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if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
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return -EFAULT;
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