OpenCloudOS-Kernel/include/linux/syscalls.h

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/*
* syscalls.h - Linux syscall interfaces (non-arch-specific)
*
* Copyright (c) 2004 Randy Dunlap
* Copyright (c) 2004 Open Source Development Labs
*
* This file is released under the GPLv2.
* See the file COPYING for more details.
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_SYSCALLS_H
#define _LINUX_SYSCALLS_H
struct epoll_event;
struct iattr;
struct inode;
struct iocb;
struct io_event;
struct iovec;
struct itimerspec;
struct itimerval;
struct kexec_segment;
struct linux_dirent;
struct linux_dirent64;
struct list_head;
struct mmap_arg_struct;
struct msgbuf;
separate kernel- and userland-side msghdr Kernel-side struct msghdr is (currently) using the same layout as userland one, but it's not a one-to-one copy - even without considering 32bit compat issues, we have msg_iov, msg_name and msg_control copied to kernel[1]. It's fairly localized, so we get away with a few functions where that knowledge is needed (and we could shrink that set even more). Pretty much everything deals with the kernel-side variant and the few places that want userland one just use a bunch of force-casts to paper over the differences. The thing is, kernel-side definition of struct msghdr is *not* exposed in include/uapi - libc doesn't see it, etc. So we can add struct user_msghdr, with proper annotations and let the few places that ever deal with those beasts use it for userland pointers. Saner typechecking aside, that will allow to change the layout of kernel-side msghdr - e.g. replace msg_iov/msg_iovlen there with struct iov_iter, getting rid of the need to modify the iovec as we copy data to/from it, etc. We could introduce kernel_msghdr instead, but that would create much more noise - the absolute majority of the instances would need to have the type switched to kernel_msghdr and definition of struct msghdr in include/linux/socket.h is not going to be seen by userland anyway. This commit just introduces user_msghdr and switches the few places that are dealing with userland-side msghdr to it. [1] actually, it's even trickier than that - we copy msg_control for sendmsg, but keep the userland address on recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-04-07 02:03:05 +08:00
struct user_msghdr;
struct mmsghdr;
struct msqid_ds;
struct new_utsname;
struct nfsctl_arg;
struct __old_kernel_stat;
struct oldold_utsname;
struct old_utsname;
struct pollfd;
struct rlimit;
rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall This patch adds the code to support the sys_prlimit64 syscall which modifies-and-returns the rlim values of a selected process atomically. The first parameter, pid, being 0 means current process. Unlike the current implementation, it is a generic interface, architecture indepentent so that we needn't handle compat stuff anymore. In the future, after glibc start to use this we can deprecate sys_setrlimit and sys_getrlimit in favor to clean up the code finally. It also adds a possibility of changing limits of other processes. We check the user's permissions to do that and if it succeeds, the new limits are propagated online. This is good for large scale applications such as SAP or databases where administrators need to change limits time by time (e.g. on crashes increase core size). And it is unacceptable to restart the service. For safety, all rlim users now either use accessors or doesn't need them due to - locking - the fact a process was just forked and nobody else knows about it yet (and nobody can't thus read/write limits) hence it is safe to modify limits now. The limitation is that we currently stay at ulong internal representation. So the rlim64_is_infinity check is used where value is compared against ULONG_MAX on 32-bit which is the maximum value there. And since internally the limits are held in struct rlimit, converters which are used before and after do_prlimit call in sys_prlimit64 are introduced. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
2010-05-05 00:03:50 +08:00
struct rlimit64;
struct rusage;
struct sched_param;
sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI Add the syscalls needed for supporting scheduling algorithms with extended scheduling parameters (e.g., SCHED_DEADLINE). In general, it makes possible to specify a periodic/sporadic task, that executes for a given amount of runtime at each instance, and is scheduled according to the urgency of their own timing constraints, i.e.: - a (maximum/typical) instance execution time, - a minimum interval between consecutive instances, - a time constraint by which each instance must be completed. Thus, both the data structure that holds the scheduling parameters of the tasks and the system calls dealing with it must be extended. Unfortunately, modifying the existing struct sched_param would break the ABI and result in potentially serious compatibility issues with legacy binaries. For these reasons, this patch: - defines the new struct sched_attr, containing all the fields that are necessary for specifying a task in the computational model described above; - defines and implements the new scheduling related syscalls that manipulate it, i.e., sched_setattr() and sched_getattr(). Syscalls are introduced for x86 (32 and 64 bits) and ARM only, as a proof of concept and for developing and testing purposes. Making them available on other architectures is straightforward. Since no "user" for these new parameters is introduced in this patch, the implementation of the new system calls is just identical to their already existing counterpart. Future patches that implement scheduling policies able to exploit the new data structure must also take care of modifying the sched_*attr() calls accordingly with their own purposes. Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it> [ Rewrote to use sched_attr. ] Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com> [ Removed sched_setscheduler2() for now. ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1383831828-15501-3-git-send-email-juri.lelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-11-07 21:43:36 +08:00
struct sched_attr;
struct sel_arg_struct;
struct semaphore;
struct sembuf;
struct shmid_ds;
struct sockaddr;
struct stat;
struct stat64;
struct statfs;
struct statfs64;
statx: Add a system call to make enhanced file info available Add a system call to make extended file information available, including file creation and some attribute flags where available through the underlying filesystem. The getattr inode operation is altered to take two additional arguments: a u32 request_mask and an unsigned int flags that indicate the synchronisation mode. This change is propagated to the vfs_getattr*() function. Functions like vfs_stat() are now inline wrappers around new functions vfs_statx() and vfs_statx_fd() to reduce stack usage. ======== OVERVIEW ======== The idea was initially proposed as a set of xattrs that could be retrieved with getxattr(), but the general preference proved to be for a new syscall with an extended stat structure. A number of requests were gathered for features to be included. The following have been included: (1) Make the fields a consistent size on all arches and make them large. (2) Spare space, request flags and information flags are provided for future expansion. (3) Better support for the y2038 problem [Arnd Bergmann] (tv_sec is an __s64). (4) Creation time: The SMB protocol carries the creation time, which could be exported by Samba, which will in turn help CIFS make use of FS-Cache as that can be used for coherency data (stx_btime). This is also specified in NFSv4 as a recommended attribute and could be exported by NFSD [Steve French]. (5) Lightweight stat: Ask for just those details of interest, and allow a netfs (such as NFS) to approximate anything not of interest, possibly without going to the server [Trond Myklebust, Ulrich Drepper, Andreas Dilger] (AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC). (6) Heavyweight stat: Force a netfs to go to the server, even if it thinks its cached attributes are up to date [Trond Myklebust] (AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC). And the following have been left out for future extension: (7) Data version number: Could be used by userspace NFS servers [Aneesh Kumar]. Can also be used to modify fill_post_wcc() in NFSD which retrieves i_version directly, but has just called vfs_getattr(). It could get it from the kstat struct if it used vfs_xgetattr() instead. (There's disagreement on the exact semantics of a single field, since not all filesystems do this the same way). (8) BSD stat compatibility: Including more fields from the BSD stat such as creation time (st_btime) and inode generation number (st_gen) [Jeremy Allison, Bernd Schubert]. (9) Inode generation number: Useful for FUSE and userspace NFS servers [Bernd Schubert]. (This was asked for but later deemed unnecessary with the open-by-handle capability available and caused disagreement as to whether it's a security hole or not). (10) Extra coherency data may be useful in making backups [Andreas Dilger]. (No particular data were offered, but things like last backup timestamp, the data version number and the DOS archive bit would come into this category). (11) Allow the filesystem to indicate what it can/cannot provide: A filesystem can now say it doesn't support a standard stat feature if that isn't available, so if, for instance, inode numbers or UIDs don't exist or are fabricated locally... (This requires a separate system call - I have an fsinfo() call idea for this). (12) Store a 16-byte volume ID in the superblock that can be returned in struct xstat [Steve French]. (Deferred to fsinfo). (13) Include granularity fields in the time data to indicate the granularity of each of the times (NFSv4 time_delta) [Steve French]. (Deferred to fsinfo). (14) FS_IOC_GETFLAGS value. These could be translated to BSD's st_flags. Note that the Linux IOC flags are a mess and filesystems such as Ext4 define flags that aren't in linux/fs.h, so translation in the kernel may be a necessity (or, possibly, we provide the filesystem type too). (Some attributes are made available in stx_attributes, but the general feeling was that the IOC flags were to ext[234]-specific and shouldn't be exposed through statx this way). (15) Mask of features available on file (eg: ACLs, seclabel) [Brad Boyer, Michael Kerrisk]. (Deferred, probably to fsinfo. Finding out if there's an ACL or seclabal might require extra filesystem operations). (16) Femtosecond-resolution timestamps [Dave Chinner]. (A __reserved field has been left in the statx_timestamp struct for this - if there proves to be a need). (17) A set multiple attributes syscall to go with this. =============== NEW SYSTEM CALL =============== The new system call is: int ret = statx(int dfd, const char *filename, unsigned int flags, unsigned int mask, struct statx *buffer); The dfd, filename and flags parameters indicate the file to query, in a similar way to fstatat(). There is no equivalent of lstat() as that can be emulated with statx() by passing AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW in flags. There is also no equivalent of fstat() as that can be emulated by passing a NULL filename to statx() with the fd of interest in dfd. Whether or not statx() synchronises the attributes with the backing store can be controlled by OR'ing a value into the flags argument (this typically only affects network filesystems): (1) AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT tells statx() to behave as stat() does in this respect. (2) AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC will require a network filesystem to synchronise its attributes with the server - which might require data writeback to occur to get the timestamps correct. (3) AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC will suppress synchronisation with the server in a network filesystem. The resulting values should be considered approximate. mask is a bitmask indicating the fields in struct statx that are of interest to the caller. The user should set this to STATX_BASIC_STATS to get the basic set returned by stat(). It should be noted that asking for more information may entail extra I/O operations. buffer points to the destination for the data. This must be 256 bytes in size. ====================== MAIN ATTRIBUTES RECORD ====================== The following structures are defined in which to return the main attribute set: struct statx_timestamp { __s64 tv_sec; __s32 tv_nsec; __s32 __reserved; }; struct statx { __u32 stx_mask; __u32 stx_blksize; __u64 stx_attributes; __u32 stx_nlink; __u32 stx_uid; __u32 stx_gid; __u16 stx_mode; __u16 __spare0[1]; __u64 stx_ino; __u64 stx_size; __u64 stx_blocks; __u64 __spare1[1]; struct statx_timestamp stx_atime; struct statx_timestamp stx_btime; struct statx_timestamp stx_ctime; struct statx_timestamp stx_mtime; __u32 stx_rdev_major; __u32 stx_rdev_minor; __u32 stx_dev_major; __u32 stx_dev_minor; __u64 __spare2[14]; }; The defined bits in request_mask and stx_mask are: STATX_TYPE Want/got stx_mode & S_IFMT STATX_MODE Want/got stx_mode & ~S_IFMT STATX_NLINK Want/got stx_nlink STATX_UID Want/got stx_uid STATX_GID Want/got stx_gid STATX_ATIME Want/got stx_atime{,_ns} STATX_MTIME Want/got stx_mtime{,_ns} STATX_CTIME Want/got stx_ctime{,_ns} STATX_INO Want/got stx_ino STATX_SIZE Want/got stx_size STATX_BLOCKS Want/got stx_blocks STATX_BASIC_STATS [The stuff in the normal stat struct] STATX_BTIME Want/got stx_btime{,_ns} STATX_ALL [All currently available stuff] stx_btime is the file creation time, stx_mask is a bitmask indicating the data provided and __spares*[] are where as-yet undefined fields can be placed. Time fields are structures with separate seconds and nanoseconds fields plus a reserved field in case we want to add even finer resolution. Note that times will be negative if before 1970; in such a case, the nanosecond fields will also be negative if not zero. The bits defined in the stx_attributes field convey information about a file, how it is accessed, where it is and what it does. The following attributes map to FS_*_FL flags and are the same numerical value: STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED File is compressed by the fs STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE File is marked immutable STATX_ATTR_APPEND File is append-only STATX_ATTR_NODUMP File is not to be dumped STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED File requires key to decrypt in fs Within the kernel, the supported flags are listed by: KSTAT_ATTR_FS_IOC_FLAGS [Are any other IOC flags of sufficient general interest to be exposed through this interface?] New flags include: STATX_ATTR_AUTOMOUNT Object is an automount trigger These are for the use of GUI tools that might want to mark files specially, depending on what they are. Fields in struct statx come in a number of classes: (0) stx_dev_*, stx_blksize. These are local system information and are always available. (1) stx_mode, stx_nlinks, stx_uid, stx_gid, stx_[amc]time, stx_ino, stx_size, stx_blocks. These will be returned whether the caller asks for them or not. The corresponding bits in stx_mask will be set to indicate whether they actually have valid values. If the caller didn't ask for them, then they may be approximated. For example, NFS won't waste any time updating them from the server, unless as a byproduct of updating something requested. If the values don't actually exist for the underlying object (such as UID or GID on a DOS file), then the bit won't be set in the stx_mask, even if the caller asked for the value. In such a case, the returned value will be a fabrication. Note that there are instances where the type might not be valid, for instance Windows reparse points. (2) stx_rdev_*. This will be set only if stx_mode indicates we're looking at a blockdev or a chardev, otherwise will be 0. (3) stx_btime. Similar to (1), except this will be set to 0 if it doesn't exist. ======= TESTING ======= The following test program can be used to test the statx system call: samples/statx/test-statx.c Just compile and run, passing it paths to the files you want to examine. The file is built automatically if CONFIG_SAMPLES is enabled. Here's some example output. Firstly, an NFS directory that crosses to another FSID. Note that the AUTOMOUNT attribute is set because transiting this directory will cause d_automount to be invoked by the VFS. [root@andromeda ~]# /tmp/test-statx -A /warthog/data statx(/warthog/data) = 0 results=7ff Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 directory Device: 00:26 Inode: 1703937 Links: 125 Access: (3777/drwxrwxrwx) Uid: 0 Gid: 4041 Access: 2016-11-24 09:02:12.219699527+0000 Modify: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Change: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Attributes: 0000000000001000 (-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ---m---- --------) Secondly, the result of automounting on that directory. [root@andromeda ~]# /tmp/test-statx /warthog/data statx(/warthog/data) = 0 results=7ff Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 directory Device: 00:27 Inode: 2 Links: 125 Access: (3777/drwxrwxrwx) Uid: 0 Gid: 4041 Access: 2016-11-24 09:02:12.219699527+0000 Modify: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Change: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-02-01 00:46:22 +08:00
struct statx;
struct __sysctl_args;
struct sysinfo;
struct timespec;
struct timeval;
struct timex;
struct timezone;
struct tms;
struct utimbuf;
struct mq_attr;
struct compat_stat;
struct compat_timeval;
struct robust_list_head;
struct getcpu_cache;
struct old_linux_dirent;
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 18:02:48 +08:00
struct perf_event_attr;
struct file_handle;
struct sigaltstack;
union bpf_attr;
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/sem.h>
#include <asm/siginfo.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/quota.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
tracing/syscalls: use a dedicated file header Impact: fix build warnings and possibe compat misbehavior on IA64 Building a kernel on ia64 might trigger these ugly build warnings: CC arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.o In file included from arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c:55: arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h:290:1: warning: "elf_check_arch" redefined In file included from include/linux/elf.h:7, from include/linux/module.h:14, from include/linux/ftrace.h:8, from include/linux/syscalls.h:68, from arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c:18: arch/ia64/include/asm/elf.h:19:1: warning: this is the location of the previous definition [...] sys_ia32.c includes linux/syscalls.h which in turn includes linux/ftrace.h to import the syscalls tracing prototypes. But including ftrace.h can pull too much things for a low level file, especially on ia64 where the ia32 private headers conflict with higher level headers. Now we isolate the syscall tracing headers in their own lightweight file. Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com> Cc: Michael Rubin <mrubin@google.com> Cc: Martin Bligh <mbligh@google.com> Cc: Michael Davidson <md@google.com> LKML-Reference: <20090408184058.GB6017@nowhere> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-04-09 02:40:59 +08:00
#include <trace/syscall.h>
/*
* __MAP - apply a macro to syscall arguments
* __MAP(n, m, t1, a1, t2, a2, ..., tn, an) will expand to
* m(t1, a1), m(t2, a2), ..., m(tn, an)
* The first argument must be equal to the amount of type/name
* pairs given. Note that this list of pairs (i.e. the arguments
* of __MAP starting at the third one) is in the same format as
* for SYSCALL_DEFINE<n>/COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE<n>
*/
#define __MAP0(m,...)
