OpenCloudOS-Kernel/kernel/exit.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* linux/kernel/exit.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
*/
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/sched/autogroup.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched/stat.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/sched/cputime.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/iocontext.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/acct.h>
#include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/profile.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
#include <linux/taskstats_kern.h>
#include <linux/delayacct.h>
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
#include <linux/audit.h> /* for audit_free() */
#include <linux/resource.h>
#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
#include <linux/init_task.h>
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 18:02:48 +08:00
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <trace/events/sched.h>
hw-breakpoints: Rewrite the hw-breakpoints layer on top of perf events This patch rebase the implementation of the breakpoints API on top of perf events instances. Each breakpoints are now perf events that handle the register scheduling, thread/cpu attachment, etc.. The new layering is now made as follows: ptrace kgdb ftrace perf syscall \ | / / \ | / / / Core breakpoint API / / | / | / Breakpoints perf events | | Breakpoints PMU ---- Debug Register constraints handling (Part of core breakpoint API) | | Hardware debug registers Reasons of this rewrite: - Use the centralized/optimized pmu registers scheduling, implying an easier arch integration - More powerful register handling: perf attributes (pinned/flexible events, exclusive/non-exclusive, tunable period, etc...) Impact: - New perf ABI: the hardware breakpoints counters - Ptrace breakpoints setting remains tricky and still needs some per thread breakpoints references. Todo (in the order): - Support breakpoints perf counter events for perf tools (ie: implement perf_bpcounter_event()) - Support from perf tools Changes in v2: - Follow the perf "event " rename - The ptrace regression have been fixed (ptrace breakpoint perf events weren't released when a task ended) - Drop the struct hw_breakpoint and store generic fields in perf_event_attr. - Separate core and arch specific headers, drop asm-generic/hw_breakpoint.h and create linux/hw_breakpoint.h - Use new generic len/type for breakpoint - Handle off case: when breakpoints api is not supported by an arch Changes in v3: - Fix broken CONFIG_KVM, we need to propagate the breakpoint api changes to kvm when we exit the guest and restore the bp registers to the host. Changes in v4: - Drop the hw_breakpoint_restore() stub as it is only used by KVM - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL hw_breakpoint_restore() as KVM can be built as a module - Restore the breakpoints unconditionally on kvm guest exit: TIF_DEBUG_THREAD doesn't anymore cover every cases of running breakpoints and vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs might not always be set when the guest used debug registers. (Waiting for a reliable optimization) Changes in v5: - Split-up the asm-generic/hw-breakpoint.h moving to linux/hw_breakpoint.h into a separate patch - Optimize the breakpoints restoring while switching from kvm guest to host. We only want to restore the state if we have active breakpoints to the host, otherwise we don't care about messed-up address registers. - Add asm/hw_breakpoint.h to Kbuild - Fix bad breakpoint type in trace_selftest.c Changes in v6: - Fix wrong header inclusion in trace.h (triggered a build error with CONFIG_FTRACE_SELFTEST Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2009-09-10 01:22:48 +08:00
#include <linux/hw_breakpoint.h>
#include <linux/oom.h>
#include <linux/writeback.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 05:27:30 +08:00
#include <linux/kcov.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
sched/wait, RCU: Introduce rcuwait machinery rcuwait provides support for (single) RCU-safe task wait/wake functionality, with the caveat that it must not be called after exit_notify(), such that we avoid racing with rcu delayed_put_task_struct callbacks, task_struct being rcu unaware in this context -- for which we similarly have task_rcu_dereference() magic, but with different return semantics, which can conflict with the wakeup side. The interfaces are quite straightforward: rcuwait_wait_event() rcuwait_wake_up() More details are in the comments, but it's perhaps worth mentioning at least, that users must provide proper serialization when waiting on a condition, and avoid corrupting a concurrent waiter. Also care must be taken between the task and the condition for when calling the wakeup -- we cannot miss wakeups. When porting users, this is for example, a given when using waitqueues in that everything is done under the q->lock. As such, it can remove sources of non preemptable unbounded work for realtime. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave@stgolabs.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484148146-14210-2-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-11 23:22:25 +08:00
#include <linux/rcuwait.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p, bool group_dead)
{
nr_threads--;
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (group_dead) {
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID);
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID);
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID);
list_del_rcu(&p->tasks);
list_del_init(&p->sibling);
__this_cpu_dec(process_counts);
}
list_del_rcu(&p->thread_group);
introduce for_each_thread() to replace the buggy while_each_thread() while_each_thread() and next_thread() should die, almost every lockless usage is wrong. 1. Unless g == current, the lockless while_each_thread() is not safe. while_each_thread(g, t) can loop forever if g exits, next_thread() can't reach the unhashed thread in this case. Note that this can happen even if g is the group leader, it can exec. 2. Even if while_each_thread() itself was correct, people often use it wrongly. It was never safe to just take rcu_read_lock() and loop unless you verify that pid_alive(g) == T, even the first next_thread() can point to the already freed/reused memory. This patch adds signal_struct->thread_head and task->thread_node to create the normal rcu-safe list with the stable head. The new for_each_thread(g, t) helper is always safe under rcu_read_lock() as long as this task_struct can't go away. Note: of course it is ugly to have both task_struct->thread_node and the old task_struct->thread_group, we will kill it later, after we change the users of while_each_thread() to use for_each_thread(). Perhaps we can kill it even before we convert all users, we can reimplement next_thread(t) using the new thread_head/thread_node. But we can't do this right now because this will lead to subtle behavioural changes. For example, do/while_each_thread() always sees at least one task, while for_each_thread() can do nothing if the whole thread group has died. Or thread_group_empty(), currently its semantics is not clear unless thread_group_leader(p) and we need to audit the callers before we can change it. So this patch adds the new interface which has to coexist with the old one for some time, hopefully the next changes will be more or less straightforward and the old one will go away soon. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org> Cc: "Ma, Xindong" <xindong.ma@intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: "Tu, Xiaobing" <xiaobing.tu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-22 07:49:56 +08:00
list_del_rcu(&p->thread_node);
}
/*
* This function expects the tasklist_lock write-locked.
*/
static void __exit_signal(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
bool group_dead = thread_group_leader(tsk);
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage Using uninitialized_var() is dangerous as it papers over real bugs[1] (or can in the future), and suppresses unrelated compiler warnings (e.g. "unused variable"). If the compiler thinks it is uninitialized, either simply initialize the variable or make compiler changes. In preparation for removing[2] the[3] macro[4], remove all remaining needless uses with the following script: git grep '\buninitialized_var\b' | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | \ xargs perl -pi -e \ 's/\buninitialized_var\(([^\)]+)\)/\1/g; s:\s*/\* (GCC be quiet|to make compiler happy) \*/$::g;' drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c was manually tweaked to avoid pathological white-space. No outstanding warnings were found building allmodconfig with GCC 9.3.0 for x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, powerpc64le, s390x, mips, sparc64, alpha, and m68k. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200603174714.192027-1-glider@google.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFw+Vbj0i=1TGqCR5vQkCzWJ0QxK6CernOU6eedsudAixw@mail.gmail.com/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFwgbgqhbp1fkxvRKEpzyR5J8n1vKT1VZdz9knmPuXhOeg@mail.gmail.com/ [4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFz2500WfbKXAx8s67wrm9=yVJu65TpLgN_ybYNv0VEOKA@mail.gmail.com/ Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # drivers/infiniband and mlx4/mlx5 Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> # IB Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # wireless drivers Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> # erofs Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-04 04:09:38 +08:00
struct tty_struct *tty;
u64 utime, stime;
sighand = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->sighand,
lockdep_tasklist_lock_is_held());
spin_lock(&sighand->siglock);
#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
posix_cpu_timers_exit(tsk);
if (group_dead)
posix_cpu_timers_exit_group(tsk);
#endif
if (group_dead) {
tty = sig->tty;
sig->tty = NULL;
} else {
/*
* If there is any task waiting for the group exit
* then notify it:
*/
if (sig->notify_count > 0 && !--sig->notify_count)
wake_up_process(sig->group_exit_task);
if (tsk == sig->curr_target)
sig->curr_target = next_thread(tsk);
}
add_device_randomness((const void*) &tsk->se.sum_exec_runtime,
sizeof(unsigned long long));
/*
* Accumulate here the counters for all threads as they die. We could
* skip the group leader because it is the last user of signal_struct,
* but we want to avoid the race with thread_group_cputime() which can
* see the empty ->thread_head list.
*/
task_cputime(tsk, &utime, &stime);
time, signal: Protect resource use statistics with seqlock Both times() and clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID) have scalability issues on large systems, due to both functions being serialized with a lock. The lock protects against reporting a wrong value, due to a thread in the task group exiting, its statistics reporting up to the signal struct, and that exited task's statistics being counted twice (or not at all). Protecting that with a lock results in times() and clock_gettime() being completely serialized on large systems. This can be fixed by using a seqlock around the events that gather and propagate statistics. As an additional benefit, the protection code can be moved into thread_group_cputime(), slightly simplifying the calling functions. In the case of posix_cpu_clock_get_task() things can be simplified a lot, because the calling function already ensures that the task sticks around, and the rest is now taken care of in thread_group_cputime(). This way the statistics reporting code can run lockless. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dongsheng Yang <yangds.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org> Cc: Ionut Alexa <ionut.m.alexa@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: srao@redhat.com Cc: lwoodman@redhat.com Cc: atheurer@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140816134010.26a9b572@annuminas.surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-08-17 01:40:10 +08:00
write_seqlock(&sig->stats_lock);
sig->utime += utime;
sig->stime += stime;
sig->gtime += task_gtime(tsk);
sig->min_flt += tsk->min_flt;
sig->maj_flt += tsk->maj_flt;
sig->nvcsw += tsk->nvcsw;
sig->nivcsw += tsk->nivcsw;
sig->inblock += task_io_get_inblock(tsk);
sig->oublock += task_io_get_oublock(tsk);
task_io_accounting_add(&sig->ioac, &tsk->ioac);
sig->sum_sched_runtime += tsk->se.sum_exec_runtime;
sig->nr_threads--;
__unhash_process(tsk, group_dead);
time, signal: Protect resource use statistics with seqlock Both times() and clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID) have scalability issues on large systems, due to both functions being serialized with a lock. The lock protects against reporting a wrong value, due to a thread in the task group exiting, its statistics reporting up to the signal struct, and that exited task's statistics being counted twice (or not at all). Protecting that with a lock results in times() and clock_gettime() being completely serialized on large systems. This can be fixed by using a seqlock around the events that gather and propagate statistics. As an additional benefit, the protection code can be moved into thread_group_cputime(), slightly simplifying the calling functions. In the case of posix_cpu_clock_get_task() things can be simplified a lot, because the calling function already ensures that the task sticks around, and the rest is now taken care of in thread_group_cputime(). This way the statistics reporting code can run lockless. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dongsheng Yang <yangds.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org> Cc: Ionut Alexa <ionut.m.alexa@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: srao@redhat.com Cc: lwoodman@redhat.com Cc: atheurer@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140816134010.26a9b572@annuminas.surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-08-17 01:40:10 +08:00
write_sequnlock(&sig->stats_lock);
/*
* Do this under ->siglock, we can race with another thread
* doing sigqueue_free() if we have SIGQUEUE_PREALLOC signals.
*/
flush_sigqueue(&tsk->pending);
tsk->sighand = NULL;
spin_unlock(&sighand->siglock);
__cleanup_sighand(sighand);
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SIGPENDING);
if (group_dead) {
flush_sigqueue(&sig->shared_pending);
tty_kref_put(tty);
}
}
[PATCH] task: RCU protect task->usage A big problem with rcu protected data structures that are also reference counted is that you must jump through several hoops to increase the reference count. I think someone finally implemented atomic_inc_not_zero(&count) to automate the common case. Unfortunately this means you must special case the rcu access case. When data structures are only visible via rcu in a manner that is not determined by the reference count on the object (i.e. tasks are visible until their zombies are reaped) there is a much simpler technique we can employ. Simply delaying the decrement of the reference count until the rcu interval is over. What that means is that the proc code that looks up a task and later wants to sleep can now do: rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid(some_pid); if (task) { get_task_struct(task); } rcu_read_unlock(); The effect on the rest of the kernel is that put_task_struct becomes cheaper and immediate, and in the case where the task has been reaped it frees the task immediate instead of unnecessarily waiting an until the rcu interval is over. Cleanup of task_struct does not happen when its reference count drops to zero, instead cleanup happens when release_task is called. Tasks can only be looked up via rcu before release_task is called. All rcu protected members of task_struct are freed by release_task. Therefore we can move call_rcu from put_task_struct into release_task. And we can modify release_task to not immediately release the reference count but instead have it call put_task_struct from the function it gives to call_rcu. The end result: - get_task_struct is safe in an rcu context where we have just looked up the task. - put_task_struct() simplifies into its old pre rcu self. This reorganization also makes put_task_struct uncallable from modules as it is not exported but it does not appear to be called from any modules so this should not be an issue, and is trivially fixed. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:37 +08:00
static void delayed_put_task_struct(struct rcu_head *rhp)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = container_of(rhp, struct task_struct, rcu);
kprobe_flush_task(tsk);
perf_event_delayed_put(tsk);
trace_sched_process_free(tsk);
put_task_struct(tsk);
[PATCH] task: RCU protect task->usage A big problem with rcu protected data structures that are also reference counted is that you must jump through several hoops to increase the reference count. I think someone finally implemented atomic_inc_not_zero(&count) to automate the common case. Unfortunately this means you must special case the rcu access case. When data structures are only visible via rcu in a manner that is not determined by the reference count on the object (i.e. tasks are visible until their zombies are reaped) there is a much simpler technique we can employ. Simply delaying the decrement of the reference count until the rcu interval is over. What that means is that the proc code that looks up a task and later wants to sleep can now do: rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid(some_pid); if (task) { get_task_struct(task); } rcu_read_unlock(); The effect on the rest of the kernel is that put_task_struct becomes cheaper and immediate, and in the case where the task has been reaped it frees the task immediate instead of unnecessarily waiting an until the rcu interval is over. Cleanup of task_struct does not happen when its reference count drops to zero, instead cleanup happens when release_task is called. Tasks can only be looked up via rcu before release_task is called. All rcu protected members of task_struct are freed by release_task. Therefore we can move call_rcu from put_task_struct into release_task. And we can modify release_task to not immediately release the reference count but instead have it call put_task_struct from the function it gives to call_rcu. The end result: - get_task_struct is safe in an rcu context where we have just looked up the task. - put_task_struct() simplifies into its old pre rcu self. This reorganization also makes put_task_struct uncallable from modules as it is not exported but it does not appear to be called from any modules so this should not be an issue, and is trivially fixed. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:37 +08:00
}
void put_task_struct_rcu_user(struct task_struct *task)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&task->rcu_users))
call_rcu(&task->rcu, delayed_put_task_struct);
}
void release_task(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct task_struct *leader;
proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc Rework the flushing of proc to use a list of directory inodes that need to be flushed. The list is kept on struct pid not on struct task_struct, as there is a fixed connection between proc inodes and pids but at least for the case of de_thread the pid of a task_struct changes. This removes the dependency on proc_mnt which allows for different mounts of proc having different mount options even in the same pid namespace and this allows for the removal of proc_mnt which will trivially the first mount of proc to honor it's mount options. This flushing remains an optimization. The functions pid_delete_dentry and pid_revalidate ensure that ordinary dcache management will not attempt to use dentries past the point their respective task has died. When unused the shrinker will eventually be able to remove these dentries. There is a case in de_thread where proc_flush_pid can be called early for a given pid. Which winds up being safe (if suboptimal) as this is just an optiimization. Only pid directories are put on the list as the other per pid files are children of those directories and d_invalidate on the directory will get them as well. So that the pid can be used during flushing it's reference count is taken in release_task and dropped in proc_flush_pid. Further the call of proc_flush_pid is moved after the tasklist_lock is released in release_task so that it is certain that the pid has already been unhashed when flushing it taking place. This removes a small race where a dentry could recreated. As struct pid is supposed to be small and I need a per pid lock I reuse the only lock that currently exists in struct pid the the wait_pidfd.lock. The net result is that this adds all of this functionality with just a little extra list management overhead and a single extra pointer in struct pid. v2: Initialize pid->inodes. I somehow failed to get that initialization into the initial version of the patch. A boot failure was reported by "kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>", and failure to initialize that pid->inodes matches all of the reported symptoms. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-02-20 08:22:26 +08:00
struct pid *thread_pid;
int zap_leader;
repeat:
/* don't need to get the RCU readlock here - the process is dead and
* can't be modifying its own credentials. But shut RCU-lockdep up */
rcu_read_lock();
dec_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
rcu_read_unlock();
cgroup_release(p);
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
ptrace_release_task(p);
proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc Rework the flushing of proc to use a list of directory inodes that need to be flushed. The list is kept on struct pid not on struct task_struct, as there is a fixed connection between proc inodes and pids but at least for the case of de_thread the pid of a task_struct changes. This removes the dependency on proc_mnt which allows for different mounts of proc having different mount options even in the same pid namespace and this allows for the removal of proc_mnt which will trivially the first mount of proc to honor it's mount options. This flushing remains an optimization. The functions pid_delete_dentry and pid_revalidate ensure that ordinary dcache management will not attempt to use dentries past the point their respective task has died. When unused the shrinker will eventually be able to remove these dentries. There is a case in de_thread where proc_flush_pid can be called early for a given pid. Which winds up being safe (if suboptimal) as this is just an optiimization. Only pid directories are put on the list as the other per pid files are children of those directories and d_invalidate on the directory will get them as well. So that the pid can be used during flushing it's reference count is taken in release_task and dropped in proc_flush_pid. Further the call of proc_flush_pid is moved after the tasklist_lock is released in release_task so that it is certain that the pid has already been unhashed when flushing it taking place. This removes a small race where a dentry could recreated. As struct pid is supposed to be small and I need a per pid lock I reuse the only lock that currently exists in struct pid the the wait_pidfd.lock. The net result is that this adds all of this functionality with just a little extra list management overhead and a single extra pointer in struct pid. v2: Initialize pid->inodes. I somehow failed to get that initialization into the initial version of the patch. A boot failure was reported by "kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>", and failure to initialize that pid->inodes matches all of the reported symptoms. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-02-20 08:22:26 +08:00
thread_pid = get_pid(p->thread_pid);
__exit_signal(p);
/*
* If we are the last non-leader member of the thread
* group, and the leader is zombie, then notify the
* group leader's parent process. (if it wants notification.)
*/
zap_leader = 0;
leader = p->group_leader;
if (leader != p && thread_group_empty(leader)
&& leader->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE) {
/*
* If we were the last child thread and the leader has
* exited already, and the leader's parent ignores SIGCHLD,
* then we are the one who should release the leader.
*/
zap_leader = do_notify_parent(leader, leader->exit_signal);
if (zap_leader)
leader->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD;
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
seccomp: release filter after task is fully dead The seccomp filter used to be released in free_task() which is called asynchronously via call_rcu() and assorted mechanisms. Since we need to inform tasks waiting on the seccomp notifier when a filter goes empty we will notify them as soon as a task has been marked fully dead in release_task(). To not split seccomp cleanup into two parts, move filter release out of free_task() and into release_task() after we've unhashed struct task from struct pid, exited signals, and unlinked it from the threadgroups' thread list. We'll put the empty filter notification infrastructure into it in a follow up patch. This also renames put_seccomp_filter() to seccomp_filter_release() which is a more descriptive name of what we're doing here especially once we've added the empty filter notification mechanism in there. We're also NULL-ing the task's filter tree entrypoint which seems cleaner than leaving a dangling pointer in there. Note that this shouldn't need any memory barriers since we're calling this when the task is in release_task() which means it's EXIT_DEAD. So it can't modify its seccomp filters anymore. You can also see this from the point where we're calling seccomp_filter_release(). It's after __exit_signal() and at this point, tsk->sighand will already have been NULLed which is required for thread-sync and filter installation alike. Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Matt Denton <mpdenton@google.com> Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Robert Sesek <rsesek@google.com> Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200531115031.391515-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-05-31 19:50:29 +08:00
seccomp_filter_release(p);
proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc Rework the flushing of proc to use a list of directory inodes that need to be flushed. The list is kept on struct pid not on struct task_struct, as there is a fixed connection between proc inodes and pids but at least for the case of de_thread the pid of a task_struct changes. This removes the dependency on proc_mnt which allows for different mounts of proc having different mount options even in the same pid namespace and this allows for the removal of proc_mnt which will trivially the first mount of proc to honor it's mount options. This flushing remains an optimization. The functions pid_delete_dentry and pid_revalidate ensure that ordinary dcache management will not attempt to use dentries past the point their respective task has died. When unused the shrinker will eventually be able to remove these dentries. There is a case in de_thread where proc_flush_pid can be called early for a given pid. Which winds up being safe (if suboptimal) as this is just an optiimization. Only pid directories are put on the list as the other per pid files are children of those directories and d_invalidate on the directory will get them as well. So that the pid can be used during flushing it's reference count is taken in release_task and dropped in proc_flush_pid. Further the call of proc_flush_pid is moved after the tasklist_lock is released in release_task so that it is certain that the pid has already been unhashed when flushing it taking place. This removes a small race where a dentry could recreated. As struct pid is supposed to be small and I need a per pid lock I reuse the only lock that currently exists in struct pid the the wait_pidfd.lock. The net result is that this adds all of this functionality with just a little extra list management overhead and a single extra pointer in struct pid. v2: Initialize pid->inodes. I somehow failed to get that initialization into the initial version of the patch. A boot failure was reported by "kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>", and failure to initialize that pid->inodes matches all of the reported symptoms. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-02-20 08:22:26 +08:00
proc_flush_pid(thread_pid);
put_pid(thread_pid);
release_thread(p);
put_task_struct_rcu_user(p);
p = leader;
if (unlikely(zap_leader))
goto repeat;
}
int rcuwait_wake_up(struct rcuwait *w)
sched/wait, RCU: Introduce rcuwait machinery rcuwait provides support for (single) RCU-safe task wait/wake functionality, with the caveat that it must not be called after exit_notify(), such that we avoid racing with rcu delayed_put_task_struct callbacks, task_struct being rcu unaware in this context -- for which we similarly have task_rcu_dereference() magic, but with different return semantics, which can conflict with the wakeup side. The interfaces are quite straightforward: rcuwait_wait_event() rcuwait_wake_up() More details are in the comments, but it's perhaps worth mentioning at least, that users must provide proper serialization when waiting on a condition, and avoid corrupting a concurrent waiter. Also care must be taken between the task and the condition for when calling the wakeup -- we cannot miss wakeups. When porting users, this is for example, a given when using waitqueues in that everything is done under the q->lock. As such, it can remove sources of non preemptable unbounded work for realtime. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave@stgolabs.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484148146-14210-2-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-11 23:22:25 +08:00
{
int ret = 0;
sched/wait, RCU: Introduce rcuwait machinery rcuwait provides support for (single) RCU-safe task wait/wake functionality, with the caveat that it must not be called after exit_notify(), such that we avoid racing with rcu delayed_put_task_struct callbacks, task_struct being rcu unaware in this context -- for which we similarly have task_rcu_dereference() magic, but with different return semantics, which can conflict with the wakeup side. The interfaces are quite straightforward: rcuwait_wait_event() rcuwait_wake_up() More details are in the comments, but it's perhaps worth mentioning at least, that users must provide proper serialization when waiting on a condition, and avoid corrupting a concurrent waiter. Also care must be taken between the task and the condition for when calling the wakeup -- we cannot miss wakeups. When porting users, this is for example, a given when using waitqueues in that everything is done under the q->lock. As such, it can remove sources of non preemptable unbounded work for realtime. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave@stgolabs.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484148146-14210-2-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-11 23:22:25 +08:00
struct task_struct *task;
rcu_read_lock();
/*
* Order condition vs @task, such that everything prior to the load
* of @task is visible. This is the condition as to why the user called
* rcuwait_wake() in the first place. Pairs with set_current_state()
sched/wait, RCU: Introduce rcuwait machinery rcuwait provides support for (single) RCU-safe task wait/wake functionality, with the caveat that it must not be called after exit_notify(), such that we avoid racing with rcu delayed_put_task_struct callbacks, task_struct being rcu unaware in this context -- for which we similarly have task_rcu_dereference() magic, but with different return semantics, which can conflict with the wakeup side. The interfaces are quite straightforward: rcuwait_wait_event() rcuwait_wake_up() More details are in the comments, but it's perhaps worth mentioning at least, that users must provide proper serialization when waiting on a condition, and avoid corrupting a concurrent waiter. Also care must be taken between the task and the condition for when calling the wakeup -- we cannot miss wakeups. When porting users, this is for example, a given when using waitqueues in that everything is done under the q->lock. As such, it can remove sources of non preemptable unbounded work for realtime. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave@stgolabs.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484148146-14210-2-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-11 23:22:25 +08:00
* barrier (A) in rcuwait_wait_event().
*
* WAIT WAKE
* [S] tsk = current [S] cond = true
* MB (A) MB (B)
* [L] cond [L] tsk
*/
smp_mb(); /* (B) */
sched/wait, RCU: Introduce rcuwait machinery rcuwait provides support for (single) RCU-safe task wait/wake functionality, with the caveat that it must not be called after exit_notify(), such that we avoid racing with rcu delayed_put_task_struct callbacks, task_struct being rcu unaware in this context -- for which we similarly have task_rcu_dereference() magic, but with different return semantics, which can conflict with the wakeup side. The interfaces are quite straightforward: rcuwait_wait_event() rcuwait_wake_up() More details are in the comments, but it's perhaps worth mentioning at least, that users must provide proper serialization when waiting on a condition, and avoid corrupting a concurrent waiter. Also care must be taken between the task and the condition for when calling the wakeup -- we cannot miss wakeups. When porting users, this is for example, a given when using waitqueues in that everything is done under the q->lock. As such, it can remove sources of non preemptable unbounded work for realtime. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave@stgolabs.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484148146-14210-2-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-11 23:22:25 +08:00
task = rcu_dereference(w->task);
if (task)
ret = wake_up_process(task);
sched/wait, RCU: Introduce rcuwait machinery rcuwait provides support for (single) RCU-safe task wait/wake functionality, with the caveat that it must not be called after exit_notify(), such that we avoid racing with rcu delayed_put_task_struct callbacks, task_struct being rcu unaware in this context -- for which we similarly have task_rcu_dereference() magic, but with different return semantics, which can conflict with the wakeup side. The interfaces are quite straightforward: rcuwait_wait_event() rcuwait_wake_up() More details are in the comments, but it's perhaps worth mentioning at least, that users must provide proper serialization when waiting on a condition, and avoid corrupting a concurrent waiter. Also care must be taken between the task and the condition for when calling the wakeup -- we cannot miss wakeups. When porting users, this is for example, a given when using waitqueues in that everything is done under the q->lock. As such, it can remove sources of non preemptable unbounded work for realtime. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave@stgolabs.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484148146-14210-2-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-11 23:22:25 +08:00
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
sched/wait, RCU: Introduce rcuwait machinery rcuwait provides support for (single) RCU-safe task wait/wake functionality, with the caveat that it must not be called after exit_notify(), such that we avoid racing with rcu delayed_put_task_struct callbacks, task_struct being rcu unaware in this context -- for which we similarly have task_rcu_dereference() magic, but with different return semantics, which can conflict with the wakeup side. The interfaces are quite straightforward: rcuwait_wait_event() rcuwait_wake_up() More details are in the comments, but it's perhaps worth mentioning at least, that users must provide proper serialization when waiting on a condition, and avoid corrupting a concurrent waiter. Also care must be taken between the task and the condition for when calling the wakeup -- we cannot miss wakeups. When porting users, this is for example, a given when using waitqueues in that everything is done under the q->lock. As such, it can remove sources of non preemptable unbounded work for realtime. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave@stgolabs.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484148146-14210-2-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-11 23:22:25 +08:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rcuwait_wake_up);
sched/wait, RCU: Introduce rcuwait machinery rcuwait provides support for (single) RCU-safe task wait/wake functionality, with the caveat that it must not be called after exit_notify(), such that we avoid racing with rcu delayed_put_task_struct callbacks, task_struct being rcu unaware in this context -- for which we similarly have task_rcu_dereference() magic, but with different return semantics, which can conflict with the wakeup side. The interfaces are quite straightforward: rcuwait_wait_event() rcuwait_wake_up() More details are in the comments, but it's perhaps worth mentioning at least, that users must provide proper serialization when waiting on a condition, and avoid corrupting a concurrent waiter. Also care must be taken between the task and the condition for when calling the wakeup -- we cannot miss wakeups. When porting users, this is for example, a given when using waitqueues in that everything is done under the q->lock. As such, it can remove sources of non preemptable unbounded work for realtime. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave@stgolabs.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484148146-14210-2-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-11 23:22:25 +08:00
/*
* Determine if a process group is "orphaned", according to the POSIX
* definition in 2.2.2.52. Orphaned process groups are not to be affected
* by terminal-generated stop signals. Newly orphaned process groups are
* to receive a SIGHUP and a SIGCONT.
