x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()
The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. The index can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg. Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it access thread->ptrace_bps. Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561476617-3759-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
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@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
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#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <asm/pgtable.h>
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@ -643,9 +644,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
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{
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struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread;
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unsigned long val = 0;
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int index = n;
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if (n < HBP_NUM) {
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struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
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index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM);
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struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
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if (bp)
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val = bp->hw.info.address;
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