#define __MAP1(m,t,a) m(t,a)
#define __MAP2(m,t,a,...) m(t,a), __MAP1(m,__VA_ARGS__)
#define __MAP3(m,t,a,...) m(t,a), __MAP2(m,__VA_ARGS__)
#define __MAP4(m,t,a,...) m(t,a), __MAP3(m,__VA_ARGS__)
#define __MAP5(m,t,a,...) m(t,a), __MAP4(m,__VA_ARGS__)
#define __MAP6(m,t,a,...) m(t,a), __MAP5(m,__VA_ARGS__)
#define __MAP(n,...) __MAP##n(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __SC_DECL(t, a) t a
#define __TYPE_AS(t, v) __same_type((__force t)0, v)
#define __TYPE_IS_L(t) (__TYPE_AS(t, 0L))
#define __TYPE_IS_UL(t) (__TYPE_AS(t, 0UL))
#define __TYPE_IS_LL(t) (__TYPE_AS(t, 0LL) || __TYPE_AS(t, 0ULL))
#define __SC_LONG(t, a) __typeof(__builtin_choose_expr(__TYPE_IS_LL(t), 0LL, 0L)) a
#define __SC_CAST(t, a) (__force t) a
#define __SC_ARGS(t, a) a
#define __SC_TEST(t, a) (void)BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(!__TYPE_IS_LL(t) && sizeof(t) > sizeof(long))
#ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_SYSCALLS
#define __SC_STR_ADECL(t, a) #a
#define __SC_STR_TDECL(t, a) #t
extern struct trace_event_class event_class_syscall_enter;
extern struct trace_event_class event_class_syscall_exit;
extern struct trace_event_functions enter_syscall_print_funcs;
extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
#define SYSCALL_TRACE_ENTER_EVENT(sname) \
tracing: Replace syscall_meta_data struct array with pointer array Currently the syscall_meta structures for the syscall tracepoints are placed in the __syscall_metadata section, and at link time, the linker makes one large array of all these syscall metadata structures. On boot up, this array is read (much like the initcall sections) and the syscall data is processed. The problem is that there is no guarantee that gcc will place complex structures nicely together in an array format. Two structures in the same file may be placed awkwardly, because gcc has no clue that they are suppose to be in an array. A hack was used previous to force the alignment to 4, to pack the structures together. But this caused alignment issues with other architectures (sparc). Instead of packing the structures into an array, the structures' addresses are now put into the __syscall_metadata section. As pointers are always the natural alignment, gcc should always pack them tightly together (otherwise initcall, extable, etc would also fail). By having the pointers to the structures in the section, we can still iterate the trace_events without causing unnecessary alignment problems with other architectures, or depending on the current behaviour of gcc that will likely change in the future just to tick us kernel developers off a little more. The __syscall_metadata section is also moved into the .init.data section as it is now only needed at boot up. Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-02-03 06:06:09 +08:00
static struct syscall_metadata __syscall_meta_##sname; \
static struct trace_event_call __used \
event_enter_##sname = { \
tracing: Remove per event trace registering This patch removes the register functions of TRACE_EVENT() to enable and disable tracepoints. The registering of a event is now down directly in the trace_events.c file. The tracepoint_probe_register() is now called directly. The prototypes are no longer type checked, but this should not be an issue since the tracepoints are created automatically by the macros. If a prototype is incorrect in the TRACE_EVENT() macro, then other macros will catch it. The trace_event_class structure now holds the probes to be called by the callbacks. This removes needing to have each event have a separate pointer for the probe. To handle kprobes and syscalls, since they register probes in a different manner, a "reg" field is added to the ftrace_event_class structure. If the "reg" field is assigned, then it will be called for enabling and disabling of the probe for either ftrace or perf. To let the reg function know what is happening, a new enum (trace_reg) is created that has the type of control that is needed. With this new rework, the 82 kernel events and 618 syscall events has their footprint dramatically lowered: text data bss dec hex filename 4913961 1088356 861512 6863829 68bbd5 vmlinux.orig 4914025 1088868 861512 6864405 68be15 vmlinux.class 4918492 1084612 861512 6864616 68bee8 vmlinux.tracepoint 4900252 1057412 861512 6819176 680d68 vmlinux.regs The size went from 6863829 to 6819176, that's a total of 44K in savings. With tracepoints being continuously added, this is critical that the footprint becomes minimal. v5: Added #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS around a reference to perf specific structure in trace_events.c. v4: Fixed trace self tests to check probe because regfunc no longer exists. v3: Updated to handle void *data in beginning of probe parameters. Also added the tracepoint: check_trace_callback_type_##call(). v2: Changed the callback probes to pass void * and typecast the value within the function. Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2010-04-22 00:27:06 +08:00
.class = &event_class_syscall_enter, \
{ \
.name = "sys_enter"#sname, \
}, \
.event.funcs = &enter_syscall_print_funcs, \
.data = (void *)&__syscall_meta_##sname,\
.flags = TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY, \
}; \
static struct trace_event_call __used \
tracing: Replace trace_event struct array with pointer array Currently the trace_event structures are placed in the _ftrace_events section, and at link time, the linker makes one large array of all the trace_event structures. On boot up, this array is read (much like the initcall sections) and the events are processed. The problem is that there is no guarantee that gcc will place complex structures nicely together in an array format. Two structures in the same file may be placed awkwardly, because gcc has no clue that they are suppose to be in an array. A hack was used previous to force the alignment to 4, to pack the structures together. But this caused alignment issues with other architectures (sparc). Instead of packing the structures into an array, the structures' addresses are now put into the _ftrace_event section. As pointers are always the natural alignment, gcc should always pack them tightly together (otherwise initcall, extable, etc would also fail). By having the pointers to the structures in the section, we can still iterate the trace_events without causing unnecessary alignment problems with other architectures, or depending on the current behaviour of gcc that will likely change in the future just to tick us kernel developers off a little more. The _ftrace_event section is also moved into the .init.data section as it is now only needed at boot up. Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-01-27 22:15:30 +08:00
__attribute__((section("_ftrace_events"))) \
*__event_enter_##sname = &event_enter_##sname;
#define SYSCALL_TRACE_EXIT_EVENT(sname) \
tracing: Replace syscall_meta_data struct array with pointer array Currently the syscall_meta structures for the syscall tracepoints are placed in the __syscall_metadata section, and at link time, the linker makes one large array of all these syscall metadata structures. On boot up, this array is read (much like the initcall sections) and the syscall data is processed. The problem is that there is no guarantee that gcc will place complex structures nicely together in an array format. Two structures in the same file may be placed awkwardly, because gcc has no clue that they are suppose to be in an array. A hack was used previous to force the alignment to 4, to pack the structures together. But this caused alignment issues with other architectures (sparc). Instead of packing the structures into an array, the structures' addresses are now put into the __syscall_metadata section. As pointers are always the natural alignment, gcc should always pack them tightly together (otherwise initcall, extable, etc would also fail). By having the pointers to the structures in the section, we can still iterate the trace_events without causing unnecessary alignment problems with other architectures, or depending on the current behaviour of gcc that will likely change in the future just to tick us kernel developers off a little more. The __syscall_metadata section is also moved into the .init.data section as it is now only needed at boot up. Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-02-03 06:06:09 +08:00
static struct syscall_metadata __syscall_meta_##sname; \
static struct trace_event_call __used \
event_exit_##sname = { \
tracing: Remove per event trace registering This patch removes the register functions of TRACE_EVENT() to enable and disable tracepoints. The registering of a event is now down directly in the trace_events.c file. The tracepoint_probe_register() is now called directly. The prototypes are no longer type checked, but this should not be an issue since the tracepoints are created automatically by the macros. If a prototype is incorrect in the TRACE_EVENT() macro, then other macros will catch it. The trace_event_class structure now holds the probes to be called by the callbacks. This removes needing to have each event have a separate pointer for the probe. To handle kprobes and syscalls, since they register probes in a different manner, a "reg" field is added to the ftrace_event_class structure. If the "reg" field is assigned, then it will be called for enabling and disabling of the probe for either ftrace or perf. To let the reg function know what is happening, a new enum (trace_reg) is created that has the type of control that is needed. With this new rework, the 82 kernel events and 618 syscall events has their footprint dramatically lowered: text data bss dec hex filename 4913961 1088356 861512 6863829 68bbd5 vmlinux.orig 4914025 1088868 861512 6864405 68be15 vmlinux.class 4918492 1084612 861512 6864616 68bee8 vmlinux.tracepoint 4900252 1057412 861512 6819176 680d68 vmlinux.regs The size went from 6863829 to 6819176, that's a total of 44K in savings. With tracepoints being continuously added, this is critical that the footprint becomes minimal. v5: Added #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS around a reference to perf specific structure in trace_events.c. v4: Fixed trace self tests to check probe because regfunc no longer exists. v3: Updated to handle void *data in beginning of probe parameters. Also added the tracepoint: check_trace_callback_type_##call(). v2: Changed the callback probes to pass void * and typecast the value within the function. Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2010-04-22 00:27:06 +08:00
.class = &event_class_syscall_exit, \
{ \
.name = "sys_exit"#sname, \
}, \
.event.funcs = &exit_syscall_print_funcs, \
.data = (void *)&__syscall_meta_##sname,\
.flags = TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY, \
}; \
static struct trace_event_call __used \
tracing: Replace trace_event struct array with pointer array Currently the trace_event structures are placed in the _ftrace_events section, and at link time, the linker makes one large array of all the trace_event structures. On boot up, this array is read (much like the initcall sections) and the events are processed. The problem is that there is no guarantee that gcc will place complex structures nicely together in an array format. Two structures in the same file may be placed awkwardly, because gcc has no clue that they are suppose to be in an array. A hack was used previous to force the alignment to 4, to pack the structures together. But this caused alignment issues with other architectures (sparc). Instead of packing the structures into an array, the structures' addresses are now put into the _ftrace_event section. As pointers are always the natural alignment, gcc should always pack them tightly together (otherwise initcall, extable, etc would also fail). By having the pointers to the structures in the section, we can still iterate the trace_events without causing unnecessary alignment problems with other architectures, or depending on the current behaviour of gcc that will likely change in the future just to tick us kernel developers off a little more. The _ftrace_event section is also moved into the .init.data section as it is now only needed at boot up. Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-01-27 22:15:30 +08:00
__attribute__((section("_ftrace_events"))) \
*__event_exit_##sname = &event_exit_##sname;
#define SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, nb, ...) \
static const char *types_##sname[] = { \
__MAP(nb,__SC_STR_TDECL,__VA_ARGS__) \
}; \
static const char *args_##sname[] = { \
__MAP(nb,__SC_STR_ADECL,__VA_ARGS__) \
}; \
SYSCALL_TRACE_ENTER_EVENT(sname); \
SYSCALL_TRACE_EXIT_EVENT(sname); \
tracing: Move fields from event to class structure Move the defined fields from the event to the class structure. Since the fields of the event are defined by the class they belong to, it makes sense to have the class hold the information instead of the individual events. The events of the same class would just hold duplicate information. After this change the size of the kernel dropped another 3K: text data bss dec hex filename 4913961 1088356 861512 6863829 68bbd5 vmlinux.orig 4900252 1057412 861512 6819176 680d68 vmlinux.regs 4900375 1053380 861512 6815267 67fe23 vmlinux.fields Although the text increased, this was mainly due to the C files having to adapt to the change. This is a constant increase, where new tracepoints will not increase the Text. But the big drop is in the data size (as well as needed allocations to hold the fields). This will give even more savings as more tracepoints are created. Note, if just TRACE_EVENT()s are used and not DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS() with several DEFINE_EVENT()s, then the savings will be lost. But we are pushing developers to consolidate events with DEFINE_EVENT() so this should not be an issue. The kprobes define a unique class to every new event, but are dynamic so it should not be a issue. The syscalls however have a single class but the fields for the individual events are different. The syscalls use a metadata to define the fields. I moved the fields list from the event to the metadata and added a "get_fields()" function to the class. This function is used to find the fields. For normal events and kprobes, get_fields() just returns a pointer to the fields list_head in the class. For syscall events, it returns the fields list_head in the metadata for the event. v2: Fixed the syscall fields. The syscall metadata needs a list of fields for both enter and exit. Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tzanussi@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2010-04-22 22:35:55 +08:00
static struct syscall_metadata __used \
__syscall_meta_##sname = { \
.name = "sys"#sname, \
.syscall_nr = -1, /* Filled in at boot */ \
.nb_args = nb, \
.types = nb ? types_##sname : NULL, \
.args = nb ? args_##sname : NULL, \
.enter_event = &event_enter_##sname, \
.exit_event = &event_exit_##sname, \
tracing: Move fields from event to class structure Move the defined fields from the event to the class structure. Since the fields of the event are defined by the class they belong to, it makes sense to have the class hold the information instead of the individual events. The events of the same class would just hold duplicate information. After this change the size of the kernel dropped another 3K: text data bss dec hex filename 4913961 1088356 861512 6863829 68bbd5 vmlinux.orig 4900252 1057412 861512 6819176 680d68 vmlinux.regs 4900375 1053380 861512 6815267 67fe23 vmlinux.fields Although the text increased, this was mainly due to the C files having to adapt to the change. This is a constant increase, where new tracepoints will not increase the Text. But the big drop is in the data size (as well as needed allocations to hold the fields). This will give even more savings as more tracepoints are created. Note, if just TRACE_EVENT()s are used and not DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS() with several DEFINE_EVENT()s, then the savings will be lost. But we are pushing developers to consolidate events with DEFINE_EVENT() so this should not be an issue. The kprobes define a unique class to every new event, but are dynamic so it should not be a issue. The syscalls however have a single class but the fields for the individual events are different. The syscalls use a metadata to define the fields. I moved the fields list from the event to the metadata and added a "get_fields()" function to the class. This function is used to find the fields. For normal events and kprobes, get_fields() just returns a pointer to the fields list_head in the class. For syscall events, it returns the fields list_head in the metadata for the event. v2: Fixed the syscall fields. The syscall metadata needs a list of fields for both enter and exit. Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tzanussi@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2010-04-22 22:35:55 +08:00
.enter_fields = LIST_HEAD_INIT(__syscall_meta_##sname.enter_fields), \
tracing: Replace syscall_meta_data struct array with pointer array Currently the syscall_meta structures for the syscall tracepoints are placed in the __syscall_metadata section, and at link time, the linker makes one large array of all these syscall metadata structures. On boot up, this array is read (much like the initcall sections) and the syscall data is processed. The problem is that there is no guarantee that gcc will place complex structures nicely together in an array format. Two structures in the same file may be placed awkwardly, because gcc has no clue that they are suppose to be in an array. A hack was used previous to force the alignment to 4, to pack the structures together. But this caused alignment issues with other architectures (sparc). Instead of packing the structures into an array, the structures' addresses are now put into the __syscall_metadata section. As pointers are always the natural alignment, gcc should always pack them tightly together (otherwise initcall, extable, etc would also fail). By having the pointers to the structures in the section, we can still iterate the trace_events without causing unnecessary alignment problems with other architectures, or depending on the current behaviour of gcc that will likely change in the future just to tick us kernel developers off a little more. The __syscall_metadata section is also moved into the .init.data section as it is now only needed at boot up. Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-02-03 06:06:09 +08:00
}; \
static struct syscall_metadata __used \
__attribute__((section("__syscalls_metadata"))) \
*__p_syscall_meta_##sname = &__syscall_meta_##sname;
static inline int is_syscall_trace_event(struct trace_event_call *tp_event)
{
return tp_event->class == &event_class_syscall_enter ||
tp_event->class == &event_class_syscall_exit;
}
#else
#define SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, nb, ...)