*
* "I ask you, have you ever known what it is to be an orphan?"
*/
static int will_become_orphaned_pgrp(struct pid *pgrp,
struct task_struct *ignored_task)
{
struct task_struct *p;
do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
if ((p == ignored_task) ||
(p->exit_state && thread_group_empty(p)) ||
is_global_init(p->real_parent))
continue;
if (task_pgrp(p->real_parent) != pgrp &&
task_session(p->real_parent) == task_session(p))
return 0;
} while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
return 1;
}
int is_current_pgrp_orphaned(void)
{
int retval;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
retval = will_become_orphaned_pgrp(task_pgrp(current), NULL);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return retval;
}
static bool has_stopped_jobs(struct pid *pgrp)
{
struct task_struct *p;
do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
if (p->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED)
return true;
} while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
return false;
}
/*
* Check to see if any process groups have become orphaned as
* a result of our exiting, and if they have any stopped jobs,
* send them a SIGHUP and then a SIGCONT. (POSIX 3.2.2.2)
*/
static void
kill_orphaned_pgrp(struct task_struct *tsk, struct task_struct *parent)
{
struct pid *pgrp = task_pgrp(tsk);
struct task_struct *ignored_task = tsk;
if (!parent)
/* exit: our father is in a different pgrp than
* we are and we were the only connection outside.
*/
parent = tsk->real_parent;
else
/* reparent: our child is in a different pgrp than
* we are, and it was the only connection outside.
*/
ignored_task = NULL;
if (task_pgrp(parent) != pgrp &&
task_session(parent) == task_session(tsk) &&
will_become_orphaned_pgrp(pgrp, ignored_task) &&
has_stopped_jobs(pgrp)) {
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGHUP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGCONT, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
}
}
coredump: Don't perform any cleanups before dumping core Rename coredump_exit_mm to coredump_task_exit and call it from do_exit before PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT, and before any cleanup work for a task happens. This ensures that an accurate copy of the process can be captured in the coredump as no cleanup for the process happens before the coredump completes. This also ensures that PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT will not be visited by any thread until the coredump is complete. Add a new flag PF_POSTCOREDUMP so that tasks that have passed through coredump_task_exit can be recognized and ignored in zap_process. Now that all of the coredumping happens before exit_mm remove code to test for a coredump in progress from mm_release. Replace "may_ptrace_stop()" with a simple test of "current->ptrace". The other tests in may_ptrace_stop all concern avoiding stopping during a coredump. These tests are no longer necessary as it is now guaranteed that fatal_signal_pending will be set if the code enters ptrace_stop during a coredump. The code in ptrace_stop is guaranteed not to stop if fatal_signal_pending returns true. Until this change "ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)" could call ptrace_stop without fatal_signal_pending being true, as signals are dequeued in get_signal before calling do_exit. This is no longer an issue as "ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)" is no longer reached until after the coredump completes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/874kaax26c.fsf@disp2133 Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-09-02 00:33:50 +08:00
static void coredump_task_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct core_state *core_state;
/*
* Serialize with any possible pending coredump.
coredump: Limit coredumps to a single thread group Today when a signal is delivered with a handler of SIG_DFL whose default behavior is to generate a core dump not only that process but every process that shares the mm is killed. In the case of vfork this looks like a real world problem. Consider the following well defined sequence. if (vfork() == 0) { execve(...); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } If a signal that generates a core dump is received after vfork but before the execve changes the mm the process that called vfork will also be killed (as the mm is shared). Similarly if the execve fails after the point of no return the kernel delivers SIGSEGV which will kill both the exec'ing process and because the mm is shared the process that called vfork as well. As far as I can tell this behavior is a violation of people's reasonable expectations, POSIX, and is unnecessarily fragile when the system is low on memory. Solve this by making a userspace visible change to only kill a single process/thread group. This is possible because Jann Horn recently modified[1] the coredump code so that the mm can safely be modified while the coredump is happening. With LinuxThreads long gone I don't expect anyone to have a notice this behavior change in practice. To accomplish this move the core_state pointer from mm_struct to signal_struct, which allows different thread groups to coredump simultatenously. In zap_threads remove the work to kill anything except for the current thread group. v2: Remove core_state from the VM_BUG_ON_MM print to fix compile failure when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is enabled. Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> [1] a07279c9a8cd ("binfmt_elf, binfmt_elf_fdpic: use a VMA list snapshot") Fixes: d89f3847def4 ("[PATCH] thread-aware coredumps, 2.5.43-C3") History-tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87y27mvnke.fsf@disp2133 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211007144701.67592574@canb.auug.org.au Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-09-23 00:24:02 +08:00
* We must hold siglock around checking core_state
coredump: Don't perform any cleanups before dumping core Rename coredump_exit_mm to coredump_task_exit and call it from do_exit before PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT, and before any cleanup work for a task happens. This ensures that an accurate copy of the process can be captured in the coredump as no cleanup for the process happens before the coredump completes. This also ensures that PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT will not be visited by any thread until the coredump is complete. Add a new flag PF_POSTCOREDUMP so that tasks that have passed through coredump_task_exit can be recognized and ignored in zap_process. Now that all of the coredumping happens before exit_mm remove code to test for a coredump in progress from mm_release. Replace "may_ptrace_stop()" with a simple test of "current->ptrace". The other tests in may_ptrace_stop all concern avoiding stopping during a coredump. These tests are no longer necessary as it is now guaranteed that fatal_signal_pending will be set if the code enters ptrace_stop during a coredump. The code in ptrace_stop is guaranteed not to stop if fatal_signal_pending returns true. Until this change "ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)" could call ptrace_stop without fatal_signal_pending being true, as signals are dequeued in get_signal before calling do_exit. This is no longer an issue as "ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)" is no longer reached until after the coredump completes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/874kaax26c.fsf@disp2133 Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-09-02 00:33:50 +08:00
* and setting PF_POSTCOREDUMP. The core-inducing thread
* will increment ->nr_threads for each thread in the
coredump: Don't perform any cleanups before dumping core Rename coredump_exit_mm to coredump_task_exit and call it from do_exit before PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT, and before any cleanup work for a task happens. This ensures that an accurate copy of the process can be captured in the coredump as no cleanup for the process happens before the coredump completes. This also ensures that PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT will not be visited by any thread until the coredump is complete. Add a new flag PF_POSTCOREDUMP so that tasks that have passed through coredump_task_exit can be recognized and ignored in zap_process. Now that all of the coredumping happens before exit_mm remove code to test for a coredump in progress from mm_release. Replace "may_ptrace_stop()" with a simple test of "current->ptrace". The other tests in may_ptrace_stop all concern avoiding stopping during a coredump. These tests are no longer necessary as it is now guaranteed that fatal_signal_pending will be set if the code enters ptrace_stop during a coredump. The code in ptrace_stop is guaranteed not to stop if fatal_signal_pending returns true. Until this change "ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)" could call ptrace_stop without fatal_signal_pending being true, as signals are dequeued in get_signal before calling do_exit. This is no longer an issue as "ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)" is no longer reached until after the coredump completes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/874kaax26c.fsf@disp2133 Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-09-02 00:33:50 +08:00
* group without PF_POSTCOREDUMP set.
*/
coredump: Limit coredumps to a single thread group Today when a signal is delivered with a handler of SIG_DFL whose default behavior is to generate a core dump not only that process but every process that shares the mm is killed. In the case of vfork this looks like a real world problem. Consider the following well defined sequence. if (vfork() == 0) { execve(...); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } If a signal that generates a core dump is received after vfork but before the execve changes the mm the process that called vfork will also be killed (as the mm is shared). Similarly if the execve fails after the point of no return the kernel delivers SIGSEGV which will kill both the exec'ing process and because the mm is shared the process that called vfork as well. As far as I can tell this behavior is a violation of people's reasonable expectations, POSIX, and is unnecessarily fragile when the system is low on memory. Solve this by making a userspace visible change to only kill a single process/thread group. This is possible because Jann Horn recently modified[1] the coredump code so that the mm can safely be modified while the coredump is happening. With LinuxThreads long gone I don't expect anyone to have a notice this behavior change in practice. To accomplish this move the core_state pointer from mm_struct to signal_struct, which allows different thread groups to coredump simultatenously. In zap_threads remove the work to kill anything except for the current thread group. v2: Remove core_state from the VM_BUG_ON_MM print to fix compile failure when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is enabled. Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> [1] a07279c9a8cd ("binfmt_elf, binfmt_elf_fdpic: use a VMA list snapshot") Fixes: d89f3847def4 ("[PATCH] thread-aware coredumps, 2.5.43-C3") History-tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87y27mvnke.fsf@disp2133 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211007144701.67592574@canb.auug.org.au Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-09-23 00:24:02 +08:00
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
coredump: Don't perform any cleanups before dumping core Rename coredump_exit_mm to coredump_task_exit and call it from do_exit before PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT, and before any cleanup work for a task happens. This ensures that an accurate copy of the process can be captured in the coredump as no cleanup for the process happens before the coredump completes. This also ensures that PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT will not be visited by any thread until the coredump is complete. Add a new flag PF_POSTCOREDUMP so that tasks that have passed through coredump_task_exit can be recognized and ignored in zap_process. Now that all of the coredumping happens before exit_mm remove code to test for a coredump in progress from mm_release. Replace "may_ptrace_stop()" with a simple test of "current->ptrace". The other tests in may_ptrace_stop all concern avoiding stopping during a coredump. These tests are no longer necessary as it is now guaranteed that fatal_signal_pending will be set if the code enters ptrace_stop during a coredump. The code in ptrace_stop is guaranteed not to stop if fatal_signal_pending returns true. Until this change "ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)" could call ptrace_stop without fatal_signal_pending being true, as signals are dequeued in get_signal before calling do_exit. This is no longer an issue as "ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)" is no longer reached until after the coredump completes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/874kaax26c.fsf@disp2133 Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-09-02 00:33:50 +08:00
tsk->flags |= PF_POSTCOREDUMP;
coredump: Limit coredumps to a single thread group Today when a signal is delivered with a handler of SIG_DFL whose default behavior is to generate a core dump not only that process but every process that shares the mm is killed. In the case of vfork this looks like a real world problem. Consider the following well defined sequence. if (vfork() == 0) { execve(...); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } If a signal that generates a core dump is received after vfork but before the execve changes the mm the process that called vfork will also be killed (as the mm is shared). Similarly if the execve fails after the point of no return the kernel delivers SIGSEGV which will kill both the exec'ing process and because the mm is shared the process that called vfork as well. As far as I can tell this behavior is a violation of people's reasonable expectations, POSIX, and is unnecessarily fragile when the system is low on memory. Solve this by making a userspace visible change to only kill a single process/thread group. This is possible because Jann Horn recently modified[1] the coredump code so that the mm can safely be modified while the coredump is happening. With LinuxThreads long gone I don't expect anyone to have a notice this behavior change in practice. To accomplish this move the core_state pointer from mm_struct to signal_struct, which allows different thread groups to coredump simultatenously. In zap_threads remove the work to kill anything except for the current thread group. v2: Remove core_state from the VM_BUG_ON_MM print to fix compile failure when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is enabled. Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> [1] a07279c9a8cd ("binfmt_elf, binfmt_elf_fdpic: use a VMA list snapshot") Fixes: d89f3847def4 ("[PATCH] thread-aware coredumps, 2.5.43-C3") History-tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87y27mvnke.fsf@disp2133 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211007144701.67592574@canb.auug.org.au Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-09-23 00:24:02 +08:00
core_state = tsk->signal->core_state;
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
if (core_state) {
struct core_thread self;
self.task = current;
if (self.task->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
self.next = xchg(&core_state->dumper.next, &self);
else
self.task = NULL;
/*
* Implies mb(), the result of xchg() must be visible
* to core_state->dumper.
*/
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&core_state->nr_threads))
complete(&core_state->startup);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!self.task) /* see coredump_finish() */
break;
freezable_schedule();
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
/*
memcg: clear mm->owner when last possible owner leaves The following crash was reported: > Call Trace: > [<ffffffff81139792>] mem_cgroup_from_task+0x15/0x17 > [<ffffffff8113a75a>] __mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x148/0x4b4 > [<ffffffff810493f3>] ? need_resched+0x23/0x2d > [<ffffffff814cbf43>] ? preempt_schedule+0x46/0x4f > [<ffffffff8113afe8>] mem_cgroup_charge_common+0x9a/0xce > [<ffffffff8113b6d1>] mem_cgroup_newpage_charge+0x5d/0x5f > [<ffffffff81134024>] khugepaged+0x5da/0xfaf > [<ffffffff81078ea0>] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x4b/0x4b > [<ffffffff81133a4a>] ? add_mm_counter.constprop.5+0x13/0x13 > [<ffffffff81078625>] kthread+0xa8/0xb0 > [<ffffffff814d13e8>] ? sub_preempt_count+0xa1/0xb4 > [<ffffffff814d5664>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 > [<ffffffff814ce858>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 > [<ffffffff8107857d>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x5a/0x5a What happens is that khugepaged tries to charge a huge page against an mm whose last possible owner has already exited, and the memory controller crashes when the stale mm->owner is used to look up the cgroup to charge. mm->owner has never been set to NULL with the last owner going away, but nobody cared until khugepaged came along. Even then it wasn't a problem because the final mmput() on an mm was forced to acquire and release mmap_sem in write-mode, preventing an exiting owner to go away while the mmap_sem was held, and until "692e0b3 mm: thp: optimize memcg charge in khugepaged", the memory cgroup charge was protected by mmap_sem in read-mode. Instead of going back to relying on the mmap_sem to enforce lifetime of a task, this patch ensures that mm->owner is properly set to NULL when the last possible owner is exiting, which the memory controller can handle just fine. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comments] Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-06-16 06:08:43 +08:00
* A task is exiting. If it owned this mm, find a new owner for the mm.
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
*/
void mm_update_next_owner(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct task_struct *c, *g, *p = current;
retry:
memcg: clear mm->owner when last possible owner leaves The following crash was reported: > Call Trace: > [<ffffffff81139792>] mem_cgroup_from_task+0x15/0x17 > [<ffffffff8113a75a>] __mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x148/0x4b4 > [<ffffffff810493f3>] ? need_resched+0x23/0x2d > [<ffffffff814cbf43>] ? preempt_schedule+0x46/0x4f > [<ffffffff8113afe8>] mem_cgroup_charge_common+0x9a/0xce > [<ffffffff8113b6d1>] mem_cgroup_newpage_charge+0x5d/0x5f > [<ffffffff81134024>] khugepaged+0x5da/0xfaf > [<ffffffff81078ea0>] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x4b/0x4b > [<ffffffff81133a4a>] ? add_mm_counter.constprop.5+0x13/0x13 > [<ffffffff81078625>] kthread+0xa8/0xb0 > [<ffffffff814d13e8>] ? sub_preempt_count+0xa1/0xb4 > [<ffffffff814d5664>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 > [<ffffffff814ce858>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 > [<ffffffff8107857d>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x5a/0x5a What happens is that khugepaged tries to charge a huge page against an mm whose last possible owner has already exited, and the memory controller crashes when the stale mm->owner is used to look up the cgroup to charge. mm->owner has never been set to NULL with the last owner going away, but nobody cared until khugepaged came along. Even then it wasn't a problem because the final mmput() on an mm was forced to acquire and release mmap_sem in write-mode, preventing an exiting owner to go away while the mmap_sem was held, and until "692e0b3 mm: thp: optimize memcg charge in khugepaged", the memory cgroup charge was protected by mmap_sem in read-mode. Instead of going back to relying on the mmap_sem to enforce lifetime of a task, this patch ensures that mm->owner is properly set to NULL when the last possible owner is exiting, which the memory controller can handle just fine. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comments] Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-06-16 06:08:43 +08:00
/*
* If the exiting or execing task is not the owner, it's
* someone else's problem.
*/
if (mm->owner != p)
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
return;
memcg: clear mm->owner when last possible owner leaves The following crash was reported: > Call Trace: > [<ffffffff81139792>] mem_cgroup_from_task+0x15/0x17 > [<ffffffff8113a75a>] __mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x148/0x4b4 > [<ffffffff810493f3>] ? need_resched+0x23/0x2d > [<ffffffff814cbf43>] ? preempt_schedule+0x46/0x4f > [<ffffffff8113afe8>] mem_cgroup_charge_common+0x9a/0xce > [<ffffffff8113b6d1>] mem_cgroup_newpage_charge+0x5d/0x5f > [<ffffffff81134024>] khugepaged+0x5da/0xfaf > [<ffffffff81078ea0>] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x4b/0x4b > [<ffffffff81133a4a>] ? add_mm_counter.constprop.5+0x13/0x13 > [<ffffffff81078625>] kthread+0xa8/0xb0 > [<ffffffff814d13e8>] ? sub_preempt_count+0xa1/0xb4 > [<ffffffff814d5664>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 > [<ffffffff814ce858>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 > [<ffffffff8107857d>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x5a/0x5a What happens is that khugepaged tries to charge a huge page against an mm whose last possible owner has already exited, and the memory controller crashes when the stale mm->owner is used to look up the cgroup to charge. mm->owner has never been set to NULL with the last owner going away, but nobody cared until khugepaged came along. Even then it wasn't a problem because the final mmput() on an mm was forced to acquire and release mmap_sem in write-mode, preventing an exiting owner to go away while the mmap_sem was held, and until "692e0b3 mm: thp: optimize memcg charge in khugepaged", the memory cgroup charge was protected by mmap_sem in read-mode. Instead of going back to relying on the mmap_sem to enforce lifetime of a task, this patch ensures that mm->owner is properly set to NULL when the last possible owner is exiting, which the memory controller can handle just fine. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comments] Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-06-16 06:08:43 +08:00
/*
* The current owner is exiting/execing and there are no other
* candidates. Do not leave the mm pointing to a possibly
* freed task structure.
*/
if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) <= 1) {
WRITE_ONCE(mm->owner, NULL);
memcg: clear mm->owner when last possible owner leaves The following crash was reported: > Call Trace: > [<ffffffff81139792>] mem_cgroup_from_task+0x15/0x17 > [<ffffffff8113a75a>] __mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x148/0x4b4 > [<ffffffff810493f3>] ? need_resched+0x23/0x2d > [<ffffffff814cbf43>] ? preempt_schedule+0x46/0x4f > [<ffffffff8113afe8>] mem_cgroup_charge_common+0x9a/0xce > [<ffffffff8113b6d1>] mem_cgroup_newpage_charge+0x5d/0x5f > [<ffffffff81134024>] khugepaged+0x5da/0xfaf > [<ffffffff81078ea0>] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x4b/0x4b > [<ffffffff81133a4a>] ? add_mm_counter.constprop.5+0x13/0x13 > [<ffffffff81078625>] kthread+0xa8/0xb0 > [<ffffffff814d13e8>] ? sub_preempt_count+0xa1/0xb4 > [<ffffffff814d5664>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 > [<ffffffff814ce858>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 > [<ffffffff8107857d>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x5a/0x5a What happens is that khugepaged tries to charge a huge page against an mm whose last possible owner has already exited, and the memory controller crashes when the stale mm->owner is used to look up the cgroup to charge. mm->owner has never been set to NULL with the last owner going away, but nobody cared until khugepaged came along. Even then it wasn't a problem because the final mmput() on an mm was forced to acquire and release mmap_sem in write-mode, preventing an exiting owner to go away while the mmap_sem was held, and until "692e0b3 mm: thp: optimize memcg charge in khugepaged", the memory cgroup charge was protected by mmap_sem in read-mode. Instead of going back to relying on the mmap_sem to enforce lifetime of a task, this patch ensures that mm->owner is properly set to NULL when the last possible owner is exiting, which the memory controller can handle just fine. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comments] Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-06-16 06:08:43 +08:00
return;
}
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
/*
* Search in the children
*/
list_for_each_entry(c, &p->children, sibling) {
if (c->mm == mm)
goto assign_new_owner;
}
/*
* Search in the siblings
*/
list_for_each_entry(c, &p->real_parent->children, sibling) {
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
if (c->mm == mm)
goto assign_new_owner;
}
/*
* Search through everything else, we should not get here often.
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
*/
for_each_process(g) {
if (g->flags & PF_KTHREAD)
continue;
for_each_thread(g, c) {
if (c->mm == mm)
goto assign_new_owner;
if (c->mm)
break;
}
}
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
mm owner: fix race between swapoff and exit There's a race between mm->owner assignment and swapoff, more easily seen when task slab poisoning is turned on. The condition occurs when try_to_unuse() runs in parallel with an exiting task. A similar race can occur with callers of get_task_mm(), such as /proc/<pid>/<mmstats> or ptrace or page migration. CPU0 CPU1 try_to_unuse looks at mm = task0->mm increments mm->mm_users task 0 exits mm->owner needs to be updated, but no new owner is found (mm_users > 1, but no other task has task->mm = task0->mm) mm_update_next_owner() leaves mmput(mm) decrements mm->mm_users task0 freed dereferencing mm->owner fails The fix is to notify the subsystem via mm_owner_changed callback(), if no new owner is found, by specifying the new task as NULL. Jiri Slaby: mm->owner was set to NULL prior to calling cgroup_mm_owner_callbacks(), but must be set after that, so as not to pass NULL as old owner causing oops. Daisuke Nishimura: mm_update_next_owner() may set mm->owner to NULL, but mem_cgroup_from_task() and its callers need to take account of this situation to avoid oops. Hugh Dickins: Lockdep warning and hang below exec_mmap() when testing these patches. exit_mm() up_reads mmap_sem before calling mm_update_next_owner(), so exec_mmap() now needs to do the same. And with that repositioning, there's now no point in mm_need_new_owner() allowing for NULL mm. Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-09-29 06:09:31 +08:00
/*
* We found no owner yet mm_users > 1: this implies that we are
* most likely racing with swapoff (try_to_unuse()) or /proc or
* ptrace or page migration (get_task_mm()). Mark owner as NULL.
mm owner: fix race between swapoff and exit There's a race between mm->owner assignment and swapoff, more easily seen when task slab poisoning is turned on. The condition occurs when try_to_unuse() runs in parallel with an exiting task. A similar race can occur with callers of get_task_mm(), such as /proc/<pid>/<mmstats> or ptrace or page migration. CPU0 CPU1 try_to_unuse looks at mm = task0->mm increments mm->mm_users task 0 exits mm->owner needs to be updated, but no new owner is found (mm_users > 1, but no other task has task->mm = task0->mm) mm_update_next_owner() leaves mmput(mm) decrements mm->mm_users task0 freed dereferencing mm->owner fails The fix is to notify the subsystem via mm_owner_changed callback(), if no new owner is found, by specifying the new task as NULL. Jiri Slaby: mm->owner was set to NULL prior to calling cgroup_mm_owner_callbacks(), but must be set after that, so as not to pass NULL as old owner causing oops. Daisuke Nishimura: mm_update_next_owner() may set mm->owner to NULL, but mem_cgroup_from_task() and its callers need to take account of this situation to avoid oops. Hugh Dickins: Lockdep warning and hang below exec_mmap() when testing these patches. exit_mm() up_reads mmap_sem before calling mm_update_next_owner(), so exec_mmap() now needs to do the same. And with that repositioning, there's now no point in mm_need_new_owner() allowing for NULL mm. Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-09-29 06:09:31 +08:00
*/
WRITE_ONCE(mm->owner, NULL);
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
return;
assign_new_owner:
BUG_ON(c == p);
get_task_struct(c);
/*
* The task_lock protects c->mm from changing.
* We always want mm->owner->mm == mm
*/
task_lock(c);
/*
* Delay read_unlock() till we have the task_lock()
* to ensure that c does not slip away underneath us
*/
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
if (c->mm != mm) {
task_unlock(c);
put_task_struct(c);
goto retry;
}
WRITE_ONCE(mm->owner, c);
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
task_unlock(c);
put_task_struct(c);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MEMCG */
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
/*
* Turn us into a lazy TLB process if we
* aren't already..
*/
static void exit_mm(void)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
exit_mm_release(current, mm);
if (!mm)
return;
sync_mm_rss(mm);
mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites This change converts the existing mmap_sem rwsem calls to use the new mmap locking API instead. The change is generated using coccinelle with the following rule: // spatch --sp-file mmap_lock_api.cocci --in-place --include-headers --dir . @@ expression mm; @@ ( -init_rwsem +mmap_init_lock | -down_write +mmap_write_lock | -down_write_killable +mmap_write_lock_killable | -down_write_trylock +mmap_write_trylock | -up_write +mmap_write_unlock | -downgrade_write +mmap_write_downgrade | -down_read +mmap_read_lock | -down_read_killable +mmap_read_lock_killable | -down_read_trylock +mmap_read_trylock | -up_read +mmap_read_unlock ) -(&mm->mmap_sem) +(mm) Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-5-walken@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09 12:33:25 +08:00
mmap_read_lock(mm);
mmgrab(mm);
BUG_ON(mm != current->active_mm);
/* more a memory barrier than a real lock */
task_lock(current);
/*
* When a thread stops operating on an address space, the loop
* in membarrier_private_expedited() may not observe that
* tsk->mm, and the loop in membarrier_global_expedited() may
* not observe a MEMBARRIER_STATE_GLOBAL_EXPEDITED
* rq->membarrier_state, so those would not issue an IPI.
* Membarrier requires a memory barrier after accessing
* user-space memory, before clearing tsk->mm or the
* rq->membarrier_state.
