OpenCloudOS-Kernel/security/landlock/ruleset.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Landlock LSM - Ruleset management
*
* Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
*/
#include <linux/bits.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/overflow.h>
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include "limits.h"
#include "object.h"
#include "ruleset.h"
static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
{
struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
new_ruleset = kzalloc(struct_size(new_ruleset, fs_access_masks,
num_layers), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!new_ruleset)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1);
mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock);
new_ruleset->root = RB_ROOT;
new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers;
/*
* hierarchy = NULL
* num_rules = 0
* fs_access_masks[] = 0
*/
return new_ruleset;
}
struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_create_ruleset(const u32 fs_access_mask)
{
struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
/* Informs about useless ruleset. */
if (!fs_access_mask)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG);
new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1);
if (!IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
new_ruleset->fs_access_masks[0] = fs_access_mask;
return new_ruleset;
}
static void build_check_rule(void)
{
const struct landlock_rule rule = {
.num_layers = ~0,
};
BUILD_BUG_ON(rule.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
}
static struct landlock_rule *create_rule(
struct landlock_object *const object,
const struct landlock_layer (*const layers)[],
const u32 num_layers,
const struct landlock_layer *const new_layer)
{
struct landlock_rule *new_rule;
u32 new_num_layers;
build_check_rule();
if (new_layer) {
/* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset(). */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(num_layers >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS))
return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
new_num_layers = num_layers + 1;
} else {
new_num_layers = num_layers;
}
new_rule = kzalloc(struct_size(new_rule, layers, new_num_layers),
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!new_rule)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&new_rule->node);
landlock_get_object(object);
new_rule->object = object;
new_rule->num_layers = new_num_layers;
/* Copies the original layer stack. */
memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers,
flex_array_size(new_rule, layers, num_layers));
if (new_layer)
/* Adds a copy of @new_layer on the layer stack. */
new_rule->layers[new_rule->num_layers - 1] = *new_layer;
return new_rule;
}
static void free_rule(struct landlock_rule *const rule)
{
might_sleep();
if (!rule)
return;
landlock_put_object(rule->object);
kfree(rule);
}
static void build_check_ruleset(void)
{
const struct landlock_ruleset ruleset = {
.num_rules = ~0,
.num_layers = ~0,
};
landlock: Support filesystem access-control Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file) and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through landlock_add_rule(2). When checking if a file access request is allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user has from the filesystem. Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are in use. This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions. This is the result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease review. Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control without breaking user space will not be a problem. Moreover, seccomp filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may not be currently handled by Landlock. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 23:41:17 +08:00
typeof(ruleset.fs_access_masks[0]) fs_access_mask = ~0;
BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
landlock: Support filesystem access-control Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file) and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through landlock_add_rule(2). When checking if a file access request is allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user has from the filesystem. Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are in use. This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions. This is the result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease review. Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control without breaking user space will not be a problem. Moreover, seccomp filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may not be currently handled by Landlock. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 23:41:17 +08:00
BUILD_BUG_ON(fs_access_mask < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS);
}
/**
* insert_rule - Create and insert a rule in a ruleset
*
* @ruleset: The ruleset to be updated.
* @object: The object to build the new rule with. The underlying kernel
* object must be held by the caller.
* @layers: One or multiple layers to be copied into the new rule.
* @num_layers: The number of @layers entries.
*
* When user space requests to add a new rule to a ruleset, @layers only
* contains one entry and this entry is not assigned to any level. In this
* case, the new rule will extend @ruleset, similarly to a boolean OR between
* access rights.
*
* When merging a ruleset in a domain, or copying a domain, @layers will be
* added to @ruleset as new constraints, similarly to a boolean AND between
* access rights.
*/
static int insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
struct landlock_object *const object,
const struct landlock_layer (*const layers)[],
size_t num_layers)
{
struct rb_node **walker_node;
struct rb_node *parent_node = NULL;
struct landlock_rule *new_rule;
might_sleep();
lockdep_assert_held(&ruleset->lock);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!object || !layers))
return -ENOENT;
walker_node = &(ruleset->root.rb_node);
while (*walker_node) {
struct landlock_rule *const this = rb_entry(*walker_node,
struct landlock_rule, node);
if (this->object != object) {
parent_node = *walker_node;
if (this->object < object)
walker_node = &((*walker_node)->rb_right);
else
walker_node = &((*walker_node)->rb_left);
continue;
}
/* Only a single-level layer should match an existing rule. */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(num_layers != 1))
return -EINVAL;
/* If there is a matching rule, updates it. */
if ((*layers)[0].level == 0) {
/*
* Extends access rights when the request comes from
* landlock_add_rule(2), i.e. @ruleset is not a domain.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->num_layers != 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->layers[0].level != 0))
return -EINVAL;
this->layers[0].access |= (*layers)[0].access;
return 0;
}
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->layers[0].level == 0))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Intersects access rights when it is a merge between a
* ruleset and a domain.
