From 5bcedc5931e7bd6928a2d8207078d4cb476b3b55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Ellerman Date: Wed, 17 May 2023 17:49:45 +1000 Subject: [PATCH] powerpc/security: Fix Speculation_Store_Bypass reporting on Power10 Nageswara reported that /proc/self/status was showing "vulnerable" for the Speculation_Store_Bypass feature on Power10, eg: $ grep Speculation_Store_Bypass: /proc/self/status Speculation_Store_Bypass: vulnerable But at the same time the sysfs files, and lscpu, were showing "Not affected". This turns out to simply be a bug in the reporting of the Speculation_Store_Bypass, aka. PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, case. When SEC_FTR_STF_BARRIER was added, so that firmware could communicate the vulnerability was not present, the code in ssb_prctl_get() was not updated to check the new flag. So add the check for SEC_FTR_STF_BARRIER being disabled. Rather than adding the new check to the existing if block and expanding the comment to cover both cases, rewrite the three cases to be separate so they can be commented separately for clarity. Fixes: 84ed26fd00c5 ("powerpc/security: Add a security feature for STF barrier") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.14+ Reported-by: Nageswara R Sastry Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry Reviewed-by: Russell Currey Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://msgid.link/20230517074945.53188-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au --- arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c index 206475e3e0b4..4856e1a5161c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c @@ -364,26 +364,27 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute * static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) { - if (stf_enabled_flush_types == STF_BARRIER_NONE) - /* - * We don't have an explicit signal from firmware that we're - * vulnerable or not, we only have certain CPU revisions that - * are known to be vulnerable. - * - * We assume that if we're on another CPU, where the barrier is - * NONE, then we are not vulnerable. - */ + /* + * The STF_BARRIER feature is on by default, so if it's off that means + * firmware has explicitly said the CPU is not vulnerable via either + * the hypercall or device tree. + */ + if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_STF_BARRIER)) return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; - else - /* - * If we do have a barrier type then we are vulnerable. The - * barrier is not a global or per-process mitigation, so the - * only value we can report here is PR_SPEC_ENABLE, which - * appears as "vulnerable" in /proc. - */ - return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; - return -EINVAL; + /* + * If the system's CPU has no known barrier (see setup_stf_barrier()) + * then assume that the CPU is not vulnerable. + */ + if (stf_enabled_flush_types == STF_BARRIER_NONE) + return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; + + /* + * Otherwise the CPU is vulnerable. The barrier is not a global or + * per-process mitigation, so the only value that can be reported here + * is PR_SPEC_ENABLE, which appears as "vulnerable" in /proc. + */ + return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; } int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)