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kfence: report sensitive information based on no_hash_pointers 

We cannot rely on CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL to decide if we're running a "debug
kernel" where we can safely show potentially sensitive information in the
kernel log.

Instead, simply rely on the newly introduced "no_hash_pointers" to print
unhashed kernel pointers, as well as decide if our reports can include
other potentially sensitive information such as registers and corrupted
bytes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210223082043.1972742-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Marco Elver 2021-02-25 17:19:40 -08:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent 0825c1d57f
commit 35beccf092
5 changed files with 18 additions and 27 deletions
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8
Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
View File

@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ A typical out-of-bounds access looks like this::
The header of the report provides a short summary of the function involved in
the access. It is followed by more detailed information about the access and
its origin. Note that, real kernel addresses are only shown for
``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds.
its origin. Note that, real kernel addresses are only shown when using the
kernel command line option ``no_hash_pointers``.
Use-after-free accesses are reported as::
@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ invalidly written bytes (offset from the address) are shown; in this
representation, '.' denote untouched bytes. In the example above ``0xac`` is
the value written to the invalid address at offset 0, and the remaining '.'
denote that no following bytes have been touched. Note that, real values are
only shown for ``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds; to avoid information
disclosure for non-debug builds, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
only shown if the kernel was booted with ``no_hash_pointers``; to avoid
information disclosure otherwise, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
written bytes.
And finally, KFENCE may also report on invalid accesses to any protected page

10
mm/kfence/core.c
View File

@ -646,13 +646,9 @@ void __init kfence_init(void)
WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true);
schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, 0);
pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE,
CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
pr_cont(" at 0x%px-0x%px\n", (void *)__kfence_pool,
(void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE));
else
pr_cont("\n");
pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects at 0x%p-0x%p\n", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE,
CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS, (void *)__kfence_pool,
(void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE));
}
void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)

7
mm/kfence/kfence.h
View File

@ -16,13 +16,6 @@
#include "../slab.h" /* for struct kmem_cache */
/* For non-debug builds, avoid leaking kernel pointers into dmesg. */
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL
#define PTR_FMT "%px"
#else
#define PTR_FMT "%p"
#endif
/*
* Get the canary byte pattern for @addr. Use a pattern that varies based on the
* lower 3 bits of the address, to detect memory corruptions with higher

2
mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
View File

@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static bool report_matches(const struct expect_report *r)
break;
}
cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, " 0x" PTR_FMT, (void *)r->addr);
cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, " 0x%p", (void *)r->addr);
spin_lock_irqsave(&observed.lock, flags);
if (!report_available())

18
mm/kfence/report.c
View File

@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
#include "kfence.h"
extern bool no_hash_pointers;
/* Helper function to either print to a seq_file or to console. */
__printf(2, 3)
static void seq_con_printf(struct seq_file *seq, const char *fmt, ...)
@ -118,7 +120,7 @@ void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *met
}
seq_con_printf(seq,
"kfence-#%zd [0x" PTR_FMT "-0x" PTR_FMT
"kfence-#%zd [0x%p-0x%p"
", size=%d, cache=%s] allocated by task %d:\n",
meta - kfence_metadata, (void *)start, (void *)(start + size - 1), size,
(cache && cache->name) ? cache->name : "<destroyed>", meta->alloc_track.pid);
@ -148,7 +150,7 @@ static void print_diff_canary(unsigned long address, size_t bytes_to_show,
for (cur = (const u8 *)address; cur < end; cur++) {
if (*cur == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(cur))
pr_cont(" .");
else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
else if (no_hash_pointers)
pr_cont(" 0x%02x", *cur);
else /* Do not leak kernel memory in non-debug builds. */
pr_cont(" !");
@ -201,7 +203,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds %s in %pS\n\n", get_access_type(is_write),
(void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
pr_err("Out-of-bounds %s at 0x" PTR_FMT " (%luB %s of kfence-#%zd):\n",
pr_err("Out-of-bounds %s at 0x%p (%luB %s of kfence-#%zd):\n",
get_access_type(is_write), (void *)address,
left_of_object ? meta->addr - address : address - meta->addr,
left_of_object ? "left" : "right", object_index);
@ -210,24 +212,24 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF:
pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free %s in %pS\n\n", get_access_type(is_write),
(void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
pr_err("Use-after-free %s at 0x" PTR_FMT " (in kfence-#%zd):\n",
pr_err("Use-after-free %s at 0x%p (in kfence-#%zd):\n",
get_access_type(is_write), (void *)address, object_index);
break;
case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION:
pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: memory corruption in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
pr_err("Corrupted memory at 0x" PTR_FMT " ", (void *)address);
pr_err("Corrupted memory at 0x%p ", (void *)address);
print_diff_canary(address, 16, meta);
pr_cont(" (in kfence-#%zd):\n", object_index);
break;
case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID:
pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: invalid %s in %pS\n\n", get_access_type(is_write),
(void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
pr_err("Invalid %s at 0x" PTR_FMT ":\n", get_access_type(is_write),
pr_err("Invalid %s at 0x%p:\n", get_access_type(is_write),
(void *)address);
break;
case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE:
pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: invalid free in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
pr_err("Invalid free of 0x" PTR_FMT " (in kfence-#%zd):\n", (void *)address,
pr_err("Invalid free of 0x%p (in kfence-#%zd):\n", (void *)address,
object_index);
break;
}
@ -242,7 +244,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
/* Print report footer. */
pr_err("\n");
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL) && regs)
if (no_hash_pointers && regs)
show_regs(regs);
else
dump_stack_print_info(KERN_ERR);