bpf: Fix spelling mistakes

Fix some spelling mistakes in comments:
aother ==> another
Netiher ==> Neither
desribe ==> describe
intializing ==> initializing
funciton ==> function
wont ==> won't and move the word 'the' at the end to the next line
accross ==> across
pathes ==> paths
triggerred ==> triggered
excute ==> execute
ether ==> either
conervative ==> conservative
convetion ==> convention
markes ==> marks
interpeter ==> interpreter

Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210525025659.8898-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com
This commit is contained in:
Zhen Lei 2021-05-25 10:56:59 +08:00 committed by Andrii Nakryiko
parent 4ce7d68beb
commit 8fb33b6055
8 changed files with 18 additions and 18 deletions

View File

@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct bpf_local_storage_data {
* from the object's bpf_local_storage.
*
* Put it in the same cacheline as the data to minimize
* the number of cachelines access during the cache hit case.
* the number of cachelines accessed during the cache hit case.
*/
struct bpf_local_storage_map __rcu *smap;
u8 data[] __aligned(8);
@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct bpf_local_storage_elem {
struct bpf_local_storage __rcu *local_storage;
struct rcu_head rcu;
/* 8 bytes hole */
/* The data is stored in aother cacheline to minimize
/* The data is stored in another cacheline to minimize
* the number of cachelines access during a cache hit.
*/
struct bpf_local_storage_data sdata ____cacheline_aligned;

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@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ void bpf_inode_storage_free(struct inode *inode)
return;
}
/* Netiher the bpf_prog nor the bpf-map's syscall
/* Neither the bpf_prog nor the bpf-map's syscall
* could be modifying the local_storage->list now.
* Thus, no elem can be added-to or deleted-from the
* local_storage->list by the bpf_prog or by the bpf-map's syscall.

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@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
* The BTF type section contains a list of 'struct btf_type' objects.
* Each one describes a C type. Recall from the above section
* that a 'struct btf_type' object could be immediately followed by extra
* data in order to desribe some particular C types.
* data in order to describe some particular C types.
*
* type_id:
* ~~~~~~~
@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@ static void *btf_show_obj_safe(struct btf_show *show,
/*
* We need a new copy to our safe object, either because we haven't
* yet copied and are intializing safe data, or because the data
* yet copied and are initializing safe data, or because the data
* we want falls outside the boundaries of the safe object.
*/
if (!safe) {
@ -3417,7 +3417,7 @@ static struct btf_kind_operations func_proto_ops = {
* BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO cannot be directly referred by
* a struct's member.
*
* It should be a funciton pointer instead.
* It should be a function pointer instead.
* (i.e. struct's member -> BTF_KIND_PTR -> BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO)
*
* Hence, there is no btf_func_check_member().

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@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ void __dev_flush(void)
}
/* rcu_read_lock (from syscall and BPF contexts) ensures that if a delete and/or
* update happens in parallel here a dev_put wont happen until after reading the
* ifindex.
* update happens in parallel here a dev_put won't happen until after reading
* the ifindex.
*/
static void *__dev_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key)
{

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@ -46,12 +46,12 @@
* events, kprobes and tracing to be invoked before the prior invocation
* from one of these contexts completed. sys_bpf() uses the same mechanism
* by pinning the task to the current CPU and incrementing the recursion
* protection accross the map operation.
* protection across the map operation.
*
* This has subtle implications on PREEMPT_RT. PREEMPT_RT forbids certain
* operations like memory allocations (even with GFP_ATOMIC) from atomic
* contexts. This is required because even with GFP_ATOMIC the memory
* allocator calls into code pathes which acquire locks with long held lock
* allocator calls into code paths which acquire locks with long held lock
* sections. To ensure the deterministic behaviour these locks are regular
* spinlocks, which are converted to 'sleepable' spinlocks on RT. The only
* true atomic contexts on an RT kernel are the low level hardware

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@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static void reuseport_array_free(struct bpf_map *map)
/*
* ops->map_*_elem() will not be able to access this
* array now. Hence, this function only races with
* bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() which was triggerred by
* bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() which was triggered by
* close() or disconnect().
*
* This function and bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() are

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@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ static void notrace inc_misses_counter(struct bpf_prog *prog)
* __bpf_prog_enter returns:
* 0 - skip execution of the bpf prog
* 1 - execute bpf prog
* [2..MAX_U64] - excute bpf prog and record execution time.
* [2..MAX_U64] - execute bpf prog and record execution time.
* This is start time.
*/
u64 notrace __bpf_prog_enter(struct bpf_prog *prog)

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@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
* - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
* - out of bounds or malformed jumps
* The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
* Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
* Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the
* analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
* insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
* Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
* If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
* .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
* R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
* returns ether pointer to map value or NULL.
* returns either pointer to map value or NULL.
*
* When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
* insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
@ -2616,7 +2616,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) {
/* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit
* stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of
* scalar via different register has to be conervative.
* scalar via different register has to be conservative.
* Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise
* that contributed into 'reg' being a constant.
*/
@ -9053,7 +9053,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
return 0;
/* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
/* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used
* to return the value from eBPF program.
* Make sure that it's readable at this time
* of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
@ -9844,7 +9844,7 @@ static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring
* the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second
* time means that all states below this branch were already explored and
* their final liveness markes are already propagated.
* their final liveness marks are already propagated.
* Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited()
* we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states
* as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state'
@ -12464,7 +12464,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF;
/* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
* conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
* conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal
* call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
* that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
*/