ARM: 8794/1: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit
A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.
This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy
barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.
Porting commit c2f0ad4fc0
("arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use
of the current addr_limit").
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
This commit is contained in:
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@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ extern int __put_user_bad(void);
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static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
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static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
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{
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{
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current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
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current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
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/*
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* Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding
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* the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation.
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*/
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dsb(nsh);
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isb();
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modify_domain(DOMAIN_KERNEL, fs ? DOMAIN_CLIENT : DOMAIN_MANAGER);
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modify_domain(DOMAIN_KERNEL, fs ? DOMAIN_CLIENT : DOMAIN_MANAGER);
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}
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}
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