UbiquitousOS
/
OpenCloudOS-Kernel
mirror of https://gitee.com/OpenCloudOS/OpenCloudOS-Kernel.git
11
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

kasan, page_alloc: deduplicate should_skip_kasan_poison 

Patch series "kasan, vmalloc, arm64: add vmalloc tagging support for SW/HW_TAGS", v6.

This patchset adds vmalloc tagging support for SW_TAGS and HW_TAGS
KASAN modes.

About half of patches are cleanups I went for along the way.  None of them
seem to be important enough to go through stable, so I decided not to
split them out into separate patches/series.

The patchset is partially based on an early version of the HW_TAGS
patchset by Vincenzo that had vmalloc support.  Thus, I added a
Co-developed-by tag into a few patches.

SW_TAGS vmalloc tagging support is straightforward.  It reuses all of the
generic KASAN machinery, but uses shadow memory to store tags instead of
magic values.  Naturally, vmalloc tagging requires adding a few
kasan_reset_tag() annotations to the vmalloc code.

HW_TAGS vmalloc tagging support stands out.  HW_TAGS KASAN is based on Arm
MTE, which can only assigns tags to physical memory.  As a result, HW_TAGS
KASAN only tags vmalloc() allocations, which are backed by page_alloc
memory.  It ignores vmap() and others.

This patch (of 39):

Currently, should_skip_kasan_poison() has two definitions: one for when
CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled, one for when it's not.

Instead of duplicating the checks, add a deferred_pages_enabled() helper
and use it in a single should_skip_kasan_poison() definition.

Also move should_skip_kasan_poison() closer to its caller and clarify all
conditions in the comment.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/658b79f5fb305edaf7dc16bc52ea870d3220d4a8.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Andrey Konovalov 2022-03-24 18:10:04 -07:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent 4cc79b3303
commit 94ae8b83fe
1 changed files with 33 additions and 22 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

55
mm/page_alloc.c
View File

@ -378,25 +378,9 @@ int page_group_by_mobility_disabled __read_mostly;
*/
static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(deferred_pages);
/*
* Calling kasan_poison_pages() only after deferred memory initialization
* has completed. Poisoning pages during deferred memory init will greatly
* lengthen the process and cause problem in large memory systems as the
* deferred pages initialization is done with interrupt disabled.
*
* Assuming that there will be no reference to those newly initialized
* pages before they are ever allocated, this should have no effect on
* KASAN memory tracking as the poison will be properly inserted at page
* allocation time. The only corner case is when pages are allocated by
* on-demand allocation and then freed again before the deferred pages
* initialization is done, but this is not likely to happen.
*/
static inline bool should_skip_kasan_poison(struct page *page, fpi_t fpi_flags)
static inline bool deferred_pages_enabled(void)
{
return static_branch_unlikely(&deferred_pages) ||
(!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
(fpi_flags & FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)) ||
PageSkipKASanPoison(page);
return static_branch_unlikely(&deferred_pages);
}
/* Returns true if the struct page for the pfn is uninitialised */
@ -447,11 +431,9 @@ defer_init(int nid, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
return false;
}
#else
static inline bool should_skip_kasan_poison(struct page *page, fpi_t fpi_flags)
static inline bool deferred_pages_enabled(void)
{
return (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
(fpi_flags & FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)) ||
PageSkipKASanPoison(page);
return false;
}
static inline bool early_page_uninitialised(unsigned long pfn)
@ -1267,6 +1249,35 @@ out:
return ret;
}
/*
* Skip KASAN memory poisoning when either:
*
* 1. Deferred memory initialization has not yet completed,
* see the explanation below.
* 2. Skipping poisoning is requested via FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON,
* see the comment next to it.
* 3. Skipping poisoning is requested via __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON,
* see the comment next to it.
*
* Poisoning pages during deferred memory init will greatly lengthen the
* process and cause problem in large memory systems as the deferred pages
* initialization is done with interrupt disabled.
*
* Assuming that there will be no reference to those newly initialized
* pages before they are ever allocated, this should have no effect on
* KASAN memory tracking as the poison will be properly inserted at page
* allocation time. The only corner case is when pages are allocated by
* on-demand allocation and then freed again before the deferred pages
* initialization is done, but this is not likely to happen.
*/
static inline bool should_skip_kasan_poison(struct page *page, fpi_t fpi_flags)
{
return deferred_pages_enabled() ||
(!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
(fpi_flags & FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)) ||
PageSkipKASanPoison(page);
}
static void kernel_init_free_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, bool zero_tags)
{
int i;