From f5fffcee27c09143ba80e5257dbd1f381d86342f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 13:49:17 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 1/6] cifs: better instrumentation for coalesce_t2 When coalesce_t2 returns an error, have it throw a cFYI message that explains the reason. Also rename some variables to clarify what they represent. Reported-and-Tested-by: Konstantinos Skarlatos Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 4666780f315d..5cc15856e4ad 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -225,74 +225,90 @@ static int check2ndT2(struct smb_hdr *pSMB) static int coalesce_t2(struct smb_hdr *psecond, struct smb_hdr *pTargetSMB) { - struct smb_t2_rsp *pSMB2 = (struct smb_t2_rsp *)psecond; + struct smb_t2_rsp *pSMBs = (struct smb_t2_rsp *)psecond; struct smb_t2_rsp *pSMBt = (struct smb_t2_rsp *)pTargetSMB; - char *data_area_of_target; - char *data_area_of_buf2; + char *data_area_of_tgt; + char *data_area_of_src; int remaining; - unsigned int byte_count, total_in_buf; - __u16 total_data_size, total_in_buf2; + unsigned int byte_count, total_in_tgt; + __u16 tgt_total_cnt, src_total_cnt, total_in_src; - total_data_size = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount); + src_total_cnt = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount); + tgt_total_cnt = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount); - if (total_data_size != - get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB2->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount)) - cFYI(1, "total data size of primary and secondary t2 differ"); + if (tgt_total_cnt != src_total_cnt) + cFYI(1, "total data count of primary and secondary t2 differ " + "source=%hu target=%hu", src_total_cnt, tgt_total_cnt); - total_in_buf = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount); + total_in_tgt = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount); - remaining = total_data_size - total_in_buf; + remaining = tgt_total_cnt - total_in_tgt; - if (remaining < 0) + if (remaining < 0) { + cFYI(1, "Server sent too much data. tgt_total_cnt=%hu " + "total_in_tgt=%hu", tgt_total_cnt, total_in_tgt); return -EPROTO; - - if (remaining == 0) /* nothing to do, ignore */ - return 0; - - total_in_buf2 = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB2->t2_rsp.DataCount); - if (remaining < total_in_buf2) { - cFYI(1, "transact2 2nd response contains too much data"); } + if (remaining == 0) { + /* nothing to do, ignore */ + cFYI(1, "no more data remains"); + return 0; + } + + total_in_src = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataCount); + if (remaining < total_in_src) + cFYI(1, "transact2 2nd response contains too much data"); + /* find end of first SMB data area */ - data_area_of_target = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + + data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); + /* validate target area */ + data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); - data_area_of_buf2 = (char *)&pSMB2->hdr.Protocol + - get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB2->t2_rsp.DataOffset); + data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; - data_area_of_target += total_in_buf; - - /* copy second buffer into end of first buffer */ - total_in_buf += total_in_buf2; + total_in_tgt += total_in_src; /* is the result too big for the field? */ - if (total_in_buf > USHRT_MAX) + if (total_in_tgt > USHRT_MAX) { + cFYI(1, "coalesced DataCount too large (%u)", total_in_tgt); return -EPROTO; - put_unaligned_le16(total_in_buf, &pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount); + } + put_unaligned_le16(total_in_tgt, &pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount); /* fix up the BCC */ byte_count = get_bcc(pTargetSMB); - byte_count += total_in_buf2; + byte_count += total_in_src; /* is the result too big for the field? */ - if (byte_count > USHRT_MAX) + if (byte_count > USHRT_MAX) { + cFYI(1, "coalesced BCC too large (%u)", byte_count); return -EPROTO; + } put_bcc(byte_count, pTargetSMB); byte_count = be32_to_cpu(pTargetSMB->smb_buf_length); - byte_count += total_in_buf2; + byte_count += total_in_src; /* don't allow buffer to overflow */ - if (byte_count > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4) + if (byte_count > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4) { + cFYI(1, "coalesced BCC exceeds buffer size (%u)", byte_count); return -ENOBUFS; + } pTargetSMB->smb_buf_length = cpu_to_be32(byte_count); - memcpy(data_area_of_target, data_area_of_buf2, total_in_buf2); + /* copy second buffer into end of first buffer */ + memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src); - if (remaining == total_in_buf2) { - cFYI(1, "found the last secondary response"); - return 0; /* we are done */ - } else /* more responses to go */ + if (remaining != total_in_src) { + /* more responses to go */ + cFYI(1, "waiting for more secondary responses"); return 1; + } + + /* we are done */ + cFYI(1, "found the last secondary response"); + return 0; } static void From ce91acb3acae26f4163c5a6f1f695d1a1e8d9009 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 16:08:51 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 2/6] cifs: lower default wsize when unix extensions are not used We've had some reports of servers (namely, the Solaris in-kernel CIFS server) that don't deal properly with writes that are "too large" even though they set CAP_LARGE_WRITE_ANDX. Change the default to better mirror what windows clients do. