random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction
When /dev/random was directly connected with entropy extraction, without any expansion stage, extract_buf() was called for every 10 bytes of data read from /dev/random. For that reason, RDRAND was used rather than RDSEED. At the same time, crng_reseed() was still only called every 5 minutes, so there RDSEED made sense. Those olden days were also a time when the entropy collector did not use a cryptographic hash function, which meant most bets were off in terms of real preimage resistance. For that reason too it didn't matter _that_ much whether RDSEED was mixed in before or after entropy extraction; both choices were sort of bad. But now we have a cryptographic hash function at work, and with that we get real preimage resistance. We also now only call extract_entropy() every 5 minutes, rather than every 10 bytes. This allows us to do two important things. First, we can switch to using RDSEED in extract_entropy(), as Dominik suggested. Second, we can ensure that RDSEED input always goes into the cryptographic hash function with other things before being used directly. This eliminates a category of attacks in which the CPU knows the current state of the crng and knows that we're going to xor RDSEED into it, and so it computes a malicious RDSEED. By going through our hash function, it would require the CPU to compute a preimage on the fly, which isn't going to happen. Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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@ -727,13 +727,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng)
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CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
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for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
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unsigned long rv;
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if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
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!arch_get_random_long(&rv))
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rv = random_get_entropy();
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crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
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crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i];
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memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
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WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
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@ -1054,16 +1049,17 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
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unsigned long flags;
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u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
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struct {
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unsigned long rdrand[32 / sizeof(long)];
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unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
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size_t counter;
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} block;
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size_t i;
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trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count);
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdrand); ++i) {
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if (!arch_get_random_long(&block.rdrand[i]))
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block.rdrand[i] = random_get_entropy();
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
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if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
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!arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
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block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
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}
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spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
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@ -1071,7 +1067,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
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/* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
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blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
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/* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || 0) */
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/* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
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block.counter = 0;
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blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
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blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
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@ -1081,7 +1077,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
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while (nbytes) {
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i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || ++counter) */
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/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
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++block.counter;
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blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
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nbytes -= i;
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