*/
smp_mb__after_spinlock();
local_irq_disable();
current->mm = NULL;
membarrier_update_current_mm(NULL);
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
local_irq_enable();
task_unlock(current);
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
cgroups: add an owner to the mm_struct Remove the mem_cgroup member from mm_struct and instead adds an owner. This approach was suggested by Paul Menage. The advantage of this approach is that, once the mm->owner is known, using the subsystem id, the cgroup can be determined. It also allows several control groups that are virtually grouped by mm_struct, to exist independent of the memory controller i.e., without adding mem_cgroup's for each controller, to mm_struct. A new config option CONFIG_MM_OWNER is added and the memory resource controller selects this config option. This patch also adds cgroup callbacks to notify subsystems when mm->owner changes. The mm_cgroup_changed callback is called with the task_lock() of the new task held and is called just prior to changing the mm->owner. I am indebted to Paul Menage for the several reviews of this patchset and helping me make it lighter and simpler. This patch was tested on a powerpc box, it was compiled with both the MM_OWNER config turned on and off. After the thread group leader exits, it's moved to init_css_state by cgroup_exit(), thus all future charges from runnings threads would be redirected to the init_css_set's subsystem. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Sudhir Kumar <skumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Cc: Hirokazu Takahashi <taka@valinux.co.jp> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:16 +08:00
mm_update_next_owner(mm);
mmput(mm);
oom, PM: make OOM detection in the freezer path raceless Commit 5695be142e20 ("OOM, PM: OOM killed task shouldn't escape PM suspend") has left a race window when OOM killer manages to note_oom_kill after freeze_processes checks the counter. The race window is quite small and really unlikely and partial solution deemed sufficient at the time of submission. Tejun wasn't happy about this partial solution though and insisted on a full solution. That requires the full OOM and freezer's task freezing exclusion, though. This is done by this patch which introduces oom_sem RW lock and turns oom_killer_disable() into a full OOM barrier. oom_killer_disabled check is moved from the allocation path to the OOM level and we take oom_sem for reading for both the check and the whole OOM invocation. oom_killer_disable() takes oom_sem for writing so it waits for all currently running OOM killer invocations. Then it disable all the further OOMs by setting oom_killer_disabled and checks for any oom victims. Victims are counted via mark_tsk_oom_victim resp. unmark_oom_victim. The last victim wakes up all waiters enqueued by oom_killer_disable(). Therefore this function acts as the full OOM barrier. The page fault path is covered now as well although it was assumed to be safe before. As per Tejun, "We used to have freezing points deep in file system code which may be reacheable from page fault." so it would be better and more robust to not rely on freezing points here. Same applies to the memcg OOM killer. out_of_memory tells the caller whether the OOM was allowed to trigger and the callers are supposed to handle the situation. The page allocation path simply fails the allocation same as before. The page fault path will retry the fault (more on that later) and Sysrq OOM trigger will simply complain to the log. Normally there wouldn't be any unfrozen user tasks after try_to_freeze_tasks so the function will not block. But if there was an OOM killer racing with try_to_freeze_tasks and the OOM victim didn't finish yet then we have to wait for it. This should complete in a finite time, though, because - the victim cannot loop in the page fault handler (it would die on the way out from the exception) - it cannot loop in the page allocator because all the further allocation would fail and __GFP_NOFAIL allocations are not acceptable at this stage - it shouldn't be blocked on any locks held by frozen tasks (try_to_freeze expects lockless context) and kernel threads and work queues are not frozen yet Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-12 07:26:24 +08:00
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_MEMDIE))
exit_oom_victim();
}
static struct task_struct *find_alive_thread(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct task_struct *t;
for_each_thread(p, t) {
if (!(t->flags & PF_EXITING))
return t;
}
return NULL;
}
static struct task_struct *find_child_reaper(struct task_struct *father,
struct list_head *dead)
__releases(&tasklist_lock)
__acquires(&tasklist_lock)
{
struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = task_active_pid_ns(father);
struct task_struct *reaper = pid_ns->child_reaper;
struct task_struct *p, *n;
if (likely(reaper != father))
return reaper;
reaper = find_alive_thread(father);
if (reaper) {
pid_ns->child_reaper = reaper;
return reaper;
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, dead, ptrace_entry) {
list_del_init(&p->ptrace_entry);
release_task(p);
}
zap_pid_ns_processes(pid_ns);
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
return father;
}
/*
prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision Userspace service managers/supervisors need to track their started services. Many services daemonize by double-forking and get implicitly re-parented to PID 1. The service manager will no longer be able to receive the SIGCHLD signals for them, and is no longer in charge of reaping the children with wait(). All information about the children is lost at the moment PID 1 cleans up the re-parented processes. With this prctl, a service manager process can mark itself as a sort of 'sub-init', able to stay as the parent for all orphaned processes created by the started services. All SIGCHLD signals will be delivered to the service manager. Receiving SIGCHLD and doing wait() is in cases of a service-manager much preferred over any possible asynchronous notification about specific PIDs, because the service manager has full access to the child process data in /proc and the PID can not be re-used until the wait(), the service-manager itself is in charge of, has happened. As a side effect, the relevant parent PID information does not get lost by a double-fork, which results in a more elaborate process tree and 'ps' output: before: # ps afx 253 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 294 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 328 ? S 0:00 /usr/sbin/modem-manager 608 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/colord 658 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/upowerd 819 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/imsettings-daemon 916 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 917 ? S 0:00 \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices after: # ps afx 294 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 426 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 449 ? S 0:00 \_ /usr/sbin/modem-manager 635 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/colord 705 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/upowerd 959 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 960 ? S 0:00 | \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices 977 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/packagekitd This prctl is orthogonal to PID namespaces. PID namespaces are isolated from each other, while a service management process usually requires the services to live in the same namespace, to be able to talk to each other. Users of this will be the systemd per-user instance, which provides init-like functionality for the user's login session and D-Bus, which activates bus services on-demand. Both need init-like capabilities to be able to properly keep track of the services they start. Many thanks to Oleg for several rounds of review and insights. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment layout and spelling] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lengthy code comment from Oleg] Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Acked-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-24 06:01:54 +08:00
* When we die, we re-parent all our children, and try to:
* 1. give them to another thread in our thread group, if such a member exists
* 2. give it to the first ancestor process which prctl'd itself as a
* child_subreaper for its children (like a service manager)
* 3. give it to the init process (PID 1) in our pid namespace
*/
static struct task_struct *find_new_reaper(struct task_struct *father,
struct task_struct *child_reaper)
{
struct task_struct *thread, *reaper;
thread = find_alive_thread(father);
if (thread)
return thread;
exit: reparent: fix the cross-namespace PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER reparenting find_new_reaper() assumes that "has_child_subreaper" logic is safe as long as we are not the exiting ->child_reaper and this is doubly wrong: 1. In fact it is safe if "pid_ns->child_reaper == father"; there must be no children after zap_pid_ns_processes() returns, so it doesn't matter what we return in this case and even pid_ns->child_reaper is wrong otherwise: we can't reparent to ->child_reaper == current. This is not a bug, but this is confusing. 2. It is not safe if we are not pid_ns->child_reaper but from the same thread group. We drop tasklist_lock before zap_pid_ns_processes(), so another thread can lock it and choose the new reaper from the upper namespace if has_child_subreaper == T, and this is obviously wrong. This is not that bad, zap_pid_ns_processes() won't return until the the new reaper reaps all zombies, but this should be fixed anyway. We could change for_each_thread() loop to use ->exit_state instead of PF_EXITING which we had to use until 8aac62706ada, or we could change copy_signal() to check CLONE_NEWPID before setting has_child_subreaper, but lets change this code so that it is clear we can't look outside of our namespace, otherwise same_thread_group(reaper, child_reaper) check will look wrong and confusing anyway. We can simply start from "father" and fix the problem. We can't wrongly return a thread from the same thread group if ->is_child_subreaper == T, we know that all threads have PF_EXITING set. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-11 07:55:02 +08:00
if (father->signal->has_child_subreaper) {
unsigned int ns_level = task_pid(father)->level;
prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision Userspace service managers/supervisors need to track their started services. Many services daemonize by double-forking and get implicitly re-parented to PID 1. The service manager will no longer be able to receive the SIGCHLD signals for them, and is no longer in charge of reaping the children with wait(). All information about the children is lost at the moment PID 1 cleans up the re-parented processes. With this prctl, a service manager process can mark itself as a sort of 'sub-init', able to stay as the parent for all orphaned processes created by the started services. All SIGCHLD signals will be delivered to the service manager. Receiving SIGCHLD and doing wait() is in cases of a service-manager much preferred over any possible asynchronous notification about specific PIDs, because the service manager has full access to the child process data in /proc and the PID can not be re-used until the wait(), the service-manager itself is in charge of, has happened. As a side effect, the relevant parent PID information does not get lost by a double-fork, which results in a more elaborate process tree and 'ps' output: before: # ps afx 253 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 294 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 328 ? S 0:00 /usr/sbin/modem-manager 608 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/colord 658 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/upowerd 819 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/imsettings-daemon 916 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 917 ? S 0:00 \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices after: # ps afx 294 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 426 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 449 ? S 0:00 \_ /usr/sbin/modem-manager 635 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/colord 705 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/upowerd 959 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 960 ? S 0:00 | \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices 977 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/packagekitd This prctl is orthogonal to PID namespaces. PID namespaces are isolated from each other, while a service management process usually requires the services to live in the same namespace, to be able to talk to each other. Users of this will be the systemd per-user instance, which provides init-like functionality for the user's login session and D-Bus, which activates bus services on-demand. Both need init-like capabilities to be able to properly keep track of the services they start. Many thanks to Oleg for several rounds of review and insights. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment layout and spelling] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lengthy code comment from Oleg] Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Acked-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-24 06:01:54 +08:00
/*
* Find the first ->is_child_subreaper ancestor in our pid_ns.
* We can't check reaper != child_reaper to ensure we do not
* cross the namespaces, the exiting parent could be injected
* by setns() + fork().
* We check pid->level, this is slightly more efficient than
* task_active_pid_ns(reaper) != task_active_pid_ns(father).
prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision Userspace service managers/supervisors need to track their started services. Many services daemonize by double-forking and get implicitly re-parented to PID 1. The service manager will no longer be able to receive the SIGCHLD signals for them, and is no longer in charge of reaping the children with wait(). All information about the children is lost at the moment PID 1 cleans up the re-parented processes. With this prctl, a service manager process can mark itself as a sort of 'sub-init', able to stay as the parent for all orphaned processes created by the started services. All SIGCHLD signals will be delivered to the service manager. Receiving SIGCHLD and doing wait() is in cases of a service-manager much preferred over any possible asynchronous notification about specific PIDs, because the service manager has full access to the child process data in /proc and the PID can not be re-used until the wait(), the service-manager itself is in charge of, has happened. As a side effect, the relevant parent PID information does not get lost by a double-fork, which results in a more elaborate process tree and 'ps' output: before: # ps afx 253 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 294 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 328 ? S 0:00 /usr/sbin/modem-manager 608 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/colord 658 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/upowerd 819 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/imsettings-daemon 916 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 917 ? S 0:00 \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices after: # ps afx 294 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 426 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 449 ? S 0:00 \_ /usr/sbin/modem-manager 635 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/colord 705 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/upowerd 959 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 960 ? S 0:00 | \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices 977 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/packagekitd This prctl is orthogonal to PID namespaces. PID namespaces are isolated from each other, while a service management process usually requires the services to live in the same namespace, to be able to talk to each other. Users of this will be the systemd per-user instance, which provides init-like functionality for the user's login session and D-Bus, which activates bus services on-demand. Both need init-like capabilities to be able to properly keep track of the services they start. Many thanks to Oleg for several rounds of review and insights. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment layout and spelling] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lengthy code comment from Oleg] Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Acked-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-24 06:01:54 +08:00
*/
for (reaper = father->real_parent;
task_pid(reaper)->level == ns_level;
prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision Userspace service managers/supervisors need to track their started services. Many services daemonize by double-forking and get implicitly re-parented to PID 1. The service manager will no longer be able to receive the SIGCHLD signals for them, and is no longer in charge of reaping the children with wait(). All information about the children is lost at the moment PID 1 cleans up the re-parented processes. With this prctl, a service manager process can mark itself as a sort of 'sub-init', able to stay as the parent for all orphaned processes created by the started services. All SIGCHLD signals will be delivered to the service manager. Receiving SIGCHLD and doing wait() is in cases of a service-manager much preferred over any possible asynchronous notification about specific PIDs, because the service manager has full access to the child process data in /proc and the PID can not be re-used until the wait(), the service-manager itself is in charge of, has happened. As a side effect, the relevant parent PID information does not get lost by a double-fork, which results in a more elaborate process tree and 'ps' output: before: # ps afx 253 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 294 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 328 ? S 0:00 /usr/sbin/modem-manager 608 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/colord 658 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/upowerd 819 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/imsettings-daemon 916 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 917 ? S 0:00 \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices after: # ps afx 294 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 426 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 449 ? S 0:00 \_ /usr/sbin/modem-manager 635 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/colord 705 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/upowerd 959 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 960 ? S 0:00 | \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices 977 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/packagekitd This prctl is orthogonal to PID namespaces. PID namespaces are isolated from each other, while a service management process usually requires the services to live in the same namespace, to be able to talk to each other. Users of this will be the systemd per-user instance, which provides init-like functionality for the user's login session and D-Bus, which activates bus services on-demand. Both need init-like capabilities to be able to properly keep track of the services they start. Many thanks to Oleg for several rounds of review and insights. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment layout and spelling] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lengthy code comment from Oleg] Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Acked-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-24 06:01:54 +08:00
reaper = reaper->real_parent) {
if (reaper == &init_task)
prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision Userspace service managers/supervisors need to track their started services. Many services daemonize by double-forking and get implicitly re-parented to PID 1. The service manager will no longer be able to receive the SIGCHLD signals for them, and is no longer in charge of reaping the children with wait(). All information about the children is lost at the moment PID 1 cleans up the re-parented processes. With this prctl, a service manager process can mark itself as a sort of 'sub-init', able to stay as the parent for all orphaned processes created by the started services. All SIGCHLD signals will be delivered to the service manager. Receiving SIGCHLD and doing wait() is in cases of a service-manager much preferred over any possible asynchronous notification about specific PIDs, because the service manager has full access to the child process data in /proc and the PID can not be re-used until the wait(), the service-manager itself is in charge of, has happened. As a side effect, the relevant parent PID information does not get lost by a double-fork, which results in a more elaborate process tree and 'ps' output: before: # ps afx 253 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 294 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 328 ? S 0:00 /usr/sbin/modem-manager 608 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/colord 658 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/upowerd 819 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/imsettings-daemon 916 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 917 ? S 0:00 \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices after: # ps afx 294 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 426 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 449 ? S 0:00 \_ /usr/sbin/modem-manager 635 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/colord 705 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/upowerd 959 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 960 ? S 0:00 | \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices 977 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/packagekitd This prctl is orthogonal to PID namespaces. PID namespaces are isolated from each other, while a service management process usually requires the services to live in the same namespace, to be able to talk to each other. Users of this will be the systemd per-user instance, which provides init-like functionality for the user's login session and D-Bus, which activates bus services on-demand. Both need init-like capabilities to be able to properly keep track of the services they start. Many thanks to Oleg for several rounds of review and insights. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment layout and spelling] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lengthy code comment from Oleg] Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Acked-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-24 06:01:54 +08:00
break;
if (!reaper->signal->is_child_subreaper)
continue;
thread = find_alive_thread(reaper);
if (thread)
return thread;
prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision Userspace service managers/supervisors need to track their started services. Many services daemonize by double-forking and get implicitly re-parented to PID 1. The service manager will no longer be able to receive the SIGCHLD signals for them, and is no longer in charge of reaping the children with wait(). All information about the children is lost at the moment PID 1 cleans up the re-parented processes. With this prctl, a service manager process can mark itself as a sort of 'sub-init', able to stay as the parent for all orphaned processes created by the started services. All SIGCHLD signals will be delivered to the service manager. Receiving SIGCHLD and doing wait() is in cases of a service-manager much preferred over any possible asynchronous notification about specific PIDs, because the service manager has full access to the child process data in /proc and the PID can not be re-used until the wait(), the service-manager itself is in charge of, has happened. As a side effect, the relevant parent PID information does not get lost by a double-fork, which results in a more elaborate process tree and 'ps' output: before: # ps afx 253 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 294 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 328 ? S 0:00 /usr/sbin/modem-manager 608 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/colord 658 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/upowerd 819 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/imsettings-daemon 916 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 917 ? S 0:00 \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices after: # ps afx 294 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork 426 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd 449 ? S 0:00 \_ /usr/sbin/modem-manager 635 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/colord 705 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/upowerd 959 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon 960 ? S 0:00 | \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices 977 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/packagekitd This prctl is orthogonal to PID namespaces. PID namespaces are isolated from each other, while a service management process usually requires the services to live in the same namespace, to be able to talk to each other. Users of this will be the systemd per-user instance, which provides init-like functionality for the user's login session and D-Bus, which activates bus services on-demand. Both need init-like capabilities to be able to properly keep track of the services they start. Many thanks to Oleg for several rounds of review and insights. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment layout and spelling] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lengthy code comment from Oleg] Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Acked-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-24 06:01:54 +08:00
}
}
pid namespaces: rework forget_original_parent() A pid namespace is a "view" of a particular set of tasks on the system. They work in a similar way to filesystem namespaces. A file (or a process) can be accessed in multiple namespaces, but it may have a different name in each. In a filesystem, this name might be /etc/passwd in one namespace, but /chroot/etc/passwd in another. For processes, a process may have pid 1234 in one namespace, but be pid 1 in another. This allows new pid namespaces to have basically arbitrary pids, and not have to worry about what pids exist in other namespaces. This is essential for checkpoint/restart where a restarted process's pid might collide with an existing process on the system's pid. In this particular implementation, pid namespaces have a parent-child relationship, just like processes. A process in a pid namespace may see all of the processes in the same namespace, as well as all of the processes in all of the namespaces which are children of its namespace. Processes may not, however, see others which are in their parent's namespace, but not in their own. The same goes for sibling namespaces. The know issue to be solved in the nearest future is signal handling in the namespace boundary. That is, currently the namespace's init is treated like an ordinary task that can be killed from within an namespace. Ideally, the signal handling by the namespace's init should have two sides: when signaling the init from its namespace, the init should look like a real init task, i.e. receive only those signals, that is explicitly wants to; when signaling the init from one of the parent namespaces, init should look like an ordinary task, i.e. receive any signal, only taking the general permissions into account. The pid namespace was developed by Pavel Emlyanov and Sukadev Bhattiprolu and we eventually came to almost the same implementation, which differed in some details. This set is based on Pavel's patches, but it includes comments and patches that from Sukadev. Many thanks to Oleg, who reviewed the patches, pointed out many BUGs and made valuable advises on how to make this set cleaner. This patch: We have to call exit_task_namespaces() only after the exiting task has reparented all his children and is sure that no other threads will reparent theirs for it. Why this is needed is explained in appropriate patch. This one only reworks the forget_original_parent() so that after calling this a task cannot be/become parent of any other task. We check PF_EXITING instead of ->exit_state while choosing the new parent. Note that tasklits_lock acts as a barrier, everyone who takes tasklist after us (when forget_original_parent() drops it) must see PF_EXITING. The other changes are just cleanups. They just move some code from exit_notify to forget_original_parent(). It is a bit silly to declare ptrace_dead in exit_notify(), take tasklist, pass ptrace_dead to forget_original_parent(), unlock-lock-unlock tasklist, and then use ptrace_dead. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 14:40:00 +08:00
return child_reaper;
}
/*
* Any that need to be release_task'd are put on the @dead list.
*/
static void reparent_leader(struct task_struct *father, struct task_struct *p,
struct list_head *dead)
{
if (unlikely(p->exit_state == EXIT_DEAD))
return;
wait: introduce EXIT_TRACE to avoid the racy EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE transition wait_task_zombie() first does EXIT_ZOMBIE->EXIT_DEAD transition and drops tasklist_lock. If this task is not the natural child and it is traced, we change its state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE for ->real_parent. The last transition is racy, this is even documented in 50b8d257486a "ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race". wait_consider_task() tries to detect this transition and clear ->notask_error but we can't rely on ptrace_reparented(), debugger can exit and do ptrace_unlink() before its sub-thread sets EXIT_ZOMBIE. And there is another problem which were missed before: this transition can also race with reparent_leader() which doesn't reset >exit_signal if EXIT_DEAD, assuming that this task must be reaped by someone else. So the tracee can be re-parented with ->exit_signal != SIGCHLD, and if /sbin/init doesn't use __WALL it becomes unreapable. This was fixed by the previous commit, but it was the temporary hack. 1. Add the new exit_state, EXIT_TRACE. It means that the task is the traced zombie, debugger is going to detach and notify its natural parent. This new state is actually EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD. This way we can avoid the changes in proc/kgdb code, get_task_state() still reports "X (dead)" in this case. Note: with or without this change userspace can see Z -> X -> Z transition. Not really bad, but probably makes sense to fix. 2. Change wait_task_zombie() to use EXIT_TRACE instead of EXIT_DEAD if we need to notify the ->real_parent. 3. Revert the previous hack in reparent_leader(), now that EXIT_DEAD is always the final state we can safely ignore such a task. 4. Change wait_consider_task() to check EXIT_TRACE separately and kill the racy and no longer needed ptrace_reparented() case. If ptrace == T an EXIT_TRACE thread should be simply ignored, the owner of this state is going to ptrace_unlink() this task. We can pretend that it was already removed from ->ptraced list. Otherwise we should skip this thread too but clear ->notask_error, we must be the natural parent and debugger is going to untrace and notify us. IOW, this doesn't differ from "EXIT_ZOMBIE && p->ptrace" even if the task was already untraced. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Reported-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 06:38:42 +08:00
/* We don't want people slaying init. */
p->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
/* If it has exited notify the new parent about this child's death. */
if (!p->ptrace &&
p->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE && thread_group_empty(p)) {
if (do_notify_parent(p, p->exit_signal)) {
p->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD;
exit: reparent: use ->ptrace_entry rather than ->sibling for EXIT_DEAD tasks reparent_leader() reuses ->sibling as a list node to add an EXIT_DEAD task into dead_children list we are going to release. This obviously removes the dead task from its real_parent->children list and this is even good; the parent can do nothing with the EXIT_DEAD reparented zombie, it only makes do_wait() slower. But, this also means that it can not be reparented once again, so if its new parent dies too nobody will update ->parent/real_parent, they can point to the freed memory even before release_task() we are going to call, this breaks the code which relies on pid_alive() to access ->real_parent/parent. Fortunately this is mostly theoretical, this can only happen if init or PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER process ignores SIGCHLD and the new parent sub-thread exits right after we drop tasklist_lock. Change this code to use ->ptrace_entry instead, we know that the child is not traced so nobody can ever use this member. This also allows to unify this logic with exit_ptrace(), see the next changes. Note: we really need to change release_task() to nullify real_parent/ parent/group_leader pointers, but we need to change the current users first somehow. And it would be better to reap this zombie immediately but release_task_locked() we need is complicated by proc_flush_task(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-11 07:45:24 +08:00
list_add(&p->ptrace_entry, dead);
}
}
kill_orphaned_pgrp(p, father);
}
/*
* This does two things:
*
* A. Make init inherit all the child processes
* B. Check to see if any process groups have become orphaned
* as a result of our exiting, and if they have any stopped
* jobs, send them a SIGHUP and then a SIGCONT. (POSIX 3.2.2.2)
*/
static void forget_original_parent(struct task_struct *father,
struct list_head *dead)
{
struct task_struct *p, *t, *reaper;
pid namespaces: rework forget_original_parent() A pid namespace is a "view" of a particular set of tasks on the system. They work in a similar way to filesystem namespaces. A file (or a process) can be accessed in multiple namespaces, but it may have a different name in each. In a filesystem, this name might be /etc/passwd in one namespace, but /chroot/etc/passwd in another. For processes, a process may have pid 1234 in one namespace, but be pid 1 in another. This allows new pid namespaces to have basically arbitrary pids, and not have to worry about what pids exist in other namespaces. This is essential for checkpoint/restart where a restarted process's pid might collide with an existing process on the system's pid. In this particular implementation, pid namespaces have a parent-child relationship, just like processes. A process in a pid namespace may see all of the processes in the same namespace, as well as all of the processes in all of the namespaces which are children of its namespace. Processes may not, however, see others which are in their parent's namespace, but not in their own. The same goes for sibling namespaces. The know issue to be solved in the nearest future is signal handling in the namespace boundary. That is, currently the namespace's init is treated like an ordinary task that can be killed from within an namespace. Ideally, the signal handling by the namespace's init should have two sides: when signaling the init from its namespace, the init should look like a real init task, i.e. receive only those signals, that is explicitly wants to; when signaling the init from one of the parent namespaces, init should look like an ordinary task, i.e. receive any signal, only taking the general permissions into account. The pid namespace was developed by Pavel Emlyanov and Sukadev Bhattiprolu and we eventually came to almost the same implementation, which differed in some details. This set is based on Pavel's patches, but it includes comments and patches that from Sukadev. Many thanks to Oleg, who reviewed the patches, pointed out many BUGs and made valuable advises on how to make this set cleaner. This patch: We have to call exit_task_namespaces() only after the exiting task has reparented all his children and is sure that no other threads will reparent theirs for it. Why this is needed is explained in appropriate patch. This one only reworks the forget_original_parent() so that after calling this a task cannot be/become parent of any other task. We check PF_EXITING instead of ->exit_state while choosing the new parent. Note that tasklits_lock acts as a barrier, everyone who takes tasklist after us (when forget_original_parent() drops it) must see PF_EXITING. The other changes are just cleanups. They just move some code from exit_notify to forget_original_parent(). It is a bit silly to declare ptrace_dead in exit_notify(), take tasklist, pass ptrace_dead to forget_original_parent(), unlock-lock-unlock tasklist, and then use ptrace_dead. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 14:40:00 +08:00
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&father->ptraced)))
exit_ptrace(father, dead);
/* Can drop and reacquire tasklist_lock */
reaper = find_child_reaper(father, dead);
if (list_empty(&father->children))
return;
reaper = find_new_reaper(father, reaper);
list_for_each_entry(p, &father->children, sibling) {
for_each_thread(p, t) {
RCU_INIT_POINTER(t->real_parent, reaper);
BUG_ON((!t->ptrace) != (rcu_access_pointer(t->parent) == father));
if (likely(!t->ptrace))
t->parent = t->real_parent;
if (t->pdeath_signal)
group_send_sig_info(t->pdeath_signal,
SEND_SIG_NOINFO, t,
PIDTYPE_TGID);
}
/*
* If this is a threaded reparent there is no need to
* notify anyone anything has happened.
*/
if (!same_thread_group(reaper, father))
reparent_leader(father, p, dead);
}
list_splice_tail_init(&father->children, &reaper->children);
}
/*
* Send signals to all our closest relatives so that they know
* to properly mourn us..
*/
static void exit_notify(struct task_struct *tsk, int group_dead)
{
bool autoreap;
struct task_struct *p, *n;
LIST_HEAD(dead);
pid namespaces: rework forget_original_parent() A pid namespace is a "view" of a particular set of tasks on the system. They work in a similar way to filesystem namespaces. A file (or a process) can be accessed in multiple namespaces, but it may have a different name in each. In a filesystem, this name might be /etc/passwd in one namespace, but /chroot/etc/passwd in another. For processes, a process may have pid 1234 in one namespace, but be pid 1 in another. This allows new pid namespaces to have basically arbitrary pids, and not have to worry about what pids exist in other namespaces. This is essential for checkpoint/restart where a restarted process's pid might collide with an existing process on the system's pid. In this particular implementation, pid namespaces have a parent-child relationship, just like processes. A process in a pid namespace may see all of the processes in the same namespace, as well as all of the processes in all of the namespaces which are children of its namespace. Processes may not, however, see others which are in their parent's namespace, but not in their own. The same goes for sibling namespaces. The know issue to be solved in the nearest future is signal handling in the namespace boundary. That is, currently the namespace's init is treated like an ordinary task that can be killed from within an namespace. Ideally, the signal handling by the namespace's init should have two sides: when signaling the init from its namespace, the init should look like a real init task, i.e. receive only those signals, that is explicitly wants to; when signaling the init from one of the parent namespaces, init should look like an ordinary task, i.e. receive any signal, only taking the general permissions into account. The pid namespace was developed by Pavel Emlyanov and Sukadev Bhattiprolu and we eventually came to almost the same implementation, which differed in some details. This set is based on Pavel's patches, but it includes comments and patches that from Sukadev. Many thanks to Oleg, who reviewed the patches, pointed out many BUGs and made valuable advises on how to make this set cleaner. This patch: We have to call exit_task_namespaces() only after the exiting task has reparented all his children and is sure that no other threads will reparent theirs for it. Why this is needed is explained in appropriate patch. This one only reworks the forget_original_parent() so that after calling this a task cannot be/become parent of any other task. We check PF_EXITING instead of ->exit_state while choosing the new parent. Note that tasklits_lock acts as a barrier, everyone who takes tasklist after us (when forget_original_parent() drops it) must see PF_EXITING. The other changes are just cleanups. They just move some code from exit_notify to forget_original_parent(). It is a bit silly to declare ptrace_dead in exit_notify(), take tasklist, pass ptrace_dead to forget_original_parent(), unlock-lock-unlock tasklist, and then use ptrace_dead. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 14:40:00 +08:00
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
forget_original_parent(tsk, &dead);
if (group_dead)
kill_orphaned_pgrp(tsk->group_leader, NULL);
tsk->exit_state = EXIT_ZOMBIE;
if (unlikely(tsk->ptrace)) {
int sig = thread_group_leader(tsk) &&
thread_group_empty(tsk) &&
!ptrace_reparented(tsk) ?
tsk->exit_signal : SIGCHLD;
autoreap = do_notify_parent(tsk, sig);
} else if (thread_group_leader(tsk)) {
autoreap = thread_group_empty(tsk) &&
do_notify_parent(tsk, tsk->exit_signal);
} else {
autoreap = true;
}
if (autoreap) {
tsk->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD;
list_add(&tsk->ptrace_entry, &dead);
}
/* mt-exec, de_thread() is waiting for group leader */
if (unlikely(tsk->signal->notify_count < 0))
wake_up_process(tsk->signal->group_exit_task);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &dead, ptrace_entry) {
list_del_init(&p->ptrace_entry);
release_task(p);
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE
static void check_stack_usage(void)
{
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(low_water_lock);
static int lowest_to_date = THREAD_SIZE;
unsigned long free;
free = stack_not_used(current);
if (free >= lowest_to_date)
return;
spin_lock(&low_water_lock);
if (free < lowest_to_date) {
pr_info("%s (%d) used greatest stack depth: %lu bytes left\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), free);
lowest_to_date = free;
}
spin_unlock(&low_water_lock);
}
#else
static inline void check_stack_usage(void) {}
#endif
void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
int group_dead;
/*
* We can get here from a kernel oops, sometimes with preemption off.
* Start by checking for critical errors.
* Then fix up important state like USER_DS and preemption.
* Then do everything else.