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Pavel Shilovsky Reported-by: Nick Davis Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 5cc15856e4ad..a66dcb52988c 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2930,18 +2930,33 @@ void cifs_setup_cifs_sb(struct smb_vol *pvolume_info, #define CIFS_DEFAULT_IOSIZE (1024 * 1024) /* - * Windows only supports a max of 60k reads. Default to that when posix - * extensions aren't in force. + * Windows only supports a max of 60kb reads and 65535 byte writes. Default to + * those values when posix extensions aren't in force. In actuality here, we + * use 65536 to allow for a write that is a multiple of 4k. Most servers seem + * to be ok with the extra byte even though Windows doesn't send writes that + * are that large. + * + * Citation: + * + * http://blogs.msdn.com/b/openspecification/archive/2009/04/10/smb-maximum-transmit-buffer-size-and-performance-tuning.aspx */ #define CIFS_DEFAULT_NON_POSIX_RSIZE (60 * 1024) +#define CIFS_DEFAULT_NON_POSIX_WSIZE (65536) static unsigned int cifs_negotiate_wsize(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct smb_vol *pvolume_info) { __u64 unix_cap = le64_to_cpu(tcon->fsUnixInfo.Capability); struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server; - unsigned int wsize = pvolume_info->wsize ? pvolume_info->wsize : - CIFS_DEFAULT_IOSIZE; + unsigned int wsize; + + /* start with specified wsize, or default */ + if (pvolume_info->wsize) + wsize = pvolume_info->wsize; + else if (tcon->unix_ext && (unix_cap & CIFS_UNIX_LARGE_WRITE_CAP)) + wsize = CIFS_DEFAULT_IOSIZE; + else + wsize = CIFS_DEFAULT_NON_POSIX_WSIZE; /* can server support 24-bit write sizes? (via UNIX extensions) */ if (!tcon->unix_ext || !(unix_cap & CIFS_UNIX_LARGE_WRITE_CAP)) From 9f6ed2ca257fa8650b876377833e6f14e272848b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 16:09:11 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 3/6] keys: add a "logon" key type For CIFS, we want to be able to store NTLM credentials (aka username and password) in the keyring. We do not, however want to allow users to fetch those keys back out of the keyring since that would be a security risk. Unfortunately, due to the nuances of key permission bits, it's not possible to do this. We need to grant search permissions so the kernel can find these keys, but that also implies permissions to read the payload. Resolve this by adding a new key_type. This key type is essentially the same as key_type_user, but does not define a .read op. This prevents the payload from ever being visible from userspace. This key type also vets the description to ensure that it's "qualified" by checking to ensure that it has a ':' in it that is preceded by other characters. Acked-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- include/keys/user-type.h | 3 ++- security/keys/internal.h | 1 + security/keys/key.c | 1 + security/keys/user_defined.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h index c37c34275a44..bc9ec1d7698c 100644 --- a/include/keys/user-type.h +++ b/include/keys/user-type.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ /*****************************************************************************/ /* - * the payload for a key of type "user" + * the payload for a key of type "user" or "logon" * - once filled in and attached to a key: * - the payload struct is invariant may not be changed, only replaced * - the payload must be read with RCU procedures or with the key semaphore @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ struct user_key_payload { }; extern struct key_type key_type_user; +extern struct key_type key_type_logon; extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); extern int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index c7a7caec4830..65647f825584 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_dead; extern struct key_type key_type_user; +extern struct key_type key_type_logon; /*****************************************************************************/ /* diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 4f64c7267afb..7ada8019be1f 