OpenCloudOS-Kernel/net/mac80211/aead_api.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright 2003-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
* Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc.
* Copyright 2014-2015, Qualcomm Atheros, Inc.
*
* Rewrite: Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include "aead_api.h"
int aead_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
size_t mic_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
struct scatterlist sg[3];
struct aead_request *aead_req;
int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
u8 *__aad;
int ret;
aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + aad_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!aead_req)
return -ENOMEM;
__aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
memcpy(__aad, aad, aad_len);
sg_init_table(sg, 3);
sg_set_buf(&sg[0], __aad, aad_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len);
aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len, b_0);
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 14:18:13 +08:00
kfree_sensitive(aead_req);
return ret;
}
int aead_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
size_t mic_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
struct scatterlist sg[3];
struct aead_request *aead_req;
int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
u8 *__aad;
int err;
mac80211: Fix regression that triggers a kernel BUG with CCMP Commit 7ec7c4a9a686c608315739ab6a2b0527a240883c (mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver) introduced a regression when decrypting empty packets (data_len == 0). This will lead to backtraces like: (scatterwalk_start) from [<c01312f4>] (scatterwalk_map_and_copy+0x2c/0xa8) (scatterwalk_map_and_copy) from [<c013a5a0>] (crypto_ccm_decrypt+0x7c/0x25c) (crypto_ccm_decrypt) from [<c032886c>] (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt+0x160/0x170) (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt) from [<c031c628>] (ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt+0x1ac/0x238) (ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt) from [<c032ef28>] (ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x870/0x1d24) (ieee80211_rx_handlers) from [<c0330c7c>] (ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x8a0/0x91c) (ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle) from [<c0331260>] (ieee80211_rx+0x568/0x730) (ieee80211_rx) from [<c01d3054>] (__carl9170_rx+0x94c/0xa20) (__carl9170_rx) from [<c01d3324>] (carl9170_rx_stream+0x1fc/0x320) (carl9170_rx_stream) from [<c01cbccc>] (carl9170_usb_tasklet+0x80/0xc8) (carl9170_usb_tasklet) from [<c00199dc>] (tasklet_hi_action+0x88/0xcc) (tasklet_hi_action) from [<c00193c8>] (__do_softirq+0xcc/0x200) (__do_softirq) from [<c0019734>] (irq_exit+0x80/0xe0) (irq_exit) from [<c0009c10>] (handle_IRQ+0x64/0x80) (handle_IRQ) from [<c000c3a0>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x4c) (__irq_svc) from [<c0009d44>] (arch_cpu_idle+0x2c/0x34) Such packets can appear for example when using the carl9170 wireless driver because hardware sometimes generates garbage when the internal FIFO overruns. This patch adds an additional length check. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7ec7c4a9a686 ("mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver") Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Ronald Wahl <ronald.wahl@raritan.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2014-11-06 18:52:13 +08:00
if (data_len == 0)
return -EINVAL;
aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + aad_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!aead_req)
return -ENOMEM;
__aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
memcpy(__aad, aad, aad_len);
sg_init_table(sg, 3);
sg_set_buf(&sg[0], __aad, aad_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len);
aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len + mic_len, b_0);
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
err = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 14:18:13 +08:00
kfree_sensitive(aead_req);
return err;
}
struct crypto_aead *
aead_key_setup_encrypt(const char *alg, const u8 key[],
size_t key_len, size_t mic_len)
{
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
int err;
tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return tfm;
err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
if (err)
goto free_aead;
err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, mic_len);
if (err)
goto free_aead;
return tfm;
free_aead:
crypto_free_aead(tfm);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
void aead_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
{
crypto_free_aead(tfm);
}