random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng
This gives the user building their own kernel (or a Linux distribution) the option of deciding whether or not to trust the CPU's hardware random number generator (e.g., RDRAND for x86 CPU's) as being correctly implemented and not having a back door introduced (perhaps courtesy of a Nation State's law enforcement or intelligence agencies). This will prevent getrandom(2) from blocking, if there is a willingness to trust the CPU manufacturer. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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@ -554,3 +554,17 @@ config ADI
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endmenu
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endmenu
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config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
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bool "Trust the CPU manufacturer to initialize Linux's CRNG"
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depends on X86 || S390 || PPC
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default n
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help
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Assume that CPU manufacturer (e.g., Intel or AMD for RDSEED or
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RDRAND, IBM for the S390 and Power PC architectures) is trustworthy
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for the purposes of initializing Linux's CRNG. Since this is not
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something that can be independently audited, this amounts to trusting
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that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate
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of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies)
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has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's
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random number generation facilities.
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@ -782,6 +782,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
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static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
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static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
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{
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{
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int i;
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int i;
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int arch_init = 1;
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unsigned long rv;
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unsigned long rv;
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memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
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memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
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@ -792,10 +793,18 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
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_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
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_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
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for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
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for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
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if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
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if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
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!arch_get_random_long(&rv))
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!arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
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rv = random_get_entropy();
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rv = random_get_entropy();
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arch_init = 0;
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}
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crng->state[i] ^= rv;
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crng->state[i] ^= rv;
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}
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
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if (arch_init) {
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crng_init = 2;
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pr_notice("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
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}
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#endif
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crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
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crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
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}
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}
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