static inline int is_syscall_trace_event(struct trace_event_call *tp_event)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
#define SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sname) \
SYSCALL_METADATA(_##sname, 0); \
asmlinkage long sys_##sname(void)
#define SYSCALL_DEFINE1(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(1, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
#define SYSCALL_DEFINE2(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(2, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
#define SYSCALL_DEFINE3(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(3, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
#define SYSCALL_DEFINE4(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(4, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
#define SYSCALL_DEFINE5(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(5, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
#define SYSCALL_DEFINE6(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(6, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
#define SYSCALL_DEFINE_MAXARGS 6
#define SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, ...) \
SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__) \
__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
#define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...) \
asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)) \
__attribute__((alias(__stringify(SyS##name)))); \
static inline long SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)); \
asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)); \
asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)) \
{ \
long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__)); \
__MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__); \
__PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__)); \
return ret; \
} \
static inline long SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))
x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate privileges [1]. The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if needed. The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture function to check the address limit. [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com
2017-06-15 09:12:01 +08:00
/*
* Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
* address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
*/
static inline void addr_limit_user_check(void)
{
#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK
x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate privileges [1]. The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if needed. The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture function to check the address limit. [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com
2017-06-15 09:12:01 +08:00
if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK))
return;
#endif
x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate privileges [1]. The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if needed. The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture function to check the address limit. [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com
2017-06-15 09:12:01 +08:00
if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS),
"Invalid address limit on user-mode return"))
force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK
x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate privileges [1]. The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if needed. The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture function to check the address limit. [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com
2017-06-15 09:12:01 +08:00
clear_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK);
#endif
}
x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate privileges [1]. The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if needed. The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture function to check the address limit. [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com
2017-06-15 09:12:01 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_time(time_t __user *tloc);
asmlinkage long sys_stime(time_t __user *tptr);
asmlinkage long sys_gettimeofday(struct timeval __user *tv,
struct timezone __user *tz);
asmlinkage long sys_settimeofday(struct timeval __user *tv,
struct timezone __user *tz);
asmlinkage long sys_adjtimex(struct timex __user *txc_p);
asmlinkage long sys_times(struct tms __user *tbuf);
asmlinkage long sys_gettid(void);
asmlinkage long sys_nanosleep(struct timespec __user *rqtp, struct timespec __user *rmtp);
asmlinkage long sys_alarm(unsigned int seconds);
asmlinkage long sys_getpid(void);
asmlinkage long sys_getppid(void);
asmlinkage long sys_getuid(void);
asmlinkage long sys_geteuid(void);
asmlinkage long sys_getgid(void);
asmlinkage long sys_getegid(void);
asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t __user *ruid, uid_t __user *euid, uid_t __user *suid);
asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t __user *rgid, gid_t __user *egid, gid_t __user *sgid);
asmlinkage long sys_getpgid(pid_t pid);
asmlinkage long sys_getpgrp(void);
asmlinkage long sys_getsid(pid_t pid);
asmlinkage long sys_getgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist);
asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid);
asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid);
asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid);
asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid);
asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid);
asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid);
asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid);
asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid);
asmlinkage long sys_setpgid(pid_t pid, pid_t pgid);
asmlinkage long sys_setsid(void);
asmlinkage long sys_setgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist);
asmlinkage long sys_acct(const char __user *name);
asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header,
cap_user_data_t dataptr);
asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header,
const cap_user_data_t data);
asmlinkage long sys_personality(unsigned int personality);
asmlinkage long sys_sigpending(old_sigset_t __user *uset);
asmlinkage long sys_sigprocmask(int how, old_sigset_t __user *set,
old_sigset_t __user *oset);
asmlinkage long sys_sigaltstack(const struct sigaltstack __user *uss,
struct sigaltstack __user *uoss);
asmlinkage long sys_getitimer(int which, struct itimerval __user *value);
asmlinkage long sys_setitimer(int which,
struct itimerval __user *value,
struct itimerval __user *ovalue);
asmlinkage long sys_timer_create(clockid_t which_clock,
struct sigevent __user *timer_event_spec,
timer_t __user * created_timer_id);
asmlinkage long sys_timer_gettime(timer_t timer_id,
struct itimerspec __user *setting);
asmlinkage long sys_timer_getoverrun(timer_t timer_id);
asmlinkage long sys_timer_settime(timer_t timer_id, int flags,
const struct itimerspec __user *new_setting,
struct itimerspec __user *old_setting);
asmlinkage long sys_timer_delete(timer_t timer_id);
asmlinkage long sys_clock_settime(clockid_t which_clock,
const struct timespec __user *tp);
asmlinkage long sys_clock_gettime(clockid_t which_clock,
struct timespec __user *tp);
asmlinkage long sys_clock_adjtime(clockid_t which_clock,
struct timex __user *tx);
asmlinkage long sys_clock_getres(clockid_t which_clock,
struct timespec __user *tp);
asmlinkage long sys_clock_nanosleep(clockid_t which_clock, int flags,
const struct timespec __user *rqtp,
struct timespec __user *rmtp);
asmlinkage long sys_nice(int increment);
asmlinkage long sys_sched_setscheduler(pid_t pid, int policy,
struct sched_param __user *param);
asmlinkage long sys_sched_setparam(pid_t pid,
struct sched_param __user *param);
sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI Add the syscalls needed for supporting scheduling algorithms with extended scheduling parameters (e.g., SCHED_DEADLINE). In general, it makes possible to specify a periodic/sporadic task, that executes for a given amount of runtime at each instance, and is scheduled according to the urgency of their own timing constraints, i.e.: - a (maximum/typical) instance execution time, - a minimum interval between consecutive instances, - a time constraint by which each instance must be completed. Thus, both the data structure that holds the scheduling parameters of the tasks and the system calls dealing with it must be extended. Unfortunately, modifying the existing struct sched_param would break the ABI and result in potentially serious compatibility issues with legacy binaries. For these reasons, this patch: - defines the new struct sched_attr, containing all the fields that are necessary for specifying a task in the computational model described above; - defines and implements the new scheduling related syscalls that manipulate it, i.e., sched_setattr() and sched_getattr(). Syscalls are introduced for x86 (32 and 64 bits) and ARM only, as a proof of concept and for developing and testing purposes. Making them available on other architectures is straightforward. Since no "user" for these new parameters is introduced in this patch, the implementation of the new system calls is just identical to their already existing counterpart. Future patches that implement scheduling policies able to exploit the new data structure must also take care of modifying the sched_*attr() calls accordingly with their own purposes. Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it> [ Rewrote to use sched_attr. ] Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com> [ Removed sched_setscheduler2() for now. ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1383831828-15501-3-git-send-email-juri.lelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-11-07 21:43:36 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_sched_setattr(pid_t pid,
struct sched_attr __user *attr,
unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_sched_getscheduler(pid_t pid);
asmlinkage long sys_sched_getparam(pid_t pid,
struct sched_param __user *param);
sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI Add the syscalls needed for supporting scheduling algorithms with extended scheduling parameters (e.g., SCHED_DEADLINE). In general, it makes possible to specify a periodic/sporadic task, that executes for a given amount of runtime at each instance, and is scheduled according to the urgency of their own timing constraints, i.e.: - a (maximum/typical) instance execution time, - a minimum interval between consecutive instances, - a time constraint by which each instance must be completed. Thus, both the data structure that holds the scheduling parameters of the tasks and the system calls dealing with it must be extended. Unfortunately, modifying the existing struct sched_param would break the ABI and result in potentially serious compatibility issues with legacy binaries. For these reasons, this patch: - defines the new struct sched_attr, containing all the fields that are necessary for specifying a task in the computational model described above; - defines and implements the new scheduling related syscalls that manipulate it, i.e., sched_setattr() and sched_getattr(). Syscalls are introduced for x86 (32 and 64 bits) and ARM only, as a proof of concept and for developing and testing purposes. Making them available on other architectures is straightforward. Since no "user" for these new parameters is introduced in this patch, the implementation of the new system calls is just identical to their already existing counterpart. Future patches that implement scheduling policies able to exploit the new data structure must also take care of modifying the sched_*attr() calls accordingly with their own purposes. Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it> [ Rewrote to use sched_attr. ] Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com> [ Removed sched_setscheduler2() for now. ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1383831828-15501-3-git-send-email-juri.lelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-11-07 21:43:36 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_sched_getattr(pid_t pid,
struct sched_attr __user *attr,
unsigned int size,
unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
unsigned long __user *user_mask_ptr);
asmlinkage long sys_sched_getaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
unsigned long __user *user_mask_ptr);
asmlinkage long sys_sched_yield(void);
asmlinkage long sys_sched_get_priority_max(int policy);
asmlinkage long sys_sched_get_priority_min(int policy);
asmlinkage long sys_sched_rr_get_interval(pid_t pid,
struct timespec __user *interval);
asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval);
asmlinkage long sys_getpriority(int which, int who);
asmlinkage long sys_shutdown(int, int);
asmlinkage long sys_reboot(int magic1, int magic2, unsigned int cmd,
void __user *arg);
asmlinkage long sys_restart_syscall(void);
asmlinkage long sys_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments,
struct kexec_segment __user *segments,
unsigned long flags);
asmlinkage long sys_kexec_file_load(int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
unsigned long cmdline_len,
const char __user *cmdline_ptr,
unsigned long flags);
asmlinkage long sys_exit(int error_code);
asmlinkage long sys_exit_group(int error_code);
asmlinkage long sys_wait4(pid_t pid, int __user *stat_addr,
int options, struct rusage __user *ru);
asmlinkage long sys_waitid(int which, pid_t pid,
struct siginfo __user *infop,
int options, struct rusage __user *ru);
asmlinkage long sys_waitpid(pid_t pid, int __user *stat_addr, int options);
asmlinkage long sys_set_tid_address(int __user *tidptr);
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI) support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it, ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1. We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons: - in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work (or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace. - in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down] - the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc. Priority Inheritance - why, oh why??? ------------------------------------- Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment, when someone actually submits working PI code ;-) So why would we like to see PI support for futexes? We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications, which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below) we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion. What are the benefits of PI? The short reply: ---------------- User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical distribution of locking related application delays. The longer reply: ----------------- Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10 and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware, or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible. Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks: for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels. So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space. Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is priority inheritance: Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it indefinitely. Implementation: --------------- As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked. (This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel. To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops: FUTEX_LOCK_PI FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work: if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains FUTEX_WAITERS|TID. If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID -> 0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered. If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes up any potential waiters. Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway, due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.] Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex, PI-futex, robust+PI-futex. glibc support: -------------- Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes (and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel functionality.] the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from: http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/ Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others. Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it: - use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI - use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long - code style / comment style cleanups - rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'. I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this patch has no code effects. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 17:54:47 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val,
struct timespec __user *utime, u32 __user *uaddr2,
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI) support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it, ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1. We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons: - in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work (or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace. - in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down] - the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc. Priority Inheritance - why, oh why??? ------------------------------------- Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment, when someone actually submits working PI code ;-) So why would we like to see PI support for futexes? We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications, which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below) we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion. What are the benefits of PI? The short reply: ---------------- User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical distribution of locking related application delays. The longer reply: ----------------- Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10 and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware, or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible. Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks: for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels. So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space. Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is priority inheritance: Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it indefinitely. Implementation: --------------- As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked. (This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel. To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops: FUTEX_LOCK_PI FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work: if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains FUTEX_WAITERS|TID. If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID -> 0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered. If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes up any potential waiters. Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway, due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.] Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex, PI-futex, robust+PI-futex. glibc support: -------------- Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes (and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel functionality.] the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from: http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/ Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others. Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it: - use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI - use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long - code style / comment style cleanups - rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'. I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this patch has no code effects. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 17:54:47 +08:00
u32 val3);
asmlinkage long sys_init_module(void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
const char __user *uargs);
asmlinkage long sys_delete_module(const char __user *name_user,
unsigned int flags);
#ifdef CONFIG_OLD_SIGSUSPEND
asmlinkage long sys_sigsuspend(old_sigset_t mask);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_OLD_SIGSUSPEND3
asmlinkage long sys_sigsuspend(int unused1, int unused2, old_sigset_t mask);
#endif
asmlinkage long sys_rt_sigsuspend(sigset_t __user *unewset, size_t sigsetsize);
#ifdef CONFIG_OLD_SIGACTION
asmlinkage long sys_sigaction(int, const struct old_sigaction __user *,
struct old_sigaction __user *);
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_ODD_RT_SIGACTION
asmlinkage long sys_rt_sigaction(int,
const struct sigaction __user *,
struct sigaction __user *,
size_t);
#endif
asmlinkage long sys_rt_sigprocmask(int how, sigset_t __user *set,
sigset_t __user *oset, size_t sigsetsize);
asmlinkage long sys_rt_sigpending(sigset_t __user *set, size_t sigsetsize);
asmlinkage long sys_rt_sigtimedwait(const sigset_t __user *uthese,
siginfo_t __user *uinfo,
const struct timespec __user *uts,
size_t sigsetsize);
asmlinkage long sys_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig,
siginfo_t __user *uinfo);
asmlinkage long sys_kill(pid_t pid, int sig);
asmlinkage long sys_tgkill(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig);
asmlinkage long sys_tkill(pid_t pid, int sig);
asmlinkage long sys_rt_sigqueueinfo(pid_t pid, int sig, siginfo_t __user *uinfo);
asmlinkage long sys_sgetmask(void);
asmlinkage long sys_ssetmask(int newmask);
asmlinkage long sys_signal(int sig, __sighandler_t handler);
asmlinkage long sys_pause(void);
asmlinkage long sys_sync(void);
asmlinkage long sys_fsync(unsigned int fd);
asmlinkage long sys_fdatasync(unsigned int fd);
asmlinkage long sys_bdflush(int func, long data);
asmlinkage long sys_mount(char __user *dev_name, char __user *dir_name,
char __user *type, unsigned long flags,
void __user *data);
asmlinkage long sys_umount(char __user *name, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_oldumount(char __user *name);
asmlinkage long sys_truncate(const char __user *path, long length);
asmlinkage long sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, unsigned long length);
asmlinkage long sys_stat(const char __user *filename,
struct __old_kernel_stat __user *statbuf);
asmlinkage long sys_statfs(const char __user * path,
struct statfs __user *buf);
asmlinkage long sys_statfs64(const char __user *path, size_t sz,
struct statfs64 __user *buf);
asmlinkage long sys_fstatfs(unsigned int fd, struct statfs __user *buf);
asmlinkage long sys_fstatfs64(unsigned int fd, size_t sz,
struct statfs64 __user *buf);
asmlinkage long sys_lstat(const char __user *filename,
struct __old_kernel_stat __user *statbuf);
asmlinkage long sys_fstat(unsigned int fd,
struct __old_kernel_stat __user *statbuf);
asmlinkage long sys_newstat(const char __user *filename,
struct stat __user *statbuf);
asmlinkage long sys_newlstat(const char __user *filename,
struct stat __user *statbuf);
asmlinkage long sys_newfstat(unsigned int fd, struct stat __user *statbuf);
asmlinkage long sys_ustat(unsigned dev, struct ustat __user *ubuf);