*/
WARN_ON(blk_needs_flush_plug(tsk));
if (unlikely(in_interrupt()))
panic("Aiee, killing interrupt handler!");
if (unlikely(!tsk->pid))
panic("Attempted to kill the idle task!");
/*
* If do_exit is called because this processes oopsed, it's possible
* that get_fs() was left as KERNEL_DS, so reset it to USER_DS before
* continuing. Amongst other possible reasons, this is to prevent
* mm_release()->clear_child_tid() from writing to a user-controlled
* kernel address.
*/
force_uaccess_begin();
if (unlikely(in_atomic())) {
pr_info("note: %s[%d] exited with preempt_count %d\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
preempt_count());
preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_ENABLED);
}
profile_task_exit(tsk);
kcov_task_exit(tsk);
coredump: Don't perform any cleanups before dumping core Rename coredump_exit_mm to coredump_task_exit and call it from do_exit before PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT, and before any cleanup work for a task happens. This ensures that an accurate copy of the process can be captured in the coredump as no cleanup for the process happens before the coredump completes. This also ensures that PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT will not be visited by any thread until the coredump is complete. Add a new flag PF_POSTCOREDUMP so that tasks that have passed through coredump_task_exit can be recognized and ignored in zap_process. Now that all of the coredumping happens before exit_mm remove code to test for a coredump in progress from mm_release. Replace "may_ptrace_stop()" with a simple test of "current->ptrace". The other tests in may_ptrace_stop all concern avoiding stopping during a coredump. These tests are no longer necessary as it is now guaranteed that fatal_signal_pending will be set if the code enters ptrace_stop during a coredump. The code in ptrace_stop is guaranteed not to stop if fatal_signal_pending returns true. Until this change "ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)" could call ptrace_stop without fatal_signal_pending being true, as signals are dequeued in get_signal before calling do_exit. This is no longer an issue as "ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)" is no longer reached until after the coredump completes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/874kaax26c.fsf@disp2133 Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-09-02 00:33:50 +08:00
coredump_task_exit(tsk);
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT, code);
validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
/*
* We're taking recursive faults here in do_exit. Safest is to just
* leave this task alone and wait for reboot.
*/
if (unlikely(tsk->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
pr_alert("Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!\n");
futex_exit_recursive(tsk);
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
schedule();
}
io_uring_files_cancel();
exit_signals(tsk); /* sets PF_EXITING */
/* sync mm's RSS info before statistics gathering */
if (tsk->mm)
sync_mm_rss(tsk->mm);
acct_update_integrals(tsk);
group_dead = atomic_dec_and_test(&tsk->signal->live);
if (group_dead) {
/*
* If the last thread of global init has exited, panic
* immediately to get a useable coredump.
*/
if (unlikely(is_global_init(tsk)))
panic("Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x%08x\n",
tsk->signal->group_exit_code ?: (int)code);
#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems 1. New entries can be added to tsk->pi_state_list after task completed exit_pi_state_list(). The result is memory leakage and deadlocks. 2. handle_mm_fault() is called under spinlock. The result is obvious. 3. results in self-inflicted deadlock inside glibc. Sometimes futex_lock_pi returns -ESRCH, when it is not expected and glibc enters to for(;;) sleep() to simulate deadlock. This problem is quite obvious and I think the patch is right. Though it looks like each "if" in futex_lock_pi() got some stupid special case "else if". :-) 4. sometimes futex_lock_pi() returns -EDEADLK, when nobody has the lock. The reason is also obvious (see comment in the patch), but correct fix is far beyond my comprehension. I guess someone already saw this, the chunk: if (rt_mutex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex)) ret = 0; is obviously from the same opera. But it does not work, because the rtmutex is really taken at this point: wake_futex_pi() of previous owner reassigned it to us. My fix works. But it looks very stupid. I would think about removal of shift of ownership in wake_futex_pi() and making all the work in context of process taking lock. From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fix 1) Avoid the tasklist lock variant of the exit race fix by adding an additional state transition to the exit code. This fixes also the issue, when a task with recursive segfaults is not able to release the futexes. Fix 2) Cleanup the lookup_pi_state() failure path and solve the -ESRCH problem finally. Fix 3) Solve the fixup_pi_state_owner() problem which needs to do the fixup in the lock protected section by using the in_atomic userspace access functions. This removes also the ugly lock drop / unqueue inside of fixup_pi_state() Fix 4) Fix a stale lock in the error path of futex_wake_pi() Added some error checks for verification. The -EDEADLK problem is solved by the rtmutex fixups. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-06-09 04:47:00 +08:00
hrtimer_cancel(&tsk->signal->real_timer);
exit_itimers(tsk->signal);
#endif
getrusage: fill ru_maxrss value Make ->ru_maxrss value in struct rusage filled accordingly to rss hiwater mark. This struct is filled as a parameter to getrusage syscall. ->ru_maxrss value is set to KBs which is the way it is done in BSD systems. /usr/bin/time (gnu time) application converts ->ru_maxrss to KBs which seems to be incorrect behavior. Maintainer of this util was notified by me with the patch which corrects it and cc'ed. To make this happen we extend struct signal_struct by two fields. The first one is ->maxrss which we use to store rss hiwater of the task. The second one is ->cmaxrss which we use to store highest rss hiwater of all task childs. These values are used in k_getrusage() to actually fill ->ru_maxrss. k_getrusage() uses current rss hiwater value directly if mm struct exists. Note: exec() clear mm->hiwater_rss, but doesn't clear sig->maxrss. it is intetionally behavior. *BSD getrusage have exec() inheriting. test programs ======================================================== getrusage.c =========== #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <signal.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include "common.h" #define err(str) perror(str), exit(1) int main(int argc, char** argv) { int status; printf("allocate 100MB\n"); consume(100); printf("testcase1: fork inherit? \n"); printf(" expect: initial.self ~= child.self\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); } else { show_rusage("fork child"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) \n"); printf(" expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); } else { show_rusage("child"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase3: fork + malloc \n"); printf(" expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); } else { printf("allocate +50MB\n"); consume(50); show_rusage("fork child"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase4: grandchild maxrss\n"); printf(" expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); show_rusage("post_wait"); } else { system("./child -n 0 -g 300"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase5: zombie\n"); printf(" expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.\n"); printf(" post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. \n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { sleep(1); /* children become zombie */ show_rusage("pre_wait"); wait(&status); show_rusage("post_wait"); } else { system("./child -n 400"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase6: SIG_IGN\n"); printf(" expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).\n"); show_rusage("initial"); signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); if (__fork()) { sleep(1); /* children become zombie */ show_rusage("after_zombie"); } else { system("./child -n 500"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); printf("testcase7: exec (without fork) \n"); printf(" expect: initial ~= exec \n"); show_rusage("initial"); execl("./child", "child", "-v", NULL); return 0; } child.c ======= #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include "common.h" int main(int argc, char** argv) { int status; int c; long consume_size = 0; long grandchild_consume_size = 0; int show = 0; while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "n:g:v")) != -1) { switch (c) { case 'n': consume_size = atol(optarg); break; case 'v': show = 1; break; case 'g': grandchild_consume_size = atol(optarg); break; default: break; } } if (show) show_rusage("exec"); if (consume_size) { printf("child alloc %ldMB\n", consume_size); consume(consume_size); } if (grandchild_consume_size) { if (fork()) { wait(&status); } else { printf("grandchild alloc %ldMB\n", grandchild_consume_size); consume(grandchild_consume_size); exit(0); } } return 0; } common.c ======== #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <signal.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include "common.h" #define err(str) perror(str), exit(1) void show_rusage(char *prefix) { int err, err2; struct rusage rusage_self; struct rusage rusage_children; printf("%s: ", prefix); err = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rusage_self); if (!err) printf("self %ld ", rusage_self.ru_maxrss); err2 = getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &rusage_children); if (!err2) printf("children %ld ", rusage_children.ru_maxrss); printf("\n"); } /* Some buggy OS need this worthless CPU waste. */ void make_pagefault(void) { void *addr; int size = getpagesize(); int i; for (i=0; i<1000; i++) { addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); if (addr == MAP_FAILED) err("make_pagefault"); memset(addr, 0, size); munmap(addr, size); } } void consume(int mega) { size_t sz = mega * 1024 * 1024; void *ptr; ptr = malloc(sz); memset(ptr, 0, sz); make_pagefault(); } pid_t __fork(void) { pid_t pid; pid = fork(); make_pagefault(); return pid; } common.h ======== void show_rusage(char *prefix); void make_pagefault(void); void consume(int mega); pid_t __fork(void); FreeBSD result (expected result) ======================================================== allocate 100MB testcase1: fork inherit? expect: initial.self ~= child.self initial: self 103492 children 0 fork child: self 103540 children 0 testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0 initial: self 103540 children 103540 child: self 103564 children 0 testcase3: fork + malloc expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB initial: self 103564 children 103564 allocate +50MB fork child: self 154860 children 0 testcase4: grandchild maxrss expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB initial: self 103564 children 154860 grandchild alloc 300MB post_wait: self 103564 children 308720 testcase5: zombie expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted. post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. initial: self 103564 children 308720 child alloc 400MB pre_wait: self 103564 children 308720 post_wait: self 103564 children 411312 testcase6: SIG_IGN expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored). initial: self 103564 children 411312 child alloc 500MB after_zombie: self 103624 children 411312 testcase7: exec (without fork) expect: initial ~= exec initial: self 103624 children 411312 exec: self 103624 children 411312 Linux result (actual test result) ======================================================== allocate 100MB testcase1: fork inherit? expect: initial.self ~= child.self initial: self 102848 children 0 fork child: self 102572 children 0 testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0 initial: self 102876 children 102644 child: self 102572 children 0 testcase3: fork + malloc expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB initial: self 102876 children 102644 allocate +50MB fork child: self 153804 children 0 testcase4: grandchild maxrss expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB initial: self 102876 children 153864 grandchild alloc 300MB post_wait: self 102876 children 307536 testcase5: zombie expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted. post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. initial: self 102876 children 307536 child alloc 400MB pre_wait: self 102876 children 307536 post_wait: self 102876 children 410076 testcase6: SIG_IGN expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored). initial: self 102876 children 410076 child alloc 500MB after_zombie: self 102880 children 410076 testcase7: exec (without fork) expect: initial ~= exec initial: self 102880 children 410076 exec: self 102880 children 410076 Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:44:10 +08:00
if (tsk->mm)
setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&tsk->signal->maxrss, tsk->mm);
}
acct_collect(code, group_dead);
Audit: add TTY input auditing Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it necessary to audit TTY output as well. Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still work). TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly useless audit events. Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel. The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone). Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY. See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16 14:40:56 +08:00
if (group_dead)
tty_audit_exit();
audit_free(tsk);
tsk->exit_code = code;
taskstats_exit(tsk, group_dead);
exit_mm();
if (group_dead)
acct_process();
trace_sched_process_exit(tsk);
exit_sem(tsk);
ipc: introduce shm_rmid_forced sysctl Add support for the shm_rmid_forced sysctl. If set to 1, all shared memory objects in current ipc namespace will be automatically forced to use IPC_RMID. The POSIX way of handling shmem allows one to create shm objects and call shmdt(), leaving shm object associated with no process, thus consuming memory not counted via rlimits. With shm_rmid_forced=1 the shared memory object is counted at least for one process, so OOM killer may effectively kill the fat process holding the shared memory. It obviously breaks POSIX - some programs relying on the feature would stop working. So set shm_rmid_forced=1 only if you're sure nobody uses "orphaned" memory. Use shm_rmid_forced=0 by default for compatability reasons. The feature was previously impemented in -ow as a configure option. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix documentation, per Randy] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: readability/conventionality tweaks] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix shm_rmid_forced/shm_forced_rmid confusion, use standard comment layout] Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-27 07:08:48 +08:00
exit_shm(tsk);
exit_files(tsk);
exit_fs(tsk);
if (group_dead)
disassociate_ctty(1);
exit_task_namespaces(tsk);
exit_task_work(tsk);
exit_thread: accept a task parameter to be exited We need to call exit_thread from copy_process in a fail path. So make it accept task_struct as a parameter. [v2] * s390: exit_thread_runtime_instr doesn't make sense to be called for non-current tasks. * arm: fix the comment in vfp_thread_copy * change 'me' to 'tsk' for task_struct * now we can change only archs that actually have exit_thread [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com> Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com> Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 08:00:20 +08:00
exit_thread(tsk);
/*
* Flush inherited counters to the parent - before the parent
* gets woken up by child-exit notifications.
*
* because of cgroup mode, must be called before cgroup_exit()
*/
perf_event_exit_task(tsk);
sched_autogroup_exit_task(tsk);
cgroup_exit(tsk);
hw-breakpoints: Rewrite the hw-breakpoints layer on top of perf events This patch rebase the implementation of the breakpoints API on top of perf events instances. Each breakpoints are now perf events that handle the register scheduling, thread/cpu attachment, etc.. The new layering is now made as follows: ptrace kgdb ftrace perf syscall \ | / / \ | / / / Core breakpoint API / / | / | / Breakpoints perf events | | Breakpoints PMU ---- Debug Register constraints handling (Part of core breakpoint API) | | Hardware debug registers Reasons of this rewrite: - Use the centralized/optimized pmu registers scheduling, implying an easier arch integration - More powerful register handling: perf attributes (pinned/flexible events, exclusive/non-exclusive, tunable period, etc...) Impact: - New perf ABI: the hardware breakpoints counters - Ptrace breakpoints setting remains tricky and still needs some per thread breakpoints references. Todo (in the order): - Support breakpoints perf counter events for perf tools (ie: implement perf_bpcounter_event()) - Support from perf tools Changes in v2: - Follow the perf "event " rename - The ptrace regression have been fixed (ptrace breakpoint perf events weren't released when a task ended) - Drop the struct hw_breakpoint and store generic fields in perf_event_attr. - Separate core and arch specific headers, drop asm-generic/hw_breakpoint.h and create linux/hw_breakpoint.h - Use new generic len/type for breakpoint - Handle off case: when breakpoints api is not supported by an arch Changes in v3: - Fix broken CONFIG_KVM, we need to propagate the breakpoint api changes to kvm when we exit the guest and restore the bp registers to the host. Changes in v4: - Drop the hw_breakpoint_restore() stub as it is only used by KVM - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL hw_breakpoint_restore() as KVM can be built as a module - Restore the breakpoints unconditionally on kvm guest exit: TIF_DEBUG_THREAD doesn't anymore cover every cases of running breakpoints and vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs might not always be set when the guest used debug registers. (Waiting for a reliable optimization) Changes in v5: - Split-up the asm-generic/hw-breakpoint.h moving to linux/hw_breakpoint.h into a separate patch - Optimize the breakpoints restoring while switching from kvm guest to host. We only want to restore the state if we have active breakpoints to the host, otherwise we don't care about messed-up address registers. - Add asm/hw_breakpoint.h to Kbuild - Fix bad breakpoint type in trace_selftest.c Changes in v6: - Fix wrong header inclusion in trace.h (triggered a build error with CONFIG_FTRACE_SELFTEST Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2009-09-10 01:22:48 +08:00
/*
* FIXME: do that only when needed, using sched_exit tracepoint
*/
flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(tsk);
exit_tasks_rcu_start();
exit_notify(tsk, group_dead);
kernel/exit.c: call proc_exit_connector() after exit_state is set The process events connector delivers a notification when a process exits. This is really convenient for a process that spawns and wants to monitor its children through an epoll-able() interface. Unfortunately, there is a small window between when the event is delivered and the child become wait()-able. This is creates a race if the parent wants to make sure that it knows about the exit, e.g pid_t pid = fork(); if (pid > 0) { register_interest_for_pid(pid); if (waitpid(pid, NULL, WNOHANG) > 0) { /* We might have raced with exit() */ } return; } /* Child */ execve(...) register_interest_for_pid() would be telling the the connector socket reader to pay attention to events related to pid. Though this is not a bug, I think it would make the connector a bit more usable if this race was closed by simply moving the call to proc_exit_connector() from just before exit_notify() to right after. Oleg said: : Even with this patch the code above is still "racy" if the child is : multi-threaded. Plus it should obviously filter-out subthreads. And : afaics there is no way to make it reliable, even if you change the code : above so that waitpid() is called only after the last thread exits WNOHANG : still can fail. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org> Cc: Matt Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 06:38:31 +08:00
proc_exit_connector(tsk);
mpol_put_task_policy(tsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
if (unlikely(current->pi_state_cache))
kfree(current->pi_state_cache);
#endif
/*
* Make sure we are holding no locks:
*/
debug_check_no_locks_held();
if (tsk->io_context)
exit_io_context(tsk);
if (tsk->splice_pipe)
free_pipe_info(tsk->splice_pipe);
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-24 07:04:42 +08:00
if (tsk->task_frag.page)
put_page(tsk->task_frag.page);
validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
check_stack_usage();
preempt_disable();
if (tsk->nr_dirtied)
__this_cpu_add(dirty_throttle_leaks, tsk->nr_dirtied);
rcu: Merge preemptable-RCU functionality into hierarchical RCU Create a kernel/rcutree_plugin.h file that contains definitions for preemptable RCU (or, under the #else branch of the #ifdef, empty definitions for the classic non-preemptable semantics). These definitions fit into plugins defined in kernel/rcutree.c for this purpose. This variant of preemptable RCU uses a new algorithm whose read-side expense is roughly that of classic hierarchical RCU under CONFIG_PREEMPT. This new algorithm's update-side expense is similar to that of classic hierarchical RCU, and, in absence of read-side preemption or blocking, is exactly that of classic hierarchical RCU. Perhaps more important, this new algorithm has a much simpler implementation, saving well over 1,000 lines of code compared to mainline's implementation of preemptable RCU, which will hopefully be retired in favor of this new algorithm. The simplifications are obtained by maintaining per-task nesting state for running tasks, and using a simple lock-protected algorithm to handle accounting when tasks block within RCU read-side critical sections, making use of lessons learned while creating numerous user-level RCU implementations over the past 18 months. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: laijs@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca Cc: josht@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: dvhltc@us.ibm.com Cc: niv@us.ibm.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org LKML-Reference: <12509746134003-git-send-email-> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-23 04:56:52 +08:00
exit_rcu();
exit_tasks_rcu_finish();
sched: Fix ancient race in do_exit() try_to_wake_up() has a problem which may change status from TASK_DEAD to TASK_RUNNING in race condition with SMI or guest environment of virtual machine. As a result, exited task is scheduled() again and panic occurs. Here is the sequence how it occurs: ----------------------------------+----------------------------- | CPU A | CPU B ----------------------------------+----------------------------- TASK A calls exit().... do_exit() exit_mm() down_read(mm->mmap_sem); rwsem_down_failed_common() set TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE set waiter.task <= task A list_add to sem->wait_list : raw_spin_unlock_irq() (I/O interruption occured) __rwsem_do_wake(mmap_sem) list_del(&waiter->list); waiter->task = NULL wake_up_process(task A) try_to_wake_up() (task is still TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE) p->on_rq is still 1.) ttwu_do_wakeup() (*A) : (I/O interruption handler finished) if (!waiter.task) schedule() is not called due to waiter.task is NULL. tsk->state = TASK_RUNNING : check_preempt_curr(); : task->state = TASK_DEAD (*B) <--- set TASK_RUNNING (*C) schedule() (exit task is running again) BUG_ON() is called! -------------------------------------------------------- The execution time between (*A) and (*B) is usually very short, because the interruption is disabled, and setting TASK_RUNNING at (*C) must be executed before setting TASK_DEAD. HOWEVER, if SMI is interrupted between (*A) and (*B), (*C) is able to execute AFTER setting TASK_DEAD! Then, exited task is scheduled again, and BUG_ON() is called.... If the system works on guest system of virtual machine, the time between (*A) and (*B) may be also long due to scheduling of hypervisor, and same phenomenon can occur. By this patch, do_exit() waits for releasing task->pi_lock which is used in try_to_wake_up(). It guarantees the task becomes TASK_DEAD after waking up. Signed-off-by: Yasunori Goto <y-goto@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120117174031.3118.E1E9C6FF@jp.fujitsu.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-01-17 16:40:31 +08:00
lockdep_free_task(tsk);
do_task_dead();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_exit);
void complete_and_exit(struct completion *comp, long code)
{
if (comp)
complete(comp);
do_exit(code);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(complete_and_exit);
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(exit, int, error_code)
{
do_exit((error_code&0xff)<<8);
}
/*
* Take down every thread in the group. This is called by fatal signals
* as well as by sys_exit_group (below).
*/
void
do_group_exit(int exit_code)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = current->signal;
BUG_ON(exit_code & 0x80); /* core dumps don't get here */
if (signal_group_exit(sig))
exit_code = sig->group_exit_code;
else if (!thread_group_empty(current)) {
struct sighand_struct *const sighand = current->sighand;
spin_lock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
if (signal_group_exit(sig))
/* Another thread got here before we took the lock. */
exit_code = sig->group_exit_code;
else {
sig->group_exit_code = exit_code;
sig->flags = SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT;
zap_other_threads(current);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
}
do_exit(exit_code);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* this kills every thread in the thread group. Note that any externally
* wait4()-ing process will get the correct exit code - even if this
* thread is not the thread group leader.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(exit_group, int, error_code)
{
do_group_exit((error_code & 0xff) << 8);
/* NOTREACHED */
return 0;
}
struct waitid_info {
pid_t pid;
uid_t uid;
int status;
int cause;
};
struct wait_opts {
enum pid_type wo_type;
int wo_flags;
struct pid *wo_pid;
struct waitid_info *wo_info;
int wo_stat;
struct rusage *wo_rusage;
wait_queue_entry_t child_wait;
int notask_error;
};
static int eligible_pid(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p)
{
return wo->wo_type == PIDTYPE_MAX ||
task_pid_type(p, wo->wo_type) == wo->wo_pid;
}
wait/ptrace: assume __WALL if the child is traced The following program (simplified version of generated by syzkaller) #include <pthread.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <signal.h> void *thread_func(void *arg) { ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0); return 0; } int main(void) { pthread_t thread; if (fork()) return 0; while (getppid() != 1) ; pthread_create(&thread, NULL, thread_func, NULL); pthread_join(thread, NULL); return 0; } creates an unreapable zombie if /sbin/init doesn't use __WALL. This is not a kernel bug, at least in a sense that everything works as expected: debugger should reap a traced sub-thread before it can reap the leader, but without __WALL/__WCLONE do_wait() ignores sub-threads. Unfortunately, it seems that /sbin/init in most (all?) distributions doesn't use it and we have to change the kernel to avoid the problem. Note also that most init's use sys_waitid() which doesn't allow __WALL, so the necessary user-space fix is not that trivial. This patch just adds the "ptrace" check into eligible_child(). To some degree this matches the "tsk->ptrace" in exit_notify(), ->exit_signal is mostly ignored when the tracee reports to debugger. Or WSTOPPED, the tracer doesn't need to set this flag to wait for the stopped tracee. This obviously means the user-visible change: __WCLONE and __WALL no longer have any meaning for debugger. And I can only hope that this won't break something, but at least strace/gdb won't suffer. We could make a more conservative change. Say, we can take __WCLONE into account, or !thread_group_leader(). But it would be nice to not complicate these historical/confusing checks. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-24 07:23:50 +08:00
static int
eligible_child(struct wait_opts *wo, bool ptrace, struct task_struct *p)
{
if (!eligible_pid(wo, p))
return 0;
wait/ptrace: assume __WALL if the child is traced The following program (simplified version of generated by syzkaller) #include <pthread.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <signal.h> void *thread_func(void *arg) { ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0); return 0; } int main(void) { pthread_t thread; if (fork()) return 0; while (getppid() != 1) ; pthread_create(&thread, NULL, thread_func, NULL); pthread_join(thread, NULL); return 0; } creates an unreapable zombie if /sbin/init doesn't use __WALL. This is not a kernel bug, at least in a sense that everything works as expected: debugger should reap a traced sub-thread before it can reap the leader, but without __WALL/__WCLONE do_wait() ignores sub-threads. Unfortunately, it seems that /sbin/init in most (all?) distributions doesn't use it and we have to change the kernel to avoid the problem. Note also that most init's use sys_waitid() which doesn't allow __WALL, so the necessary user-space fix is not that trivial. This patch just adds the "ptrace" check into eligible_child(). To some degree this matches the "tsk->ptrace" in exit_notify(), ->exit_signal is mostly ignored when the tracee reports to debugger. Or WSTOPPED, the tracer doesn't need to set this flag to wait for the stopped tracee. This obviously means the user-visible change: __WCLONE and __WALL no longer have any meaning for debugger. And I can only hope that this won't break something, but at least strace/gdb won't suffer. We could make a more conservative change. Say, we can take __WCLONE into account, or !thread_group_leader(). But it would be nice to not complicate these historical/confusing checks. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-24 07:23:50 +08:00
/*
* Wait for all children (clone and not) if __WALL is set or
* if it is traced by us.
*/
if (ptrace || (wo->wo_flags & __WALL))
return 1;
/*
* Otherwise, wait for clone children *only* if __WCLONE is set;
* otherwise, wait for non-clone children *only*.
*
* Note: a "clone" child here is one that reports to its parent
* using a signal other than SIGCHLD, or a non-leader thread which
* we can only see if it is traced by us.
*/
if ((p->exit_signal != SIGCHLD) ^ !!(wo->wo_flags & __WCLONE))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Handle sys_wait4 work for one task in state EXIT_ZOMBIE. We hold
* read_lock(&tasklist_lock) on entry. If we return zero, we still hold
* the lock and this task is uninteresting. If we return nonzero, we have
* released the lock and the system call should return.
*/
static int wait_task_zombie(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p)
{
int state, status;
pid_t pid = task_pid_vnr(p);
uid_t uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), task_uid(p));
struct waitid_info *infop;
if (!likely(wo->wo_flags & WEXITED))
return 0;
if (unlikely(wo->wo_flags & WNOWAIT)) {
status = p->exit_code;
get_task_struct(p);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
sched, exit: Deal with nested sleeps do_wait() is a big wait loop, but we set TASK_RUNNING too late; we end up calling potential sleeps before we reset it. Not strictly a bug since we're guaranteed to exit the loop and not call schedule(); put in annotations to quiet might_sleep(). WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at ../kernel/sched/core.c:7123 __might_sleep+0x7e/0x90() do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff8109a788>] do_wait+0x88/0x270 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81694991>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a [<ffffffff8109877c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8109886c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4c/0x50 [<ffffffff810bca6e>] __might_sleep+0x7e/0x90 [<ffffffff811a1c15>] might_fault+0x55/0xb0 [<ffffffff8109a3fb>] wait_consider_task+0x90b/0xc10 [<ffffffff8109a804>] do_wait+0x104/0x270 [<ffffffff8109b837>] SyS_wait4+0x77/0x100 [<ffffffff8169d692>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: tglx@linutronix.de Cc: umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com Cc: ilya.dryomov@inktank.com Cc: Alex Elder <alex.elder@linaro.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Axel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org> Cc: Ionut Alexa <ionut.m.alexa@gmail.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140924082242.186408915@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-09-24 16:18:49 +08:00
sched_annotate_sleep();
if (wo->wo_rusage)
getrusage(p, RUSAGE_BOTH, wo->wo_rusage);
put_task_struct(p);
goto out_info;
}
/*
wait: introduce EXIT_TRACE to avoid the racy EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE transition wait_task_zombie() first does EXIT_ZOMBIE->EXIT_DEAD transition and drops tasklist_lock. If this task is not the natural child and it is traced, we change its state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE for ->real_parent. The last transition is racy, this is even documented in 50b8d257486a "ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race". wait_consider_task() tries to detect this transition and clear ->notask_error but we can't rely on ptrace_reparented(), debugger can exit and do ptrace_unlink() before its sub-thread sets EXIT_ZOMBIE. And there is another problem which were missed before: this transition can also race with reparent_leader() which doesn't reset >exit_signal if EXIT_DEAD, assuming that this task must be reaped by someone else. So the tracee can be re-parented with ->exit_signal != SIGCHLD, and if /sbin/init doesn't use __WALL it becomes unreapable. This was fixed by the previous commit, but it was the temporary hack. 1. Add the new exit_state, EXIT_TRACE. It means that the task is the traced zombie, debugger is going to detach and notify its natural parent. This new state is actually EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD. This way we can avoid the changes in proc/kgdb code, get_task_state() still reports "X (dead)" in this case. Note: with or without this change userspace can see Z -> X -> Z transition. Not really bad, but probably makes sense to fix. 2. Change wait_task_zombie() to use EXIT_TRACE instead of EXIT_DEAD if we need to notify the ->real_parent. 3. Revert the previous hack in reparent_leader(), now that EXIT_DEAD is always the final state we can safely ignore such a task. 4. Change wait_consider_task() to check EXIT_TRACE separately and kill the racy and no longer needed ptrace_reparented() case. If ptrace == T an EXIT_TRACE thread should be simply ignored, the owner of this state is going to ptrace_unlink() this task. We can pretend that it was already removed from ->ptraced list. Otherwise we should skip this thread too but clear ->notask_error, we must be the natural parent and debugger is going to untrace and notify us. IOW, this doesn't differ from "EXIT_ZOMBIE && p->ptrace" even if the task was already untraced. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Reported-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 06:38:42 +08:00
* Move the task's state to DEAD/TRACE, only one thread can do this.
