Merge branch 'stable/for-linus-5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/konrad/swiotlb

Pull swiotlb fix from Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk:
 "A fix for the regression for the DMA operations where the offset was
  ignored and corruptions would appear.

  Going forward there will be a cleanups to make the offset and
  alignment logic more clearer and better test-cases to help with this"

* 'stable/for-linus-5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/konrad/swiotlb:
  swiotlb: manipulate orig_addr when tlb_addr has offset
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2021-06-23 09:04:07 -07:00
commit 8fd2ed1c01
1 changed files with 15 additions and 8 deletions

View File

@ -334,6 +334,14 @@ void __init swiotlb_exit(void)
io_tlb_default_mem = NULL;
}
/*
* Return the offset into a iotlb slot required to keep the device happy.
*/
static unsigned int swiotlb_align_offset(struct device *dev, u64 addr)
{
return addr & dma_get_min_align_mask(dev) & (IO_TLB_SIZE - 1);
}
/*
* Bounce: copy the swiotlb buffer from or back to the original dma location
*/
@ -346,10 +354,17 @@ static void swiotlb_bounce(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t tlb_addr, size_t size
size_t alloc_size = mem->slots[index].alloc_size;
unsigned long pfn = PFN_DOWN(orig_addr);
unsigned char *vaddr = phys_to_virt(tlb_addr);
unsigned int tlb_offset;
if (orig_addr == INVALID_PHYS_ADDR)
return;
tlb_offset = (tlb_addr & (IO_TLB_SIZE - 1)) -
swiotlb_align_offset(dev, orig_addr);
orig_addr += tlb_offset;
alloc_size -= tlb_offset;
if (size > alloc_size) {
dev_WARN_ONCE(dev, 1,
"Buffer overflow detected. Allocation size: %zu. Mapping size: %zu.\n",
@ -390,14 +405,6 @@ static void swiotlb_bounce(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t tlb_addr, size_t size
#define slot_addr(start, idx) ((start) + ((idx) << IO_TLB_SHIFT))
/*
* Return the offset into a iotlb slot required to keep the device happy.
*/
static unsigned int swiotlb_align_offset(struct device *dev, u64 addr)
{
return addr & dma_get_min_align_mask(dev) & (IO_TLB_SIZE - 1);
}
/*
* Carefully handle integer overflow which can occur when boundary_mask == ~0UL.
*/