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OpenCloudOS-Kernel/security/selinux/Makefile

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Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
#
# Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree.
#
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/
SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions. The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are also modified to take advantage of this new functionality. In addition, remove the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is redundant since we already have the address family. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-29 21:38:13 +08:00
selinux-y := avc.o \
hooks.o \
selinuxfs.o \
netlink.o \
nlmsgtab.o \
netif.o \
netnode.o \
SELinux: Add network port SID cache Much like we added a network node cache, this patch adds a network port cache. The design is taken almost completely from the network node cache which in turn was taken from the network interface cache. The basic idea is to cache entries in a hash table based on protocol/port information. The hash function only takes the port number into account since the number of different protocols in use at any one time is expected to be relatively small. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-10 22:48:14 +08:00
netport.o \
SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions. The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are also modified to take advantage of this new functionality. In addition, remove the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is redundant since we already have the address family. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-29 21:38:13 +08:00
exports.o
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
[LSM-IPSec]: Per-packet access control. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies (xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec policy based on their security contexts. Since the communication is implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the security association's negotiated and used have the same security context. The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such security contexts for policies and security associations. It also enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned. Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be sent in that manner. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup. The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used, then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet, respectively. The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc. When a security association is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via selinux_xfrm_state_alloc. When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone. When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or selinux_xfrm_state_free. Testing: The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools. We created policies and security associations with particular security contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the authorization decision. We also made sure that packets for which no security context was supplied (which either did or did not use security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 15:12:40 +08:00
selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
SELinux: extract the NetLabel SELinux support from the security server Up until this patch the functions which have provided NetLabel support to SELinux have been integrated into the SELinux security server, which for various reasons is not really ideal. This patch makes an effort to extract as much of the NetLabel support from the security server as possibile and move it into it's own file within the SELinux directory structure. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-03-01 04:14:22 +08:00
selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include