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -999,6 +999,7 @@ void __init key_init(void) list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list); list_add_tail(&key_type_dead.link, &key_types_list); list_add_tail(&key_type_user.link, &key_types_list); + list_add_tail(&key_type_logon.link, &key_types_list); /* record the root user tracking */ rb_link_node(&root_key_user.node, diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 69ff52c08e97..6e1a6276649f 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ #include #include "internal.h" +static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc); + /* * user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an * arbitrary blob of data as the payload @@ -35,6 +37,24 @@ struct key_type key_type_user = { EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user); +/* + * This key type is essentially the same as key_type_user, but it does + * not define a .read op. This is suitable for storing username and + * password pairs in the keyring that you do not want to be readable + * from userspace. + */ +struct key_type key_type_logon = { + .name = "logon", + .instantiate = user_instantiate, + .update = user_update, + .match = user_match, + .revoke = user_revoke, + .destroy = user_destroy, + .describe = user_describe, + .vet_description = logon_vet_description, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon); + /* * instantiate a user defined key */ @@ -189,3 +209,20 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_read); + +/* Vet the description for a "logon" key */ +static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc) +{ + char *p; + + /* require a "qualified" description string */ + p = strchr(desc, ':'); + if (!p) + return -EINVAL; + + /* also reject description with ':' as first char */ + if (p == desc) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} From 04febabcf55beeffb8794a0d8c539e571bd2ae29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 16:09:15 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 4/6] cifs: sanitize username handling Currently, it's not very clear whether you're allowed to have a NULL vol->username or ses->user_name. Some places check for it and some don't. Make it clear that a NULL pointer is OK in these fields, and ensure that all the callers check for that. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 10 +++++++--- fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c | 11 ++++++++--- fs/cifs/connect.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c index 2272fd5fe5b7..e622863b292f 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c @@ -113,9 +113,11 @@ cifs_get_spnego_key(struct cifs_ses *sesInfo) MAX_MECH_STR_LEN + UID_KEY_LEN + (sizeof(uid_t) * 2) + CREDUID_KEY_LEN + (sizeof(uid_t) * 2) + - USER_KEY_LEN + strlen(sesInfo->user_name) + PID_KEY_LEN + (sizeof(pid_t) * 2) + 1; + if (sesInfo->user_name) + desc_len += USER_KEY_LEN + strlen(sesInfo->user_name); + spnego_key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); description = kzalloc(desc_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (description == NULL) @@ -152,8 +154,10 @@ cifs_get_spnego_key(struct cifs_ses *sesInfo) dp = description + strlen(description); sprintf(dp, ";creduid=0x%x", sesInfo->cred_uid); - dp = description + strlen(description); - sprintf(dp, ";user=%s", sesInfo->user_name); + if (sesInfo->user_name) { + dp = description + strlen(description); + sprintf(dp, ";user=%s", sesInfo->user_name); + } dp = description + strlen(description); sprintf(dp, ";pid=0x%x", current->pid); diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c index 5d9b9acc5fce..bce99e6a4950 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c @@ -420,15 +420,20 @@ static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash, } /* convert ses->user_name to unicode and uppercase */ - len = strlen(ses->user_name); + len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0; user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL); if (user == NULL) { cERROR(1, "calc_ntlmv2_hash: user mem alloc failure\n"); rc = -ENOMEM; return rc; } - len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp); - UniStrupr(user); + + if (len) { + len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp); + UniStrupr(user); + } else { + memset(user, '\0', 2); + } rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, (char *)user, 2 * len); diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index a66dcb52988c..b952a21e917b 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -1997,10 +1997,16 @@ static int match_session(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct smb_vol *vol) return 0; break; default: + /* NULL username means anonymous session */ + if (ses->user_name == NULL) { + if (!vol->nullauth) + return 0; + break; + } + /* anything