*/
new_rule = create_rule(object, &this->layers, this->num_layers,
&(*layers)[0]);
if (IS_ERR(new_rule))
return PTR_ERR(new_rule);
rb_replace_node(&this->node, &new_rule->node, &ruleset->root);
free_rule(this);
return 0;
}
/* There is no match for @object. */
build_check_ruleset();
if (ruleset->num_rules >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES)
return -E2BIG;
new_rule = create_rule(object, layers, num_layers, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(new_rule))
return PTR_ERR(new_rule);
rb_link_node(&new_rule->node, parent_node, walker_node);
rb_insert_color(&new_rule->node, &ruleset->root);
ruleset->num_rules++;
return 0;
}
static void build_check_layer(void)
{
const struct landlock_layer layer = {
.level = ~0,
landlock: Support filesystem access-control Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file) and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through landlock_add_rule(2). When checking if a file access request is allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user has from the filesystem. Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are in use. This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions. This is the result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease review. Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control without breaking user space will not be a problem. Moreover, seccomp filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may not be currently handled by Landlock. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 23:41:17 +08:00
.access = ~0,
};
BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.level < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
landlock: Support filesystem access-control Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file) and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through landlock_add_rule(2). When checking if a file access request is allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user has from the filesystem. Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are in use. This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions. This is the result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease review. Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control without breaking user space will not be a problem. Moreover, seccomp filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may not be currently handled by Landlock. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 23:41:17 +08:00
BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.access < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS);
}
/* @ruleset must be locked by the caller. */
int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
struct landlock_object *const object, const u32 access)
{
struct landlock_layer layers[] = {{
.access = access,
/* When @level is zero, insert_rule() extends @ruleset. */
.level = 0,
}};
build_check_layer();
return insert_rule(ruleset, object, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
}
static inline void get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
{
if (hierarchy)
refcount_inc(&hierarchy->usage);
}
static void put_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy)
{
while (hierarchy && refcount_dec_and_test(&hierarchy->usage)) {
const struct landlock_hierarchy *const freeme = hierarchy;
hierarchy = hierarchy->parent;
kfree(freeme);
}
}
static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
struct landlock_ruleset *const src)
{
struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
int err = 0;
might_sleep();
/* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset() */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!src))
return 0;
/* Only merge into a domain. */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy))
return -EINVAL;
/* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */
mutex_lock(&dst->lock);
mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
/* Stacks the new layer. */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(src->num_layers != 1 || dst->num_layers < 1)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
dst->fs_access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->fs_access_masks[0];
/* Merges the @src tree. */
rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule,
&src->root, node) {
struct landlock_layer layers[] = {{
.level = dst->num_layers,
}};
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->num_layers != 1)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->layers[0].level != 0)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
layers[0].access = walker_rule->layers[0].access;
err = insert_rule(dst, walker_rule->object, &layers,
ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&src->lock);
mutex_unlock(&dst->lock);
return err;
}
static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
{
struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
int err = 0;
might_sleep();
if (!parent)
return 0;
/* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */
mutex_lock(&child->lock);
mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
/* Copies the @parent tree. */
rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule,
&parent->root, node) {
err = insert_rule(child, walker_rule->object,
&walker_rule->layers, walker_rule->num_layers);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space for the new layer. */
memcpy(child->fs_access_masks, parent->fs_access_masks,
flex_array_size(parent, fs_access_masks, parent->num_layers));
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!parent->hierarchy)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
get_hierarchy(parent->hierarchy);
child->hierarchy->parent = parent->hierarchy;
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&parent->lock);
mutex_unlock(&child->lock);
return err;
}
static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
{
struct landlock_rule *freeme, *next;
might_sleep();
rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, &ruleset->root,
node)
free_rule(freeme);
put_hierarchy(ruleset->hierarchy);
kfree(ruleset);
}
void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
{
might_sleep();
if (ruleset && refcount_dec_and_test(&ruleset->usage))
free_ruleset(ruleset);
}
static void free_ruleset_work(struct work_struct *const work)
{
struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
ruleset = container_of(work, struct landlock_ruleset, work_free);
free_ruleset(ruleset);
}
void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
{
if (ruleset && refcount_dec_and_test(&ruleset->usage)) {
INIT_WORK(&ruleset->work_free, free_ruleset_work);
schedule_work(&ruleset->work_free);
}
}
/**
* landlock_merge_ruleset - Merge a ruleset with a domain
*
* @parent: Parent domain.
* @ruleset: New ruleset to be merged.
*
* Returns the intersection of @parent and @ruleset, or returns @parent if
* @ruleset is empty, or returns a duplicate of @ruleset if @parent is empty.
*/
struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_merge_ruleset(
struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
{
struct landlock_ruleset *new_dom;
u32 num_layers;
int err;
might_sleep();
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ruleset || parent == ruleset))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (parent) {
if (parent->num_layers >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS)
return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
num_layers = parent->num_layers + 1;
} else {
num_layers = 1;
}
/* Creates a new domain... */
new_dom = create_ruleset(num_layers);
if (IS_ERR(new_dom))
return new_dom;
new_dom->hierarchy = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_dom->hierarchy),
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!new_dom->hierarchy) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_put_dom;
}
refcount_set(&new_dom->hierarchy->usage, 1);
/* ...as a child of @parent... */
err = inherit_ruleset(parent, new_dom);
if (err)
goto out_put_dom;
/* ...and including @ruleset. */
err = merge_ruleset(new_dom, ruleset);
if (err)
goto out_put_dom;
return new_dom;
out_put_dom:
landlock_put_ruleset(new_dom);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
/*
* The returned access has the same lifetime as @ruleset.
*/
const struct landlock_rule *landlock_find_rule(
const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
const struct landlock_object *const object)
{
const struct rb_node *node;
if (!object)
return NULL;
node = ruleset->root.rb_node;
while (node) {
struct landlock_rule *this = rb_entry(node,
struct landlock_rule, node);
if (this->object == object)
return this;
if (this->object < object)
node = node->rb_right;
else
node = node->rb_left;
}
return NULL;
}