License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_UACCESS_H
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#define __ASM_GENERIC_UACCESS_H
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/*
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* User space memory access functions, these should work
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2013-12-30 17:06:33 +08:00
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* on any machine that has kernel and user data in the same
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2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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* address space, e.g. all NOMMU machines.
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*/
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#include <linux/string.h>
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2019-04-24 00:38:08 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_UACCESS_MEMCPY
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static inline __must_check unsigned long
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raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user * from, unsigned long n)
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{
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if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) {
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switch(n) {
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case 1:
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*(u8 *)to = *(u8 __force *)from;
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return 0;
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case 2:
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*(u16 *)to = *(u16 __force *)from;
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return 0;
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case 4:
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*(u32 *)to = *(u32 __force *)from;
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return 0;
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2019-04-24 00:38:09 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
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case 8:
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*(u64 *)to = *(u64 __force *)from;
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return 0;
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#endif
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2019-04-24 00:38:08 +08:00
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}
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}
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memcpy(to, (const void __force *)from, n);
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return 0;
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}
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static inline __must_check unsigned long
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raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
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{
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if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) {
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switch(n) {
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case 1:
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*(u8 __force *)to = *(u8 *)from;
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return 0;
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case 2:
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*(u16 __force *)to = *(u16 *)from;
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return 0;
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case 4:
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*(u32 __force *)to = *(u32 *)from;
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return 0;
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2019-04-24 00:38:09 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
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case 8:
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*(u64 __force *)to = *(u64 *)from;
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return 0;
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#endif
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2019-04-24 00:38:08 +08:00
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default:
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break;
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}
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}
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memcpy((void __force *)to, from, n);
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return 0;
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}
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#define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
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#define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
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#endif /* CONFIG_UACCESS_MEMCPY */
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2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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#define MAKE_MM_SEG(s) ((mm_segment_t) { (s) })
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#ifndef KERNEL_DS
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#define KERNEL_DS MAKE_MM_SEG(~0UL)
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#endif
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#ifndef USER_DS
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#define USER_DS MAKE_MM_SEG(TASK_SIZE - 1)
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#endif
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#ifndef get_fs
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#define get_fs() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit)
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static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
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{
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current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
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}
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#endif
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2020-08-12 09:33:44 +08:00
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#ifndef uaccess_kernel
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#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
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2013-01-18 17:42:16 +08:00
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#endif
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2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
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#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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/*
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* The architecture should really override this if possible, at least
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* doing a check on the get_fs()
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*/
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#ifndef __access_ok
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static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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/*
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* These are the main single-value transfer routines. They automatically
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* use the right size if we just have the right pointer type.
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* This version just falls back to copy_{from,to}_user, which should
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* provide a fast-path for small values.
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*/
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#define __put_user(x, ptr) \
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({ \
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__typeof__(*(ptr)) __x = (x); \
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int __pu_err = -EFAULT; \
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__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
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switch (sizeof (*(ptr))) { \
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case 1: \
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case 2: \
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case 4: \
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|
case 8: \
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__pu_err = __put_user_fn(sizeof (*(ptr)), \
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ptr, &__x); \
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|
break; \
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|
default: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_bad(); \
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|
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|
break; \
|
|
|
|
} \
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|
__pu_err; \
|
|
|
|
})
|
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|
|
#define put_user(x, ptr) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
2017-09-05 00:07:24 +08:00
|
|
|
void __user *__p = (ptr); \
|
2013-05-26 22:30:36 +08:00
|
|
|
might_fault(); \
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
access_ok(__p, sizeof(*ptr)) ? \
|
2017-09-05 00:07:24 +08:00
|
|
|
__put_user((x), ((__typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *)__p)) : \
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
