powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/245a606e1a42a558a310220312d9b6adb9159df6.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
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@ -2514,7 +2514,7 @@
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http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
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mitigations=
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[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
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[X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
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vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated,
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arch-independent options, each of which is an
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aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
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@ -2523,10 +2523,11 @@
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Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This
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improves system performance, but it may also
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expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
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Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
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nospectre_v2 [X86]
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Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
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nospectre_v1 [PPC]
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nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
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spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
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spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
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spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
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l1tf=off [X86]
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auto (default)
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@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
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enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
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security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
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if (!no_nospec)
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if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
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enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
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}
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@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
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early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
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void setup_spectre_v2(void)
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{
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if (no_spectrev2)
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if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
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do_btb_flush_fixups();
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else
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btb_flush_enabled = true;
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@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
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stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
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if (!no_stf_barrier)
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if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
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stf_barrier_enable(enable);
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}
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@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
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enabled_flush_types = types;
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if (!no_rfi_flush)
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if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off())
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rfi_flush_enable(enable);
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}
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