*/
state = (ptrace_reparented(p) && thread_group_leader(p)) ?
EXIT_TRACE : EXIT_DEAD;
wait: introduce EXIT_TRACE to avoid the racy EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE transition wait_task_zombie() first does EXIT_ZOMBIE->EXIT_DEAD transition and drops tasklist_lock. If this task is not the natural child and it is traced, we change its state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE for ->real_parent. The last transition is racy, this is even documented in 50b8d257486a "ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race". wait_consider_task() tries to detect this transition and clear ->notask_error but we can't rely on ptrace_reparented(), debugger can exit and do ptrace_unlink() before its sub-thread sets EXIT_ZOMBIE. And there is another problem which were missed before: this transition can also race with reparent_leader() which doesn't reset >exit_signal if EXIT_DEAD, assuming that this task must be reaped by someone else. So the tracee can be re-parented with ->exit_signal != SIGCHLD, and if /sbin/init doesn't use __WALL it becomes unreapable. This was fixed by the previous commit, but it was the temporary hack. 1. Add the new exit_state, EXIT_TRACE. It means that the task is the traced zombie, debugger is going to detach and notify its natural parent. This new state is actually EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD. This way we can avoid the changes in proc/kgdb code, get_task_state() still reports "X (dead)" in this case. Note: with or without this change userspace can see Z -> X -> Z transition. Not really bad, but probably makes sense to fix. 2. Change wait_task_zombie() to use EXIT_TRACE instead of EXIT_DEAD if we need to notify the ->real_parent. 3. Revert the previous hack in reparent_leader(), now that EXIT_DEAD is always the final state we can safely ignore such a task. 4. Change wait_consider_task() to check EXIT_TRACE separately and kill the racy and no longer needed ptrace_reparented() case. If ptrace == T an EXIT_TRACE thread should be simply ignored, the owner of this state is going to ptrace_unlink() this task. We can pretend that it was already removed from ->ptraced list. Otherwise we should skip this thread too but clear ->notask_error, we must be the natural parent and debugger is going to untrace and notify us. IOW, this doesn't differ from "EXIT_ZOMBIE && p->ptrace" even if the task was already untraced. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Reported-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 06:38:42 +08:00
if (cmpxchg(&p->exit_state, EXIT_ZOMBIE, state) != EXIT_ZOMBIE)
return 0;
/*
* We own this thread, nobody else can reap it.
*/
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
sched_annotate_sleep();
/*
* Check thread_group_leader() to exclude the traced sub-threads.
*/
if (state == EXIT_DEAD && thread_group_leader(p)) {
struct signal_struct *sig = p->signal;
struct signal_struct *psig = current->signal;
getrusage: fill ru_maxrss value Make ->ru_maxrss value in struct rusage filled accordingly to rss hiwater mark. This struct is filled as a parameter to getrusage syscall. ->ru_maxrss value is set to KBs which is the way it is done in BSD systems. /usr/bin/time (gnu time) application converts ->ru_maxrss to KBs which seems to be incorrect behavior. Maintainer of this util was notified by me with the patch which corrects it and cc'ed. To make this happen we extend struct signal_struct by two fields. The first one is ->maxrss which we use to store rss hiwater of the task. The second one is ->cmaxrss which we use to store highest rss hiwater of all task childs. These values are used in k_getrusage() to actually fill ->ru_maxrss. k_getrusage() uses current rss hiwater value directly if mm struct exists. Note: exec() clear mm->hiwater_rss, but doesn't clear sig->maxrss. it is intetionally behavior. *BSD getrusage have exec() inheriting. test programs ======================================================== getrusage.c =========== #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <signal.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include "common.h" #define err(str) perror(str), exit(1) int main(int argc, char** argv) { int status; printf("allocate 100MB\n"); consume(100); printf("testcase1: fork inherit? \n"); printf(" expect: initial.self ~= child.self\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); } else { show_rusage("fork child"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) \n"); printf(" expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); } else { show_rusage("child"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase3: fork + malloc \n"); printf(" expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); } else { printf("allocate +50MB\n"); consume(50); show_rusage("fork child"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase4: grandchild maxrss\n"); printf(" expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); show_rusage("post_wait"); } else { system("./child -n 0 -g 300"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase5: zombie\n"); printf(" expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.\n"); printf(" post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. \n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { sleep(1); /* children become zombie */ show_rusage("pre_wait"); wait(&status); show_rusage("post_wait"); } else { system("./child -n 400"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase6: SIG_IGN\n"); printf(" expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).\n"); show_rusage("initial"); signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); if (__fork()) { sleep(1); /* children become zombie */ show_rusage("after_zombie"); } else { system("./child -n 500"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); printf("testcase7: exec (without fork) \n"); printf(" expect: initial ~= exec \n"); show_rusage("initial"); execl("./child", "child", "-v", NULL); return 0; } child.c ======= #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include "common.h" int main(int argc, char** argv) { int status; int c; long consume_size = 0; long grandchild_consume_size = 0; int show = 0; while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "n:g:v")) != -1) { switch (c) { case 'n': consume_size = atol(optarg); break; case 'v': show = 1; break; case 'g': grandchild_consume_size = atol(optarg); break; default: break; } } if (show) show_rusage("exec"); if (consume_size) { printf("child alloc %ldMB\n", consume_size); consume(consume_size); } if (grandchild_consume_size) { if (fork()) { wait(&status); } else { printf("grandchild alloc %ldMB\n", grandchild_consume_size); consume(grandchild_consume_size); exit(0); } } return 0; } common.c ======== #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <signal.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include "common.h" #define err(str) perror(str), exit(1) void show_rusage(char *prefix) { int err, err2; struct rusage rusage_self; struct rusage rusage_children; printf("%s: ", prefix); err = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rusage_self); if (!err) printf("self %ld ", rusage_self.ru_maxrss); err2 = getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &rusage_children); if (!err2) printf("children %ld ", rusage_children.ru_maxrss); printf("\n"); } /* Some buggy OS need this worthless CPU waste. */ void make_pagefault(void) { void *addr; int size = getpagesize(); int i; for (i=0; i<1000; i++) { addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); if (addr == MAP_FAILED) err("make_pagefault"); memset(addr, 0, size); munmap(addr, size); } } void consume(int mega) { size_t sz = mega * 1024 * 1024; void *ptr; ptr = malloc(sz); memset(ptr, 0, sz); make_pagefault(); } pid_t __fork(void) { pid_t pid; pid = fork(); make_pagefault(); return pid; } common.h ======== void show_rusage(char *prefix); void make_pagefault(void); void consume(int mega); pid_t __fork(void); FreeBSD result (expected result) ======================================================== allocate 100MB testcase1: fork inherit? expect: initial.self ~= child.self initial: self 103492 children 0 fork child: self 103540 children 0 testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0 initial: self 103540 children 103540 child: self 103564 children 0 testcase3: fork + malloc expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB initial: self 103564 children 103564 allocate +50MB fork child: self 154860 children 0 testcase4: grandchild maxrss expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB initial: self 103564 children 154860 grandchild alloc 300MB post_wait: self 103564 children 308720 testcase5: zombie expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted. post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. initial: self 103564 children 308720 child alloc 400MB pre_wait: self 103564 children 308720 post_wait: self 103564 children 411312 testcase6: SIG_IGN expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored). initial: self 103564 children 411312 child alloc 500MB after_zombie: self 103624 children 411312 testcase7: exec (without fork) expect: initial ~= exec initial: self 103624 children 411312 exec: self 103624 children 411312 Linux result (actual test result) ======================================================== allocate 100MB testcase1: fork inherit? expect: initial.self ~= child.self initial: self 102848 children 0 fork child: self 102572 children 0 testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0 initial: self 102876 children 102644 child: self 102572 children 0 testcase3: fork + malloc expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB initial: self 102876 children 102644 allocate +50MB fork child: self 153804 children 0 testcase4: grandchild maxrss expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB initial: self 102876 children 153864 grandchild alloc 300MB post_wait: self 102876 children 307536 testcase5: zombie expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted. post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. initial: self 102876 children 307536 child alloc 400MB pre_wait: self 102876 children 307536 post_wait: self 102876 children 410076 testcase6: SIG_IGN expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored). initial: self 102876 children 410076 child alloc 500MB after_zombie: self 102880 children 410076 testcase7: exec (without fork) expect: initial ~= exec initial: self 102880 children 410076 exec: self 102880 children 410076 Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:44:10 +08:00
unsigned long maxrss;
u64 tgutime, tgstime;
/*
* The resource counters for the group leader are in its
* own task_struct. Those for dead threads in the group
* are in its signal_struct, as are those for the child
* processes it has previously reaped. All these
* accumulate in the parent's signal_struct c* fields.
*
* We don't bother to take a lock here to protect these
* p->signal fields because the whole thread group is dead
* and nobody can change them.
*
* psig->stats_lock also protects us from our sub-theads
* which can reap other children at the same time. Until
* we change k_getrusage()-like users to rely on this lock
* we have to take ->siglock as well.
sched, cputime: Introduce thread_group_times() This is a real fix for problem of utime/stime values decreasing described in the thread: http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/11/3/522 Now cputime is accounted in the following way: - {u,s}time in task_struct are increased every time when the thread is interrupted by a tick (timer interrupt). - When a thread exits, its {u,s}time are added to signal->{u,s}time, after adjusted by task_times(). - When all threads in a thread_group exits, accumulated {u,s}time (and also c{u,s}time) in signal struct are added to c{u,s}time in signal struct of the group's parent. So {u,s}time in task struct are "raw" tick count, while {u,s}time and c{u,s}time in signal struct are "adjusted" values. And accounted values are used by: - task_times(), to get cputime of a thread: This function returns adjusted values that originates from raw {u,s}time and scaled by sum_exec_runtime that accounted by CFS. - thread_group_cputime(), to get cputime of a thread group: This function returns sum of all {u,s}time of living threads in the group, plus {u,s}time in the signal struct that is sum of adjusted cputimes of all exited threads belonged to the group. The problem is the return value of thread_group_cputime(), because it is mixed sum of "raw" value and "adjusted" value: group's {u,s}time = foreach(thread){{u,s}time} + exited({u,s}time) This misbehavior can break {u,s}time monotonicity. Assume that if there is a thread that have raw values greater than adjusted values (e.g. interrupted by 1000Hz ticks 50 times but only runs 45ms) and if it exits, cputime will decrease (e.g. -5ms). To fix this, we could do: group's {u,s}time = foreach(t){task_times(t)} + exited({u,s}time) But task_times() contains hard divisions, so applying it for every thread should be avoided. This patch fixes the above problem in the following way: - Modify thread's exit (= __exit_signal()) not to use task_times(). It means {u,s}time in signal struct accumulates raw values instead of adjusted values. As the result it makes thread_group_cputime() to return pure sum of "raw" values. - Introduce a new function thread_group_times(*task, *utime, *stime) that converts "raw" values of thread_group_cputime() to "adjusted" values, in same calculation procedure as task_times(). - Modify group's exit (= wait_task_zombie()) to use this introduced thread_group_times(). It make c{u,s}time in signal struct to have adjusted values like before this patch. - Replace some thread_group_cputime() by thread_group_times(). This replacements are only applied where conveys the "adjusted" cputime to users, and where already uses task_times() near by it. (i.e. sys_times(), getrusage(), and /proc/<PID>/stat.) This patch have a positive side effect: - Before this patch, if a group contains many short-life threads (e.g. runs 0.9ms and not interrupted by ticks), the group's cputime could be invisible since thread's cputime was accumulated after adjusted: imagine adjustment function as adj(ticks, runtime), {adj(0, 0.9) + adj(0, 0.9) + ....} = {0 + 0 + ....} = 0. After this patch it will not happen because the adjustment is applied after accumulated. v2: - remove if()s, put new variables into signal_struct. Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Spencer Candland <spencer@bluehost.com> Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <4B162517.8040909@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-12-02 16:28:07 +08:00
*
* We use thread_group_cputime_adjusted() to get times for
* the thread group, which consolidates times for all threads
* in the group including the group leader.
*/
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime);
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
time, signal: Protect resource use statistics with seqlock Both times() and clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID) have scalability issues on large systems, due to both functions being serialized with a lock. The lock protects against reporting a wrong value, due to a thread in the task group exiting, its statistics reporting up to the signal struct, and that exited task's statistics being counted twice (or not at all). Protecting that with a lock results in times() and clock_gettime() being completely serialized on large systems. This can be fixed by using a seqlock around the events that gather and propagate statistics. As an additional benefit, the protection code can be moved into thread_group_cputime(), slightly simplifying the calling functions. In the case of posix_cpu_clock_get_task() things can be simplified a lot, because the calling function already ensures that the task sticks around, and the rest is now taken care of in thread_group_cputime(). This way the statistics reporting code can run lockless. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dongsheng Yang <yangds.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org> Cc: Ionut Alexa <ionut.m.alexa@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: srao@redhat.com Cc: lwoodman@redhat.com Cc: atheurer@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140816134010.26a9b572@annuminas.surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-08-17 01:40:10 +08:00
write_seqlock(&psig->stats_lock);
psig->cutime += tgutime + sig->cutime;
psig->cstime += tgstime + sig->cstime;
psig->cgtime += task_gtime(p) + sig->gtime + sig->cgtime;
psig->cmin_flt +=
p->min_flt + sig->min_flt + sig->cmin_flt;
psig->cmaj_flt +=
p->maj_flt + sig->maj_flt + sig->cmaj_flt;
psig->cnvcsw +=
p->nvcsw + sig->nvcsw + sig->cnvcsw;
psig->cnivcsw +=
p->nivcsw + sig->nivcsw + sig->cnivcsw;
psig->cinblock +=
task_io_get_inblock(p) +
sig->inblock + sig->cinblock;
psig->coublock +=
task_io_get_oublock(p) +
sig->oublock + sig->coublock;
getrusage: fill ru_maxrss value Make ->ru_maxrss value in struct rusage filled accordingly to rss hiwater mark. This struct is filled as a parameter to getrusage syscall. ->ru_maxrss value is set to KBs which is the way it is done in BSD systems. /usr/bin/time (gnu time) application converts ->ru_maxrss to KBs which seems to be incorrect behavior. Maintainer of this util was notified by me with the patch which corrects it and cc'ed. To make this happen we extend struct signal_struct by two fields. The first one is ->maxrss which we use to store rss hiwater of the task. The second one is ->cmaxrss which we use to store highest rss hiwater of all task childs. These values are used in k_getrusage() to actually fill ->ru_maxrss. k_getrusage() uses current rss hiwater value directly if mm struct exists. Note: exec() clear mm->hiwater_rss, but doesn't clear sig->maxrss. it is intetionally behavior. *BSD getrusage have exec() inheriting. test programs ======================================================== getrusage.c =========== #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <signal.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include "common.h" #define err(str) perror(str), exit(1) int main(int argc, char** argv) { int status; printf("allocate 100MB\n"); consume(100); printf("testcase1: fork inherit? \n"); printf(" expect: initial.self ~= child.self\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); } else { show_rusage("fork child"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) \n"); printf(" expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); } else { show_rusage("child"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase3: fork + malloc \n"); printf(" expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); } else { printf("allocate +50MB\n"); consume(50); show_rusage("fork child"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase4: grandchild maxrss\n"); printf(" expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB\n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { wait(&status); show_rusage("post_wait"); } else { system("./child -n 0 -g 300"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase5: zombie\n"); printf(" expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.\n"); printf(" post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. \n"); show_rusage("initial"); if (__fork()) { sleep(1); /* children become zombie */ show_rusage("pre_wait"); wait(&status); show_rusage("post_wait"); } else { system("./child -n 400"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); printf("testcase6: SIG_IGN\n"); printf(" expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).\n"); show_rusage("initial"); signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); if (__fork()) { sleep(1); /* children become zombie */ show_rusage("after_zombie"); } else { system("./child -n 500"); _exit(0); } printf("\n"); signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); printf("testcase7: exec (without fork) \n"); printf(" expect: initial ~= exec \n"); show_rusage("initial"); execl("./child", "child", "-v", NULL); return 0; } child.c ======= #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include "common.h" int main(int argc, char** argv) { int status; int c; long consume_size = 0; long grandchild_consume_size = 0; int show = 0; while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "n:g:v")) != -1) { switch (c) { case 'n': consume_size = atol(optarg); break; case 'v': show = 1; break; case 'g': grandchild_consume_size = atol(optarg); break; default: break; } } if (show) show_rusage("exec"); if (consume_size) { printf("child alloc %ldMB\n", consume_size); consume(consume_size); } if (grandchild_consume_size) { if (fork()) { wait(&status); } else { printf("grandchild alloc %ldMB\n", grandchild_consume_size); consume(grandchild_consume_size); exit(0); } } return 0; } common.c ======== #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <signal.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include "common.h" #define err(str) perror(str), exit(1) void show_rusage(char *prefix) { int err, err2; struct rusage rusage_self; struct rusage rusage_children; printf("%s: ", prefix); err = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rusage_self); if (!err) printf("self %ld ", rusage_self.ru_maxrss); err2 = getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &rusage_children); if (!err2) printf("children %ld ", rusage_children.ru_maxrss); printf("\n"); } /* Some buggy OS need this worthless CPU waste. */ void make_pagefault(void) { void *addr; int size = getpagesize(); int i; for (i=0; i<1000; i++) { addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); if (addr == MAP_FAILED) err("make_pagefault"); memset(addr, 0, size); munmap(addr, size); } } void consume(int mega) { size_t sz = mega * 1024 * 1024; void *ptr; ptr = malloc(sz); memset(ptr, 0, sz); make_pagefault(); } pid_t __fork(void) { pid_t pid; pid = fork(); make_pagefault(); return pid; } common.h ======== void show_rusage(char *prefix); void make_pagefault(void); void consume(int mega); pid_t __fork(void); FreeBSD result (expected result) ======================================================== allocate 100MB testcase1: fork inherit? expect: initial.self ~= child.self initial: self 103492 children 0 fork child: self 103540 children 0 testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0 initial: self 103540 children 103540 child: self 103564 children 0 testcase3: fork + malloc expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB initial: self 103564 children 103564 allocate +50MB fork child: self 154860 children 0 testcase4: grandchild maxrss expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB initial: self 103564 children 154860 grandchild alloc 300MB post_wait: self 103564 children 308720 testcase5: zombie expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted. post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. initial: self 103564 children 308720 child alloc 400MB pre_wait: self 103564 children 308720 post_wait: self 103564 children 411312 testcase6: SIG_IGN expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored). initial: self 103564 children 411312 child alloc 500MB after_zombie: self 103624 children 411312 testcase7: exec (without fork) expect: initial ~= exec initial: self 103624 children 411312 exec: self 103624 children 411312 Linux result (actual test result) ======================================================== allocate 100MB testcase1: fork inherit? expect: initial.self ~= child.self initial: self 102848 children 0 fork child: self 102572 children 0 testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0 initial: self 102876 children 102644 child: self 102572 children 0 testcase3: fork + malloc expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB initial: self 102876 children 102644 allocate +50MB fork child: self 153804 children 0 testcase4: grandchild maxrss expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB initial: self 102876 children 153864 grandchild alloc 300MB post_wait: self 102876 children 307536 testcase5: zombie expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted. post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. initial: self 102876 children 307536 child alloc 400MB pre_wait: self 102876 children 307536 post_wait: self 102876 children 410076 testcase6: SIG_IGN expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored). initial: self 102876 children 410076 child alloc 500MB after_zombie: self 102880 children 410076 testcase7: exec (without fork) expect: initial ~= exec initial: self 102880 children 410076 exec: self 102880 children 410076 Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:44:10 +08:00
maxrss = max(sig->maxrss, sig->cmaxrss);
if (psig->cmaxrss < maxrss)
psig->cmaxrss = maxrss;
task_io_accounting_add(&psig->ioac, &p->ioac);
task_io_accounting_add(&psig->ioac, &sig->ioac);
time, signal: Protect resource use statistics with seqlock Both times() and clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID) have scalability issues on large systems, due to both functions being serialized with a lock. The lock protects against reporting a wrong value, due to a thread in the task group exiting, its statistics reporting up to the signal struct, and that exited task's statistics being counted twice (or not at all). Protecting that with a lock results in times() and clock_gettime() being completely serialized on large systems. This can be fixed by using a seqlock around the events that gather and propagate statistics. As an additional benefit, the protection code can be moved into thread_group_cputime(), slightly simplifying the calling functions. In the case of posix_cpu_clock_get_task() things can be simplified a lot, because the calling function already ensures that the task sticks around, and the rest is now taken care of in thread_group_cputime(). This way the statistics reporting code can run lockless. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dongsheng Yang <yangds.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org> Cc: Ionut Alexa <ionut.m.alexa@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: srao@redhat.com Cc: lwoodman@redhat.com Cc: atheurer@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140816134010.26a9b572@annuminas.surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-08-17 01:40:10 +08:00
write_sequnlock(&psig->stats_lock);
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
}
if (wo->wo_rusage)
getrusage(p, RUSAGE_BOTH, wo->wo_rusage);
status = (p->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)
? p->signal->group_exit_code : p->exit_code;
wo->wo_stat = status;
wait_task_zombie: fix 2/3 races vs forget_original_parent() Two threads, T1 and T2. T2 ptraces P, and P is not a child of ptracer's thread group. P exits and goes to TASK_ZOMBIE. T1 does wait_task_zombie(P): P->exit_state = TASK_DEAD; ... read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); T2 does exit(), takes tasklist, forget_original_parent() does __ptrace_unlink(P) but doesn't call do_notify_parent(P) because p->exit_state == EXIT_DEAD. Now, P is not visible to our process: __ptrace_unlink() removed it from ->children. We should send notification to P->parent and release P if and only if SIGCHLD is ignored. And we have 3 bugs: 1. P->parent does do_wait() and gets -ECHILD (P is on ->parent->children, but its state is TASK_DEAD). 2. // wait_task_zombie() continues if (put_user(...)) { // TODO: is this safe? p->exit_state = EXIT_ZOMBIE; return; } we return without notification/release, task_struct leaked. Solution: ignore -EFAULT and proceed. It is an application's bug if we can't fill infop/stat_addr (in case of VM_FAULT_OOM we have much more problems). 3. // wait_task_zombie() continues if (p->real_parent != p->parent) { // Not taken, it was untraced'ed ... } release_task(p); we released the task which we shouldn't. Solution: check ->real_parent != ->parent before, under tasklist_lock, but use ptrace_unlink() instead of __ptrace_unlink() to check ->ptrace. This patch hopefully solves 2 and 3, the 1st bug will be fixed later, we need some cleanups in forget_original_parent/reparent_thread. However, the first race is very unlikely and not critical, so I hope it makes sense to fix 1 and 2 for now. 4. Small cleanup: don't "restore" EXIT_ZOMBIE unless we know we are not going to realease the child. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:26:58 +08:00
if (state == EXIT_TRACE) {
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
wait_task_zombie: fix 2/3 races vs forget_original_parent() Two threads, T1 and T2. T2 ptraces P, and P is not a child of ptracer's thread group. P exits and goes to TASK_ZOMBIE. T1 does wait_task_zombie(P): P->exit_state = TASK_DEAD; ... read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); T2 does exit(), takes tasklist, forget_original_parent() does __ptrace_unlink(P) but doesn't call do_notify_parent(P) because p->exit_state == EXIT_DEAD. Now, P is not visible to our process: __ptrace_unlink() removed it from ->children. We should send notification to P->parent and release P if and only if SIGCHLD is ignored. And we have 3 bugs: 1. P->parent does do_wait() and gets -ECHILD (P is on ->parent->children, but its state is TASK_DEAD). 2. // wait_task_zombie() continues if (put_user(...)) { // TODO: is this safe? p->exit_state = EXIT_ZOMBIE; return; } we return without notification/release, task_struct leaked. Solution: ignore -EFAULT and proceed. It is an application's bug if we can't fill infop/stat_addr (in case of VM_FAULT_OOM we have much more problems). 3. // wait_task_zombie() continues if (p->real_parent != p->parent) { // Not taken, it was untraced'ed ... } release_task(p); we released the task which we shouldn't. Solution: check ->real_parent != ->parent before, under tasklist_lock, but use ptrace_unlink() instead of __ptrace_unlink() to check ->ptrace. This patch hopefully solves 2 and 3, the 1st bug will be fixed later, we need some cleanups in forget_original_parent/reparent_thread. However, the first race is very unlikely and not critical, so I hope it makes sense to fix 1 and 2 for now. 4. Small cleanup: don't "restore" EXIT_ZOMBIE unless we know we are not going to realease the child. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:26:58 +08:00
/* We dropped tasklist, ptracer could die and untrace */
ptrace_unlink(p);
/* If parent wants a zombie, don't release it now */
state = EXIT_ZOMBIE;
if (do_notify_parent(p, p->exit_signal))
state = EXIT_DEAD;
wait: introduce EXIT_TRACE to avoid the racy EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE transition wait_task_zombie() first does EXIT_ZOMBIE->EXIT_DEAD transition and drops tasklist_lock. If this task is not the natural child and it is traced, we change its state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE for ->real_parent. The last transition is racy, this is even documented in 50b8d257486a "ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race". wait_consider_task() tries to detect this transition and clear ->notask_error but we can't rely on ptrace_reparented(), debugger can exit and do ptrace_unlink() before its sub-thread sets EXIT_ZOMBIE. And there is another problem which were missed before: this transition can also race with reparent_leader() which doesn't reset >exit_signal if EXIT_DEAD, assuming that this task must be reaped by someone else. So the tracee can be re-parented with ->exit_signal != SIGCHLD, and if /sbin/init doesn't use __WALL it becomes unreapable. This was fixed by the previous commit, but it was the temporary hack. 1. Add the new exit_state, EXIT_TRACE. It means that the task is the traced zombie, debugger is going to detach and notify its natural parent. This new state is actually EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD. This way we can avoid the changes in proc/kgdb code, get_task_state() still reports "X (dead)" in this case. Note: with or without this change userspace can see Z -> X -> Z transition. Not really bad, but probably makes sense to fix. 2. Change wait_task_zombie() to use EXIT_TRACE instead of EXIT_DEAD if we need to notify the ->real_parent. 3. Revert the previous hack in reparent_leader(), now that EXIT_DEAD is always the final state we can safely ignore such a task. 4. Change wait_consider_task() to check EXIT_TRACE separately and kill the racy and no longer needed ptrace_reparented() case. If ptrace == T an EXIT_TRACE thread should be simply ignored, the owner of this state is going to ptrace_unlink() this task. We can pretend that it was already removed from ->ptraced list. Otherwise we should skip this thread too but clear ->notask_error, we must be the natural parent and debugger is going to untrace and notify us. IOW, this doesn't differ from "EXIT_ZOMBIE && p->ptrace" even if the task was already untraced. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Reported-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 06:38:42 +08:00
p->exit_state = state;
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
}
wait: introduce EXIT_TRACE to avoid the racy EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE transition wait_task_zombie() first does EXIT_ZOMBIE->EXIT_DEAD transition and drops tasklist_lock. If this task is not the natural child and it is traced, we change its state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE for ->real_parent. The last transition is racy, this is even documented in 50b8d257486a "ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race". wait_consider_task() tries to detect this transition and clear ->notask_error but we can't rely on ptrace_reparented(), debugger can exit and do ptrace_unlink() before its sub-thread sets EXIT_ZOMBIE. And there is another problem which were missed before: this transition can also race with reparent_leader() which doesn't reset >exit_signal if EXIT_DEAD, assuming that this task must be reaped by someone else. So the tracee can be re-parented with ->exit_signal != SIGCHLD, and if /sbin/init doesn't use __WALL it becomes unreapable. This was fixed by the previous commit, but it was the temporary hack. 1. Add the new exit_state, EXIT_TRACE. It means that the task is the traced zombie, debugger is going to detach and notify its natural parent. This new state is actually EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD. This way we can avoid the changes in proc/kgdb code, get_task_state() still reports "X (dead)" in this case. Note: with or without this change userspace can see Z -> X -> Z transition. Not really bad, but probably makes sense to fix. 2. Change wait_task_zombie() to use EXIT_TRACE instead of EXIT_DEAD if we need to notify the ->real_parent. 3. Revert the previous hack in reparent_leader(), now that EXIT_DEAD is always the final state we can safely ignore such a task. 4. Change wait_consider_task() to check EXIT_TRACE separately and kill the racy and no longer needed ptrace_reparented() case. If ptrace == T an EXIT_TRACE thread should be simply ignored, the owner of this state is going to ptrace_unlink() this task. We can pretend that it was already removed from ->ptraced list. Otherwise we should skip this thread too but clear ->notask_error, we must be the natural parent and debugger is going to untrace and notify us. IOW, this doesn't differ from "EXIT_ZOMBIE && p->ptrace" even if the task was already untraced. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Reported-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 06:38:42 +08:00
if (state == EXIT_DEAD)
release_task(p);
wait_task_zombie: fix 2/3 races vs forget_original_parent() Two threads, T1 and T2. T2 ptraces P, and P is not a child of ptracer's thread group. P exits and goes to TASK_ZOMBIE. T1 does wait_task_zombie(P): P->exit_state = TASK_DEAD; ... read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); T2 does exit(), takes tasklist, forget_original_parent() does __ptrace_unlink(P) but doesn't call do_notify_parent(P) because p->exit_state == EXIT_DEAD. Now, P is not visible to our process: __ptrace_unlink() removed it from ->children. We should send notification to P->parent and release P if and only if SIGCHLD is ignored. And we have 3 bugs: 1. P->parent does do_wait() and gets -ECHILD (P is on ->parent->children, but its state is TASK_DEAD). 2. // wait_task_zombie() continues if (put_user(...)) { // TODO: is this safe? p->exit_state = EXIT_ZOMBIE; return; } we return without notification/release, task_struct leaked. Solution: ignore -EFAULT and proceed. It is an application's bug if we can't fill infop/stat_addr (in case of VM_FAULT_OOM we have much more problems). 3. // wait_task_zombie() continues if (p->real_parent != p->parent) { // Not taken, it was untraced'ed ... } release_task(p); we released the task which we shouldn't. Solution: check ->real_parent != ->parent before, under tasklist_lock, but use ptrace_unlink() instead of __ptrace_unlink() to check ->ptrace. This patch hopefully solves 2 and 3, the 1st bug will be fixed later, we need some cleanups in forget_original_parent/reparent_thread. However, the first race is very unlikely and not critical, so I hope it makes sense to fix 1 and 2 for now. 4. Small cleanup: don't "restore" EXIT_ZOMBIE unless we know we are not going to realease the child. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:26:58 +08:00
out_info:
infop = wo->wo_info;
if (infop) {
if ((status & 0x7f) == 0) {
infop->cause = CLD_EXITED;
infop->status = status >> 8;
} else {
infop->cause = (status & 0x80) ? CLD_DUMPED : CLD_KILLED;
infop->status = status & 0x7f;
}
infop->pid = pid;
infop->uid = uid;
}
return pid;
}
do_wait: fix waiting for the group stop with the dead leader do_wait(WSTOPPED) assumes that p->state must be == TASK_STOPPED, this is not true if the leader is already dead. Check SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED instead and use signal->group_exit_code. Trivial test-case: void *tfunc(void *arg) { pause(); return NULL; } int main(void) { pthread_t thr; pthread_create(&thr, NULL, tfunc, NULL); pthread_exit(NULL); return 0; } It doesn't react to ^Z (and then to ^C or ^\). The task is stopped, but bash can't see this. The bug is very old, and it was reported multiple times. This patch was sent more than a year ago (http://marc.info/?t=119713920000003) but it was ignored. This change also fixes other oddities (but not all) in this area. For example, before this patch: $ sleep 100 ^Z [1]+ Stopped sleep 100 $ strace -p `pidof sleep` Process 11442 attached - interrupt to quit strace hangs in do_wait(), because ->exit_code was already consumed by bash. After this patch, strace happily proceeds: --- SIGTSTP (Stopped) @ 0 (0) --- restart_syscall(<... resuming interrupted call ...> To me, this looks much more "natural" and correct. Another example. Let's suppose we have the main thread M and sub-thread T, the process is stopped, and its parent did wait(WSTOPPED). Now we can ptrace T but not M. This looks at least strange to me. Imho, do_wait() should not confuse the per-thread ptrace stops with the per-process job control stops. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: Kaz Kylheku <kkylheku@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:58 +08:00
static int *task_stopped_code(struct task_struct *p, bool ptrace)
{
if (ptrace) {
if (task_is_traced(p) && !(p->jobctl & JOBCTL_LISTENING))
do_wait: fix waiting for the group stop with the dead leader do_wait(WSTOPPED) assumes that p->state must be == TASK_STOPPED, this is not true if the leader is already dead. Check SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED instead and use signal->group_exit_code. Trivial test-case: void *tfunc(void *arg) { pause(); return NULL; } int main(void) { pthread_t thr; pthread_create(&thr, NULL, tfunc, NULL); pthread_exit(NULL); return 0; } It doesn't react to ^Z (and then to ^C or ^\). The task is stopped, but bash can't see this. The bug is very old, and it was reported multiple times. This patch was sent more than a year ago (http://marc.info/?t=119713920000003) but it was ignored. This change also fixes other oddities (but not all) in this area. For example, before this patch: $ sleep 100 ^Z [1]+ Stopped sleep 100 $ strace -p `pidof sleep` Process 11442 attached - interrupt to quit strace hangs in do_wait(), because ->exit_code was already consumed by bash. After this patch, strace happily proceeds: --- SIGTSTP (Stopped) @ 0 (0) --- restart_syscall(<... resuming interrupted call ...> To me, this looks much more "natural" and correct. Another example. Let's suppose we have the main thread M and sub-thread T, the process is stopped, and its parent did wait(WSTOPPED). Now we can ptrace T but not M. This looks at least strange to me. Imho, do_wait() should not confuse the per-thread ptrace stops with the per-process job control stops. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: Kaz Kylheku <kkylheku@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:58 +08:00
return &p->exit_code;
} else {
if (p->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED)
return &p->signal->group_exit_code;
}
return NULL;
}
/**
* wait_task_stopped - Wait for %TASK_STOPPED or %TASK_TRACED
* @wo: wait options
* @ptrace: is the wait for ptrace
* @p: task to wait for
*
* Handle sys_wait4() work for %p in state %TASK_STOPPED or %TASK_TRACED.
