Fix some bugs in the /dev/random driver which causes getrandom(2) to
unblock earlier than designed. Thanks to Jann Horn from Google's Project Zero for pointing this out to me. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCAAdFiEEK2m5VNv+CHkogTfJ8vlZVpUNgaMFAlrcCWAACgkQ8vlZVpUN gaOedwf/e1OU7CXMiinCcGfsr5XydZrEivaqS9QmqAKsLzJSNDDu1Jw6N9cbWagp OEIIRZdaFPImZHosEbjOW12Z3nxnlDC8jtOLyLIRGSA2u4RXd03RupHhQW4cE7ys EOljEvK5KFDIlPa947R5/k4CzC4O3PGf1GdWhHmkENOgd23GqI/yOTKQq5Z5ZgAp rZzcXiuCSq1QkLME7ElxoOLQhs+fYiVGoAM/maxLa+2g4M1Y/YlHBDGhG4RB4lLA 3zugbyJ15tNfgNuRvCB4x304WkCp5VDlcsCiKq18LFcrkz1SYGj5LwG/bswDqgkS 0mOtZKu68NhutX8Pcy4vY3iOmMa1/Q== =RhHb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random Pull /dev/random fixes from Ted Ts'o: "Fix some bugs in the /dev/random driver which causes getrandom(2) to unblock earlier than designed. Thanks to Jann Horn from Google's Project Zero for pointing this out to me" * tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random: random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized random: use a different mixing algorithm for add_device_randomness() random: fix crng_ready() test
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commit
285848b0f4
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@ -427,8 +427,9 @@ struct crng_state primary_crng = {
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* its value (from 0->1->2).
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*/
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static int crng_init = 0;
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#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 0))
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#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
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static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
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static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
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#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
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static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
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__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]);
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@ -787,6 +788,36 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
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crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
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static void numa_crng_init(void)
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{
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int i;
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struct crng_state *crng;
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struct crng_state **pool;
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pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
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for_each_online_node(i) {
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crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
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GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
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spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
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crng_initialize(crng);
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pool[i] = crng;
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}
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mb();
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if (cmpxchg(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool)) {
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for_each_node(i)
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kfree(pool[i]);
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kfree(pool);
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}
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}
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#else
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static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
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#endif
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/*
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* crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
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* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally.
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*/
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static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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@ -794,7 +825,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
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if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
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return 0;
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if (crng_ready()) {
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if (crng_init != 0) {
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -813,6 +844,51 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two
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* attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is
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* guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at
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* all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
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* crng_fast_load().
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*
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* So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch
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* all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a
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* period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm. Finally, we do
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* *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something
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* like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be
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* unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
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*/
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static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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static unsigned char lfsr = 1;
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unsigned char tmp;
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unsigned i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
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const char * src_buf = cp;
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char * dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
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if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
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return 0;
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if (crng_init != 0) {
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
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return 0;
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}
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if (len > max)
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max = len;
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for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
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tmp = lfsr;
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lfsr >>= 1;
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if (tmp & 1)
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lfsr ^= 0xE1;
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tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
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dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
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lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5);
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}
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
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return 1;
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}
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static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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@ -831,7 +907,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
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_crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
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CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
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spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
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for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
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unsigned long rv;
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if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
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@ -841,9 +917,10 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
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}
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memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
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crng->init_time = jiffies;
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
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if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
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invalidate_batched_entropy();
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numa_crng_init();
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crng_init = 2;
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process_random_ready_list();
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wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
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@ -856,8 +933,9 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
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{
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unsigned long v, flags;
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if (crng_init > 1 &&
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time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
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if (crng_ready() &&
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(time_after(crng_global_init_time, crng->init_time) ||
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time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)))
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crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL);
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spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
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if (arch_get_random_long(&v))
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unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
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unsigned long flags;
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if (!crng_ready()) {
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crng_fast_load(buf, size);
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return;
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}
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if (!crng_ready() && size)
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crng_slow_load(buf, size);
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trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
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spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
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@ -1139,7 +1215,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
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fast_mix(fast_pool);
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add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
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if (!crng_ready()) {
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if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
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if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
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crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
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sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) {
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@ -1680,28 +1756,10 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
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*/
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static int rand_initialize(void)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
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int i;
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struct crng_state *crng;
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struct crng_state **pool;
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#endif
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init_std_data(&input_pool);
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init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
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crng_initialize(&primary_crng);
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#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
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pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
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for_each_online_node(i) {
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crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
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GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
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spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
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crng_initialize(crng);
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pool[i] = crng;
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}
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mb();
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crng_node_pool = pool;
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#endif
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crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
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return 0;
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}
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early_initcall(rand_initialize);
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input_pool.entropy_count = 0;
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blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0;
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return 0;
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case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
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if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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return -EPERM;
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if (crng_init < 2)
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return -ENODATA;
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crng_reseed(&primary_crng, NULL);
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crng_global_init_time = jiffies - 1;
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return 0;
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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{
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struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
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if (!crng_ready()) {
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if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
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crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
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return;
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}
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@ -35,6 +35,9 @@
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/* Clear the entropy pool and associated counters. (Superuser only.) */
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#define RNDCLEARPOOL _IO( 'R', 0x06 )
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/* Reseed CRNG. (Superuser only.) */
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#define RNDRESEEDCRNG _IO( 'R', 0x07 )
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struct rand_pool_info {
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int entropy_count;
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int buf_size;
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