netfilter: xt_osf: Add missing permission checks
The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket. However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable() check: vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS fingerprint list. Add new capable() checks so that they can't. Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/if.h>
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#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
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#include <linux/ip.h>
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@ -70,6 +71,9 @@ static int xt_osf_add_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
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struct xt_osf_finger *kf = NULL, *sf;
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int err = 0;
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if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
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return -EPERM;
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if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
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return -EINVAL;
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@ -115,6 +119,9 @@ static int xt_osf_remove_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
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struct xt_osf_finger *sf;
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int err = -ENOENT;
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if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
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return -EPERM;
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if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
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return -EINVAL;
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