ip6mr: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
vr.mifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1845 ip6mr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1919 ip6mr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing vr.mifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table' Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
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#include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
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#include <linux/netconf.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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struct ip6mr_rule {
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struct fib_rule common;
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};
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@ -1841,6 +1843,7 @@ int ip6mr_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *arg)
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return -EFAULT;
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if (vr.mifi >= mrt->maxvif)
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return -EINVAL;
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vr.mifi = array_index_nospec(vr.mifi, mrt->maxvif);
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read_lock(&mrt_lock);
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vif = &mrt->vif_table[vr.mifi];
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if (VIF_EXISTS(mrt, vr.mifi)) {
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@ -1915,6 +1918,7 @@ int ip6mr_compat_ioctl(struct sock *sk, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
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return -EFAULT;
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if (vr.mifi >= mrt->maxvif)
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return -EINVAL;
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vr.mifi = array_index_nospec(vr.mifi, mrt->maxvif);
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read_lock(&mrt_lock);
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vif = &mrt->vif_table[vr.mifi];
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if (VIF_EXISTS(mrt, vr.mifi)) {
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