#if defined(__ARCH_WANT_STAT64) || defined(__ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_STAT64)
asmlinkage long sys_stat64(const char __user *filename,
struct stat64 __user *statbuf);
asmlinkage long sys_fstat64(unsigned long fd, struct stat64 __user *statbuf);
asmlinkage long sys_lstat64(const char __user *filename,
struct stat64 __user *statbuf);
asmlinkage long sys_fstatat64(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
struct stat64 __user *statbuf, int flag);
#endif
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
asmlinkage long sys_truncate64(const char __user *path, loff_t length);
asmlinkage long sys_ftruncate64(unsigned int fd, loff_t length);
#endif
asmlinkage long sys_setxattr(const char __user *path, const char __user *name,
const void __user *value, size_t size, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_lsetxattr(const char __user *path, const char __user *name,
const void __user *value, size_t size, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_fsetxattr(int fd, const char __user *name,
const void __user *value, size_t size, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_getxattr(const char __user *path, const char __user *name,
void __user *value, size_t size);
asmlinkage long sys_lgetxattr(const char __user *path, const char __user *name,
void __user *value, size_t size);
asmlinkage long sys_fgetxattr(int fd, const char __user *name,
void __user *value, size_t size);
asmlinkage long sys_listxattr(const char __user *path, char __user *list,
size_t size);
asmlinkage long sys_llistxattr(const char __user *path, char __user *list,
size_t size);
asmlinkage long sys_flistxattr(int fd, char __user *list, size_t size);
asmlinkage long sys_removexattr(const char __user *path,
const char __user *name);
asmlinkage long sys_lremovexattr(const char __user *path,
const char __user *name);
asmlinkage long sys_fremovexattr(int fd, const char __user *name);
asmlinkage long sys_brk(unsigned long brk);
asmlinkage long sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len,
unsigned long prot);
asmlinkage long sys_mremap(unsigned long addr,
unsigned long old_len, unsigned long new_len,
unsigned long flags, unsigned long new_addr);
asmlinkage long sys_remap_file_pages(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long pgoff,
unsigned long flags);
asmlinkage long sys_msync(unsigned long start, size_t len, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_fadvise64(int fd, loff_t offset, size_t len, int advice);
asmlinkage long sys_fadvise64_64(int fd, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice);
asmlinkage long sys_munmap(unsigned long addr, size_t len);
asmlinkage long sys_mlock(unsigned long start, size_t len);
asmlinkage long sys_munlock(unsigned long start, size_t len);
asmlinkage long sys_mlockall(int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_munlockall(void);
asmlinkage long sys_madvise(unsigned long start, size_t len, int behavior);
asmlinkage long sys_mincore(unsigned long start, size_t len,
unsigned char __user * vec);
asmlinkage long sys_pivot_root(const char __user *new_root,
const char __user *put_old);
asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __user *filename);
asmlinkage long sys_mknod(const char __user *filename, umode_t mode,
unsigned dev);
asmlinkage long sys_link(const char __user *oldname,
const char __user *newname);
asmlinkage long sys_symlink(const char __user *old, const char __user *new);
asmlinkage long sys_unlink(const char __user *pathname);
asmlinkage long sys_rename(const char __user *oldname,
const char __user *newname);
asmlinkage long sys_chmod(const char __user *filename, umode_t mode);
asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int fd, umode_t mode);
asmlinkage long sys_fcntl(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
asmlinkage long sys_fcntl64(unsigned int fd,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
#endif
asmlinkage long sys_pipe(int __user *fildes);
asmlinkage long sys_pipe2(int __user *fildes, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_dup(unsigned int fildes);
asmlinkage long sys_dup2(unsigned int oldfd, unsigned int newfd);
flag parameters: dup2 This patch adds the new dup3 syscall. It extends the old dup2 syscall by one parameter which is meant to hold a flag value. Support for the O_CLOEXEC flag is added in this patch. The following test must be adjusted for architectures other than x86 and x86-64 and in case the syscall numbers changed. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <time.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #ifndef __NR_dup3 # ifdef __x86_64__ # define __NR_dup3 292 # elif defined __i386__ # define __NR_dup3 330 # else # error "need __NR_dup3" # endif #endif int main (void) { int fd = syscall (__NR_dup3, 1, 4, 0); if (fd == -1) { puts ("dup3(0) failed"); return 1; } int coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if (coe & FD_CLOEXEC) { puts ("dup3(0) set close-on-exec flag"); return 1; } close (fd); fd = syscall (__NR_dup3, 1, 4, O_CLOEXEC); if (fd == -1) { puts ("dup3(O_CLOEXEC) failed"); return 1; } coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if ((coe & FD_CLOEXEC) == 0) { puts ("dup3(O_CLOEXEC) set close-on-exec flag"); return 1; } close (fd); puts ("OK"); return 0; } ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Acked-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 12:29:29 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_dup3(unsigned int oldfd, unsigned int newfd, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int on);
asmlinkage long sys_ioctl(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg);
asmlinkage long sys_flock(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd);
asmlinkage long sys_io_setup(unsigned nr_reqs, aio_context_t __user *ctx);
asmlinkage long sys_io_destroy(aio_context_t ctx);
asmlinkage long sys_io_getevents(aio_context_t ctx_id,
long min_nr,
long nr,
struct io_event __user *events,
struct timespec __user *timeout);
asmlinkage long sys_io_submit(aio_context_t, long,
struct iocb __user * __user *);
asmlinkage long sys_io_cancel(aio_context_t ctx_id, struct iocb __user *iocb,
struct io_event __user *result);
asmlinkage long sys_sendfile(int out_fd, int in_fd,
off_t __user *offset, size_t count);
asmlinkage long sys_sendfile64(int out_fd, int in_fd,
loff_t __user *offset, size_t count);
asmlinkage long sys_readlink(const char __user *path,
char __user *buf, int bufsiz);
asmlinkage long sys_creat(const char __user *pathname, umode_t mode);
asmlinkage long sys_open(const char __user *filename,
int flags, umode_t mode);
asmlinkage long sys_close(unsigned int fd);
asmlinkage long sys_access(const char __user *filename, int mode);
asmlinkage long sys_vhangup(void);
asmlinkage long sys_chown(const char __user *filename,
uid_t user, gid_t group);
asmlinkage long sys_lchown(const char __user *filename,
uid_t user, gid_t group);
asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int fd, uid_t user, gid_t group);
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_UID16
asmlinkage long sys_chown16(const char __user *filename,
old_uid_t user, old_gid_t group);
asmlinkage long sys_lchown16(const char __user *filename,
old_uid_t user, old_gid_t group);
asmlinkage long sys_fchown16(unsigned int fd, old_uid_t user, old_gid_t group);
asmlinkage long sys_setregid16(old_gid_t rgid, old_gid_t egid);
asmlinkage long sys_setgid16(old_gid_t gid);
asmlinkage long sys_setreuid16(old_uid_t ruid, old_uid_t euid);
asmlinkage long sys_setuid16(old_uid_t uid);
asmlinkage long sys_setresuid16(old_uid_t ruid, old_uid_t euid, old_uid_t suid);
asmlinkage long sys_getresuid16(old_uid_t __user *ruid,
old_uid_t __user *euid, old_uid_t __user *suid);
asmlinkage long sys_setresgid16(old_gid_t rgid, old_gid_t egid, old_gid_t sgid);
asmlinkage long sys_getresgid16(old_gid_t __user *rgid,
old_gid_t __user *egid, old_gid_t __user *sgid);
asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid16(old_uid_t uid);
asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid16(old_gid_t gid);
asmlinkage long sys_getgroups16(int gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *grouplist);
asmlinkage long sys_setgroups16(int gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *grouplist);
asmlinkage long sys_getuid16(void);
asmlinkage long sys_geteuid16(void);
asmlinkage long sys_getgid16(void);
asmlinkage long sys_getegid16(void);
#endif
asmlinkage long sys_utime(char __user *filename,
struct utimbuf __user *times);
asmlinkage long sys_utimes(char __user *filename,
struct timeval __user *utimes);
asmlinkage long sys_lseek(unsigned int fd, off_t offset,
unsigned int whence);
asmlinkage long sys_llseek(unsigned int fd, unsigned long offset_high,
unsigned long offset_low, loff_t __user *result,
unsigned int whence);
asmlinkage long sys_read(unsigned int fd, char __user *buf, size_t count);
asmlinkage long sys_readahead(int fd, loff_t offset, size_t count);
asmlinkage long sys_readv(unsigned long fd,
const struct iovec __user *vec,
unsigned long vlen);
asmlinkage long sys_write(unsigned int fd, const char __user *buf,
size_t count);
asmlinkage long sys_writev(unsigned long fd,
const struct iovec __user *vec,
unsigned long vlen);
asmlinkage long sys_pread64(unsigned int fd, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t pos);
asmlinkage long sys_pwrite64(unsigned int fd, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t pos);
preadv/pwritev: Add preadv and pwritev system calls. This patch adds preadv and pwritev system calls. These syscalls are a pretty straightforward combination of pread and readv (same for write). They are quite useful for doing vectored I/O in threaded applications. Using lseek+readv instead opens race windows you'll have to plug with locking. Other systems have such system calls too, for example NetBSD, check here: http://www.daemon-systems.org/man/preadv.2.html The application-visible interface provided by glibc should look like this to be compatible to the existing implementations in the *BSD family: ssize_t preadv(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, off_t offset); ssize_t pwritev(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, off_t offset); This prototype has one problem though: On 32bit archs is the (64bit) offset argument unaligned, which the syscall ABI of several archs doesn't allow to do. At least s390 needs a wrapper in glibc to handle this. As we'll need a wrappers in glibc anyway I've decided to push problem to glibc entriely and use a syscall prototype which works without arch-specific wrappers inside the kernel: The offset argument is explicitly splitted into two 32bit values. The patch sports the actual system call implementation and the windup in the x86 system call tables. Other archs follow as separate patches. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:59:23 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_preadv(unsigned long fd, const struct iovec __user *vec,
Make non-compat preadv/pwritev use native register size Instead of always splitting the file offset into 32-bit 'high' and 'low' parts, just split them into the largest natural word-size - which in C terms is 'unsigned long'. This allows 64-bit architectures to avoid the unnecessary 32-bit shifting and masking for native format (while the compat interfaces will obviously always have to do it). This also changes the order of 'high' and 'low' to be "low first". Why? Because when we have it like this, the 64-bit system calls now don't use the "pos_high" argument at all, and it makes more sense for the native system call to simply match the user-mode prototype. This results in a much more natural calling convention, and allows the compiler to generate much more straightforward code. On x86-64, we now generate testq %rcx, %rcx # pos_l js .L122 #, movq %rcx, -48(%rbp) # pos_l, pos from the C source loff_t pos = pos_from_hilo(pos_h, pos_l); ... if (pos < 0) return -EINVAL; and the 'pos_h' register isn't even touched. It used to generate code like mov %r8d, %r8d # pos_low, pos_low salq $32, %rcx #, tmp71 movq %r8, %rax # pos_low, pos.386 orq %rcx, %rax # tmp71, pos.386 js .L122 #, movq %rax, -48(%rbp) # pos.386, pos which isn't _that_ horrible, but it does show how the natural word size is just a more sensible interface (same arguments will hold in the user level glibc wrapper function, of course, so the kernel side is just half of the equation!) Note: in all cases the user code wrapper can again be the same. You can just do #define HALF_BITS (sizeof(unsigned long)*4) __syscall(PWRITEV, fd, iov, count, offset, (offset >> HALF_BITS) >> HALF_BITS); or something like that. That way the user mode wrapper will also be nicely passing in a zero (it won't actually have to do the shifts, the compiler will understand what is going on) for the last argument. And that is a good idea, even if nobody will necessarily ever care: if we ever do move to a 128-bit lloff_t, this particular system call might be left alone. Of course, that will be the least of our worries if we really ever need to care, so this may not be worth really caring about. [ Fixed for lost 'loff_t' cast noticed by Andrew Morton ] Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 23:03:22 +08:00
unsigned long vlen, unsigned long pos_l, unsigned long pos_h);
asmlinkage long sys_preadv2(unsigned long fd, const struct iovec __user *vec,
unsigned long vlen, unsigned long pos_l, unsigned long pos_h,
rwf_t flags);
preadv/pwritev: Add preadv and pwritev system calls. This patch adds preadv and pwritev system calls. These syscalls are a pretty straightforward combination of pread and readv (same for write). They are quite useful for doing vectored I/O in threaded applications. Using lseek+readv instead opens race windows you'll have to plug with locking. Other systems have such system calls too, for example NetBSD, check here: http://www.daemon-systems.org/man/preadv.2.html The application-visible interface provided by glibc should look like this to be compatible to the existing implementations in the *BSD family: ssize_t preadv(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, off_t offset); ssize_t pwritev(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, off_t offset); This prototype has one problem though: On 32bit archs is the (64bit) offset argument unaligned, which the syscall ABI of several archs doesn't allow to do. At least s390 needs a wrapper in glibc to handle this. As we'll need a wrappers in glibc anyway I've decided to push problem to glibc entriely and use a syscall prototype which works without arch-specific wrappers inside the kernel: The offset argument is explicitly splitted into two 32bit values. The patch sports the actual system call implementation and the windup in the x86 system call tables. Other archs follow as separate patches. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:59:23 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_pwritev(unsigned long fd, const struct iovec __user *vec,
Make non-compat preadv/pwritev use native register size Instead of always splitting the file offset into 32-bit 'high' and 'low' parts, just split them into the largest natural word-size - which in C terms is 'unsigned long'. This allows 64-bit architectures to avoid the unnecessary 32-bit shifting and masking for native format (while the compat interfaces will obviously always have to do it). This also changes the order of 'high' and 'low' to be "low first". Why? Because when we have it like this, the 64-bit system calls now don't use the "pos_high" argument at all, and it makes more sense for the native system call to simply match the user-mode prototype. This results in a much more natural calling convention, and allows the compiler to generate much more straightforward code. On x86-64, we now generate testq %rcx, %rcx # pos_l js .L122 #, movq %rcx, -48(%rbp) # pos_l, pos from the C source loff_t pos = pos_from_hilo(pos_h, pos_l); ... if (pos < 0) return -EINVAL; and the 'pos_h' register isn't even touched. It used to generate code like mov %r8d, %r8d # pos_low, pos_low salq $32, %rcx #, tmp71 movq %r8, %rax # pos_low, pos.386 orq %rcx, %rax # tmp71, pos.386 js .L122 #, movq %rax, -48(%rbp) # pos.386, pos which isn't _that_ horrible, but it does show how the natural word size is just a more sensible interface (same arguments will hold in the user level glibc wrapper function, of course, so the kernel side is just half of the equation!) Note: in all cases the user code wrapper can again be the same. You can just do #define HALF_BITS (sizeof(unsigned long)*4) __syscall(PWRITEV, fd, iov, count, offset, (offset >> HALF_BITS) >> HALF_BITS); or something like that. That way the user mode wrapper will also be nicely passing in a zero (it won't actually have to do the shifts, the compiler will understand what is going on) for the last argument. And that is a good idea, even if nobody will necessarily ever care: if we ever do move to a 128-bit lloff_t, this particular system call might be left alone. Of course, that will be the least of our worries if we really ever need to care, so this may not be worth really caring about. [ Fixed for lost 'loff_t' cast noticed by Andrew Morton ] Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 23:03:22 +08:00
unsigned long vlen, unsigned long pos_l, unsigned long pos_h);
asmlinkage long sys_pwritev2(unsigned long fd, const struct iovec __user *vec,
unsigned long vlen, unsigned long pos_l, unsigned long pos_h,
rwf_t flags);
asmlinkage long sys_getcwd(char __user *buf, unsigned long size);
asmlinkage long sys_mkdir(const char __user *pathname, umode_t mode);
asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __user *filename);
asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int fd);
asmlinkage long sys_rmdir(const char __user *pathname);
asmlinkage long sys_lookup_dcookie(u64 cookie64, char __user *buf, size_t len);
asmlinkage long sys_quotactl(unsigned int cmd, const char __user *special,
qid_t id, void __user *addr);
asmlinkage long sys_getdents(unsigned int fd,
struct linux_dirent __user *dirent,
unsigned int count);
asmlinkage long sys_getdents64(unsigned int fd,
struct linux_dirent64 __user *dirent,
unsigned int count);
asmlinkage long sys_setsockopt(int fd, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int optlen);
asmlinkage long sys_getsockopt(int fd, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen);
asmlinkage long sys_bind(int, struct sockaddr __user *, int);
asmlinkage long sys_connect(int, struct sockaddr __user *, int);
asmlinkage long sys_accept(int, struct sockaddr __user *, int __user *);
reintroduce accept4 Introduce a new accept4() system call. The addition of this system call matches analogous changes in 2.6.27 (dup3(), evenfd2(), signalfd4(), inotify_init1(), epoll_create1(), pipe2()) which added new system calls that differed from analogous traditional system calls in adding a flags argument that can be used to access additional functionality. The accept4() system call is exactly the same as accept(), except that it adds a flags bit-mask argument. Two flags are initially implemented. (Most of the new system calls in 2.6.27 also had both of these flags.) SOCK_CLOEXEC causes the close-on-exec (FD_CLOEXEC) flag to be enabled for the new file descriptor returned by accept4(). This is a useful security feature to avoid leaking information in a multithreaded program where one thread is doing an accept() at the same time as another thread is doing a fork() plus exec(). More details here: http://udrepper.livejournal.com/20407.html "Secure File Descriptor Handling", Ulrich Drepper). The other flag is SOCK_NONBLOCK, which causes the O_NONBLOCK flag to be enabled on the new open file description created by accept4(). (This flag is merely a convenience, saving the use of additional calls fcntl(F_GETFL) and fcntl (F_SETFL) to achieve the same result. Here's a test program. Works on x86-32. Should work on x86-64, but I (mtk) don't have a system to hand to test with. It tests accept4() with each of the four possible combinations of SOCK_CLOEXEC and SOCK_NONBLOCK set/clear in 'flags', and verifies that the appropriate flags are set on the file descriptor/open file description returned by accept4(). I tested Ulrich's patch in this thread by applying against 2.6.28-rc2, and it passes according to my test program. /* test_accept4.c Copyright (C) 2008, Linux Foundation, written by Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Licensed under the GNU GPLv2 or later. */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #define PORT_NUM 33333 #define die(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } while (0) /**********************************************************************/ /* The following is what we need until glibc gets a wrapper for accept4() */ /* Flags for socket(), socketpair(), accept4() */ #ifndef SOCK_CLOEXEC #define SOCK_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC #endif #ifndef SOCK_NONBLOCK #define SOCK_NONBLOCK O_NONBLOCK #endif #ifdef __x86_64__ #define SYS_accept4 288 #elif __i386__ #define USE_SOCKETCALL 1 #define SYS_ACCEPT4 18 #else #error "Sorry -- don't know the syscall # on this architecture" #endif static int accept4(int fd, struct sockaddr *sockaddr, socklen_t *addrlen, int flags) { printf("Calling accept4(): flags = %x", flags); if (flags != 0) { printf(" ("); if (flags & SOCK_CLOEXEC) printf("SOCK_CLOEXEC"); if ((flags & SOCK_CLOEXEC) && (flags & SOCK_NONBLOCK)) printf(" "); if (flags & SOCK_NONBLOCK) printf("SOCK_NONBLOCK"); printf(")"); } printf("\n"); #if USE_SOCKETCALL long args[6]; args[0] = fd; args[1] = (long) sockaddr; args[2] = (long) addrlen; args[3] = flags; return syscall(SYS_socketcall, SYS_ACCEPT4, args); #else return syscall(SYS_accept4, fd, sockaddr, addrlen, flags); #endif } /**********************************************************************/ static int do_test(int lfd, struct sockaddr_in *conn_addr, int closeonexec_flag, int nonblock_flag) { int connfd, acceptfd; int fdf, flf, fdf_pass, flf_pass; struct sockaddr_in claddr; socklen_t addrlen; printf("=======================================\n"); connfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (connfd == -1) die("socket"); if (connect(connfd, (struct sockaddr *) conn_addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) == -1) die("connect"); addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); acceptfd = accept4(lfd, (struct sockaddr *) &claddr, &addrlen, closeonexec_flag | nonblock_flag); if (acceptfd == -1) { perror("accept4()"); close(connfd); return 0; } fdf = fcntl(acceptfd, F_GETFD); if (fdf == -1) die("fcntl:F_GETFD"); fdf_pass = ((fdf & FD_CLOEXEC) != 0) == ((closeonexec_flag & SOCK_CLOEXEC) != 0); printf("Close-on-exec flag is %sset (%s); ", (fdf & FD_CLOEXEC) ? "" : "not ", fdf_pass ? "OK" : "failed"); flf = fcntl(acceptfd, F_GETFL); if (flf == -1) die("fcntl:F_GETFD"); flf_pass = ((flf & O_NONBLOCK) != 0) == ((nonblock_flag & SOCK_NONBLOCK) !=0); printf("nonblock flag is %sset (%s)\n", (flf & O_NONBLOCK) ? "" : "not ", flf_pass ? "OK" : "failed"); close(acceptfd); close(connfd); printf("Test result: %s\n", (fdf_pass && flf_pass) ? "PASS" : "FAIL"); return fdf_pass && flf_pass; } static int create_listening_socket(int port_num) { struct sockaddr_in svaddr; int lfd; int optval; memset(&svaddr, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); svaddr.sin_family = AF_INET; svaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); svaddr.sin_port = htons(port_num); lfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (lfd == -1) die("socket"); optval = 1; if (setsockopt(lfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &optval, sizeof(optval)) == -1) die("setsockopt"); if (bind(lfd, (struct sockaddr *) &svaddr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) == -1) die("bind"); if (listen(lfd, 5) == -1) die("listen"); return lfd; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { struct sockaddr_in conn_addr; int lfd; int port_num; int passed; passed = 1; port_num = (argc > 1) ? atoi(argv[1]) : PORT_NUM; memset(&conn_addr, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); conn_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; conn_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); conn_addr.sin_port = htons(port_num); lfd = create_listening_socket(port_num); if (!do_test(lfd, &conn_addr, 0, 0)) passed = 0; if (!do_test(lfd, &conn_addr, SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0)) passed = 0; if (!do_test(lfd, &conn_addr, 0, SOCK_NONBLOCK)) passed = 0; if (!do_test(lfd, &conn_addr, SOCK_CLOEXEC, SOCK_NONBLOCK)) passed = 0; close(lfd); exit(passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE); } [mtk.manpages@gmail.com: rewrote changelog, updated test program] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Tested-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-20 07:36:14 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_accept4(int, struct sockaddr __user *, int __user *, int);
