tpm: fix response size validation in tpm_get_random()
When checking whether the response is large enough to be able to contain
the received random bytes in tpm_get_random() and tpm2_get_random(),
they fail to take account the header size, which should be added to the
minimum size. This commit fixes this issue.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c659af78eb
("tpm: Check size of response before accessing data")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
2ecefa0a15
commit
84b59f6487
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@ -1321,7 +1321,8 @@ int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max)
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}
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rlength = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length);
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if (rlength < offsetof(struct tpm_getrandom_out, rng_data) +
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if (rlength < TPM_HEADER_SIZE +
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offsetof(struct tpm_getrandom_out, rng_data) +
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recd) {
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total = -EFAULT;
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break;
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@ -329,7 +329,9 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
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&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
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recd = min_t(u32, be16_to_cpu(out->size), num_bytes);
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if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) <
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offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer) + recd) {
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TPM_HEADER_SIZE +
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offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer) +
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recd) {
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err = -EFAULT;
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goto out;
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}
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