seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations
When speculation flaw mitigations are opt-in (via prctl), using seccomp will automatically opt-in to these protections, since using seccomp indicates at least some level of sandboxing is desired. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
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#include <linux/compat.h>
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#include <linux/coredump.h>
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#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include <linux/prctl.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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#include <linux/seccomp.h>
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@ -227,6 +229,19 @@ static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
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return true;
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}
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/*
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* If a given speculation mitigation is opt-in (prctl()-controlled),
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* select it, by disabling speculation (enabling mitigation).
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*/
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static inline void spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task,
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unsigned long which)
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{
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int state = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(task, which);
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if (state > 0 && (state & PR_SPEC_PRCTL))
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arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(task, which, PR_SPEC_DISABLE);
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}
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static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
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unsigned long seccomp_mode)
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{
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@ -238,6 +253,8 @@ static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
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* filter) is set.
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*/
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smp_mb__before_atomic();
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/* Assume seccomp processes want speculation flaw mitigation. */
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spec_mitigate(task, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
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set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
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}
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