asmlinkage long sys_getsockname(int, struct sockaddr __user *, int __user *);
asmlinkage long sys_getpeername(int, struct sockaddr __user *, int __user *);
asmlinkage long sys_send(int, void __user *, size_t, unsigned);
asmlinkage long sys_sendto(int, void __user *, size_t, unsigned,
struct sockaddr __user *, int);
separate kernel- and userland-side msghdr Kernel-side struct msghdr is (currently) using the same layout as userland one, but it's not a one-to-one copy - even without considering 32bit compat issues, we have msg_iov, msg_name and msg_control copied to kernel[1]. It's fairly localized, so we get away with a few functions where that knowledge is needed (and we could shrink that set even more). Pretty much everything deals with the kernel-side variant and the few places that want userland one just use a bunch of force-casts to paper over the differences. The thing is, kernel-side definition of struct msghdr is *not* exposed in include/uapi - libc doesn't see it, etc. So we can add struct user_msghdr, with proper annotations and let the few places that ever deal with those beasts use it for userland pointers. Saner typechecking aside, that will allow to change the layout of kernel-side msghdr - e.g. replace msg_iov/msg_iovlen there with struct iov_iter, getting rid of the need to modify the iovec as we copy data to/from it, etc. We could introduce kernel_msghdr instead, but that would create much more noise - the absolute majority of the instances would need to have the type switched to kernel_msghdr and definition of struct msghdr in include/linux/socket.h is not going to be seen by userland anyway. This commit just introduces user_msghdr and switches the few places that are dealing with userland-side msghdr to it. [1] actually, it's even trickier than that - we copy msg_control for sendmsg, but keep the userland address on recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-04-07 02:03:05 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_sendmsg(int fd, struct user_msghdr __user *msg, unsigned flags);
asmlinkage long sys_sendmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *msg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned flags);
asmlinkage long sys_recv(int, void __user *, size_t, unsigned);
asmlinkage long sys_recvfrom(int, void __user *, size_t, unsigned,
struct sockaddr __user *, int __user *);
separate kernel- and userland-side msghdr Kernel-side struct msghdr is (currently) using the same layout as userland one, but it's not a one-to-one copy - even without considering 32bit compat issues, we have msg_iov, msg_name and msg_control copied to kernel[1]. It's fairly localized, so we get away with a few functions where that knowledge is needed (and we could shrink that set even more). Pretty much everything deals with the kernel-side variant and the few places that want userland one just use a bunch of force-casts to paper over the differences. The thing is, kernel-side definition of struct msghdr is *not* exposed in include/uapi - libc doesn't see it, etc. So we can add struct user_msghdr, with proper annotations and let the few places that ever deal with those beasts use it for userland pointers. Saner typechecking aside, that will allow to change the layout of kernel-side msghdr - e.g. replace msg_iov/msg_iovlen there with struct iov_iter, getting rid of the need to modify the iovec as we copy data to/from it, etc. We could introduce kernel_msghdr instead, but that would create much more noise - the absolute majority of the instances would need to have the type switched to kernel_msghdr and definition of struct msghdr in include/linux/socket.h is not going to be seen by userland anyway. This commit just introduces user_msghdr and switches the few places that are dealing with userland-side msghdr to it. [1] actually, it's even trickier than that - we copy msg_control for sendmsg, but keep the userland address on recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-04-07 02:03:05 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_recvmsg(int fd, struct user_msghdr __user *msg, unsigned flags);
asmlinkage long sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *msg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned flags,
struct timespec __user *timeout);
asmlinkage long sys_socket(int, int, int);
asmlinkage long sys_socketpair(int, int, int, int __user *);
asmlinkage long sys_socketcall(int call, unsigned long __user *args);
asmlinkage long sys_listen(int, int);
asmlinkage long sys_poll(struct pollfd __user *ufds, unsigned int nfds,
int timeout);
asmlinkage long sys_select(int n, fd_set __user *inp, fd_set __user *outp,
fd_set __user *exp, struct timeval __user *tvp);
asmlinkage long sys_old_select(struct sel_arg_struct __user *arg);
asmlinkage long sys_epoll_create(int size);
flag parameters add-on: remove epoll_create size param Remove the size parameter from the new epoll_create syscall and renames the syscall itself. The updated test program follows. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <time.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #ifndef __NR_epoll_create2 # ifdef __x86_64__ # define __NR_epoll_create2 291 # elif defined __i386__ # define __NR_epoll_create2 329 # else # error "need __NR_epoll_create2" # endif #endif #define EPOLL_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC int main (void) { int fd = syscall (__NR_epoll_create2, 0); if (fd == -1) { puts ("epoll_create2(0) failed"); return 1; } int coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if (coe & FD_CLOEXEC) { puts ("epoll_create2(0) set close-on-exec flag"); return 1; } close (fd); fd = syscall (__NR_epoll_create2, EPOLL_CLOEXEC); if (fd == -1) { puts ("epoll_create2(EPOLL_CLOEXEC) failed"); return 1; } coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if ((coe & FD_CLOEXEC) == 0) { puts ("epoll_create2(EPOLL_CLOEXEC) set close-on-exec flag"); return 1; } close (fd); puts ("OK"); return 0; } ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Acked-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 12:29:43 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_epoll_create1(int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_epoll_ctl(int epfd, int op, int fd,
struct epoll_event __user *event);
asmlinkage long sys_epoll_wait(int epfd, struct epoll_event __user *events,
int maxevents, int timeout);
asmlinkage long sys_epoll_pwait(int epfd, struct epoll_event __user *events,
int maxevents, int timeout,
const sigset_t __user *sigmask,
size_t sigsetsize);
asmlinkage long sys_gethostname(char __user *name, int len);
asmlinkage long sys_sethostname(char __user *name, int len);
asmlinkage long sys_setdomainname(char __user *name, int len);
asmlinkage long sys_newuname(struct new_utsname __user *name);
asmlinkage long sys_uname(struct old_utsname __user *);
asmlinkage long sys_olduname(struct oldold_utsname __user *);
asmlinkage long sys_getrlimit(unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit __user *rlim);
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
asmlinkage long sys_old_getrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit __user *rlim);
#endif
asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit __user *rlim);
rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall This patch adds the code to support the sys_prlimit64 syscall which modifies-and-returns the rlim values of a selected process atomically. The first parameter, pid, being 0 means current process. Unlike the current implementation, it is a generic interface, architecture indepentent so that we needn't handle compat stuff anymore. In the future, after glibc start to use this we can deprecate sys_setrlimit and sys_getrlimit in favor to clean up the code finally. It also adds a possibility of changing limits of other processes. We check the user's permissions to do that and if it succeeds, the new limits are propagated online. This is good for large scale applications such as SAP or databases where administrators need to change limits time by time (e.g. on crashes increase core size). And it is unacceptable to restart the service. For safety, all rlim users now either use accessors or doesn't need them due to - locking - the fact a process was just forked and nobody else knows about it yet (and nobody can't thus read/write limits) hence it is safe to modify limits now. The limitation is that we currently stay at ulong internal representation. So the rlim64_is_infinity check is used where value is compared against ULONG_MAX on 32-bit which is the maximum value there. And since internally the limits are held in struct rlimit, converters which are used before and after do_prlimit call in sys_prlimit64 are introduced. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
2010-05-05 00:03:50 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_prlimit64(pid_t pid, unsigned int resource,
const struct rlimit64 __user *new_rlim,
struct rlimit64 __user *old_rlim);
asmlinkage long sys_getrusage(int who, struct rusage __user *ru);
asmlinkage long sys_umask(int mask);
asmlinkage long sys_msgget(key_t key, int msgflg);
asmlinkage long sys_msgsnd(int msqid, struct msgbuf __user *msgp,
size_t msgsz, int msgflg);
asmlinkage long sys_msgrcv(int msqid, struct msgbuf __user *msgp,
size_t msgsz, long msgtyp, int msgflg);
asmlinkage long sys_msgctl(int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf);
asmlinkage long sys_semget(key_t key, int nsems, int semflg);
asmlinkage long sys_semop(int semid, struct sembuf __user *sops,
unsigned nsops);
asmlinkage long sys_semctl(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, unsigned long arg);
asmlinkage long sys_semtimedop(int semid, struct sembuf __user *sops,
unsigned nsops,
const struct timespec __user *timeout);
asmlinkage long sys_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg);
asmlinkage long sys_shmget(key_t key, size_t size, int flag);
asmlinkage long sys_shmdt(char __user *shmaddr);
asmlinkage long sys_shmctl(int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf);
asmlinkage long sys_ipc(unsigned int call, int first, unsigned long second,
Add generic sys_ipc wrapper Add a generic implementation of the ipc demultiplexer syscall. Except for s390 and sparc64 all implementations of the sys_ipc are nearly identical. There are slight differences in the types of the parameters, where mips and powerpc as the only 64-bit architectures with sys_ipc use unsigned long for the "third" argument as it gets casted to a pointer later, while it traditionally is an "int" like most other paramters. frv goes even further and uses unsigned long for all parameters execept for "ptr" which is a pointer type everywhere. The change from int to unsigned long for "third" and back to "int" for the others on frv should be fine due to the in-register calling conventions for syscalls (we already had a similar issue with the generic sys_ptrace), but I'd prefer to have the arch maintainers looks over this in details. Except for that h8300, m68k and m68knommu lack an impplementation of the semtimedop sub call which this patch adds, and various architectures have gets used - at least on i386 it seems superflous as the compat code on x86-64 and ia64 doesn't even bother to implement it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add sys_ipc to sys_ni.c] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-11 07:21:18 +08:00
unsigned long third, void __user *ptr, long fifth);
2011-07-26 17:26:10 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_mq_open(const char __user *name, int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *attr);
asmlinkage long sys_mq_unlink(const char __user *name);
asmlinkage long sys_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, const char __user *msg_ptr, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, const struct timespec __user *abs_timeout);
asmlinkage long sys_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, char __user *msg_ptr, size_t msg_len, unsigned int __user *msg_prio, const struct timespec __user *abs_timeout);
asmlinkage long sys_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *notification);
asmlinkage long sys_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, const struct mq_attr __user *mqstat, struct mq_attr __user *omqstat);
asmlinkage long sys_pciconfig_iobase(long which, unsigned long bus, unsigned long devfn);
asmlinkage long sys_pciconfig_read(unsigned long bus, unsigned long dfn,
unsigned long off, unsigned long len,
void __user *buf);
asmlinkage long sys_pciconfig_write(unsigned long bus, unsigned long dfn,
unsigned long off, unsigned long len,
void __user *buf);
asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
asmlinkage long sys_swapon(const char __user *specialfile, int swap_flags);
asmlinkage long sys_swapoff(const char __user *specialfile);
asmlinkage long sys_sysctl(struct __sysctl_args __user *args);
asmlinkage long sys_sysinfo(struct sysinfo __user *info);
asmlinkage long sys_sysfs(int option,
unsigned long arg1, unsigned long arg2);
asmlinkage long sys_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len);
asmlinkage long sys_uselib(const char __user *library);
asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(void);
asmlinkage long sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long data);
asmlinkage long sys_add_key(const char __user *_type,
const char __user *_description,
const void __user *_payload,
size_t plen,
key_serial_t destringid);
asmlinkage long sys_request_key(const char __user *_type,
const char __user *_description,
const char __user *_callout_info,
key_serial_t destringid);
asmlinkage long sys_keyctl(int cmd, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
asmlinkage long sys_ioprio_set(int which, int who, int ioprio);
asmlinkage long sys_ioprio_get(int which, int who);
asmlinkage long sys_set_mempolicy(int mode, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
unsigned long maxnode);
[PATCH] Swap Migration V5: sys_migrate_pages interface sys_migrate_pages implementation using swap based page migration This is the original API proposed by Ray Bryant in his posts during the first half of 2005 on linux-mm@kvack.org and linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org. The intent of sys_migrate is to migrate memory of a process. A process may have migrated to another node. Memory was allocated optimally for the prior context. sys_migrate_pages allows to shift the memory to the new node. sys_migrate_pages is also useful if the processes available memory nodes have changed through cpuset operations to manually move the processes memory. Paul Jackson is working on an automated mechanism that will allow an automatic migration if the cpuset of a process is changed. However, a user may decide to manually control the migration. This implementation is put into the policy layer since it uses concepts and functions that are also needed for mbind and friends. The patch also provides a do_migrate_pages function that may be useful for cpusets to automatically move memory. sys_migrate_pages does not modify policies in contrast to Ray's implementation. The current code here is based on the swap based page migration capability and thus is not able to preserve the physical layout relative to it containing nodeset (which may be a cpuset). When direct page migration becomes available then the implementation needs to be changed to do a isomorphic move of pages between different nodesets. The current implementation simply evicts all pages in source nodeset that are not in the target nodeset. Patch supports ia64, i386 and x86_64. Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 17:00:51 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_migrate_pages(pid_t pid, unsigned long maxnode,
const unsigned long __user *from,
const unsigned long __user *to);
[PATCH] page migration: sys_move_pages(): support moving of individual pages move_pages() is used to move individual pages of a process. The function can be used to determine the location of pages and to move them onto the desired node. move_pages() returns status information for each page. long move_pages(pid, number_of_pages_to_move, addresses_of_pages[], nodes[] or NULL, status[], flags); The addresses of pages is an array of void * pointing to the pages to be moved. The nodes array contains the node numbers that the pages should be moved to. If a NULL is passed instead of an array then no pages are moved but the status array is updated. The status request may be used to determine the page state before issuing another move_pages() to move pages. The status array will contain the state of all individual page migration attempts when the function terminates. The status array is only valid if move_pages() completed successfullly. Possible page states in status[]: 0..MAX_NUMNODES The page is now on the indicated node. -ENOENT Page is not present -EACCES Page is mapped by multiple processes and can only be moved if MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL is specified. -EPERM The page has been mlocked by a process/driver and cannot be moved. -EBUSY Page is busy and cannot be moved. Try again later. -EFAULT Invalid address (no VMA or zero page). -ENOMEM Unable to allocate memory on target node. -EIO Unable to write back page. The page must be written back in order to move it since the page is dirty and the filesystem does not provide a migration function that would allow the moving of dirty pages. -EINVAL A dirty page cannot be moved. The filesystem does not provide a migration function and has no ability to write back pages. The flags parameter indicates what types of pages to move: MPOL_MF_MOVE Move pages that are only mapped by the process. MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL Also move pages that are mapped by multiple processes. Requires sufficient capabilities. Possible return codes from move_pages() -ENOENT No pages found that would require moving. All pages are either already on the target node, not present, had an invalid address or could not be moved because they were mapped by multiple processes. -EINVAL Flags other than MPOL_MF_MOVE(_ALL) specified or an attempt to migrate pages in a kernel thread. -EPERM MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL specified without sufficient priviledges. or an attempt to move a process belonging to another user. -EACCES One of the target nodes is not allowed by the current cpuset. -ENODEV One of the target nodes is not online. -ESRCH Process does not exist. -E2BIG Too many pages to move. -ENOMEM Not enough memory to allocate control array. -EFAULT Parameters could not be accessed. A test program for move_pages() may be found with the patches on ftp.kernel.org:/pub/linux/kernel/people/christoph/pmig/patches-2.6.17-rc4-mm3 From: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Detailed results for sys_move_pages() Pass a pointer to an integer to get_new_page() that may be used to indicate where the completion status of a migration operation should be placed. This allows sys_move_pags() to report back exactly what happened to each page. Wish there would be a better way to do this. Looks a bit hacky. Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Jes Sorensen <jes@trained-monkey.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 17:03:55 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_move_pages(pid_t pid, unsigned long nr_pages,
const void __user * __user *pages,
const int __user *nodes,
int __user *status,
int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_mbind(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
unsigned long mode,
const unsigned long __user *nmask,
unsigned long maxnode,
unsigned flags);
asmlinkage long sys_get_mempolicy(int __user *policy,
unsigned long __user *nmask,
unsigned long maxnode,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags);
asmlinkage long sys_inotify_init(void);
flag parameters: inotify_init This patch introduces the new syscall inotify_init1 (note: the 1 stands for the one parameter the syscall takes, as opposed to no parameter before). The values accepted for this parameter are function-specific and defined in the inotify.h header. Here the values must match the O_* flags, though. In this patch CLOEXEC support is introduced. The following test must be adjusted for architectures other than x86 and x86-64 and in case the syscall numbers changed. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #ifndef __NR_inotify_init1 # ifdef __x86_64__ # define __NR_inotify_init1 294 # elif defined __i386__ # define __NR_inotify_init1 332 # else # error "need __NR_inotify_init1" # endif #endif #define IN_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC int main (void) { int fd; fd = syscall (__NR_inotify_init1, 0); if (fd == -1) { puts ("inotify_init1(0) failed"); return 1; } int coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if (coe & FD_CLOEXEC) { puts ("inotify_init1(0) set close-on-exit"); return 1; } close (fd); fd = syscall (__NR_inotify_init1, IN_CLOEXEC); if (fd == -1) { puts ("inotify_init1(IN_CLOEXEC) failed"); return 1; } coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if ((coe & FD_CLOEXEC) == 0) { puts ("inotify_init1(O_CLOEXEC) does not set close-on-exit"); return 1; } close (fd); puts ("OK"); return 0; } ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add sys_ni stub] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Acked-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 12:29:32 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_inotify_init1(int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_inotify_add_watch(int fd, const char __user *path,
u32 mask);
asmlinkage long sys_inotify_rm_watch(int fd, __s32 wd);
asmlinkage long sys_spu_run(int fd, __u32 __user *unpc,
__u32 __user *ustatus);
asmlinkage long sys_spu_create(const char __user *name,
unsigned int flags, umode_t mode, int fd);
asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, const char __user * filename, umode_t mode,
unsigned dev);
asmlinkage long sys_mkdirat(int dfd, const char __user * pathname, umode_t mode);
asmlinkage long sys_unlinkat(int dfd, const char __user * pathname, int flag);
asmlinkage long sys_symlinkat(const char __user * oldname,
int newdfd, const char __user * newname);
asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, const char __user *oldname,
int newdfd, const char __user *newname, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_renameat(int olddfd, const char __user * oldname,
int newdfd, const char __user * newname);
asmlinkage long sys_renameat2(int olddfd, const char __user *oldname,
int newdfd, const char __user *newname,
unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_futimesat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
struct timeval __user *utimes);
asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode);
asmlinkage long sys_fchmodat(int dfd, const char __user * filename,
umode_t mode);
asmlinkage long sys_fchownat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, uid_t user,
gid_t group, int flag);
asmlinkage long sys_openat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags,
umode_t mode);
asmlinkage long sys_newfstatat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
struct stat __user *statbuf, int flag);
asmlinkage long sys_readlinkat(int dfd, const char __user *path, char __user *buf,
int bufsiz);
asmlinkage long sys_utimensat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
struct timespec __user *utimes, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags);
asmlinkage long sys_splice(int fd_in, loff_t __user *off_in,
int fd_out, loff_t __user *off_out,
size_t len, unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_vmsplice(int fd, const struct iovec __user *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_tee(int fdin, int fdout, size_t len, unsigned int flags);
[PATCH] sys_sync_file_range() Remove the recently-added LINUX_FADV_ASYNC_WRITE and LINUX_FADV_WRITE_WAIT fadvise() additions, do it in a new sys_sync_file_range() syscall instead. Reasons: - It's more flexible. Things which would require two or three syscalls with fadvise() can be done in a single syscall. - Using fadvise() in this manner is something not covered by POSIX. The patch wires up the syscall for x86. The sycall is implemented in the new fs/sync.c. The intention is that we can move sys_fsync(), sys_fdatasync() and perhaps sys_sync() into there later. Documentation for the syscall is in fs/sync.c. A test app (sync_file_range.c) is in http://www.zip.com.au/~akpm/linux/patches/stuff/ext3-tools.tar.gz. The available-to-GPL-modules do_sync_file_range() is for knfsd: "A COMMIT can say NFS_DATA_SYNC or NFS_FILE_SYNC. I can skip the ->fsync call for NFS_DATA_SYNC which is hopefully the more common." Note: the `async' writeout mode SYNC_FILE_RANGE_WRITE will turn synchronous if the queue is congested. This is trivial to fix: add a new flag bit, set wbc->nonblocking. But I'm not sure that we want to expose implementation details down to that level. Note: it's notable that we can sync an fd which wasn't opened for writing. Same with fsync() and fdatasync()). Note: the code takes some care to handle attempts to sync file contents outside the 16TB offset on 32-bit machines. It makes such attempts appear to succeed, for best 32-bit/64-bit compatibility. Perhaps it should make such requests fail... Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:30:42 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_sync_file_range(int fd, loff_t offset, loff_t nbytes,
unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_sync_file_range2(int fd, unsigned int flags,
loff_t offset, loff_t nbytes);
asmlinkage long sys_get_robust_list(int pid,
struct robust_list_head __user * __user *head_ptr,
size_t __user *len_ptr);
asmlinkage long sys_set_robust_list(struct robust_list_head __user *head,
size_t len);
asmlinkage long sys_getcpu(unsigned __user *cpu, unsigned __user *node, struct getcpu_cache __user *cache);
signal/timer/event: signalfd core This patch series implements the new signalfd() system call. I took part of the original Linus code (and you know how badly it can be broken :), and I added even more breakage ;) Signals are fetched from the same signal queue used by the process, so signalfd will compete with standard kernel delivery in dequeue_signal(). If you want to reliably fetch signals on the signalfd file, you need to block them with sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK). This seems to be working fine on my Dual Opteron machine. I made a quick test program for it: http://www.xmailserver.org/signafd-test.c The signalfd() system call implements signal delivery into a file descriptor receiver. The signalfd file descriptor if created with the following API: int signalfd(int ufd, const sigset_t *mask, size_t masksize); The "ufd" parameter allows to change an existing signalfd sigmask, w/out going to close/create cycle (Linus idea). Use "ufd" == -1 if you want a brand new signalfd file. The "mask" allows to specify the signal mask of signals that we are interested in. The "masksize" parameter is the size of "mask". The signalfd fd supports the poll(2) and read(2) system calls. The poll(2) will return POLLIN when signals are available to be dequeued. As a direct consequence of supporting the Linux poll subsystem, the signalfd fd can use used together with epoll(2) too. The read(2) system call will return a "struct signalfd_siginfo" structure in the userspace supplied buffer. The return value is the number of bytes copied in the supplied buffer, or -1 in case of error. The read(2) call can also return 0, in case the sighand structure to which the signalfd was attached, has been orphaned. The O_NONBLOCK flag is also supported, and read(2) will return -EAGAIN in case no signal is available. If the size of the buffer passed to read(2) is lower than sizeof(struct signalfd_siginfo), -EINVAL is returned. A read from the signalfd can also return -ERESTARTSYS in case a signal hits the process. The format of the struct signalfd_siginfo is, and the valid fields depends of the (->code & __SI_MASK) value, in the same way a struct siginfo would: struct signalfd_siginfo { __u32 signo; /* si_signo */ __s32 err; /* si_errno */ __s32 code; /* si_code */ __u32 pid; /* si_pid */ __u32 uid; /* si_uid */ __s32 fd; /* si_fd */ __u32 tid; /* si_fd */ __u32 band; /* si_band */ __u32 overrun; /* si_overrun */ __u32 trapno; /* si_trapno */ __s32 status; /* si_status */ __s32 svint; /* si_int */ __u64 svptr; /* si_ptr */ __u64 utime; /* si_utime */ __u64 stime; /* si_stime */ __u64 addr; /* si_addr */ }; [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix signalfd_copyinfo() on i386] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-11 13:23:13 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_signalfd(int ufd, sigset_t __user *user_mask, size_t sizemask);
flag parameters: signalfd This patch adds the new signalfd4 syscall. It extends the old signalfd syscall by one parameter which is meant to hold a flag value. In this patch the only flag support is SFD_CLOEXEC which causes the close-on-exec flag for the returned file descriptor to be set. A new name SFD_CLOEXEC is introduced which in this implementation must have the same value as O_CLOEXEC. The following test must be adjusted for architectures other than x86 and x86-64 and in case the syscall numbers changed. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ #include <fcntl.h> #include <signal.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #ifndef __NR_signalfd4 # ifdef __x86_64__ # define __NR_signalfd4 289 # elif defined __i386__ # define __NR_signalfd4 327 # else # error "need __NR_signalfd4" # endif #endif #define SFD_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC int main (void) { sigset_t ss; sigemptyset (&ss); sigaddset (&ss, SIGUSR1); int fd = syscall (__NR_signalfd4, -1, &ss, 8, 0); if (fd == -1) { puts ("signalfd4(0) failed"); return 1; } int coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if (coe & FD_CLOEXEC) { puts ("signalfd4(0) set close-on-exec flag"); return 1; } close (fd); fd = syscall (__NR_signalfd4, -1, &ss, 8, SFD_CLOEXEC); if (fd == -1) { puts ("signalfd4(SFD_CLOEXEC) failed"); return 1; } coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if ((coe & FD_CLOEXEC) == 0) { puts ("signalfd4(SFD_CLOEXEC) does not set close-on-exec flag"); return 1; } close (fd); puts ("OK"); return 0; } ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add sys_ni stub] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Acked-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 12:29:24 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_signalfd4(int ufd, sigset_t __user *user_mask, size_t sizemask, int flags);
timerfd: new timerfd API This is the new timerfd API as it is implemented by the following patch: int timerfd_create(int clockid, int flags); int timerfd_settime(int ufd, int flags, const struct itimerspec *utmr, struct itimerspec *otmr); int timerfd_gettime(int ufd, struct itimerspec *otmr); The timerfd_create() API creates an un-programmed timerfd fd. The "clockid" parameter can be either CLOCK_MONOTONIC or CLOCK_REALTIME. The timerfd_settime() API give new settings by the timerfd fd, by optionally retrieving the previous expiration time (in case the "otmr" parameter is not NULL). The time value specified in "utmr" is absolute, if the TFD_TIMER_ABSTIME bit is set in the "flags" parameter. Otherwise it's a relative time. The timerfd_gettime() API returns the next expiration time of the timer, or {0, 0} if the timerfd has not been set yet. Like the previous timerfd API implementation, read(2) and poll(2) are supported (with the same interface). Here's a simple test program I used to exercise the new timerfd APIs: http://www.xmailserver.org/timerfd-test2.c [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix ia64 build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix m68k build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mips build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix alpha, arm, blackfin, cris, m68k, s390, sparc and sparc64 builds] [heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com: fix s390] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix powerpc build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix sparc64 more] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 14:27:26 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_timerfd_create(int clockid, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_timerfd_settime(int ufd, int flags,
const struct itimerspec __user *utmr,
struct itimerspec __user *otmr);
asmlinkage long sys_timerfd_gettime(int ufd, struct itimerspec __user *otmr);
signal/timer/event: eventfd core This is a very simple and light file descriptor, that can be used as event wait/dispatch by userspace (both wait and dispatch) and by the kernel (dispatch only). It can be used instead of pipe(2) in all cases where those would simply be used to signal events. Their kernel overhead is much lower than pipes, and they do not consume two fds. When used in the kernel, it can offer an fd-bridge to enable, for example, functionalities like KAIO or syslets/threadlets to signal to an fd the completion of certain operations. But more in general, an eventfd can be used by the kernel to signal readiness, in a POSIX poll/select way, of interfaces that would otherwise be incompatible with it. The API is: int eventfd(unsigned int count); The eventfd API accepts an initial "count" parameter, and returns an eventfd fd. It supports poll(2) (POLLIN, POLLOUT, POLLERR), read(2) and write(2). The POLLIN flag is raised when the internal counter is greater than zero. The POLLOUT flag is raised when at least a value of "1" can be written to the internal counter. The POLLERR flag is raised when an overflow in the counter value is detected. The write(2) operation can never overflow the counter, since it blocks (unless O_NONBLOCK is set, in which case -EAGAIN is returned). But the eventfd_signal() function can do it, since it's supposed to not sleep during its operation. The read(2) function reads the __u64 counter value, and reset the internal value to zero. If the value read is equal to (__u64) -1, an overflow happened on the internal counter (due to 2^64 eventfd_signal() posts that has never been retired - unlickely, but possible). The write(2) call writes an __u64 count value, and adds it to the current counter. The eventfd fd supports O_NONBLOCK also. On the kernel side, we have: struct file *eventfd_fget(int fd); int eventfd_signal(struct file *file, unsigned int n); The eventfd_fget() should be called to get a struct file* from an eventfd fd (this is an fget() + check of f_op being an eventfd fops pointer). The kernel can then call eventfd_signal() every time it wants to post an event to userspace. The eventfd_signal() function can be called from any context. An eventfd() simple test and bench is available here: http://www.xmailserver.org/eventfd-bench.c This is the eventfd-based version of pipetest-4 (pipe(2) based): http://www.xmailserver.org/pipetest-4.c Not that performance matters much in the eventfd case, but eventfd-bench shows almost as double as performance than pipetest-4. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add sys_eventfd to sys_ni.c] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-11 13:23:19 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_eventfd(unsigned int count);
flag parameters: eventfd This patch adds the new eventfd2 syscall. It extends the old eventfd syscall by one parameter which is meant to hold a flag value. In this patch the only flag support is EFD_CLOEXEC which causes the close-on-exec flag for the returned file descriptor to be set. A new name EFD_CLOEXEC is introduced which in this implementation must have the same value as O_CLOEXEC. The following test must be adjusted for architectures other than x86 and x86-64 and in case the syscall numbers changed. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #ifndef __NR_eventfd2 # ifdef __x86_64__ # define __NR_eventfd2 290 # elif defined __i386__ # define __NR_eventfd2 328 # else # error "need __NR_eventfd2" # endif #endif #define EFD_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC int main (void) { int fd = syscall (__NR_eventfd2, 1, 0); if (fd == -1) { puts ("eventfd2(0) failed"); return 1; } int coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if (coe & FD_CLOEXEC) { puts ("eventfd2(0) sets close-on-exec flag"); return 1; } close (fd); fd = syscall (__NR_eventfd2, 1, EFD_CLOEXEC); if (fd == -1) { puts ("eventfd2(EFD_CLOEXEC) failed"); return 1; } coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if ((coe & FD_CLOEXEC) == 0) { puts ("eventfd2(EFD_CLOEXEC) does not set close-on-exec flag"); return 1; } close (fd); puts ("OK"); return 0; } ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add sys_ni stub] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Acked-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 12:29:25 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_eventfd2(unsigned int count, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_memfd_create(const char __user *uname_ptr, unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_userfaultfd(int flags);
sys_fallocate() implementation on i386, x86_64 and powerpc fallocate() is a new system call being proposed here which will allow applications to preallocate space to any file(s) in a file system. Each file system implementation that wants to use this feature will need to support an inode operation called ->fallocate(). Applications can use this feature to avoid fragmentation to certain level and thus get faster access speed. With preallocation, applications also get a guarantee of space for particular file(s) - even if later the the system becomes full. Currently, glibc provides an interface called posix_fallocate() which can be used for similar cause. Though this has the advantage of working on all file systems, but it is quite slow (since it writes zeroes to each block that has to be preallocated). Without a doubt, file systems can do this more efficiently within the kernel, by implementing the proposed fallocate() system call. It is expected that posix_fallocate() will be modified to call this new system call first and incase the kernel/filesystem does not implement it, it should fall back to the current implementation of writing zeroes to the new blocks. ToDos: 1. Implementation on other architectures (other than i386, x86_64, and ppc). Patches for s390(x) and ia64 are already available from previous posts, but it was decided that they should be added later once fallocate is in the mainline. Hence not including those patches in this take. 2. Changes to glibc, a) to support fallocate() system call b) to make posix_fallocate() and posix_fallocate64() call fallocate() Signed-off-by: Amit Arora <aarora@in.ibm.com>
2007-07-18 09:42:44 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_fallocate(int fd, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len);
asmlinkage long sys_old_readdir(unsigned int, struct old_linux_dirent __user *, unsigned int);
asmlinkage long sys_pselect6(int, fd_set __user *, fd_set __user *,
fd_set __user *, struct timespec __user *,
void __user *);
asmlinkage long sys_ppoll(struct pollfd __user *, unsigned int,
struct timespec __user *, const sigset_t __user *,
size_t);
asmlinkage long sys_fanotify_init(unsigned int flags, unsigned int event_f_flags);
asmlinkage long sys_fanotify_mark(int fanotify_fd, unsigned int flags,
u64 mask, int fd,
const char __user *pathname);
introduce sys_syncfs to sync a single file system It is frequently useful to sync a single file system, instead of all mounted file systems via sync(2): - On machines with many mounts, it is not at all uncommon for some of them to hang (e.g. unresponsive NFS server). sync(2) will get stuck on those and may never get to the one you do care about (e.g., /). - Some applications write lots of data to the file system and then want to make sure it is flushed to disk. Calling fsync(2) on each file introduces unnecessary ordering constraints that result in a large amount of sub-optimal writeback/flush/commit behavior by the file system. There are currently two ways (that I know of) to sync a single super_block: - BLKFLSBUF ioctl on the block device: That also invalidates the bdev mapping, which isn't usually desirable, and doesn't work for non-block file systems. - 'mount -o remount,rw' will call sync_filesystem as an artifact of the current implemention. Relying on this little-known side effect for something like data safety sounds foolish. Both of these approaches require root privileges, which some applications do not have (nor should they need?) given that sync(2) is an unprivileged operation. This patch introduces a new system call syncfs(2) that takes an fd and syncs only the file system it references. Maybe someday we can $ sync /some/path and not get sync: ignoring all arguments The syscall is motivated by comments by Al and Christoph at the last LSF. syncfs(2) seems like an appropriate name given statfs(2). A similar ioctl was also proposed a while back, see http://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=127970513829285&w=2 Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-03-11 03:31:30 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_syncfs(int fd);
asmlinkage long sys_fork(void);
asmlinkage long sys_vfork(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS
clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific calling conventions. In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel. That's a massive hack, and it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system call entry point across architectures. The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt into this. These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely uncontroversial and have acks. I'd like to go ahead and submit these two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. However, I'm also happy to wait and send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if anyone would prefer that. This patch (of 2): clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local storage area for the new thread. sys_clone declares an int argument tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along that argument. Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls in). Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific argument-passing order. This prevents introducing a new version of the clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific position of the tls argument. However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments. Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into, and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument. Change sys_clone's tls argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass that down to copy_thread_tls. Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone syscall. Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26 06:01:19 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_clone(unsigned long, unsigned long, int __user *, unsigned long,
int __user *);
#else
#ifdef CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS3
asmlinkage long sys_clone(unsigned long, unsigned long, int, int __user *,
clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific calling conventions. In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel. That's a massive hack, and it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system call entry point across architectures. The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt into this. These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely uncontroversial and have acks. I'd like to go ahead and submit these two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. However, I'm also happy to wait and send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if anyone would prefer that. This patch (of 2): clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local storage area for the new thread. sys_clone declares an int argument tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along that argument. Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls in). Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific argument-passing order. This prevents introducing a new version of the clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific position of the tls argument. However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments. Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into, and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument. Change sys_clone's tls argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass that down to copy_thread_tls. Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone syscall. Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26 06:01:19 +08:00
int __user *, unsigned long);
#else
asmlinkage long sys_clone(unsigned long, unsigned long, int __user *,
clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific calling conventions. In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel. That's a massive hack, and it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system call entry point across architectures. The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt into this. These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely uncontroversial and have acks. I'd like to go ahead and submit these two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS. However, I'm also happy to wait and send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if anyone would prefer that. This patch (of 2): clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local storage area for the new thread. sys_clone declares an int argument tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along that argument. Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls in). Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific argument-passing order. This prevents introducing a new version of the clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific position of the tls argument. However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments. Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into, and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument. Change sys_clone's tls argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass that down to copy_thread_tls. Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone syscall. Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira. Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26 06:01:19 +08:00
int __user *, unsigned long);
#endif
#endif
asmlinkage long sys_execve(const char __user *filename,
const char __user *const __user *argv,
const char __user *const __user *envp);
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 18:02:48 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_perf_event_open(
struct perf_event_attr __user *attr_uptr,
pid_t pid, int cpu, int group_fd, unsigned long flags);
asmlinkage long sys_mmap_pgoff(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
unsigned long fd, unsigned long pgoff);
asmlinkage long sys_old_mmap(struct mmap_arg_struct __user *arg);
asmlinkage long sys_name_to_handle_at(int dfd, const char __user *name,
struct file_handle __user *handle,
int __user *mnt_id, int flag);
asmlinkage long sys_open_by_handle_at(int mountdirfd,
struct file_handle __user *handle,
int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_setns(int fd, int nstype);
Cross Memory Attach The basic idea behind cross memory attach is to allow MPI programs doing intra-node communication to do a single copy of the message rather than a double copy of the message via shared memory. The following patch attempts to achieve this by allowing a destination process, given an address and size from a source process, to copy memory directly from the source process into its own address space via a system call. There is also a symmetrical ability to copy from the current process's address space into a destination process's address space. - Use of /proc/pid/mem has been considered, but there are issues with using it: - Does not allow for specifying iovecs for both src and dest, assuming preadv or pwritev was implemented either the area read from or written to would need to be contiguous. - Currently mem_read allows only processes who are currently ptrace'ing the target and are still able to ptrace the target to read from the target. This check could possibly be moved to the open call, but its not clear exactly what race this restriction is stopping (reason appears to have been lost) - Having to send the fd of /proc/self/mem via SCM_RIGHTS on unix domain socket is a bit ugly from a userspace point of view, especially when you may have hundreds if not (eventually) thousands of processes that all need to do this with each other - Doesn't allow for some future use of the interface we would like to consider adding in the future (see below) - Interestingly reading from /proc/pid/mem currently actually involves two copies! (But this could be fixed pretty easily) As mentioned previously use of vmsplice instead was considered, but has problems. Since you need the reader and writer working co-operatively if the pipe is not drained then you block. Which requires some wrapping to do non blocking on the send side or polling on the receive. In all to all communication it requires ordering otherwise you can deadlock. And in the example of many MPI tasks writing to one MPI task vmsplice serialises the copying. There are some cases of MPI collectives where even a single copy interface does not get us the performance gain we could. For example in an MPI_Reduce rather than copy the data from the source we would like to instead use it directly in a mathops (say the reduce is doing a sum) as this would save us doing a copy. We don't need to keep a copy of the data from the source. I haven't implemented this, but I think this interface could in the future do all this through the use of the flags - eg could specify the math operation and type and the kernel rather than just copying the data would apply the specified operation between the source and destination and store it in the destination. Although we don't have a "second user" of the interface (though I've had some nibbles from people who may be interested in using it for intra process messaging which is not MPI). This interface is something which hardware vendors are already doing for their custom drivers to implement fast local communication. And so in addition to this being useful for OpenMPI it would mean the driver maintainers don't have to fix things up when the mm changes. There was some discussion about how much faster a true zero copy would go. Here's a link back to the email with some testing I did on that: http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=130105930902915&w=2 There is a basic man page for the proposed interface here: http://ozlabs.org/~cyeoh/cma/process_vm_readv.txt This has been implemented for x86 and powerpc, other architecture should mainly (I think) just need to add syscall numbers for the process_vm_readv and process_vm_writev. There are 32 bit compatibility versions for 64-bit kernels. For arch maintainers there are some simple tests to be able to quickly verify that the syscalls are working correctly here: http://ozlabs.org/~cyeoh/cma/cma-test-20110718.tgz Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh <yeohc@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-11-01 08:06:39 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_process_vm_readv(pid_t pid,
const struct iovec __user *lvec,
unsigned long liovcnt,
const struct iovec __user *rvec,
unsigned long riovcnt,
unsigned long flags);
asmlinkage long sys_process_vm_writev(pid_t pid,
const struct iovec __user *lvec,
unsigned long liovcnt,
const struct iovec __user *rvec,
unsigned long riovcnt,
unsigned long flags);
syscalls, x86: add __NR_kcmp syscall While doing the checkpoint-restore in the user space one need to determine whether various kernel objects (like mm_struct-s of file_struct-s) are shared between tasks and restore this state. The 2nd step can be solved by using appropriate CLONE_ flags and the unshare syscall, while there's currently no ways for solving the 1st one. One of the ways for checking whether two tasks share e.g. mm_struct is to provide some mm_struct ID of a task to its proc file, but showing such info considered to be not that good for security reasons. Thus after some debates we end up in conclusion that using that named 'comparison' syscall might be the best candidate. So here is it -- __NR_kcmp. It takes up to 5 arguments - the pids of the two tasks (which characteristics should be compared), the comparison type and (in case of comparison of files) two file descriptors. Lookups for pids are done in the caller's PID namespace only. At moment only x86 is supported and tested. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up selftests, warnings] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: include errno.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-06-01 07:26:44 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type,
unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2);
asmlinkage long sys_finit_module(int fd, const char __user *uargs, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
const char __user *uargs);
random: introduce getrandom(2) system call The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD. The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where /dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode entirely. The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the /dev/urandom entropy pool. Historically, the emphasis in the /dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably before the init scripts start execution. This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not acceptable. In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not). However, on an embedded system, this may not be the case. And so with this new interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the urandom pool has been initialized. Any userspace program which uses this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely. SYNOPSIS #include <linux/random.h> int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags); DESCRIPTION The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other cryptographic uses. It should not be used for Monte Carlo simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing probabilistic sampling. If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the /dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The /dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned. If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags. If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool will be used. Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from /dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags). The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using the following function: int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen) { int ret; if (buflen > 256) goto failure; ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0); if (ret < 0) return ret; if (ret == buflen) return 0; failure: errno = EIO; return -1; } RETURN VALUE On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is returned. This may not be all the bytes requested by the caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the /dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a signal. On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately. ERRORS EINVAL An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2) EFAULT buf is outside the accessible address space. EAGAIN The requested entropy was not available, and getentropy(2) would have blocked if the GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set. EINTR While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was interrupted by a signal handler; see the description of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag in the signal(7) man page. NOTES For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of the bytes that have been requested. This is the recommended way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call. However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2) will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime. Since it may block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply. The user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal, so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned would be unfriendly. For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer bytes than requested was returned. In the case of !GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code should be careful) should check for this anyway! Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for /dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be sufficient for all purposes. The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Zach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
2014-07-17 16:13:05 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_getrandom(char __user *buf, size_t count,
unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size);
syscalls: implement execveat() system call This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528). The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem, at least for executables (rather than scripts). The current glibc version of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed or otherwise restricted environments. Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested (https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be an appropriate generalization. Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without back-compatibility concerns. The current implementation just defines the AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474). Related history: - https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment. - http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to "prevent other people from wasting their time". - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve() because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since been fixed. This patch (of 4): Add a new execveat(2) system call. execveat() is to execve() as openat() is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and resolves the filename relative to that. In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified, execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers. This replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/<fd>" (and so relies on /proc being mounted). The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/<fd>" (for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>", effectively reflecting how the executable was found. This does however mean that execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be accessible after exec). Based on patches by Meredydd Luff. Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah.kh@samsung.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-13 08:57:29 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_execveat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
const char __user *const __user *argv,
const char __user *const __user *envp, int flags);
sys_membarrier(): system-wide memory barrier (generic, x86) Here is an implementation of a new system call, sys_membarrier(), which executes a memory barrier on all threads running on the system. It is implemented by calling synchronize_sched(). It can be used to distribute the cost of user-space memory barriers asymmetrically by transforming pairs of memory barriers into pairs consisting of sys_membarrier() and a compiler barrier. For synchronization primitives that distinguish between read-side and write-side (e.g. userspace RCU [1], rwlocks), the read-side can be accelerated significantly by moving the bulk of the memory barrier overhead to the write-side. The existing applications of which I am aware that would be improved by this system call are as follows: * Through Userspace RCU library (http://urcu.so) - DNS server (Knot DNS) https://www.knot-dns.cz/ - Network sniffer (http://netsniff-ng.org/) - Distributed object storage (https://sheepdog.github.io/sheepdog/) - User-space tracing (http://lttng.org) - Network storage system (https://www.gluster.org/) - Virtual routers (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/DPDK_RCU_0MQ.pdf) - Financial software (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/23/189) Those projects use RCU in userspace to increase read-side speed and scalability compared to locking. Especially in the case of RCU used by libraries, sys_membarrier can speed up the read-side by moving the bulk of the memory barrier cost to synchronize_rcu(). * Direct users of sys_membarrier - core dotnet garbage collector (https://github.com/dotnet/coreclr/issues/198) Microsoft core dotnet GC developers are planning to use the mprotect() side-effect of issuing memory barriers through IPIs as a way to implement Windows FlushProcessWriteBuffers() on Linux. They are referring to sys_membarrier in their github thread, specifically stating that sys_membarrier() is what they are looking for. To explain the benefit of this scheme, let's introduce two example threads: Thread A (non-frequent, e.g. executing liburcu synchronize_rcu()) Thread B (frequent, e.g. executing liburcu rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock()) In a scheme where all smp_mb() in thread A are ordering memory accesses with respect to smp_mb() present in Thread B, we can change each smp_mb() within Thread A into calls to sys_membarrier() and each smp_mb() within Thread B into compiler barriers "barrier()". Before the change, we had, for each smp_mb() pairs: Thread A Thread B previous mem accesses previous mem accesses smp_mb() smp_mb() following mem accesses following mem accesses After the change, these pairs become: Thread A Thread B prev mem accesses prev mem accesses sys_membarrier() barrier() follow mem accesses follow mem accesses As we can see, there are two possible scenarios: either Thread B memory accesses do not happen concurrently with Thread A accesses (1), or they do (2). 1) Non-concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses: Thread A Thread B prev mem accesses sys_membarrier() follow mem accesses prev mem accesses barrier() follow mem accesses In this case, thread B accesses will be weakly ordered. This is OK, because at that point, thread A is not particularly interested in ordering them with respect to its own accesses. 2) Concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses Thread A Thread B prev mem accesses prev mem accesses sys_membarrier() barrier() follow mem accesses follow mem accesses In this case, thread B accesses, which are ensured to be in program order thanks to the compiler barrier, will be "upgraded" to full smp_mb() by synchronize_sched(). * Benchmarks On Intel Xeon E5405 (8 cores) (one thread is calling sys_membarrier, the other 7 threads are busy looping) 1000 non-expedited sys_membarrier calls in 33s =3D 33 milliseconds/call. * User-space user of this system call: Userspace RCU library Both the signal-based and the sys_membarrier userspace RCU schemes permit us to remove the memory barrier from the userspace RCU rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock() primitives, thus significantly accelerating them. These memory barriers are replaced by compiler barriers on the read-side, and all matching memory barriers on the write-side are turned into an invocation of a memory barrier on all active threads in the process. By letting the kernel perform this synchronization rather than dumbly sending a signal to every process threads (as we currently do), we diminish the number of unnecessary wake ups and only issue the memory barriers on active threads. Non-running threads do not need to execute such barrier anyway, because these are implied by the scheduler context switches. Results in liburcu: Operations in 10s, 6 readers, 2 writers: memory barriers in reader: 1701557485 reads, 2202847 writes signal-based scheme: 9830061167 reads, 6700 writes sys_membarrier: 9952759104 reads, 425 writes sys_membarrier (dyn. check): 7970328887 reads, 425 writes The dynamic sys_membarrier availability check adds some overhead to the read-side compared to the signal-based scheme, but besides that, sys_membarrier slightly outperforms the signal-based scheme. However, this non-expedited sys_membarrier implementation has a much slower grace period than signal and memory barrier schemes. Besides diminishing the number of wake-ups, one major advantage of the membarrier system call over the signal-based scheme is that it does not need to reserve a signal. This plays much more nicely with libraries, and with processes injected into for tracing purposes, for which we cannot expect that signals will be unused by the application. An expedited version of this system call can be added later on to speed up the grace period. Its implementation will likely depend on reading the cpu_curr()->mm without holding each CPU's rq lock. This patch adds the system call to x86 and to asm-generic. [1] http://urcu.so membarrier(2) man page: MEMBARRIER(2) Linux Programmer's Manual MEMBARRIER(2) NAME membarrier - issue memory barriers on a set of threads SYNOPSIS #include <linux/membarrier.h> int membarrier(int cmd, int flags); DESCRIPTION The cmd argument is one of the following: MEMBARRIER_CMD_QUERY Query the set of supported commands. It returns a bitmask of supported commands. MEMBARRIER_CMD_SHARED Execute a memory barrier on all threads running on the system. Upon return from system call, the caller thread is ensured that all running threads have passed through a state where all memory accesses to user-space addresses match program order between entry to and return from the system call (non-running threads are de facto in such a state). This covers threads from all pro=E2=80=90 cesses running on the system. This command returns 0. The flags argument needs to be 0. For future extensions. All memory accesses performed in program order from each targeted thread is guaranteed to be ordered with respect to sys_membarrier(). If we use the semantic "barrier()" to represent a compiler barrier forcing memory accesses to be performed in program order across the barrier, and smp_mb() to represent explicit memory barriers forcing full memory ordering across the barrier, we have the following ordering table for each pair of barrier(), sys_membarrier() and smp_mb(): The pair ordering is detailed as (O: ordered, X: not ordered): barrier() smp_mb() sys_membarrier() barrier() X X O smp_mb() X O O sys_membarrier() O O O RETURN VALUE On success, these system calls return zero. On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately. For a given command, with flags argument set to 0, this system call is guaranteed to always return the same value until reboot. ERRORS ENOSYS System call is not implemented. EINVAL Invalid arguments. Linux 2015-04-15 MEMBARRIER(2) Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Nicholas Miell <nmiell@comcast.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-12 04:07:39 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_membarrier(int cmd, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_copy_file_range(int fd_in, loff_t __user *off_in,
int fd_out, loff_t __user *off_out,
size_t len, unsigned int flags);