-EFAULT; \
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-18 17:42:16 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef __put_user_fn
|
|
|
|
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline int __put_user_fn(size_t size, void __user *ptr, void *x)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-03-21 09:56:06 +08:00
|
|
|
return unlikely(raw_copy_to_user(ptr, x, size)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-18 17:42:16 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_fn(sz, u, k) __put_user_fn(sz, u, k)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
extern int __put_user_bad(void) __attribute__((noreturn));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define __get_user(x, ptr) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
|
|
|
int __gu_err = -EFAULT; \
|
|
|
|
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
|
|
|
|
switch (sizeof(*(ptr))) { \
|
|
|
|
case 1: { \
|
2017-03-28 13:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned char __x = 0; \
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
__gu_err = __get_user_fn(sizeof (*(ptr)), \
|
|
|
|
ptr, &__x); \
|
|
|
|
(x) = *(__force __typeof__(*(ptr)) *) &__x; \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
}; \
|
|
|
|
case 2: { \
|
2017-03-28 13:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned short __x = 0; \
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
__gu_err = __get_user_fn(sizeof (*(ptr)), \
|
|
|
|
ptr, &__x); \
|
|
|
|
(x) = *(__force __typeof__(*(ptr)) *) &__x; \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
}; \
|
|
|
|
case 4: { \
|
2017-03-28 13:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int __x = 0; \
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
__gu_err = __get_user_fn(sizeof (*(ptr)), \
|
|
|
|
ptr, &__x); \
|
|
|
|
(x) = *(__force __typeof__(*(ptr)) *) &__x; \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
}; \
|
|
|
|
case 8: { \
|
2017-03-28 13:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long long __x = 0; \
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
__gu_err = __get_user_fn(sizeof (*(ptr)), \
|
|
|
|
ptr, &__x); \
|
|
|
|
(x) = *(__force __typeof__(*(ptr)) *) &__x; \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
}; \
|
|
|
|
default: \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_bad(); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
__gu_err; \
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define get_user(x, ptr) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
2017-09-05 00:07:24 +08:00
|
|
|
const void __user *__p = (ptr); \
|
2013-05-26 22:30:36 +08:00
|
|
|
might_fault(); \
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
access_ok(__p, sizeof(*ptr)) ? \
|
2017-09-05 00:07:24 +08:00
|
|
|
__get_user((x), (__typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *)__p) :\
|
2016-08-18 11:19:01 +08:00
|
|
|
((x) = (__typeof__(*(ptr)))0,-EFAULT); \
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-18 17:42:16 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef __get_user_fn
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline int __get_user_fn(size_t size, const void __user *ptr, void *x)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-03-21 09:56:06 +08:00
|
|
|
return unlikely(raw_copy_from_user(x, ptr, size)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-18 17:42:16 +08:00
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#define __get_user_fn(sz, u, k) __get_user_fn(sz, u, k)
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#endif
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2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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extern int __get_user_bad(void) __attribute__((noreturn));
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/*
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* Copy a null terminated string from userspace.
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*/
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#ifndef __strncpy_from_user
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static inline long
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__strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
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{
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char *tmp;
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strncpy(dst, (const char __force *)src, count);
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for (tmp = dst; *tmp && count > 0; tmp++, count--)
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;
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return (tmp - dst);
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}
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#endif
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static inline long
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strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
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{
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
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if (!access_ok(src, 1))
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2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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return -EFAULT;
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return __strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count);
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}
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/*
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* Return the size of a string (including the ending 0)
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*
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* Return 0 on exception, a value greater than N if too long
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*/
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2011-01-15 18:08:09 +08:00
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#ifndef __strnlen_user
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2011-10-04 21:17:36 +08:00
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#define __strnlen_user(s, n) (strnlen((s), (n)) + 1)
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2011-01-15 18:08:09 +08:00
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#endif
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2011-10-04 21:17:36 +08:00
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/*
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* Unlike strnlen, strnlen_user includes the nul terminator in
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* its returned count. Callers should check for a returned value
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* greater than N as an indication the string is too long.
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*/
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2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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static inline long strnlen_user(const char __user *src, long n)
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{
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
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if (!access_ok(src, 1))
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2009-06-14 14:00:02 +08:00
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return 0;
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2011-01-15 18:08:09 +08:00
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return __strnlen_user(src, n);
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2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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}
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/*
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* Zero Userspace
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*/
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#ifndef __clear_user
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static inline __must_check unsigned long
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__clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
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{
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memset((void __force *)to, 0, n);
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return 0;
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}
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#endif
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static inline __must_check unsigned long
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clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
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{
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2013-05-26 22:30:36 +08:00
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might_fault();
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
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if (!access_ok(to, n))
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2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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return n;
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return __clear_user(to, n);
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}
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2016-12-25 14:22:09 +08:00
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#include <asm/extable.h>
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2009-05-14 06:56:37 +08:00
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#endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_UACCESS_H */
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