IB/core: Don't enforce PKey security on SMI MADs

Per the infiniband spec an SMI MAD can have any PKey. Checking the pkey
on SMI MADs is not necessary, and it seems that some older adapters
using the mthca driver don't follow the convention of using the default
PKey, resulting in false denials, or errors querying the PKey cache.

SMI MAD security is still enforced, only agents allowed to manage the
subnet are able to receive or send SMI MADs.

Reported-by: Chris Blake <chrisrblake93@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12
Fixes: 47a2b338fe ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Jurgens 2017-12-05 22:30:02 +02:00 committed by Doug Ledford
parent 4cae8ff136
commit 0fbe8f575b
1 changed files with 5 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -739,8 +739,11 @@ int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))
return 0;
if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) {
if (!map->agent.smp_allowed)
return -EACCES;
return 0;
}
return ib_security_pkey_access(map->agent.device,
map->agent.port_num,