HID: usbhid: Fix warning caused by 0-length input reports
Syzbot found a warning caused by hid_submit_ctrl() submitting a control request to transfer a 0-length input report: usb 1-1: BOGUS control dir, pipe 80000280 doesn't match bRequestType a1 (The warning message is a little difficult to understand. It means that the control request claims to be for an IN transfer but this contradicts the USB spec, which requires 0-length control transfers always to be in the OUT direction.) Now, a zero-length report isn't good for anything and there's no reason for a device to have one, but the fuzzer likes to pick out these weird edge cases. In the future, perhaps we will decide to reject 0-length reports at probe time. For now, the simplest approach for avoiding these warnings is to pretend that the report actually has length 1. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+9b57a46bf1801ce2a2ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Tested-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ static int hid_submit_ctrl(struct hid_device *hid)
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maxpacket = usb_maxpacket(hid_to_usb_dev(hid),
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usbhid->urbctrl->pipe, 0);
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if (maxpacket > 0) {
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len += (len == 0); /* Don't allow 0-length reports */
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len = DIV_ROUND_UP(len, maxpacket);
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len *= maxpacket;
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if (len > usbhid->bufsize)
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