OpenCloudOS-Kernel/fs/jffs2/acl.c

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/*
* JFFS2 -- Journalling Flash File System, Version 2.
*
* Copyright © 2006 NEC Corporation
*
* Created by KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
*
* For licensing information, see the file 'LICENCE' in this directory.
*
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/crc32.h>
#include <linux/jffs2.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
#include <linux/mtd/mtd.h>
#include "nodelist.h"
static size_t jffs2_acl_size(int count)
{
if (count <= 4) {
return sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_header)
+ count * sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short);
} else {
return sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_header)
+ 4 * sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short)
+ (count - 4) * sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry);
}
}
static int jffs2_acl_count(size_t size)
{
size_t s;
size -= sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_header);
if (size < 4 * sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short)) {
if (size % sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short))
return -1;
return size / sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short);
} else {
s = size - 4 * sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short);
if (s % sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry))
return -1;
return s / sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry) + 4;
}
}
static struct posix_acl *jffs2_acl_from_medium(void *value, size_t size)
{
void *end = value + size;
struct jffs2_acl_header *header = value;
struct jffs2_acl_entry *entry;
struct posix_acl *acl;
uint32_t ver;
int i, count;
if (!value)
return NULL;
if (size < sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_header))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
ver = je32_to_cpu(header->a_version);
if (ver != JFFS2_ACL_VERSION) {
JFFS2_WARNING("Invalid ACL version. (=%u)\n", ver);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
value += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_header);
count = jffs2_acl_count(size);
if (count < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (count == 0)
return NULL;
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i=0; i < count; i++) {
entry = value;
if (value + sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short) > end)
goto fail;
acl->a_entries[i].e_tag = je16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
acl->a_entries[i].e_perm = je16_to_cpu(entry->e_perm);
switch (acl->a_entries[i].e_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
value += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short);
break;
case ACL_USER:
value += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry);
if (value > end)
goto fail;
acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =
make_kuid(&init_user_ns,
je32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
value += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry);
if (value > end)
goto fail;
acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =
make_kgid(&init_user_ns,
je32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
if (value != end)
goto fail;
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
static void *jffs2_acl_to_medium(const struct posix_acl *acl, size_t *size)
{
struct jffs2_acl_header *header;
struct jffs2_acl_entry *entry;
void *e;
size_t i;
*size = jffs2_acl_size(acl->a_count);
header = kmalloc(struct_size(header, a_entries, acl->a_count),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!header)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
header->a_version = cpu_to_je32(JFFS2_ACL_VERSION);
e = header + 1;
for (i=0; i < acl->a_count; i++) {
const struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
entry = e;
entry->e_tag = cpu_to_je16(acl_e->e_tag);
entry->e_perm = cpu_to_je16(acl_e->e_perm);
switch(acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
entry->e_id = cpu_to_je32(
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, acl_e->e_uid));
e += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry);
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
entry->e_id = cpu_to_je32(
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, acl_e->e_gid));
e += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
e += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short);
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return header;
fail:
kfree(header);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
struct posix_acl *jffs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu)
{
struct posix_acl *acl;
char *value = NULL;
int rc, xprefix;
if (rcu)
return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
BUG();
}
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", NULL, 0);
if (rc > 0) {
value = kmalloc(rc, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", value, rc);
}
if (rc > 0) {
acl = jffs2_acl_from_medium(value, rc);
} else if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
acl = ERR_PTR(rc);
}
kfree(value);
return acl;
}
static int __jffs2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, int xprefix, struct posix_acl *acl)
{
char *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int rc;
if (acl) {
value = jffs2_acl_to_medium(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return PTR_ERR(value);
}
rc = do_jffs2_setxattr(inode, xprefix, "", value, size, 0);
if (!value && rc == -ENODATA)
rc = 0;
kfree(value);
return rc;
}
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 16:29:39 +08:00
int jffs2_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int rc, xprefix;
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 16:29:39 +08:00
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode;
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 21:19:27 +08:00
rc = posix_acl_update_mode(&init_user_ns, inode, &mode,
&acl);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (inode->i_mode != mode) {
struct iattr attr;
attr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
attr.ia_mode = mode;
attr.ia_ctime = current_time(inode);
rc = jffs2_do_setattr(inode, &attr);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = __jffs2_set_acl(inode, xprefix, acl);
if (!rc)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return rc;
}
int jffs2_init_acl_pre(struct inode *dir_i, struct inode *inode, umode_t *i_mode)
{
struct posix_acl *default_acl, *acl;
int rc;
cache_no_acl(inode);
rc = posix_acl_create(dir_i, i_mode, &default_acl, &acl);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (default_acl) {
set_cached_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, default_acl);
posix_acl_release(default_acl);
}
if (acl) {
set_cached_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, acl);
posix_acl_release(acl);
}
return 0;
}
int jffs2_init_acl_post(struct inode *inode)
{
int rc;
if (inode->i_default_acl) {
rc = __jffs2_set_acl(inode, JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT, inode->i_default_acl);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
if (inode->i_acl) {
rc = __jffs2_set_acl(inode, JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS, inode->i_acl);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
return 0;
}