else takes username/password */ - if (ses->user_name == NULL) - return 0; - if (strncmp(ses->user_name, vol->username, + if (strncmp(ses->user_name, + vol->username ? vol->username : "", MAX_USERNAME_SIZE)) return 0; if (strlen(vol->username) != 0 && @@ -3167,10 +3173,9 @@ cifs_setup_volume_info(struct smb_vol *volume_info, char *mount_data, return -EINVAL; if (volume_info->nullauth) { - cFYI(1, "null user"); - volume_info->username = kzalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (volume_info->username == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + cFYI(1, "Anonymous login"); + kfree(volume_info->username); + volume_info->username = NULL; } else if (volume_info->username) { /* BB fixme parse for domain name here */ cFYI(1, "Username: %s", volume_info->username); From 8a8798a5ff90977d6459ce1d657cf8fe13a51e97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 16:09:15 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 5/6] cifs: fetch credentials out of keyring for non-krb5 auth multiuser mounts Fix up multiuser mounts to set the secType and set the username and password from the key payload in the vol info for non-krb5 auth types. Look for a key of type "secret" with a description of "cifs:a:" or "cifs:d:". If that's found, then scrape the username and password out of the key payload and use that to create a new user session. Finally, don't have the code enforce krb5 auth on multiuser mounts, but do require a kernel with keys support. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 175 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 165 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index b952a21e917b..28f23c03da53 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "cifspdu.h" #include "cifsglob.h" @@ -1594,11 +1595,14 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char *devname, } } - if (vol->multiuser && !(vol->secFlg & CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5)) { - cERROR(1, "Multiuser mounts currently require krb5 " - "authentication!"); +#ifndef CONFIG_KEYS + /* Muliuser mounts require CONFIG_KEYS support */ + if (vol->multiuser) { + cERROR(1, "Multiuser mounts require kernels with " + "CONFIG_KEYS enabled."); goto cifs_parse_mount_err; } +#endif if (vol->UNCip == NULL) vol->UNCip = &vol->UNC[2]; @@ -2061,6 +2065,132 @@ cifs_put_smb_ses(struct cifs_ses *ses) cifs_put_tcp_session(server); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + +/* strlen("cifs:a:") + INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 1 */ +#define CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE (7 + INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 1) + +/* Populate username and pw fields from keyring if possible */ +static int +cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *desc, *delim, *payload; + ssize_t len; + struct key *key; + struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server; + struct sockaddr_in *sa; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; + struct user_key_payload *upayload; + + desc = kmalloc(CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* try to find an address key first */ + switch (server->dstaddr.ss_family) { + case AF_INET: + sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)&server->dstaddr; + sprintf(desc, "cifs:a:%pI4", &sa->sin_addr.s_addr); + break; + case AF_INET6: + sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&server->dstaddr; + sprintf(desc, "cifs:a:%pI6c", &sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); + break; + default: + cFYI(1, "Bad ss_family (%hu)", server->dstaddr.ss_family); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_err; + } + + cFYI(1, "%s: desc=%s", __func__, desc); + key = request_key(&key_type_logon, desc, ""); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + if (!ses->domainName) { + cFYI(1, "domainName is NULL"); + rc = PTR_ERR(key); + goto out_err; + } + + /* didn't work, try to find a domain key */ + sprintf(desc, "cifs:d:%s", ses->domainName); + cFYI(1, "%s: desc=%s", __func__, desc); + key = request_key(&key_type_logon, desc, ""); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(key); + goto out_err; + } + } + + down_read(&key->sem); + upayload = key->payload.data; + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(upayload)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(key); + goto out_key_put; + } + + /* find first : in payload */ + payload = (char *)upayload->data; + delim = strnchr(payload, upayload->datalen, ':'); + cFYI(1, "payload=%s", payload); + if (!delim) { + cFYI(1, "Unable to find ':' in payload (datalen=%d)", + upayload->datalen); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_key_put; + } + + len = delim - payload; + if (len > MAX_USERNAME_SIZE || len <= 0) { + cFYI(1, "Bad value from username search (len=%ld)", len); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_key_put; + } + + vol->username = kstrndup(payload, len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vol->username) { + cFYI(1, "Unable to allocate %ld bytes for username", len); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_key_put; + } + cFYI(1, "%s: username=%s", __func__, vol->username); + + len = key->datalen - (len + 1); + if (len > MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE || len <= 0) { + cFYI(1, "Bad len for password search (len=%ld)", len); + rc = -EINVAL; + kfree(vol->username); + vol->username = NULL; + goto out_key_put; + } + + ++delim; + vol->password = kstrndup(delim, len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vol->password) { + cFYI(1, "Unable to allocate %ld bytes for password", len); + rc = -ENOMEM; + kfree(vol->username); + vol->username = NULL; + goto out_key_put; + } + +out_key_put: + up_read(&key->sem); + key_put(key); +out_err: + kfree(desc); + cFYI(1, "%s: returning %d", __func__, rc); + return rc; +} +#else /* ! CONFIG_KEYS */ +static inline int +cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol __attribute__((unused)), + struct cifs_ses *ses __attribute__((unused))) +{ + return -ENOSYS; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + static bool warned_on_ntlm; /* globals init to false automatically */ static struct cifs_ses * @@ -3693,16 +3823,38 @@ int cifs_setup_session(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, return rc; } +static int +cifs_set_vol_auth(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) +{ + switch (ses->server->secType) { + case Kerberos: + vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_KRB5; + return 0; + case NTLMv2: + vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2; + break; + case NTLM: + vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLM; + break; + case RawNTLMSSP: + vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMSSP; + break; + case LANMAN: + vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_LANMAN; + break; + } + + return cifs_set_cifscreds(vol, ses); +} + static struct cifs_tcon * cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, uid_t fsuid) { + int rc; struct cifs_tcon *master_tcon = cifs_sb_master_tcon(cifs_sb); struct cifs_ses *ses; struct cifs_tcon *tcon = NULL; struct smb_vol *vol_info; - char username[28]; /* big enough for "krb50x" + hex of ULONG_MAX 6+16 */ - /* We used to have this as MAX_USERNAME which is */ - /* way too big now (256 instead of 32) */ vol_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*vol_info), GFP_KERNEL); if (vol_info == NULL) { @@ -3710,8 +3862,6 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, uid_t fsuid) goto out; } - snprintf(username, sizeof(username), "krb50x%x", fsuid); - vol_info->username = username; vol_info->local_nls = cifs_sb->local_nls; vol_info->linux_uid = fsuid; vol_info->cred_uid = fsuid; @@ -3721,8 +3871,11 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, uid_t fsuid) vol_info->local_lease = master_tcon->local_lease; vol_info->no_linux_ext = !master_tcon->unix_ext; - /* FIXME: allow for other secFlg settings */ - vol_info->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_KRB5; + rc = cifs_set_vol_auth(vol_info, master_tcon->ses); + if (rc) { + tcon = ERR_PTR(rc); + goto out; + } /* get a reference for the same TCP session */ spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); @@ -3745,6 +3898,8 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, uid_t fsuid) if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNIX) reset_cifs_unix_caps(0, tcon, NULL, vol_info); out: + kfree(vol_info->username); + kfree(vol_info->password); kfree(vol_info); return tcon; From 789b4588da40cf572ef982bdc5d590ec1b0386fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 16:09:15 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 6/6] cifs: warn about impending deprecation of legacy MultiuserMount code We'll allow a grace period of 2 releases (3.3 and 3.4) and then remove the legacy code in 3.5. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c index 84e8c0724704..24b3dfc05282 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c @@ -676,14 +676,23 @@ static ssize_t cifs_multiuser_mount_proc_write(struct file *file, { char c; int rc; + static bool warned; rc = get_user(c, buffer); if (rc) return rc; if (c == '0' || c == 'n' || c == 'N') multiuser_mount = 0; - else if (c == '1' || c == 'y' || c == 'Y') + else if (c == '1' || c == 'y' || c == 'Y') { multiuser_mount = 1; + if (!warned) { + warned = true; + printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS VFS: The legacy multiuser " + "mount code is scheduled to be deprecated in " + "3.5. Please switch to using the multiuser " + "mount option."); + } + } return count; }