sys_membarrier(): system-wide memory barrier (generic, x86) Here is an implementation of a new system call, sys_membarrier(), which executes a memory barrier on all threads running on the system. It is implemented by calling synchronize_sched(). It can be used to distribute the cost of user-space memory barriers asymmetrically by transforming pairs of memory barriers into pairs consisting of sys_membarrier() and a compiler barrier. For synchronization primitives that distinguish between read-side and write-side (e.g. userspace RCU [1], rwlocks), the read-side can be accelerated significantly by moving the bulk of the memory barrier overhead to the write-side. The existing applications of which I am aware that would be improved by this system call are as follows: * Through Userspace RCU library (http://urcu.so) - DNS server (Knot DNS) https://www.knot-dns.cz/ - Network sniffer (http://netsniff-ng.org/) - Distributed object storage (https://sheepdog.github.io/sheepdog/) - User-space tracing (http://lttng.org) - Network storage system (https://www.gluster.org/) - Virtual routers (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/DPDK_RCU_0MQ.pdf) - Financial software (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/23/189) Those projects use RCU in userspace to increase read-side speed and scalability compared to locking. Especially in the case of RCU used by libraries, sys_membarrier can speed up the read-side by moving the bulk of the memory barrier cost to synchronize_rcu(). * Direct users of sys_membarrier - core dotnet garbage collector (https://github.com/dotnet/coreclr/issues/198) Microsoft core dotnet GC developers are planning to use the mprotect() side-effect of issuing memory barriers through IPIs as a way to implement Windows FlushProcessWriteBuffers() on Linux. They are referring to sys_membarrier in their github thread, specifically stating that sys_membarrier() is what they are looking for. To explain the benefit of this scheme, let's introduce two example threads: Thread A (non-frequent, e.g. executing liburcu synchronize_rcu()) Thread B (frequent, e.g. executing liburcu rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock()) In a scheme where all smp_mb() in thread A are ordering memory accesses with respect to smp_mb() present in Thread B, we can change each smp_mb() within Thread A into calls to sys_membarrier() and each smp_mb() within Thread B into compiler barriers "barrier()". Before the change, we had, for each smp_mb() pairs: Thread A Thread B previous mem accesses previous mem accesses smp_mb() smp_mb() following mem accesses following mem accesses After the change, these pairs become: Thread A Thread B prev mem accesses prev mem accesses sys_membarrier() barrier() follow mem accesses follow mem accesses As we can see, there are two possible scenarios: either Thread B memory accesses do not happen concurrently with Thread A accesses (1), or they do (2). 1) Non-concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses: Thread A Thread B prev mem accesses sys_membarrier() follow mem accesses prev mem accesses barrier() follow mem accesses In this case, thread B accesses will be weakly ordered. This is OK, because at that point, thread A is not particularly interested in ordering them with respect to its own accesses. 2) Concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses Thread A Thread B prev mem accesses prev mem accesses sys_membarrier() barrier() follow mem accesses follow mem accesses In this case, thread B accesses, which are ensured to be in program order thanks to the compiler barrier, will be "upgraded" to full smp_mb() by synchronize_sched(). * Benchmarks On Intel Xeon E5405 (8 cores) (one thread is calling sys_membarrier, the other 7 threads are busy looping) 1000 non-expedited sys_membarrier calls in 33s =3D 33 milliseconds/call. * User-space user of this system call: Userspace RCU library Both the signal-based and the sys_membarrier userspace RCU schemes permit us to remove the memory barrier from the userspace RCU rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock() primitives, thus significantly accelerating them. These memory barriers are replaced by compiler barriers on the read-side, and all matching memory barriers on the write-side are turned into an invocation of a memory barrier on all active threads in the process. By letting the kernel perform this synchronization rather than dumbly sending a signal to every process threads (as we currently do), we diminish the number of unnecessary wake ups and only issue the memory barriers on active threads. Non-running threads do not need to execute such barrier anyway, because these are implied by the scheduler context switches. Results in liburcu: Operations in 10s, 6 readers, 2 writers: memory barriers in reader: 1701557485 reads, 2202847 writes signal-based scheme: 9830061167 reads, 6700 writes sys_membarrier: 9952759104 reads, 425 writes sys_membarrier (dyn. check): 7970328887 reads, 425 writes The dynamic sys_membarrier availability check adds some overhead to the read-side compared to the signal-based scheme, but besides that, sys_membarrier slightly outperforms the signal-based scheme. However, this non-expedited sys_membarrier implementation has a much slower grace period than signal and memory barrier schemes. Besides diminishing the number of wake-ups, one major advantage of the membarrier system call over the signal-based scheme is that it does not need to reserve a signal. This plays much more nicely with libraries, and with processes injected into for tracing purposes, for which we cannot expect that signals will be unused by the application. An expedited version of this system call can be added later on to speed up the grace period. Its implementation will likely depend on reading the cpu_curr()->mm without holding each CPU's rq lock. This patch adds the system call to x86 and to asm-generic. [1] http://urcu.so membarrier(2) man page: MEMBARRIER(2) Linux Programmer's Manual MEMBARRIER(2) NAME membarrier - issue memory barriers on a set of threads SYNOPSIS #include <linux/membarrier.h> int membarrier(int cmd, int flags); DESCRIPTION The cmd argument is one of the following: MEMBARRIER_CMD_QUERY Query the set of supported commands. It returns a bitmask of supported commands. MEMBARRIER_CMD_SHARED Execute a memory barrier on all threads running on the system. Upon return from system call, the caller thread is ensured that all running threads have passed through a state where all memory accesses to user-space addresses match program order between entry to and return from the system call (non-running threads are de facto in such a state). This covers threads from all pro=E2=80=90 cesses running on the system. This command returns 0. The flags argument needs to be 0. For future extensions. All memory accesses performed in program order from each targeted thread is guaranteed to be ordered with respect to sys_membarrier(). If we use the semantic "barrier()" to represent a compiler barrier forcing memory accesses to be performed in program order across the barrier, and smp_mb() to represent explicit memory barriers forcing full memory ordering across the barrier, we have the following ordering table for each pair of barrier(), sys_membarrier() and smp_mb(): The pair ordering is detailed as (O: ordered, X: not ordered): barrier() smp_mb() sys_membarrier() barrier() X X O smp_mb() X O O sys_membarrier() O O O RETURN VALUE On success, these system calls return zero. On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately. For a given command, with flags argument set to 0, this system call is guaranteed to always return the same value until reboot. ERRORS ENOSYS System call is not implemented. EINVAL Invalid arguments. Linux 2015-04-15 MEMBARRIER(2) Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Nicholas Miell <nmiell@comcast.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-12 04:07:39 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_mlock2(unsigned long start, size_t len, int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_pkey_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len,
unsigned long prot, int pkey);
asmlinkage long sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val);
asmlinkage long sys_pkey_free(int pkey);
statx: Add a system call to make enhanced file info available Add a system call to make extended file information available, including file creation and some attribute flags where available through the underlying filesystem. The getattr inode operation is altered to take two additional arguments: a u32 request_mask and an unsigned int flags that indicate the synchronisation mode. This change is propagated to the vfs_getattr*() function. Functions like vfs_stat() are now inline wrappers around new functions vfs_statx() and vfs_statx_fd() to reduce stack usage. ======== OVERVIEW ======== The idea was initially proposed as a set of xattrs that could be retrieved with getxattr(), but the general preference proved to be for a new syscall with an extended stat structure. A number of requests were gathered for features to be included. The following have been included: (1) Make the fields a consistent size on all arches and make them large. (2) Spare space, request flags and information flags are provided for future expansion. (3) Better support for the y2038 problem [Arnd Bergmann] (tv_sec is an __s64). (4) Creation time: The SMB protocol carries the creation time, which could be exported by Samba, which will in turn help CIFS make use of FS-Cache as that can be used for coherency data (stx_btime). This is also specified in NFSv4 as a recommended attribute and could be exported by NFSD [Steve French]. (5) Lightweight stat: Ask for just those details of interest, and allow a netfs (such as NFS) to approximate anything not of interest, possibly without going to the server [Trond Myklebust, Ulrich Drepper, Andreas Dilger] (AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC). (6) Heavyweight stat: Force a netfs to go to the server, even if it thinks its cached attributes are up to date [Trond Myklebust] (AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC). And the following have been left out for future extension: (7) Data version number: Could be used by userspace NFS servers [Aneesh Kumar]. Can also be used to modify fill_post_wcc() in NFSD which retrieves i_version directly, but has just called vfs_getattr(). It could get it from the kstat struct if it used vfs_xgetattr() instead. (There's disagreement on the exact semantics of a single field, since not all filesystems do this the same way). (8) BSD stat compatibility: Including more fields from the BSD stat such as creation time (st_btime) and inode generation number (st_gen) [Jeremy Allison, Bernd Schubert]. (9) Inode generation number: Useful for FUSE and userspace NFS servers [Bernd Schubert]. (This was asked for but later deemed unnecessary with the open-by-handle capability available and caused disagreement as to whether it's a security hole or not). (10) Extra coherency data may be useful in making backups [Andreas Dilger]. (No particular data were offered, but things like last backup timestamp, the data version number and the DOS archive bit would come into this category). (11) Allow the filesystem to indicate what it can/cannot provide: A filesystem can now say it doesn't support a standard stat feature if that isn't available, so if, for instance, inode numbers or UIDs don't exist or are fabricated locally... (This requires a separate system call - I have an fsinfo() call idea for this). (12) Store a 16-byte volume ID in the superblock that can be returned in struct xstat [Steve French]. (Deferred to fsinfo). (13) Include granularity fields in the time data to indicate the granularity of each of the times (NFSv4 time_delta) [Steve French]. (Deferred to fsinfo). (14) FS_IOC_GETFLAGS value. These could be translated to BSD's st_flags. Note that the Linux IOC flags are a mess and filesystems such as Ext4 define flags that aren't in linux/fs.h, so translation in the kernel may be a necessity (or, possibly, we provide the filesystem type too). (Some attributes are made available in stx_attributes, but the general feeling was that the IOC flags were to ext[234]-specific and shouldn't be exposed through statx this way). (15) Mask of features available on file (eg: ACLs, seclabel) [Brad Boyer, Michael Kerrisk]. (Deferred, probably to fsinfo. Finding out if there's an ACL or seclabal might require extra filesystem operations). (16) Femtosecond-resolution timestamps [Dave Chinner]. (A __reserved field has been left in the statx_timestamp struct for this - if there proves to be a need). (17) A set multiple attributes syscall to go with this. =============== NEW SYSTEM CALL =============== The new system call is: int ret = statx(int dfd, const char *filename, unsigned int flags, unsigned int mask, struct statx *buffer); The dfd, filename and flags parameters indicate the file to query, in a similar way to fstatat(). There is no equivalent of lstat() as that can be emulated with statx() by passing AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW in flags. There is also no equivalent of fstat() as that can be emulated by passing a NULL filename to statx() with the fd of interest in dfd. Whether or not statx() synchronises the attributes with the backing store can be controlled by OR'ing a value into the flags argument (this typically only affects network filesystems): (1) AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT tells statx() to behave as stat() does in this respect. (2) AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC will require a network filesystem to synchronise its attributes with the server - which might require data writeback to occur to get the timestamps correct. (3) AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC will suppress synchronisation with the server in a network filesystem. The resulting values should be considered approximate. mask is a bitmask indicating the fields in struct statx that are of interest to the caller. The user should set this to STATX_BASIC_STATS to get the basic set returned by stat(). It should be noted that asking for more information may entail extra I/O operations. buffer points to the destination for the data. This must be 256 bytes in size. ====================== MAIN ATTRIBUTES RECORD ====================== The following structures are defined in which to return the main attribute set: struct statx_timestamp { __s64 tv_sec; __s32 tv_nsec; __s32 __reserved; }; struct statx { __u32 stx_mask; __u32 stx_blksize; __u64 stx_attributes; __u32 stx_nlink; __u32 stx_uid; __u32 stx_gid; __u16 stx_mode; __u16 __spare0[1]; __u64 stx_ino; __u64 stx_size; __u64 stx_blocks; __u64 __spare1[1]; struct statx_timestamp stx_atime; struct statx_timestamp stx_btime; struct statx_timestamp stx_ctime; struct statx_timestamp stx_mtime; __u32 stx_rdev_major; __u32 stx_rdev_minor; __u32 stx_dev_major; __u32 stx_dev_minor; __u64 __spare2[14]; }; The defined bits in request_mask and stx_mask are: STATX_TYPE Want/got stx_mode & S_IFMT STATX_MODE Want/got stx_mode & ~S_IFMT STATX_NLINK Want/got stx_nlink STATX_UID Want/got stx_uid STATX_GID Want/got stx_gid STATX_ATIME Want/got stx_atime{,_ns} STATX_MTIME Want/got stx_mtime{,_ns} STATX_CTIME Want/got stx_ctime{,_ns} STATX_INO Want/got stx_ino STATX_SIZE Want/got stx_size STATX_BLOCKS Want/got stx_blocks STATX_BASIC_STATS [The stuff in the normal stat struct] STATX_BTIME Want/got stx_btime{,_ns} STATX_ALL [All currently available stuff] stx_btime is the file creation time, stx_mask is a bitmask indicating the data provided and __spares*[] are where as-yet undefined fields can be placed. Time fields are structures with separate seconds and nanoseconds fields plus a reserved field in case we want to add even finer resolution. Note that times will be negative if before 1970; in such a case, the nanosecond fields will also be negative if not zero. The bits defined in the stx_attributes field convey information about a file, how it is accessed, where it is and what it does. The following attributes map to FS_*_FL flags and are the same numerical value: STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED File is compressed by the fs STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE File is marked immutable STATX_ATTR_APPEND File is append-only STATX_ATTR_NODUMP File is not to be dumped STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED File requires key to decrypt in fs Within the kernel, the supported flags are listed by: KSTAT_ATTR_FS_IOC_FLAGS [Are any other IOC flags of sufficient general interest to be exposed through this interface?] New flags include: STATX_ATTR_AUTOMOUNT Object is an automount trigger These are for the use of GUI tools that might want to mark files specially, depending on what they are. Fields in struct statx come in a number of classes: (0) stx_dev_*, stx_blksize. These are local system information and are always available. (1) stx_mode, stx_nlinks, stx_uid, stx_gid, stx_[amc]time, stx_ino, stx_size, stx_blocks. These will be returned whether the caller asks for them or not. The corresponding bits in stx_mask will be set to indicate whether they actually have valid values. If the caller didn't ask for them, then they may be approximated. For example, NFS won't waste any time updating them from the server, unless as a byproduct of updating something requested. If the values don't actually exist for the underlying object (such as UID or GID on a DOS file), then the bit won't be set in the stx_mask, even if the caller asked for the value. In such a case, the returned value will be a fabrication. Note that there are instances where the type might not be valid, for instance Windows reparse points. (2) stx_rdev_*. This will be set only if stx_mode indicates we're looking at a blockdev or a chardev, otherwise will be 0. (3) stx_btime. Similar to (1), except this will be set to 0 if it doesn't exist. ======= TESTING ======= The following test program can be used to test the statx system call: samples/statx/test-statx.c Just compile and run, passing it paths to the files you want to examine. The file is built automatically if CONFIG_SAMPLES is enabled. Here's some example output. Firstly, an NFS directory that crosses to another FSID. Note that the AUTOMOUNT attribute is set because transiting this directory will cause d_automount to be invoked by the VFS. [root@andromeda ~]# /tmp/test-statx -A /warthog/data statx(/warthog/data) = 0 results=7ff Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 directory Device: 00:26 Inode: 1703937 Links: 125 Access: (3777/drwxrwxrwx) Uid: 0 Gid: 4041 Access: 2016-11-24 09:02:12.219699527+0000 Modify: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Change: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Attributes: 0000000000001000 (-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ---m---- --------) Secondly, the result of automounting on that directory. [root@andromeda ~]# /tmp/test-statx /warthog/data statx(/warthog/data) = 0 results=7ff Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 directory Device: 00:27 Inode: 2 Links: 125 Access: (3777/drwxrwxrwx) Uid: 0 Gid: 4041 Access: 2016-11-24 09:02:12.219699527+0000 Modify: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Change: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-02-01 00:46:22 +08:00
asmlinkage long sys_statx(int dfd, const char __user *path, unsigned flags,
unsigned mask, struct statx __user *buffer);
/*
* Kernel code should not call syscalls (i.e., sys_xyzyyz()) directly.
* Instead, use one of the functions which work equivalently, such as
* the ksys_xyzyyz() functions prototyped below.
*/
int ksys_mount(char __user *dev_name, char __user *dir_name, char __user *type,
unsigned long flags, void __user *data);
int ksys_umount(char __user *name, int flags);
int ksys_dup(unsigned int fildes);
int ksys_chroot(const char __user *filename);
ssize_t ksys_write(unsigned int fd, const char __user *buf, size_t count);
int ksys_chdir(const char __user *filename);
int ksys_fchmod(unsigned int fd, umode_t mode);
int ksys_fchown(unsigned int fd, uid_t user, gid_t group);
int ksys_getdents64(unsigned int fd, struct linux_dirent64 __user *dirent,
unsigned int count);
int ksys_ioctl(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
off_t ksys_lseek(unsigned int fd, off_t offset, unsigned int whence);
ssize_t ksys_read(unsigned int fd, char __user *buf, size_t count);
void ksys_sync(void);
int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags);
int ksys_setsid(void);
int ksys_sync_file_range(int fd, loff_t offset, loff_t nbytes,
unsigned int flags);
ssize_t ksys_pread64(unsigned int fd, char __user *buf, size_t count,
loff_t pos);
ssize_t ksys_pwrite64(unsigned int fd, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t pos);
int ksys_fallocate(int fd, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len);
/*
* The following kernel syscall equivalents are just wrappers to fs-internal
* functions. Therefore, provide stubs to be inlined at the callsites.
*/
extern long do_unlinkat(int dfd, struct filename *name);
static inline long ksys_unlink(const char __user *pathname)
{
return do_unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, getname(pathname));
}
extern long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char __user *pathname);
static inline long ksys_rmdir(const char __user *pathname)
{
return do_rmdir(AT_FDCWD, pathname);
}
extern long do_mkdirat(int dfd, const char __user *pathname, umode_t mode);
static inline long ksys_mkdir(const char __user *pathname, umode_t mode)
{
return do_mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, pathname, mode);
}
extern long do_symlinkat(const char __user *oldname, int newdfd,
const char __user *newname);
static inline long ksys_symlink(const char __user *oldname,
const char __user *newname)
{
return do_symlinkat(oldname, AT_FDCWD, newname);
}
extern long do_mknodat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, umode_t mode,
unsigned int dev);
static inline long ksys_mknod(const char __user *filename, umode_t mode,
unsigned int dev)
{
return do_mknodat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode, dev);
}
extern int do_linkat(int olddfd, const char __user *oldname, int newdfd,
const char __user *newname, int flags);
static inline long ksys_link(const char __user *oldname,
const char __user *newname)
{
return do_linkat(AT_FDCWD, oldname, AT_FDCWD, newname, 0);
}
extern int do_fchmodat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, umode_t mode);
static inline int ksys_chmod(const char __user *filename, umode_t mode)
{
return do_fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode);
}
extern long do_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode);
static inline long ksys_access(const char __user *filename, int mode)
{
return do_faccessat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode);
}
extern int do_fchownat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, uid_t user,
gid_t group, int flag);
static inline long ksys_chown(const char __user *filename, uid_t user,
gid_t group)
{
return do_fchownat(AT_FDCWD, filename, user, group, 0);
}
static inline long ksys_lchown(const char __user *filename, uid_t user,
gid_t group)
{
return do_fchownat(AT_FDCWD, filename, user, group,
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
}
extern long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small);
static inline long ksys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, unsigned long length)
{
return do_sys_ftruncate(fd, length, 1);
}
extern int __close_fd(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd);
/*
* In contrast to sys_close(), this stub does not check whether the syscall
* should or should not be restarted, but returns the raw error codes from
* __close_fd().
*/
static inline int ksys_close(unsigned int fd)
{
return __close_fd(current->files, fd);
}
extern long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags,
umode_t mode);
static inline long ksys_open(const char __user *filename, int flags,
umode_t mode)
{
if (force_o_largefile())
flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
return do_sys_open(AT_FDCWD, filename, flags, mode);
}
extern long do_sys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length);
static inline long ksys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length)
{
return do_sys_truncate(pathname, length);
}
#endif