netfilter: nat: force port remap to prevent shadowing well-known ports
If destination port is above 32k and source port below 16k assume this might cause 'port shadowing' where a 'new' inbound connection matches an existing one, e.g. inbound X:41234 -> Y:53 matches existing conntrack entry Z:53 -> X:4123, where Z got natted to X. In this case, new packet is natted to Z:53 which is likely unwanted. We avoid the rewrite for connections that originate from local host: port-shadowing is only possible with forwarded connections. Also adjust test case. v3: no need to call tuple_force_port_remap if already in random mode (Phil) Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc> Acked-by: Eric Garver <eric@garver.life> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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@ -494,6 +494,38 @@ another_round:
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goto another_round;
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}
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static bool tuple_force_port_remap(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple)
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{
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u16 sp, dp;
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switch (tuple->dst.protonum) {
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case IPPROTO_TCP:
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sp = ntohs(tuple->src.u.tcp.port);
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dp = ntohs(tuple->dst.u.tcp.port);
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break;
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case IPPROTO_UDP:
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case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
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sp = ntohs(tuple->src.u.udp.port);
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dp = ntohs(tuple->dst.u.udp.port);
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break;
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default:
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return false;
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}
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/* IANA: System port range: 1-1023,
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* user port range: 1024-49151,
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* private port range: 49152-65535.
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*
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* Linux default ephemeral port range is 32768-60999.
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*
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* Enforce port remapping if sport is significantly lower
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* than dport to prevent NAT port shadowing, i.e.
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* accidental match of 'new' inbound connection vs.
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* existing outbound one.
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*/
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return sp < 16384 && dp >= 32768;
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}
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/* Manipulate the tuple into the range given. For NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
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* we change the source to map into the range. For NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING
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* and NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, we change the destination to map into the
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@ -507,11 +539,17 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
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struct nf_conn *ct,
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enum nf_nat_manip_type maniptype)
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{
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bool random_port = range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_ALL;
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const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone;
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struct net *net = nf_ct_net(ct);
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zone = nf_ct_zone(ct);
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if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC &&
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!random_port &&
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!ct->local_origin)
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random_port = tuple_force_port_remap(orig_tuple);
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/* 1) If this srcip/proto/src-proto-part is currently mapped,
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* and that same mapping gives a unique tuple within the given
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* range, use that.
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@ -520,8 +558,7 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
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* So far, we don't do local source mappings, so multiple
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* manips not an issue.
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*/
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if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC &&
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!(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_ALL)) {
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if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC && !random_port) {
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/* try the original tuple first */
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if (in_range(orig_tuple, range)) {
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if (!nf_nat_used_tuple(orig_tuple, ct)) {
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@ -545,7 +582,7 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
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*/
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/* Only bother mapping if it's not already in range and unique */
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if (!(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_ALL)) {
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if (!random_port) {
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if (range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED) {
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if (!(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_OFFSET) &&
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l4proto_in_range(tuple, maniptype,
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@ -880,8 +880,9 @@ EOF
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return $ksft_skip
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fi
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# test default behaviour. Packet from ns1 to ns0 is redirected to ns2.
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test_port_shadow "default" "CLIENT"
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# test default behaviour. Packet from ns1 to ns0 is not redirected
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# due to automatic port translation.
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test_port_shadow "default" "ROUTER"
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# test packet filter based mitigation: prevent forwarding of
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# packets claiming to come from the service port.
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