Revert "ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler"
This reverts commit 2f36db7100
.
It fixed a local root exploit but also introduced a dependency on
the lower file system implementing an mmap operation just to open a file,
which is a bit of a heavy hammer. The right fix is to have mmap depend
on the existence of the mmap handler instead.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
40f0fd372a
commit
78c4e17241
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@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/wait.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include "ecryptfs_kernel.h"
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struct ecryptfs_open_req {
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@ -148,7 +147,7 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file,
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flags |= IS_RDONLY(d_inode(lower_dentry)) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR;
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(*lower_file) = dentry_open(&req.path, flags, cred);
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if (!IS_ERR(*lower_file))
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goto have_file;
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goto out;
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if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) {
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rc = PTR_ERR((*lower_file));
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goto out;
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@ -166,16 +165,8 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file,
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mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux);
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wake_up(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.wait);
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wait_for_completion(&req.done);
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if (IS_ERR(*lower_file)) {
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if (IS_ERR(*lower_file))
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rc = PTR_ERR(*lower_file);
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goto out;
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}
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have_file:
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if ((*lower_file)->f_op->mmap == NULL) {
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fput(*lower_file);
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*lower_file = NULL;
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rc = -EMEDIUMTYPE;
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}
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out:
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return rc;
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}
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