*
* CONTEXT:
* read_lock(&tasklist_lock), which is released if return value is
* non-zero. Also, grabs and releases @p->sighand->siglock.
*
* RETURNS:
* 0 if wait condition didn't exist and search for other wait conditions
* should continue. Non-zero return, -errno on failure and @p's pid on
* success, implies that tasklist_lock is released and wait condition
* search should terminate.
*/
static int wait_task_stopped(struct wait_opts *wo,
int ptrace, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct waitid_info *infop;
int exit_code, *p_code, why;
uid_t uid = 0; /* unneeded, required by compiler */
pid_t pid;
/*
* Traditionally we see ptrace'd stopped tasks regardless of options.
*/
if (!ptrace && !(wo->wo_flags & WUNTRACED))
return 0;
if (!task_stopped_code(p, ptrace))
return 0;
exit_code = 0;
spin_lock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
do_wait: fix waiting for the group stop with the dead leader do_wait(WSTOPPED) assumes that p->state must be == TASK_STOPPED, this is not true if the leader is already dead. Check SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED instead and use signal->group_exit_code. Trivial test-case: void *tfunc(void *arg) { pause(); return NULL; } int main(void) { pthread_t thr; pthread_create(&thr, NULL, tfunc, NULL); pthread_exit(NULL); return 0; } It doesn't react to ^Z (and then to ^C or ^\). The task is stopped, but bash can't see this. The bug is very old, and it was reported multiple times. This patch was sent more than a year ago (http://marc.info/?t=119713920000003) but it was ignored. This change also fixes other oddities (but not all) in this area. For example, before this patch: $ sleep 100 ^Z [1]+ Stopped sleep 100 $ strace -p `pidof sleep` Process 11442 attached - interrupt to quit strace hangs in do_wait(), because ->exit_code was already consumed by bash. After this patch, strace happily proceeds: --- SIGTSTP (Stopped) @ 0 (0) --- restart_syscall(<... resuming interrupted call ...> To me, this looks much more "natural" and correct. Another example. Let's suppose we have the main thread M and sub-thread T, the process is stopped, and its parent did wait(WSTOPPED). Now we can ptrace T but not M. This looks at least strange to me. Imho, do_wait() should not confuse the per-thread ptrace stops with the per-process job control stops. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: Kaz Kylheku <kkylheku@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:58 +08:00
p_code = task_stopped_code(p, ptrace);
if (unlikely(!p_code))
goto unlock_sig;
do_wait: fix waiting for the group stop with the dead leader do_wait(WSTOPPED) assumes that p->state must be == TASK_STOPPED, this is not true if the leader is already dead. Check SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED instead and use signal->group_exit_code. Trivial test-case: void *tfunc(void *arg) { pause(); return NULL; } int main(void) { pthread_t thr; pthread_create(&thr, NULL, tfunc, NULL); pthread_exit(NULL); return 0; } It doesn't react to ^Z (and then to ^C or ^\). The task is stopped, but bash can't see this. The bug is very old, and it was reported multiple times. This patch was sent more than a year ago (http://marc.info/?t=119713920000003) but it was ignored. This change also fixes other oddities (but not all) in this area. For example, before this patch: $ sleep 100 ^Z [1]+ Stopped sleep 100 $ strace -p `pidof sleep` Process 11442 attached - interrupt to quit strace hangs in do_wait(), because ->exit_code was already consumed by bash. After this patch, strace happily proceeds: --- SIGTSTP (Stopped) @ 0 (0) --- restart_syscall(<... resuming interrupted call ...> To me, this looks much more "natural" and correct. Another example. Let's suppose we have the main thread M and sub-thread T, the process is stopped, and its parent did wait(WSTOPPED). Now we can ptrace T but not M. This looks at least strange to me. Imho, do_wait() should not confuse the per-thread ptrace stops with the per-process job control stops. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: Kaz Kylheku <kkylheku@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:58 +08:00
exit_code = *p_code;
if (!exit_code)
goto unlock_sig;
if (!unlikely(wo->wo_flags & WNOWAIT))
do_wait: fix waiting for the group stop with the dead leader do_wait(WSTOPPED) assumes that p->state must be == TASK_STOPPED, this is not true if the leader is already dead. Check SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED instead and use signal->group_exit_code. Trivial test-case: void *tfunc(void *arg) { pause(); return NULL; } int main(void) { pthread_t thr; pthread_create(&thr, NULL, tfunc, NULL); pthread_exit(NULL); return 0; } It doesn't react to ^Z (and then to ^C or ^\). The task is stopped, but bash can't see this. The bug is very old, and it was reported multiple times. This patch was sent more than a year ago (http://marc.info/?t=119713920000003) but it was ignored. This change also fixes other oddities (but not all) in this area. For example, before this patch: $ sleep 100 ^Z [1]+ Stopped sleep 100 $ strace -p `pidof sleep` Process 11442 attached - interrupt to quit strace hangs in do_wait(), because ->exit_code was already consumed by bash. After this patch, strace happily proceeds: --- SIGTSTP (Stopped) @ 0 (0) --- restart_syscall(<... resuming interrupted call ...> To me, this looks much more "natural" and correct. Another example. Let's suppose we have the main thread M and sub-thread T, the process is stopped, and its parent did wait(WSTOPPED). Now we can ptrace T but not M. This looks at least strange to me. Imho, do_wait() should not confuse the per-thread ptrace stops with the per-process job control stops. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: Kaz Kylheku <kkylheku@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:58 +08:00
*p_code = 0;
uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), task_uid(p));
unlock_sig:
spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
if (!exit_code)
return 0;
/*
* Now we are pretty sure this task is interesting.
* Make sure it doesn't get reaped out from under us while we
* give up the lock and then examine it below. We don't want to
* keep holding onto the tasklist_lock while we call getrusage and
* possibly take page faults for user memory.
*/
get_task_struct(p);
pid = task_pid_vnr(p);
why = ptrace ? CLD_TRAPPED : CLD_STOPPED;
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
sched, exit: Deal with nested sleeps do_wait() is a big wait loop, but we set TASK_RUNNING too late; we end up calling potential sleeps before we reset it. Not strictly a bug since we're guaranteed to exit the loop and not call schedule(); put in annotations to quiet might_sleep(). WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at ../kernel/sched/core.c:7123 __might_sleep+0x7e/0x90() do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff8109a788>] do_wait+0x88/0x270 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81694991>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a [<ffffffff8109877c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8109886c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4c/0x50 [<ffffffff810bca6e>] __might_sleep+0x7e/0x90 [<ffffffff811a1c15>] might_fault+0x55/0xb0 [<ffffffff8109a3fb>] wait_consider_task+0x90b/0xc10 [<ffffffff8109a804>] do_wait+0x104/0x270 [<ffffffff8109b837>] SyS_wait4+0x77/0x100 [<ffffffff8169d692>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: tglx@linutronix.de Cc: umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com Cc: ilya.dryomov@inktank.com Cc: Alex Elder <alex.elder@linaro.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Axel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org> Cc: Ionut Alexa <ionut.m.alexa@gmail.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140924082242.186408915@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-09-24 16:18:49 +08:00
sched_annotate_sleep();
if (wo->wo_rusage)
getrusage(p, RUSAGE_BOTH, wo->wo_rusage);
put_task_struct(p);
if (likely(!(wo->wo_flags & WNOWAIT)))
wo->wo_stat = (exit_code << 8) | 0x7f;
infop = wo->wo_info;
if (infop) {
infop->cause = why;
infop->status = exit_code;
infop->pid = pid;
infop->uid = uid;
}
return pid;
}
/*
* Handle do_wait work for one task in a live, non-stopped state.
* read_lock(&tasklist_lock) on entry. If we return zero, we still hold
* the lock and this task is uninteresting. If we return nonzero, we have
* released the lock and the system call should return.
*/
static int wait_task_continued(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct waitid_info *infop;
pid_t pid;
uid_t uid;
if (!unlikely(wo->wo_flags & WCONTINUED))
return 0;
if (!(p->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED))
return 0;
spin_lock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
/* Re-check with the lock held. */
if (!(p->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED)) {
spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
return 0;
}
if (!unlikely(wo->wo_flags & WNOWAIT))
p->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED;
uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), task_uid(p));
spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
pid = task_pid_vnr(p);
get_task_struct(p);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
sched, exit: Deal with nested sleeps do_wait() is a big wait loop, but we set TASK_RUNNING too late; we end up calling potential sleeps before we reset it. Not strictly a bug since we're guaranteed to exit the loop and not call schedule(); put in annotations to quiet might_sleep(). WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at ../kernel/sched/core.c:7123 __might_sleep+0x7e/0x90() do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff8109a788>] do_wait+0x88/0x270 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81694991>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a [<ffffffff8109877c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8109886c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4c/0x50 [<ffffffff810bca6e>] __might_sleep+0x7e/0x90 [<ffffffff811a1c15>] might_fault+0x55/0xb0 [<ffffffff8109a3fb>] wait_consider_task+0x90b/0xc10 [<ffffffff8109a804>] do_wait+0x104/0x270 [<ffffffff8109b837>] SyS_wait4+0x77/0x100 [<ffffffff8169d692>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: tglx@linutronix.de Cc: umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com Cc: ilya.dryomov@inktank.com Cc: Alex Elder <alex.elder@linaro.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Axel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org> Cc: Ionut Alexa <ionut.m.alexa@gmail.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140924082242.186408915@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-09-24 16:18:49 +08:00
sched_annotate_sleep();
if (wo->wo_rusage)
getrusage(p, RUSAGE_BOTH, wo->wo_rusage);
put_task_struct(p);
infop = wo->wo_info;
if (!infop) {
wo->wo_stat = 0xffff;
} else {
infop->cause = CLD_CONTINUED;
infop->pid = pid;
infop->uid = uid;
infop->status = SIGCONT;
}
return pid;
}
/*
* Consider @p for a wait by @parent.
*
* -ECHILD should be in ->notask_error before the first call.
* Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock.
* Returns zero if the search for a child should continue;
* then ->notask_error is 0 if @p is an eligible child,
* or still -ECHILD.
*/
static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
struct task_struct *p)
{
/*
* We can race with wait_task_zombie() from another thread.
* Ensure that EXIT_ZOMBIE -> EXIT_DEAD/EXIT_TRACE transition
* can't confuse the checks below.
*/
locking/atomics: COCCINELLE/treewide: Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() patterns to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the coccinelle script shown below and apply its output. For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in churn. However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following coccinelle script: ---- // Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and // WRITE_ONCE() // $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch virtual patch @ depends on patch @ expression E1, E2; @@ - ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2 + WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2) @ depends on patch @ expression E; @@ - ACCESS_ONCE(E) + READ_ONCE(E) ---- Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: shuah@kernel.org Cc: snitzer@redhat.com Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com Cc: tj@kernel.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-24 05:07:29 +08:00
int exit_state = READ_ONCE(p->exit_state);
int ret;
if (unlikely(exit_state == EXIT_DEAD))
return 0;
wait/ptrace: assume __WALL if the child is traced The following program (simplified version of generated by syzkaller) #include <pthread.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <signal.h> void *thread_func(void *arg) { ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0); return 0; } int main(void) { pthread_t thread; if (fork()) return 0; while (getppid() != 1) ; pthread_create(&thread, NULL, thread_func, NULL); pthread_join(thread, NULL); return 0; } creates an unreapable zombie if /sbin/init doesn't use __WALL. This is not a kernel bug, at least in a sense that everything works as expected: debugger should reap a traced sub-thread before it can reap the leader, but without __WALL/__WCLONE do_wait() ignores sub-threads. Unfortunately, it seems that /sbin/init in most (all?) distributions doesn't use it and we have to change the kernel to avoid the problem. Note also that most init's use sys_waitid() which doesn't allow __WALL, so the necessary user-space fix is not that trivial. This patch just adds the "ptrace" check into eligible_child(). To some degree this matches the "tsk->ptrace" in exit_notify(), ->exit_signal is mostly ignored when the tracee reports to debugger. Or WSTOPPED, the tracer doesn't need to set this flag to wait for the stopped tracee. This obviously means the user-visible change: __WCLONE and __WALL no longer have any meaning for debugger. And I can only hope that this won't break something, but at least strace/gdb won't suffer. We could make a more conservative change. Say, we can take __WCLONE into account, or !thread_group_leader(). But it would be nice to not complicate these historical/confusing checks. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-24 07:23:50 +08:00
ret = eligible_child(wo, ptrace, p);
if (!ret)
return ret;
if (unlikely(exit_state == EXIT_TRACE)) {
ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race Test-case: int main(void) { int pid, status; pid = fork(); if (!pid) { for (;;) { if (!fork()) return 0; if (waitpid(-1, &status, 0) < 0) { printf("ERR!! wait: %m\n"); return 0; } } } assert(ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0,0) == 0); assert(waitpid(-1, NULL, 0) == pid); assert(ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK) == 0); do { ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0); pid = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); } while (pid > 0); return 1; } It fails because ->real_parent sees its child in EXIT_DEAD state while the tracer is going to change the state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE in wait_task_zombie(). The offending commit is 823b018e which moved the EXIT_DEAD check, but in fact we should not blame it. The original code was not correct as well because it didn't take ptrace_reparented() into account and because we can't really trust ->ptrace. This patch adds the additional check to close this particular race but it doesn't solve the whole problem. We simply can't rely on ->ptrace in this case, it can be cleared if the tracer is multithreaded by the exiting ->parent. I think we should kill EXIT_DEAD altogether, we should always remove the soon-to-be-reaped child from ->children or at least we should never do the DEAD->ZOMBIE transition. But this is too complex for 3.2. Reported-and-tested-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> Tested-by: Lukasz Michalik <lmi@ift.uni.wroc.pl> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [3.0+] Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-05 00:29:02 +08:00
/*
wait: introduce EXIT_TRACE to avoid the racy EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE transition wait_task_zombie() first does EXIT_ZOMBIE->EXIT_DEAD transition and drops tasklist_lock. If this task is not the natural child and it is traced, we change its state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE for ->real_parent. The last transition is racy, this is even documented in 50b8d257486a "ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race". wait_consider_task() tries to detect this transition and clear ->notask_error but we can't rely on ptrace_reparented(), debugger can exit and do ptrace_unlink() before its sub-thread sets EXIT_ZOMBIE. And there is another problem which were missed before: this transition can also race with reparent_leader() which doesn't reset >exit_signal if EXIT_DEAD, assuming that this task must be reaped by someone else. So the tracee can be re-parented with ->exit_signal != SIGCHLD, and if /sbin/init doesn't use __WALL it becomes unreapable. This was fixed by the previous commit, but it was the temporary hack. 1. Add the new exit_state, EXIT_TRACE. It means that the task is the traced zombie, debugger is going to detach and notify its natural parent. This new state is actually EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD. This way we can avoid the changes in proc/kgdb code, get_task_state() still reports "X (dead)" in this case. Note: with or without this change userspace can see Z -> X -> Z transition. Not really bad, but probably makes sense to fix. 2. Change wait_task_zombie() to use EXIT_TRACE instead of EXIT_DEAD if we need to notify the ->real_parent. 3. Revert the previous hack in reparent_leader(), now that EXIT_DEAD is always the final state we can safely ignore such a task. 4. Change wait_consider_task() to check EXIT_TRACE separately and kill the racy and no longer needed ptrace_reparented() case. If ptrace == T an EXIT_TRACE thread should be simply ignored, the owner of this state is going to ptrace_unlink() this task. We can pretend that it was already removed from ->ptraced list. Otherwise we should skip this thread too but clear ->notask_error, we must be the natural parent and debugger is going to untrace and notify us. IOW, this doesn't differ from "EXIT_ZOMBIE && p->ptrace" even if the task was already untraced. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Reported-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 06:38:42 +08:00
* ptrace == 0 means we are the natural parent. In this case
* we should clear notask_error, debugger will notify us.
ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race Test-case: int main(void) { int pid, status; pid = fork(); if (!pid) { for (;;) { if (!fork()) return 0; if (waitpid(-1, &status, 0) < 0) { printf("ERR!! wait: %m\n"); return 0; } } } assert(ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0,0) == 0); assert(waitpid(-1, NULL, 0) == pid); assert(ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK) == 0); do { ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0); pid = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); } while (pid > 0); return 1; } It fails because ->real_parent sees its child in EXIT_DEAD state while the tracer is going to change the state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE in wait_task_zombie(). The offending commit is 823b018e which moved the EXIT_DEAD check, but in fact we should not blame it. The original code was not correct as well because it didn't take ptrace_reparented() into account and because we can't really trust ->ptrace. This patch adds the additional check to close this particular race but it doesn't solve the whole problem. We simply can't rely on ->ptrace in this case, it can be cleared if the tracer is multithreaded by the exiting ->parent. I think we should kill EXIT_DEAD altogether, we should always remove the soon-to-be-reaped child from ->children or at least we should never do the DEAD->ZOMBIE transition. But this is too complex for 3.2. Reported-and-tested-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> Tested-by: Lukasz Michalik <lmi@ift.uni.wroc.pl> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [3.0+] Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-05 00:29:02 +08:00
*/
wait: introduce EXIT_TRACE to avoid the racy EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE transition wait_task_zombie() first does EXIT_ZOMBIE->EXIT_DEAD transition and drops tasklist_lock. If this task is not the natural child and it is traced, we change its state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE for ->real_parent. The last transition is racy, this is even documented in 50b8d257486a "ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race". wait_consider_task() tries to detect this transition and clear ->notask_error but we can't rely on ptrace_reparented(), debugger can exit and do ptrace_unlink() before its sub-thread sets EXIT_ZOMBIE. And there is another problem which were missed before: this transition can also race with reparent_leader() which doesn't reset >exit_signal if EXIT_DEAD, assuming that this task must be reaped by someone else. So the tracee can be re-parented with ->exit_signal != SIGCHLD, and if /sbin/init doesn't use __WALL it becomes unreapable. This was fixed by the previous commit, but it was the temporary hack. 1. Add the new exit_state, EXIT_TRACE. It means that the task is the traced zombie, debugger is going to detach and notify its natural parent. This new state is actually EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD. This way we can avoid the changes in proc/kgdb code, get_task_state() still reports "X (dead)" in this case. Note: with or without this change userspace can see Z -> X -> Z transition. Not really bad, but probably makes sense to fix. 2. Change wait_task_zombie() to use EXIT_TRACE instead of EXIT_DEAD if we need to notify the ->real_parent. 3. Revert the previous hack in reparent_leader(), now that EXIT_DEAD is always the final state we can safely ignore such a task. 4. Change wait_consider_task() to check EXIT_TRACE separately and kill the racy and no longer needed ptrace_reparented() case. If ptrace == T an EXIT_TRACE thread should be simply ignored, the owner of this state is going to ptrace_unlink() this task. We can pretend that it was already removed from ->ptraced list. Otherwise we should skip this thread too but clear ->notask_error, we must be the natural parent and debugger is going to untrace and notify us. IOW, this doesn't differ from "EXIT_ZOMBIE && p->ptrace" even if the task was already untraced. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Reported-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 06:38:42 +08:00
if (likely(!ptrace))
ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race Test-case: int main(void) { int pid, status; pid = fork(); if (!pid) { for (;;) { if (!fork()) return 0; if (waitpid(-1, &status, 0) < 0) { printf("ERR!! wait: %m\n"); return 0; } } } assert(ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0,0) == 0); assert(waitpid(-1, NULL, 0) == pid); assert(ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK) == 0); do { ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0); pid = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); } while (pid > 0); return 1; } It fails because ->real_parent sees its child in EXIT_DEAD state while the tracer is going to change the state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE in wait_task_zombie(). The offending commit is 823b018e which moved the EXIT_DEAD check, but in fact we should not blame it. The original code was not correct as well because it didn't take ptrace_reparented() into account and because we can't really trust ->ptrace. This patch adds the additional check to close this particular race but it doesn't solve the whole problem. We simply can't rely on ->ptrace in this case, it can be cleared if the tracer is multithreaded by the exiting ->parent. I think we should kill EXIT_DEAD altogether, we should always remove the soon-to-be-reaped child from ->children or at least we should never do the DEAD->ZOMBIE transition. But this is too complex for 3.2. Reported-and-tested-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> Tested-by: Lukasz Michalik <lmi@ift.uni.wroc.pl> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [3.0+] Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-05 00:29:02 +08:00
wo->notask_error = 0;
return 0;
ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race Test-case: int main(void) { int pid, status; pid = fork(); if (!pid) { for (;;) { if (!fork()) return 0; if (waitpid(-1, &status, 0) < 0) { printf("ERR!! wait: %m\n"); return 0; } } } assert(ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0,0) == 0); assert(waitpid(-1, NULL, 0) == pid); assert(ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK) == 0); do { ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0); pid = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); } while (pid > 0); return 1; } It fails because ->real_parent sees its child in EXIT_DEAD state while the tracer is going to change the state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE in wait_task_zombie(). The offending commit is 823b018e which moved the EXIT_DEAD check, but in fact we should not blame it. The original code was not correct as well because it didn't take ptrace_reparented() into account and because we can't really trust ->ptrace. This patch adds the additional check to close this particular race but it doesn't solve the whole problem. We simply can't rely on ->ptrace in this case, it can be cleared if the tracer is multithreaded by the exiting ->parent. I think we should kill EXIT_DEAD altogether, we should always remove the soon-to-be-reaped child from ->children or at least we should never do the DEAD->ZOMBIE transition. But this is too complex for 3.2. Reported-and-tested-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> Tested-by: Lukasz Michalik <lmi@ift.uni.wroc.pl> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [3.0+] Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-05 00:29:02 +08:00
}
wait: WSTOPPED|WCONTINUED hangs if a zombie child is traced by real_parent "A zombie is only visible to its ptracer" logic in wait_consider_task() is very wrong. Trivial test-case: #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <assert.h> int main(void) { int child = fork(); if (!child) { assert(ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0) == 0); return 0x23; } assert(waitid(P_ALL, child, NULL, WEXITED | WNOWAIT) == 0); assert(waitid(P_ALL, 0, NULL, WSTOPPED) == -1); return 0; } it hangs in waitpid(WSTOPPED) despite the fact it has a single zombie child. This is because wait_consider_task(ptrace => 0) sees p->ptrace and cleares ->notask_error assuming that the debugger should detach and notify us. Change wait_consider_task(ptrace => 0) to pretend that ptrace == T if the child is traced by us. This really simplifies the logic and allows us to do more fixes, see the next changes. This also hides the unwanted group stop state automatically, we can remove another ptrace_reparented() check. Unfortunately, this adds the following behavioural changes: 1. Before this patch wait(WEXITED | __WNOTHREAD) does not reap a natural child if it is traced by the caller's sub-thread. Hopefully nobody will ever notice this change, and I think that nobody should rely on this behaviour anyway. 2. SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED is no longer hidden from debugger if it is real parent. While this change comes as a side effect, I think it is good by itself. The group continued state can not be consumed by another process in this case, it doesn't depend on ptrace, it doesn't make sense to hide it from real parent. Perhaps we should add the thread_group_leader() check before wait_task_continued()? May be, but this shouldn't depend on ptrace_reparented(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 06:38:47 +08:00
if (likely(!ptrace) && unlikely(p->ptrace)) {
/*
* If it is traced by its real parent's group, just pretend
* the caller is ptrace_do_wait() and reap this child if it
* is zombie.
