core dump: remain dumpable
The coredump code always calls set_dumpable(0) when it starts (even if RLIMIT_CORE prevents any core from being dumped). The effect of this (via task_dumpable) is to make /proc/pid/* files owned by root instead of the user, so the user can no longer examine his own process--in a case where there was never any privileged data to protect. This affects e.g. auxv, environ, fd; in Fedora (execshield) kernels, also maps. In practice, you can only notice this when a debugger has requested PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT tracing. set_dumpable was only used in do_coredump for synchronization and not intended for any security purpose. (It doesn't secure anything that wasn't already unsecured when a process dies by SIGTERM instead of SIGQUIT.) This changes do_coredump to check the core_waiters count as the means of synchronization, which is sufficient. Now we leave the "dumpable" bits alone. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -1692,7 +1692,10 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
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if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump)
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goto fail;
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down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
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if (!get_dumpable(mm)) {
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/*
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* If another thread got here first, or we are not dumpable, bail out.
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*/
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if (mm->core_waiters || !get_dumpable(mm)) {
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up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
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goto fail;
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}
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@ -1706,7 +1709,6 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
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flag = O_EXCL; /* Stop rewrite attacks */
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current->fsuid = 0; /* Dump root private */
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}
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set_dumpable(mm, 0);
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retval = coredump_wait(exit_code);
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if (retval < 0)
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