*
* This also hides group stop state from real parent; otherwise
* a single stop can be reported twice as group and ptrace stop.
* If a ptracer wants to distinguish these two events for its
* own children it should create a separate process which takes
* the role of real parent.
*/
if (!ptrace_reparented(p))
ptrace = 1;
}
job control: Allow access to job control events through ptracees Currently a real parent can't access job control stopped/continued events through a ptraced child. This utterly breaks job control when the children are ptraced. For example, if a program is run from an interactive shell and then strace(1) attaches to it, pressing ^Z would send SIGTSTP and strace(1) would notice it but the shell has no way to tell whether the child entered job control stop and thus can't tell when to take over the terminal - leading to awkward lone ^Z on the terminal. Because the job control and ptrace stopped states are independent, there is no reason to prevent real parents from accessing the stopped state regardless of ptrace. The continued state isn't separate but ptracers don't have any use for them as ptracees can never resume without explicit command from their ptracers, so as long as ptracers don't consume it, it should be fine. Although this is a behavior change, because the previous behavior is utterly broken when viewed from real parents and the change is only visible to real parents, I don't think it's necessary to make this behavior optional. One situation to be careful about is when a task from the real parent's group is ptracing. The parent group is the recipient of both ptrace and job control stop events and one stop can be reported as both job control and ptrace stops. As this can break the current ptrace users, suppress job control stopped events for these cases. If a real parent ptracer wants to know about both job control and ptrace stops, it can create a separate process to serve the role of real parent. Note that this only updates wait(2) side of things. The real parent can access the states via wait(2) but still is not properly notified (woken up and delivered signal). Test case polls wait(2) with WNOHANG to work around. Notification will be updated by future patches. Test case follows. #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <time.h> #include <errno.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <sys/wait.h> int main(void) { const struct timespec ts100ms = { .tv_nsec = 100000000 }; pid_t tracee, tracer; siginfo_t si; int i; tracee = fork(); if (tracee == 0) { while (1) { printf("tracee: SIGSTOP\n"); raise(SIGSTOP); nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); printf("tracee: SIGCONT\n"); raise(SIGCONT); nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); } } waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED | WNOHANG | WNOWAIT); tracer = fork(); if (tracer == 0) { nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tracee, NULL, NULL); for (i = 0; i < 11; i++) { si.si_pid = 0; waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED); if (si.si_pid && si.si_code == CLD_TRAPPED) ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL, (void *)(long)si.si_status); } printf("tracer: EXITING\n"); return 0; } while (1) { si.si_pid = 0; waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED | WCONTINUED | WEXITED | WNOHANG); if (si.si_pid) printf("mommy : WAIT status=%02d code=%02d\n", si.si_status, si.si_code); nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); } return 0; } Before the patch, while ptraced, the parent can't see any job control events. tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT tracee: SIGSTOP tracee: SIGCONT tracee: SIGSTOP tracee: SIGCONT tracee: SIGSTOP tracer: EXITING mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 ^C After the patch, tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT mommy : WAIT status=18 code=06 tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT mommy : WAIT status=18 code=06 tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT mommy : WAIT status=18 code=06 tracee: SIGSTOP tracer: EXITING mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 ^C -v2: Oleg pointed out that wait(2) should be suppressed for the real parent's group instead of only the real parent task itself. Updated accordingly. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2011-03-23 17:37:01 +08:00
/* slay zombie? */
if (exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE) {
job control: Fix ptracer wait(2) hang and explain notask_error clearing wait(2) and friends allow access to stopped/continued states through zombies, which is required as the states are process-wide and should be accessible whether the leader task is alive or undead. wait_consider_task() implements this by always clearing notask_error and going through wait_task_stopped/continued() for unreaped zombies. However, while ptraced, the stopped state is per-task and as such if the ptracee became a zombie, there's no further stopped event to listen to and wait(2) and friends should return -ECHILD on the tracee. Fix it by clearing notask_error only if WCONTINUED | WEXITED is set for ptraced zombies. While at it, document why clearing notask_error is safe for each case. Test case follows. #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <time.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <sys/wait.h> static void *nooper(void *arg) { pause(); return NULL; } int main(void) { const struct timespec ts1s = { .tv_sec = 1 }; pid_t tracee, tracer; siginfo_t si; tracee = fork(); if (tracee == 0) { pthread_t thr; pthread_create(&thr, NULL, nooper, NULL); nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL); printf("tracee exiting\n"); pthread_exit(NULL); /* let subthread run */ } tracer = fork(); if (tracer == 0) { ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tracee, NULL, NULL); while (1) { if (waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED) < 0) { perror("waitid"); break; } ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL, (void *)(long)si.si_status); } return 0; } waitid(P_PID, tracer, &si, WEXITED); kill(tracee, SIGKILL); return 0; } Before the patch, after the tracee becomes a zombie, the tracer's waitid(WSTOPPED) never returns and the program doesn't terminate. tracee exiting ^C After the patch, tracee exiting triggers waitid() to fail. tracee exiting waitid: No child processes -v2: Oleg pointed out that exited in addition to continued can happen for ptraced dead group leader. Clear notask_error for ptraced child on WEXITED too. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2011-03-23 17:37:01 +08:00
/* we don't reap group leaders with subthreads */
wait: WSTOPPED|WCONTINUED doesn't work if a zombie leader is traced by another process Even if the main thread is dead the process still can stop/continue. However, if the leader is ptraced wait_consider_task(ptrace => false) always skips wait_task_stopped/wait_task_continued, so WSTOPPED or WCONTINUED can never work for the natural parent in this case. Move the "A zombie ptracee is only visible to its ptracer" check into the "if (!delay_group_leader(p))" block. ->notask_error is cleared by the "fall through" code below. This depends on the previous change, wait_task_stopped/continued must be avoided if !delay_group_leader() and the tracer is ->real_parent. Otherwise WSTOPPED|WEXITED could wrongly report "stopped" when the child is already dead (single-threaded or not). If it is traced by another task then the "stopped" state is fine until the debugger detaches and reveals a zombie state. Stupid test-case: void *tfunc(void *arg) { sleep(1); // wait for zombie leader raise(SIGSTOP); exit(0x13); return NULL; } int run_child(void) { pthread_t thread; if (!fork()) { int tracee = getppid(); assert(ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tracee, 0,0) == 0); do ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, 0,0); while (wait(NULL) > 0); return 0; } sleep(1); // wait for PTRACE_ATTACH assert(pthread_create(&thread, NULL, tfunc, NULL) == 0); pthread_exit(NULL); } int main(void) { int child, stat; child = fork(); if (!child) return run_child(); assert(child == waitpid(-1, &stat, WSTOPPED)); assert(stat == 0x137f); kill(child, SIGCONT); assert(child == waitpid(-1, &stat, WCONTINUED)); assert(stat == 0xffff); assert(child == waitpid(-1, &stat, 0)); assert(stat == 0x1300); return 0; } Without this patch it hangs in waitpid(WSTOPPED), wait_task_stopped() is never called. Note: this doesn't fix all problems with a zombie delay_group_leader(), WCONTINUED | WEXITED check is not exactly right. debugger can't assume it will be notified if another thread reaps the whole thread group. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 06:38:49 +08:00
if (!delay_group_leader(p)) {
/*
* A zombie ptracee is only visible to its ptracer.
* Notification and reaping will be cascaded to the
* real parent when the ptracer detaches.
*/
if (unlikely(ptrace) || likely(!p->ptrace))
return wait_task_zombie(wo, p);
}
/*
job control: Fix ptracer wait(2) hang and explain notask_error clearing wait(2) and friends allow access to stopped/continued states through zombies, which is required as the states are process-wide and should be accessible whether the leader task is alive or undead. wait_consider_task() implements this by always clearing notask_error and going through wait_task_stopped/continued() for unreaped zombies. However, while ptraced, the stopped state is per-task and as such if the ptracee became a zombie, there's no further stopped event to listen to and wait(2) and friends should return -ECHILD on the tracee. Fix it by clearing notask_error only if WCONTINUED | WEXITED is set for ptraced zombies. While at it, document why clearing notask_error is safe for each case. Test case follows. #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <time.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <sys/wait.h> static void *nooper(void *arg) { pause(); return NULL; } int main(void) { const struct timespec ts1s = { .tv_sec = 1 }; pid_t tracee, tracer; siginfo_t si; tracee = fork(); if (tracee == 0) { pthread_t thr; pthread_create(&thr, NULL, nooper, NULL); nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL); printf("tracee exiting\n"); pthread_exit(NULL); /* let subthread run */ } tracer = fork(); if (tracer == 0) { ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tracee, NULL, NULL); while (1) { if (waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED) < 0) { perror("waitid"); break; } ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL, (void *)(long)si.si_status); } return 0; } waitid(P_PID, tracer, &si, WEXITED); kill(tracee, SIGKILL); return 0; } Before the patch, after the tracee becomes a zombie, the tracer's waitid(WSTOPPED) never returns and the program doesn't terminate. tracee exiting ^C After the patch, tracee exiting triggers waitid() to fail. tracee exiting waitid: No child processes -v2: Oleg pointed out that exited in addition to continued can happen for ptraced dead group leader. Clear notask_error for ptraced child on WEXITED too. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2011-03-23 17:37:01 +08:00
* Allow access to stopped/continued state via zombie by
* falling through. Clearing of notask_error is complex.
*
* When !@ptrace:
*
* If WEXITED is set, notask_error should naturally be
* cleared. If not, subset of WSTOPPED|WCONTINUED is set,
* so, if there are live subthreads, there are events to
* wait for. If all subthreads are dead, it's still safe
* to clear - this function will be called again in finite
* amount time once all the subthreads are released and
* will then return without clearing.
*
* When @ptrace:
*
* Stopped state is per-task and thus can't change once the
* target task dies. Only continued and exited can happen.
* Clear notask_error if WCONTINUED | WEXITED.
*/
if (likely(!ptrace) || (wo->wo_flags & (WCONTINUED | WEXITED)))
wo->notask_error = 0;
} else {
/*
* @p is alive and it's gonna stop, continue or exit, so
* there always is something to wait for.
*/
wo->notask_error = 0;
}
/*
job control: Allow access to job control events through ptracees Currently a real parent can't access job control stopped/continued events through a ptraced child. This utterly breaks job control when the children are ptraced. For example, if a program is run from an interactive shell and then strace(1) attaches to it, pressing ^Z would send SIGTSTP and strace(1) would notice it but the shell has no way to tell whether the child entered job control stop and thus can't tell when to take over the terminal - leading to awkward lone ^Z on the terminal. Because the job control and ptrace stopped states are independent, there is no reason to prevent real parents from accessing the stopped state regardless of ptrace. The continued state isn't separate but ptracers don't have any use for them as ptracees can never resume without explicit command from their ptracers, so as long as ptracers don't consume it, it should be fine. Although this is a behavior change, because the previous behavior is utterly broken when viewed from real parents and the change is only visible to real parents, I don't think it's necessary to make this behavior optional. One situation to be careful about is when a task from the real parent's group is ptracing. The parent group is the recipient of both ptrace and job control stop events and one stop can be reported as both job control and ptrace stops. As this can break the current ptrace users, suppress job control stopped events for these cases. If a real parent ptracer wants to know about both job control and ptrace stops, it can create a separate process to serve the role of real parent. Note that this only updates wait(2) side of things. The real parent can access the states via wait(2) but still is not properly notified (woken up and delivered signal). Test case polls wait(2) with WNOHANG to work around. Notification will be updated by future patches. Test case follows. #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <time.h> #include <errno.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <sys/wait.h> int main(void) { const struct timespec ts100ms = { .tv_nsec = 100000000 }; pid_t tracee, tracer; siginfo_t si; int i; tracee = fork(); if (tracee == 0) { while (1) { printf("tracee: SIGSTOP\n"); raise(SIGSTOP); nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); printf("tracee: SIGCONT\n"); raise(SIGCONT); nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); } } waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED | WNOHANG | WNOWAIT); tracer = fork(); if (tracer == 0) { nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tracee, NULL, NULL); for (i = 0; i < 11; i++) { si.si_pid = 0; waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED); if (si.si_pid && si.si_code == CLD_TRAPPED) ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL, (void *)(long)si.si_status); } printf("tracer: EXITING\n"); return 0; } while (1) { si.si_pid = 0; waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED | WCONTINUED | WEXITED | WNOHANG); if (si.si_pid) printf("mommy : WAIT status=%02d code=%02d\n", si.si_status, si.si_code); nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); } return 0; } Before the patch, while ptraced, the parent can't see any job control events. tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT tracee: SIGSTOP tracee: SIGCONT tracee: SIGSTOP tracee: SIGCONT tracee: SIGSTOP tracer: EXITING mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 ^C After the patch, tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT mommy : WAIT status=18 code=06 tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT mommy : WAIT status=18 code=06 tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT mommy : WAIT status=18 code=06 tracee: SIGSTOP tracer: EXITING mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 ^C -v2: Oleg pointed out that wait(2) should be suppressed for the real parent's group instead of only the real parent task itself. Updated accordingly. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2011-03-23 17:37:01 +08:00
* Wait for stopped. Depending on @ptrace, different stopped state
* is used and the two don't interact with each other.
*/
ret = wait_task_stopped(wo, ptrace, p);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
job control: Allow access to job control events through ptracees Currently a real parent can't access job control stopped/continued events through a ptraced child. This utterly breaks job control when the children are ptraced. For example, if a program is run from an interactive shell and then strace(1) attaches to it, pressing ^Z would send SIGTSTP and strace(1) would notice it but the shell has no way to tell whether the child entered job control stop and thus can't tell when to take over the terminal - leading to awkward lone ^Z on the terminal. Because the job control and ptrace stopped states are independent, there is no reason to prevent real parents from accessing the stopped state regardless of ptrace. The continued state isn't separate but ptracers don't have any use for them as ptracees can never resume without explicit command from their ptracers, so as long as ptracers don't consume it, it should be fine. Although this is a behavior change, because the previous behavior is utterly broken when viewed from real parents and the change is only visible to real parents, I don't think it's necessary to make this behavior optional. One situation to be careful about is when a task from the real parent's group is ptracing. The parent group is the recipient of both ptrace and job control stop events and one stop can be reported as both job control and ptrace stops. As this can break the current ptrace users, suppress job control stopped events for these cases. If a real parent ptracer wants to know about both job control and ptrace stops, it can create a separate process to serve the role of real parent. Note that this only updates wait(2) side of things. The real parent can access the states via wait(2) but still is not properly notified (woken up and delivered signal). Test case polls wait(2) with WNOHANG to work around. Notification will be updated by future patches. Test case follows. #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <time.h> #include <errno.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <sys/wait.h> int main(void) { const struct timespec ts100ms = { .tv_nsec = 100000000 }; pid_t tracee, tracer; siginfo_t si; int i; tracee = fork(); if (tracee == 0) { while (1) { printf("tracee: SIGSTOP\n"); raise(SIGSTOP); nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); printf("tracee: SIGCONT\n"); raise(SIGCONT); nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); } } waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED | WNOHANG | WNOWAIT); tracer = fork(); if (tracer == 0) { nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tracee, NULL, NULL); for (i = 0; i < 11; i++) { si.si_pid = 0; waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED); if (si.si_pid && si.si_code == CLD_TRAPPED) ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL, (void *)(long)si.si_status); } printf("tracer: EXITING\n"); return 0; } while (1) { si.si_pid = 0; waitid(P_PID, tracee, &si, WSTOPPED | WCONTINUED | WEXITED | WNOHANG); if (si.si_pid) printf("mommy : WAIT status=%02d code=%02d\n", si.si_status, si.si_code); nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL); } return 0; } Before the patch, while ptraced, the parent can't see any job control events. tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT tracee: SIGSTOP tracee: SIGCONT tracee: SIGSTOP tracee: SIGCONT tracee: SIGSTOP tracer: EXITING mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 ^C After the patch, tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT mommy : WAIT status=18 code=06 tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT mommy : WAIT status=18 code=06 tracee: SIGSTOP mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 tracee: SIGCONT mommy : WAIT status=18 code=06 tracee: SIGSTOP tracer: EXITING mommy : WAIT status=19 code=05 ^C -v2: Oleg pointed out that wait(2) should be suppressed for the real parent's group instead of only the real parent task itself. Updated accordingly. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2011-03-23 17:37:01 +08:00
* Wait for continued. There's only one continued state and the
* ptracer can consume it which can confuse the real parent. Don't
* use WCONTINUED from ptracer. You don't need or want it.
*/
return wait_task_continued(wo, p);
}
/*
* Do the work of do_wait() for one thread in the group, @tsk.
*
* -ECHILD should be in ->notask_error before the first call.
* Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock.
* Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; then
* ->notask_error is 0 if there were any eligible children,
* or still -ECHILD.
*/
static int do_wait_thread(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct task_struct *p;
list_for_each_entry(p, &tsk->children, sibling) {
int ret = wait_consider_task(wo, 0, p);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
static int ptrace_do_wait(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct task_struct *p;
list_for_each_entry(p, &tsk->ptraced, ptrace_entry) {
int ret = wait_consider_task(wo, 1, p);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
static int child_wait_callback(wait_queue_entry_t *wait, unsigned mode,
int sync, void *key)
{
struct wait_opts *wo = container_of(wait, struct wait_opts,
child_wait);
struct task_struct *p = key;
if (!eligible_pid(wo, p))
return 0;
if ((wo->wo_flags & __WNOTHREAD) && wait->private != p->parent)
return 0;
return default_wake_function(wait, mode, sync, key);
}
void __wake_up_parent(struct task_struct *p, struct task_struct *parent)
{
__wake_up_sync_key(&parent->signal->wait_chldexit,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, p);
}
do_wait: make PIDTYPE_PID case O(1) instead of O(n) Add a special-case when waiting on a pid (via waitpid, waitid, wait4, etc) to avoid doing an O(n) scan of children and tracees, and instead do an O(1) lookup. This improves performance when waiting on a pid from a thread group with many children and/or tracees. Time to fork and then call waitpid on the child, from a task that already has N children [1]: N | Before | After -----|---------|------ 1 | 74 us | 74 us 20 | 72 us | 75 us 100 | 83 us | 77 us 500 | 99 us | 74 us 1000 | 179 us | 75 us 5000 | 804 us | 79 us 8000 | 1268 us | 78 us [1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/3/12/1567 This can make a substantial performance improvement for applications with a thread that has many children or tracees and frequently needs to wait on them. Tools that use ptrace to intercept syscalls for a large number of processes are likely to fall into this category. In particular this patch was developed while building a ptrace-based second generation of the Shadow emulator [2], for which it allows us to avoid quadratic scaling (without having to use a workaround that introduces a ~40% performance penalty) [3]. Other examples of tools that fall into this category which this patch may help include User Mode Linux [4] and DetTrace [5]. [2]: https://shadow.github.io/ [3]: https://github.com/shadow/shadow/issues/1134#issuecomment-798992292 [4]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User-mode_Linux [5]: https://github.com/dettrace/dettrace Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210314231544.9379-1-jnewsome@torproject.org Signed-off-by: James Newsome <jnewsome@torproject.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-05-07 09:04:22 +08:00
static bool is_effectively_child(struct wait_opts *wo, bool ptrace,
struct task_struct *target)
{
struct task_struct *parent =
!ptrace ? target->real_parent : target->parent;
return current == parent || (!(wo->wo_flags & __WNOTHREAD) &&
same_thread_group(current, parent));
}
/*
* Optimization for waiting on PIDTYPE_PID. No need to iterate through child
* and tracee lists to find the target task.
*/
static int do_wait_pid(struct wait_opts *wo)
{
bool ptrace;
struct task_struct *target;
int retval;
ptrace = false;
target = pid_task(wo->wo_pid, PIDTYPE_TGID);
if (target && is_effectively_child(wo, ptrace, target)) {
retval = wait_consider_task(wo, ptrace, target);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
ptrace = true;
target = pid_task(wo->wo_pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (target && target->ptrace &&
is_effectively_child(wo, ptrace, target)) {
retval = wait_consider_task(wo, ptrace, target);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
return 0;
}
static long do_wait(struct wait_opts *wo)
{
int retval;
trace_sched_process_wait(wo->wo_pid);
init_waitqueue_func_entry(&wo->child_wait, child_wait_callback);
wo->child_wait.private = current;
add_wait_queue(&current->signal->wait_chldexit, &wo->child_wait);
repeat:
/*
* If there is nothing that can match our criteria, just get out.
* We will clear ->notask_error to zero if we see any child that
* might later match our criteria, even if we are not able to reap
* it yet.
*/
wo->notask_error = -ECHILD;
if ((wo->wo_type < PIDTYPE_MAX) &&
(!wo->wo_pid || !pid_has_task(wo->wo_pid, wo->wo_type)))
goto notask;
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
do_wait: make PIDTYPE_PID case O(1) instead of O(n) Add a special-case when waiting on a pid (via waitpid, waitid, wait4, etc) to avoid doing an O(n) scan of children and tracees, and instead do an O(1) lookup. This improves performance when waiting on a pid from a thread group with many children and/or tracees. Time to fork and then call waitpid on the child, from a task that already has N children [1]: N | Before | After -----|---------|------ 1 | 74 us | 74 us 20 | 72 us | 75 us 100 | 83 us | 77 us 500 | 99 us | 74 us 1000 | 179 us | 75 us 5000 | 804 us | 79 us 8000 | 1268 us | 78 us [1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/3/12/1567 This can make a substantial performance improvement for applications with a thread that has many children or tracees and frequently needs to wait on them. Tools that use ptrace to intercept syscalls for a large number of processes are likely to fall into this category. In particular this patch was developed while building a ptrace-based second generation of the Shadow emulator [2], for which it allows us to avoid quadratic scaling (without having to use a workaround that introduces a ~40% performance penalty) [3]. Other examples of tools that fall into this category which this patch may help include User Mode Linux [4] and DetTrace [5]. [2]: https://shadow.github.io/ [3]: https://github.com/shadow/shadow/issues/1134#issuecomment-798992292 [4]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User-mode_Linux [5]: https://github.com/dettrace/dettrace Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210314231544.9379-1-jnewsome@torproject.org Signed-off-by: James Newsome <jnewsome@torproject.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-05-07 09:04:22 +08:00
if (wo->wo_type == PIDTYPE_PID) {
retval = do_wait_pid(wo);
if (retval)
goto end;
do_wait: make PIDTYPE_PID case O(1) instead of O(n) Add a special-case when waiting on a pid (via waitpid, waitid, wait4, etc) to avoid doing an O(n) scan of children and tracees, and instead do an O(1) lookup. This improves performance when waiting on a pid from a thread group with many children and/or tracees. Time to fork and then call waitpid on the child, from a task that already has N children [1]: N | Before | After -----|---------|------ 1 | 74 us | 74 us 20 | 72 us | 75 us 100 | 83 us | 77 us 500 | 99 us | 74 us 1000 | 179 us | 75 us 5000 | 804 us | 79 us 8000 | 1268 us | 78 us [1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/3/12/1567 This can make a substantial performance improvement for applications with a thread that has many children or tracees and frequently needs to wait on them. Tools that use ptrace to intercept syscalls for a large number of processes are likely to fall into this category. In particular this patch was developed while building a ptrace-based second generation of the Shadow emulator [2], for which it allows us to avoid quadratic scaling (without having to use a workaround that introduces a ~40% performance penalty) [3]. Other examples of tools that fall into this category which this patch may help include User Mode Linux [4] and DetTrace [5]. [2]: https://shadow.github.io/ [3]: https://github.com/shadow/shadow/issues/1134#issuecomment-798992292 [4]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User-mode_Linux [5]: https://github.com/dettrace/dettrace Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210314231544.9379-1-jnewsome@torproject.org Signed-off-by: James Newsome <jnewsome@torproject.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-05-07 09:04:22 +08:00
} else {
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
do {
retval = do_wait_thread(wo, tsk);
if (retval)
goto end;
do_wait: make PIDTYPE_PID case O(1) instead of O(n) Add a special-case when waiting on a pid (via waitpid, waitid, wait4, etc) to avoid doing an O(n) scan of children and tracees, and instead do an O(1) lookup. This improves performance when waiting on a pid from a thread group with many children and/or tracees. Time to fork and then call waitpid on the child, from a task that already has N children [1]: N | Before | After -----|---------|------ 1 | 74 us | 74 us 20 | 72 us | 75 us 100 | 83 us | 77 us 500 | 99 us | 74 us 1000 | 179 us | 75 us 5000 | 804 us | 79 us 8000 | 1268 us | 78 us [1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/3/12/1567 This can make a substantial performance improvement for applications with a thread that has many children or tracees and frequently needs to wait on them. Tools that use ptrace to intercept syscalls for a large number of processes are likely to fall into this category. In particular this patch was developed while building a ptrace-based second generation of the Shadow emulator [2], for which it allows us to avoid quadratic scaling (without having to use a workaround that introduces a ~40% performance penalty) [3]. Other examples of tools that fall into this category which this patch may help include User Mode Linux [4] and DetTrace [5]. [2]: https://shadow.github.io/ [3]: https://github.com/shadow/shadow/issues/1134#issuecomment-798992292 [4]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User-mode_Linux [5]: https://github.com/dettrace/dettrace Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210314231544.9379-1-jnewsome@torproject.org Signed-off-by: James Newsome <jnewsome@torproject.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-05-07 09:04:22 +08:00
retval = ptrace_do_wait(wo, tsk);
if (retval)
goto end;
if (wo->wo_flags & __WNOTHREAD)
break;
} while_each_thread(current, tsk);
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
notask:
retval = wo->notask_error;
if (!retval && !(wo->wo_flags & WNOHANG)) {
retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (!signal_pending(current)) {
schedule();
goto repeat;
}
}
end:
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&current->signal->wait_chldexit, &wo->child_wait);
return retval;
}
static long kernel_waitid(int which, pid_t upid, struct waitid_info *infop,
int options, struct rusage *ru)
{
struct wait_opts wo;
struct pid *pid = NULL;
enum pid_type type;
long ret;
exit: support non-blocking pidfds Passing a non-blocking pidfd to waitid() currently has no effect, i.e. is not supported. There are users which would like to use waitid() on pidfds that are O_NONBLOCK and mix it with pidfds that are blocking and both pass them to waitid(). The expected behavior is to have waitid() return -EAGAIN for non-blocking pidfds and to block for blocking pidfds without needing to perform any additional checks for flags set on the pidfd before passing it to waitid(). Non-blocking pidfds will return EAGAIN from waitid() when no child process is ready yet. Returning -EAGAIN for non-blocking pidfds makes it easier for event loops that handle EAGAIN specially. It also makes the API more consistent and uniform. In essence, waitid() is treated like a read on a non-blocking pidfd or a recvmsg() on a non-blocking socket. With the addition of support for non-blocking pidfds we support the same functionality that sockets do. For sockets() recvmsg() supports MSG_DONTWAIT for pidfds waitid() supports WNOHANG. Both flags are per-call options. In contrast non-blocking pidfds and non-blocking sockets are a setting on an open file description affecting all threads in the calling process as well as other processes that hold file descriptors referring to the same open file description. Both behaviors, per call and per open file description, have genuine use-cases. The implementation should be straightforward: - If a non-blocking pidfd is passed and WNOHANG is not raised we simply raise the WNOHANG flag internally. When do_wait() returns indicating that there are eligible child processes but none have exited yet we set EAGAIN. If no child process exists we continue returning ECHILD. - If a non-blocking pidfd is passed and WNOHANG is raised waitid() will continue returning 0, i.e. it will not set EAGAIN. This ensure backwards compatibility with applications passing WNOHANG explicitly with pidfds. A concrete use-case that was brought on-list was Josh's async pidfd library. Ever since the introduction of pidfds and more advanced async io various programming languages such as Rust have grown support for async event libraries. These libraries are created to help build epoll-based event loops around file descriptors. A common pattern is to automatically make all file descriptors they manage to O_NONBLOCK. For such libraries the EAGAIN error code is treated specially. When a function is called that returns EAGAIN the function isn't called again until the event loop indicates the the file descriptor is ready. Supporting EAGAIN when waiting on pidfds makes such libraries just work with little effort. Suggested-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200811181236.GA18763@localhost/ Link: https://github.com/joshtriplett/async-pidfd Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902102130.147672-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-09-02 18:21:28 +08:00
unsigned int f_flags = 0;
if (options & ~(WNOHANG|WNOWAIT|WEXITED|WSTOPPED|WCONTINUED|
__WNOTHREAD|__WCLONE|__WALL))
return -EINVAL;
if (!(options & (WEXITED|WSTOPPED|WCONTINUED)))
return -EINVAL;
switch (which) {
case P_ALL:
type = PIDTYPE_MAX;
break;
case P_PID:
type = PIDTYPE_PID;
if (upid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
pidfd: add P_PIDFD to waitid() This adds the P_PIDFD type to waitid(). One of the last remaining bits for the pidfd api is to make it possible to wait on pidfds. With P_PIDFD added to waitid() the parts of userspace that want to use the pidfd api to exclusively manage processes can do so now. One of the things this will unblock in the future is the ability to make it possible to retrieve the exit status via waitid(P_PIDFD) for non-parent processes if handed a _suitable_ pidfd that has this feature set. This is similar to what you can do on FreeBSD with kqueue(). It might even end up being possible to wait on a process as a non-parent if an appropriate property is enabled on the pidfd. With P_PIDFD no scoping of the process identified by the pidfd is possible, i.e. it explicitly blocks things such as wait4(-1), wait4(0), waitid(P_ALL), waitid(P_PGID) etc. It only allows for semantics equivalent to wait4(pid), waitid(P_PID). Users that need scoping should rely on pid-based wait*() syscalls for now. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190727222229.6516-2-christian@brauner.io
2019-07-28 06:22:29 +08:00
pid = find_get_pid(upid);
break;
case P_PGID:
type = PIDTYPE_PGID;
waitid: Add support for waiting for the current process group It was recently discovered that the linux version of waitid is not a superset of the other wait functions because it does not include support for waiting for the current process group. This has two downsides: 1. An extra system call is needed to get the current process group. 2. After the current process group is received and before it is passed to waitid a signal could arrive causing the current process group to change. Inherent race-conditions as these make it impossible for userspace to emulate this functionaly and thus violate async-signal safety requirements for waitpid. Arguments can be made for using a different choice of idtype and id for this case but the BSDs already use this P_PGID and 0 to indicate waiting for the current process's process group. So be nice to user space programmers and don't introduce an unnecessary incompatibility. Some people have noted that the posix description is that waitpid will wait for the current process group, and that in the presence of pthreads that process group can change. To get clarity on this issue I looked at XNU, FreeBSD, and Luminos. All of those flavors of unix waited for the current process group at the time of call and as written could not adapt to the process group changing after the call. At one point Linux did adapt to the current process group changing but that stopped in 161550d74c07 ("pid: sys_wait... fixes"). It has been over 11 years since Linux has that behavior, no programs that fail with the change in behavior have been reported, and I could not find any other unix that does this. So I think it is safe to clarify the definition of current process group, to current process group at the time of the wait function. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Alistair Francis <alistair23@gmail.com> Cc: Zong Li <zongbox@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: GNU C Library <libc-alpha@sourceware.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190814154400.6371-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2019-07-23 20:44:46 +08:00
if (upid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
pidfd: add P_PIDFD to waitid() This adds the P_PIDFD type to waitid(). One of the last remaining bits for the pidfd api is to make it possible to wait on pidfds. With P_PIDFD added to waitid() the parts of userspace that want to use the pidfd api to exclusively manage processes can do so now. One of the things this will unblock in the future is the ability to make it possible to retrieve the exit status via waitid(P_PIDFD) for non-parent processes if handed a _suitable_ pidfd that has this feature set. This is similar to what you can do on FreeBSD with kqueue(). It might even end up being possible to wait on a process as a non-parent if an appropriate property is enabled on the pidfd. With P_PIDFD no scoping of the process identified by the pidfd is possible, i.e. it explicitly blocks things such as wait4(-1), wait4(0), waitid(P_ALL), waitid(P_PGID) etc. It only allows for semantics equivalent to wait4(pid), waitid(P_PID). Users that need scoping should rely on pid-based wait*() syscalls for now. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190727222229.6516-2-christian@brauner.io
2019-07-28 06:22:29 +08:00
waitid: Add support for waiting for the current process group It was recently discovered that the linux version of waitid is not a superset of the other wait functions because it does not include support for waiting for the current process group. This has two downsides: 1. An extra system call is needed to get the current process group. 2. After the current process group is received and before it is passed to waitid a signal could arrive causing the current process group to change. Inherent race-conditions as these make it impossible for userspace to emulate this functionaly and thus violate async-signal safety requirements for waitpid. Arguments can be made for using a different choice of idtype and id for this case but the BSDs already use this P_PGID and 0 to indicate waiting for the current process's process group. So be nice to user space programmers and don't introduce an unnecessary incompatibility. Some people have noted that the posix description is that waitpid will wait for the current process group, and that in the presence of pthreads that process group can change. To get clarity on this issue I looked at XNU, FreeBSD, and Luminos. All of those flavors of unix waited for the current process group at the time of call and as written could not adapt to the process group changing after the call. At one point Linux did adapt to the current process group changing but that stopped in 161550d74c07 ("pid: sys_wait... fixes"). It has been over 11 years since Linux has that behavior, no programs that fail with the change in behavior have been reported, and I could not find any other unix that does this. So I think it is safe to clarify the definition of current process group, to current process group at the time of the wait function. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Alistair Francis <alistair23@gmail.com> Cc: Zong Li <zongbox@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: GNU C Library <libc-alpha@sourceware.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190814154400.6371-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2019-07-23 20:44:46 +08:00
if (upid)
pid = find_get_pid(upid);
else
pid = get_task_pid(current, PIDTYPE_PGID);
pidfd: add P_PIDFD to waitid() This adds the P_PIDFD type to waitid(). One of the last remaining bits for the pidfd api is to make it possible to wait on pidfds. With P_PIDFD added to waitid() the parts of userspace that want to use the pidfd api to exclusively manage processes can do so now. One of the things this will unblock in the future is the ability to make it possible to retrieve the exit status via waitid(P_PIDFD) for non-parent processes if handed a _suitable_ pidfd that has this feature set. This is similar to what you can do on FreeBSD with kqueue(). It might even end up being possible to wait on a process as a non-parent if an appropriate property is enabled on the pidfd. With P_PIDFD no scoping of the process identified by the pidfd is possible, i.e. it explicitly blocks things such as wait4(-1), wait4(0), waitid(P_ALL), waitid(P_PGID) etc. It only allows for semantics equivalent to wait4(pid), waitid(P_PID). Users that need scoping should rely on pid-based wait*() syscalls for now. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190727222229.6516-2-christian@brauner.io
2019-07-28 06:22:29 +08:00
break;
case P_PIDFD:
type = PIDTYPE_PID;
if (upid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
pidfd: add P_PIDFD to waitid() This adds the P_PIDFD type to waitid(). One of the last remaining bits for the pidfd api is to make it possible to wait on pidfds. With P_PIDFD added to waitid() the parts of userspace that want to use the pidfd api to exclusively manage processes can do so now. One of the things this will unblock in the future is the ability to make it possible to retrieve the exit status via waitid(P_PIDFD) for non-parent processes if handed a _suitable_ pidfd that has this feature set. This is similar to what you can do on FreeBSD with kqueue(). It might even end up being possible to wait on a process as a non-parent if an appropriate property is enabled on the pidfd. With P_PIDFD no scoping of the process identified by the pidfd is possible, i.e. it explicitly blocks things such as wait4(-1), wait4(0), waitid(P_ALL), waitid(P_PGID) etc. It only allows for semantics equivalent to wait4(pid), waitid(P_PID). Users that need scoping should rely on pid-based wait*() syscalls for now. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190727222229.6516-2-christian@brauner.io
2019-07-28 06:22:29 +08:00
exit: support non-blocking pidfds Passing a non-blocking pidfd to waitid() currently has no effect, i.e. is not supported. There are users which would like to use waitid() on pidfds that are O_NONBLOCK and mix it with pidfds that are blocking and both pass them to waitid(). The expected behavior is to have waitid() return -EAGAIN for non-blocking pidfds and to block for blocking pidfds without needing to perform any additional checks for flags set on the pidfd before passing it to waitid(). Non-blocking pidfds will return EAGAIN from waitid() when no child process is ready yet. Returning -EAGAIN for non-blocking pidfds makes it easier for event loops that handle EAGAIN specially. It also makes the API more consistent and uniform. In essence, waitid() is treated like a read on a non-blocking pidfd or a recvmsg() on a non-blocking socket. With the addition of support for non-blocking pidfds we support the same functionality that sockets do. For sockets() recvmsg() supports MSG_DONTWAIT for pidfds waitid() supports WNOHANG. Both flags are per-call options. In contrast non-blocking pidfds and non-blocking sockets are a setting on an open file description affecting all threads in the calling process as well as other processes that hold file descriptors referring to the same open file description. Both behaviors, per call and per open file description, have genuine use-cases. The implementation should be straightforward: - If a non-blocking pidfd is passed and WNOHANG is not raised we simply raise the WNOHANG flag internally. When do_wait() returns indicating that there are eligible child processes but none have exited yet we set EAGAIN. If no child process exists we continue returning ECHILD. - If a non-blocking pidfd is passed and WNOHANG is raised waitid() will continue returning 0, i.e. it will not set EAGAIN. This ensure backwards compatibility with applications passing WNOHANG explicitly with pidfds. A concrete use-case that was brought on-list was Josh's async pidfd library. Ever since the introduction of pidfds and more advanced async io various programming languages such as Rust have grown support for async event libraries. These libraries are created to help build epoll-based event loops around file descriptors. A common pattern is to automatically make all file descriptors they manage to O_NONBLOCK. For such libraries the EAGAIN error code is treated specially. When a function is called that returns EAGAIN the function isn't called again until the event loop indicates the the file descriptor is ready. Supporting EAGAIN when waiting on pidfds makes such libraries just work with little effort. Suggested-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200811181236.GA18763@localhost/ Link: https://github.com/joshtriplett/async-pidfd Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902102130.147672-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-09-02 18:21:28 +08:00
pid = pidfd_get_pid(upid, &f_flags);
pidfd: add P_PIDFD to waitid() This adds the P_PIDFD type to waitid(). One of the last remaining bits for the pidfd api is to make it possible to wait on pidfds. With P_PIDFD added to waitid() the parts of userspace that want to use the pidfd api to exclusively manage processes can do so now. One of the things this will unblock in the future is the ability to make it possible to retrieve the exit status via waitid(P_PIDFD) for non-parent processes if handed a _suitable_ pidfd that has this feature set. This is similar to what you can do on FreeBSD with kqueue(). It might even end up being possible to wait on a process as a non-parent if an appropriate property is enabled on the pidfd. With P_PIDFD no scoping of the process identified by the pidfd is possible, i.e. it explicitly blocks things such as wait4(-1), wait4(0), waitid(P_ALL), waitid(P_PGID) etc. It only allows for semantics equivalent to wait4(pid), waitid(P_PID). Users that need scoping should rely on pid-based wait*() syscalls for now. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190727222229.6516-2-christian@brauner.io
2019-07-28 06:22:29 +08:00
if (IS_ERR(pid))
return PTR_ERR(pid);
exit: support non-blocking pidfds Passing a non-blocking pidfd to waitid() currently has no effect, i.e. is not supported. There are users which would like to use waitid() on pidfds that are O_NONBLOCK and mix it with pidfds that are blocking and both pass them to waitid(). The expected behavior is to have waitid() return -EAGAIN for non-blocking pidfds and to block for blocking pidfds without needing to perform any additional checks for flags set on the pidfd before passing it to waitid(). Non-blocking pidfds will return EAGAIN from waitid() when no child process is ready yet. Returning -EAGAIN for non-blocking pidfds makes it easier for event loops that handle EAGAIN specially. It also makes the API more consistent and uniform. In essence, waitid() is treated like a read on a non-blocking pidfd or a recvmsg() on a non-blocking socket. With the addition of support for non-blocking pidfds we support the same functionality that sockets do. For sockets() recvmsg() supports MSG_DONTWAIT for pidfds waitid() supports WNOHANG. Both flags are per-call options. In contrast non-blocking pidfds and non-blocking sockets are a setting on an open file description affecting all threads in the calling process as well as other processes that hold file descriptors referring to the same open file description. Both behaviors, per call and per open file description, have genuine use-cases. The implementation should be straightforward: - If a non-blocking pidfd is passed and WNOHANG is not raised we simply raise the WNOHANG flag internally. When do_wait() returns indicating that there are eligible child processes but none have exited yet we set EAGAIN. If no child process exists we continue returning ECHILD. - If a non-blocking pidfd is passed and WNOHANG is raised waitid() will continue returning 0, i.e. it will not set EAGAIN. This ensure backwards compatibility with applications passing WNOHANG explicitly with pidfds. A concrete use-case that was brought on-list was Josh's async pidfd library. Ever since the introduction of pidfds and more advanced async io various programming languages such as Rust have grown support for async event libraries. These libraries are created to help build epoll-based event loops around file descriptors. A common pattern is to automatically make all file descriptors they manage to O_NONBLOCK. For such libraries the EAGAIN error code is treated specially. When a function is called that returns EAGAIN the function isn't called again until the event loop indicates the the file descriptor is ready. Supporting EAGAIN when waiting on pidfds makes such libraries just work with little effort. Suggested-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200811181236.GA18763@localhost/ Link: https://github.com/joshtriplett/async-pidfd Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902102130.147672-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-09-02 18:21:28 +08:00
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
wo.wo_type = type;
wo.wo_pid = pid;
wo.wo_flags = options;
wo.wo_info = infop;
wo.wo_rusage = ru;
exit: support non-blocking pidfds Passing a non-blocking pidfd to waitid() currently has no effect, i.e. is not supported. There are users which would like to use waitid() on pidfds that are O_NONBLOCK and mix it with pidfds that are blocking and both pass them to waitid(). The expected behavior is to have waitid() return -EAGAIN for non-blocking pidfds and to block for blocking pidfds without needing to perform any additional checks for flags set on the pidfd before passing it to waitid(). Non-blocking pidfds will return EAGAIN from waitid() when no child process is ready yet. Returning -EAGAIN for non-blocking pidfds makes it easier for event loops that handle EAGAIN specially. It also makes the API more consistent and uniform. In essence, waitid() is treated like a read on a non-blocking pidfd or a recvmsg() on a non-blocking socket. With the addition of support for non-blocking pidfds we support the same functionality that sockets do. For sockets() recvmsg() supports MSG_DONTWAIT for pidfds waitid() supports WNOHANG. Both flags are per-call options. In contrast non-blocking pidfds and non-blocking sockets are a setting on an open file description affecting all threads in the calling process as well as other processes that hold file descriptors referring to the same open file description. Both behaviors, per call and per open file description, have genuine use-cases. The implementation should be straightforward: - If a non-blocking pidfd is passed and WNOHANG is not raised we simply raise the WNOHANG flag internally. When do_wait() returns indicating that there are eligible child processes but none have exited yet we set EAGAIN. If no child process exists we continue returning ECHILD. - If a non-blocking pidfd is passed and WNOHANG is raised waitid() will continue returning 0, i.e. it will not set EAGAIN. This ensure backwards compatibility with applications passing WNOHANG explicitly with pidfds. A concrete use-case that was brought on-list was Josh's async pidfd library. Ever since the introduction of pidfds and more advanced async io various programming languages such as Rust have grown support for async event libraries. These libraries are created to help build epoll-based event loops around file descriptors. A common pattern is to automatically make all file descriptors they manage to O_NONBLOCK. For such libraries the EAGAIN error code is treated specially. When a function is called that returns EAGAIN the function isn't called again until the event loop indicates the the file descriptor is ready. Supporting EAGAIN when waiting on pidfds makes such libraries just work with little effort. Suggested-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200811181236.GA18763@localhost/ Link: https://github.com/joshtriplett/async-pidfd Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902102130.147672-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-09-02 18:21:28 +08:00
if (f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
wo.wo_flags |= WNOHANG;
ret = do_wait(&wo);
exit: support non-blocking pidfds Passing a non-blocking pidfd to waitid() currently has no effect, i.e. is not supported. There are users which would like to use waitid() on pidfds that are O_NONBLOCK and mix it with pidfds that are blocking and both pass them to waitid(). The expected behavior is to have waitid() return -EAGAIN for non-blocking pidfds and to block for blocking pidfds without needing to perform any additional checks for flags set on the pidfd before passing it to waitid(). Non-blocking pidfds will return EAGAIN from waitid() when no child process is ready yet. Returning -EAGAIN for non-blocking pidfds makes it easier for event loops that handle EAGAIN specially. It also makes the API more consistent and uniform. In essence, waitid() is treated like a read on a non-blocking pidfd or a recvmsg() on a non-blocking socket. With the addition of support for non-blocking pidfds we support the same functionality that sockets do. For sockets() recvmsg() supports MSG_DONTWAIT for pidfds waitid() supports WNOHANG. Both flags are per-call options. In contrast non-blocking pidfds and non-blocking sockets are a setting on an open file description affecting all threads in the calling process as well as other processes that hold file descriptors referring to the same open file description. Both behaviors, per call and per open file description, have genuine use-cases. The implementation should be straightforward: - If a non-blocking pidfd is passed and WNOHANG is not raised we simply raise the WNOHANG flag internally. When do_wait() returns indicating that there are eligible child processes but none have exited yet we set EAGAIN. If no child process exists we continue returning ECHILD. - If a non-blocking pidfd is passed and WNOHANG is raised waitid() will continue returning 0, i.e. it will not set EAGAIN. This ensure backwards compatibility with applications passing WNOHANG explicitly with pidfds. A concrete use-case that was brought on-list was Josh's async pidfd library. Ever since the introduction of pidfds and more advanced async io various programming languages such as Rust have grown support for async event libraries. These libraries are created to help build epoll-based event loops around file descriptors. A common pattern is to automatically make all file descriptors they manage to O_NONBLOCK. For such libraries the EAGAIN error code is treated specially. When a function is called that returns EAGAIN the function isn't called again until the event loop indicates the the file descriptor is ready. Supporting EAGAIN when waiting on pidfds makes such libraries just work with little effort. Suggested-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200811181236.GA18763@localhost/ Link: https://github.com/joshtriplett/async-pidfd Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902102130.147672-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-09-02 18:21:28 +08:00
if (!ret && !(options & WNOHANG) && (f_flags & O_NONBLOCK))
ret = -EAGAIN;
put_pid(pid);
return ret;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, int, which, pid_t, upid, struct siginfo __user *,
infop, int, options, struct rusage __user *, ru)
{
struct rusage r;
struct waitid_info info = {.status = 0};
long err = kernel_waitid(which, upid, &info, options, ru ? &r : NULL);
int signo = 0;
if (err > 0) {
signo = SIGCHLD;
err = 0;
if (ru && copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(struct rusage)))
return -EFAULT;
}
if (!infop)
return err;
if (!user_write_access_begin(infop, sizeof(*infop)))
return -EFAULT;
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic struct siginfo is a union and the kernel since 2.4 has been hiding a union tag in the high 16bits of si_code using the values: __SI_KILL __SI_TIMER __SI_POLL __SI_FAULT __SI_CHLD __SI_RT __SI_MESGQ __SI_SYS While this looks plausible on the surface, in practice this situation has not worked well. - Injected positive signals are not copied to user space properly unless they have these magic high bits set. - Injected positive signals are not reported properly by signalfd unless they have these magic high bits set. - These kernel internal values leaked to userspace via ptrace_peek_siginfo - It was possible to inject these kernel internal values and cause the the kernel to misbehave. - Kernel developers got confused and expected these kernel internal values in userspace in kernel self tests. - Kernel developers got confused and set si_code to __SI_FAULT which is SI_USER in userspace which causes userspace to think an ordinary user sent the signal and that it was not kernel generated. - The values make it impossible to reorganize the code to transform siginfo_copy_to_user into a plain copy_to_user. As si_code must be massaged before being passed to userspace. So remove these kernel internal si codes and make the kernel code simpler and more maintainable. To replace these kernel internal magic si_codes introduce the helper function siginfo_layout, that takes a signal number and an si_code and computes which union member of siginfo is being used. Have siginfo_layout return an enumeration so that gcc will have enough information to warn if a switch statement does not handle all of union members. A couple of architectures have a messed up ABI that defines signal specific duplications of SI_USER which causes more special cases in siginfo_layout than I would like. The good news is only problem architectures pay the cost. Update all of the code that used the previous magic __SI_ values to use the new SIL_ values and to call siginfo_layout to get those values. Escept where not all of the cases are handled remove the defaults in the switch statements so that if a new case is missed in the future the lack will show up at compile time. Modify the code that copies siginfo si_code to userspace to just copy the value and not cast si_code to a short first. The high bits are no longer used to hold a magic union member. Fixup the siginfo header files to stop including the __SI_ values in their constants and for the headers that were missing it to properly update the number of si_codes for each signal type. The fixes to copy_siginfo_from_user32 implementations has the interesting property that several of them perviously should never have worked as the __SI_ values they depended up where kernel internal. With that dependency gone those implementations should work much better. The idea of not passing the __SI_ values out to userspace and then not reinserting them has been tested with criu and criu worked without changes. Ref: 2.4.0-test1 Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-07-17 11:36:59 +08:00
unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.pid, &infop->si_pid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.uid, &infop->si_uid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.status, &infop->si_status, Efault);
user_write_access_end();
return err;
Efault:
user_write_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
}
long kernel_wait4(pid_t upid, int __user *stat_addr, int options,
struct rusage *ru)
{
struct wait_opts wo;
struct pid *pid = NULL;
enum pid_type type;
long ret;
if (options & ~(WNOHANG|WUNTRACED|WCONTINUED|
__WNOTHREAD|__WCLONE|__WALL))
return -EINVAL;
/* -INT_MIN is not defined */
if (upid == INT_MIN)
return -ESRCH;
if (upid == -1)
type = PIDTYPE_MAX;
else if (upid < 0) {
type = PIDTYPE_PGID;
pid = find_get_pid(-upid);
} else if (upid == 0) {
type = PIDTYPE_PGID;
pid = get_task_pid(current, PIDTYPE_PGID);
} else /* upid > 0 */ {
type = PIDTYPE_PID;
pid = find_get_pid(upid);
}
wo.wo_type = type;
wo.wo_pid = pid;
wo.wo_flags = options | WEXITED;
wo.wo_info = NULL;
wo.wo_stat = 0;
wo.wo_rusage = ru;
ret = do_wait(&wo);
put_pid(pid);
if (ret > 0 && stat_addr && put_user(wo.wo_stat, stat_addr))
ret = -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
int kernel_wait(pid_t pid, int *stat)
{
struct wait_opts wo = {
.wo_type = PIDTYPE_PID,
.wo_pid = find_get_pid(pid),
.wo_flags = WEXITED,
};
int ret;
ret = do_wait(&wo);
if (ret > 0 && wo.wo_stat)
*stat = wo.wo_stat;
put_pid(wo.wo_pid);
return ret;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(wait4, pid_t, upid, int __user *, stat_addr,
int, options, struct rusage __user *, ru)
{
struct rusage r;
long err = kernel_wait4(upid, stat_addr, options, ru ? &r : NULL);
if (err > 0) {
if (ru && copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(struct rusage)))
return -EFAULT;
}
return err;
}
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_WAITPID
/*
* sys_waitpid() remains for compatibility. waitpid() should be
* implemented by calling sys_wait4() from libc.a.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(waitpid, pid_t, pid, int __user *, stat_addr, int, options)
{
return kernel_wait4(pid, stat_addr, options, NULL);
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(wait4,
compat_pid_t, pid,
compat_uint_t __user *, stat_addr,
int, options,
struct compat_rusage __user *, ru)
{
struct rusage r;
long err = kernel_wait4(pid, stat_addr, options, ru ? &r : NULL);
if (err > 0) {
if (ru && put_compat_rusage(&r, ru))
return -EFAULT;
}
return err;
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid,
int, which, compat_pid_t, pid,
struct compat_siginfo __user *, infop, int, options,
struct compat_rusage __user *, uru)
{
struct rusage ru;
struct waitid_info info = {.status = 0};
long err = kernel_waitid(which, pid, &info, options, uru ? &ru : NULL);
int signo = 0;
if (err > 0) {
signo = SIGCHLD;
err = 0;
if (uru) {
/* kernel_waitid() overwrites everything in ru */
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
err = copy_to_user(uru, &ru, sizeof(ru));
else
err = put_compat_rusage(&ru, uru);
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
}
}
if (!infop)
return err;
if (!user_write_access_begin(infop, sizeof(*infop)))
return -EFAULT;
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic struct siginfo is a union and the kernel since 2.4 has been hiding a union tag in the high 16bits of si_code using the values: __SI_KILL __SI_TIMER __SI_POLL __SI_FAULT __SI_CHLD __SI_RT __SI_MESGQ __SI_SYS While this looks plausible on the surface, in practice this situation has not worked well. - Injected positive signals are not copied to user space properly unless they have these magic high bits set. - Injected positive signals are not reported properly by signalfd unless they have these magic high bits set. - These kernel internal values leaked to userspace via ptrace_peek_siginfo - It was possible to inject these kernel internal values and cause the the kernel to misbehave. - Kernel developers got confused and expected these kernel internal values in userspace in kernel self tests. - Kernel developers got confused and set si_code to __SI_FAULT which is SI_USER in userspace which causes userspace to think an ordinary user sent the signal and that it was not kernel generated. - The values make it impossible to reorganize the code to transform siginfo_copy_to_user into a plain copy_to_user. As si_code must be massaged before being passed to userspace. So remove these kernel internal si codes and make the kernel code simpler and more maintainable. To replace these kernel internal magic si_codes introduce the helper function siginfo_layout, that takes a signal number and an si_code and computes which union member of siginfo is being used. Have siginfo_layout return an enumeration so that gcc will have enough information to warn if a switch statement does not handle all of union members. A couple of architectures have a messed up ABI that defines signal specific duplications of SI_USER which causes more special cases in siginfo_layout than I would like. The good news is only problem architectures pay the cost. Update all of the code that used the previous magic __SI_ values to use the new SIL_ values and to call siginfo_layout to get those values. Escept where not all of the cases are handled remove the defaults in the switch statements so that if a new case is missed in the future the lack will show up at compile time. Modify the code that copies siginfo si_code to userspace to just copy the value and not cast si_code to a short first. The high bits are no longer used to hold a magic union member. Fixup the siginfo header files to stop including the __SI_ values in their constants and for the headers that were missing it to properly update the number of si_codes for each signal type. The fixes to copy_siginfo_from_user32 implementations has the interesting property that several of them perviously should never have worked as the __SI_ values they depended up where kernel internal. With that dependency gone those implementations should work much better. The idea of not passing the __SI_ values out to userspace and then not reinserting them has been tested with criu and criu worked without changes. Ref: 2.4.0-test1 Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-07-17 11:36:59 +08:00
unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.pid, &infop->si_pid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.uid, &infop->si_uid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.status, &infop->si_status, Efault);
user_write_access_end();
return err;
Efault:
user_write_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
}
#endif
/**
* thread_group_exited - check that a thread group has exited
* @pid: tgid of thread group to be checked.
*
* Test if the thread group represented by tgid has exited (all
* threads are zombies, dead or completely gone).
*
* Return: true if the thread group has exited. false otherwise.
*/
bool thread_group_exited(struct pid *pid)
{
struct task_struct *task;
bool exited;
rcu_read_lock();
task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
exited = !task ||
(READ_ONCE(task->exit_state) && thread_group_empty(task));
rcu_read_unlock();
return exited;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(thread_group_exited);
__weak void abort(void)
{
BUG();
/* if that doesn't kill us, halt */
panic("Oops failed to kill thread");
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort);