OpenCloudOS-Kernel/fs/binfmt_elf.c

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/*
* linux/fs/binfmt_elf.c
*
* These are the functions used to load ELF format executables as used
* on SVr4 machines. Information on the format may be found in the book
* "UNIX SYSTEM V RELEASE 4 Programmers Guide: Ansi C and Programming Support
* Tools".
*
* Copyright 1993, 1994: Eric Youngdale (ericy@cais.com).
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/elfcore.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/highuid.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR This fixes the "offset2lib" weakness in ASLR for arm, arm64, mips, powerpc, and x86. The problem is that if there is a leak of ASLR from the executable (ET_DYN), it means a leak of shared library offset as well (mmap), and vice versa. Further details and a PoC of this attack is available here: http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html With this patch, a PIE linked executable (ET_DYN) has its own ASLR region: $ ./show_mmaps_pie 54859ccd6000-54859ccd7000 r-xp ... /tmp/show_mmaps_pie 54859ced6000-54859ced7000 r--p ... /tmp/show_mmaps_pie 54859ced7000-54859ced8000 rw-p ... /tmp/show_mmaps_pie 7f75be764000-7f75be91f000 r-xp ... /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 7f75be91f000-7f75beb1f000 ---p ... /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 7f75beb1f000-7f75beb23000 r--p ... /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 7f75beb23000-7f75beb25000 rw-p ... /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 7f75beb25000-7f75beb2a000 rw-p ... 7f75beb2a000-7f75beb4d000 r-xp ... /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 7f75bed45000-7f75bed46000 rw-p ... 7f75bed46000-7f75bed47000 r-xp ... 7f75bed47000-7f75bed4c000 rw-p ... 7f75bed4c000-7f75bed4d000 r--p ... /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 7f75bed4d000-7f75bed4e000 rw-p ... /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 7f75bed4e000-7f75bed4f000 rw-p ... 7fffb3741000-7fffb3762000 rw-p ... [stack] 7fffb377b000-7fffb377d000 r--p ... [vvar] 7fffb377d000-7fffb377f000 r-xp ... [vdso] The change is to add a call the newly created arch_mmap_rnd() into the ELF loader for handling ET_DYN ASLR in a separate region from mmap ASLR, as was already done on s390. Removes CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, which is no longer needed. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:48:07 +08:00
#include <linux/elf-randomize.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/coredump.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/sched/cputime.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/dax.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/param.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#ifndef user_long_t
#define user_long_t long
#endif
#ifndef user_siginfo_t
#define user_siginfo_t siginfo_t
#endif
/* That's for binfmt_elf_fdpic to deal with */
#ifndef elf_check_fdpic
#define elf_check_fdpic(ex) false
#endif
static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
#ifdef CONFIG_USELIB
static int load_elf_library(struct file *);
#else
#define load_elf_library NULL
#endif
/*
* If we don't support core dumping, then supply a NULL so we
* don't even try.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_ELF_CORE
static int elf_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm);
#else
#define elf_core_dump NULL
#endif
#if ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE > PAGE_SIZE
#define ELF_MIN_ALIGN ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE
#else
#define ELF_MIN_ALIGN PAGE_SIZE
#endif
#ifndef ELF_CORE_EFLAGS
#define ELF_CORE_EFLAGS 0
#endif
#define ELF_PAGESTART(_v) ((_v) & ~(unsigned long)(ELF_MIN_ALIGN-1))
#define ELF_PAGEOFFSET(_v) ((_v) & (ELF_MIN_ALIGN-1))
#define ELF_PAGEALIGN(_v) (((_v) + ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1) & ~(ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1))
static struct linux_binfmt elf_format = {
.module = THIS_MODULE,
.load_binary = load_elf_binary,
.load_shlib = load_elf_library,
.core_dump = elf_core_dump,
.min_coredump = ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE,
};
#define BAD_ADDR(x) ((unsigned long)(x) >= TASK_SIZE)
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int prot)
{
start = ELF_PAGEALIGN(start);
end = ELF_PAGEALIGN(end);
if (end > start) {
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
/*
* Map the last of the bss segment.
* If the header is requesting these pages to be
* executable, honour that (ppc32 needs this).
*/
int error = vm_brk_flags(start, end - start,
prot & PROT_EXEC ? VM_EXEC : 0);
if (error)
return error;
}
current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = end;
return 0;
}
/* We need to explicitly zero any fractional pages
after the data section (i.e. bss). This would
contain the junk from the file that should not
be in memory
*/
static int padzero(unsigned long elf_bss)
{
unsigned long nbyte;
nbyte = ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_bss);
if (nbyte) {
nbyte = ELF_MIN_ALIGN - nbyte;
if (clear_user((void __user *) elf_bss, nbyte))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
/* Let's use some macros to make this stack manipulation a little clearer */
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
#define STACK_ADD(sp, items) ((elf_addr_t __user *)(sp) + (items))
#define STACK_ROUND(sp, items) \
((15 + (unsigned long) ((sp) + (items))) &~ 15UL)
#define STACK_ALLOC(sp, len) ({ \
elf_addr_t __user *old_sp = (elf_addr_t __user *)sp; sp += len; \
old_sp; })
#else
#define STACK_ADD(sp, items) ((elf_addr_t __user *)(sp) - (items))
#define STACK_ROUND(sp, items) \
(((unsigned long) (sp - items)) &~ 15UL)
#define STACK_ALLOC(sp, len) ({ sp -= len ; sp; })
#endif
#ifndef ELF_BASE_PLATFORM
/*
* AT_BASE_PLATFORM indicates the "real" hardware/microarchitecture.
* If the arch defines ELF_BASE_PLATFORM (in asm/elf.h), the value
* will be copied to the user stack in the same manner as AT_PLATFORM.
*/
#define ELF_BASE_PLATFORM NULL
#endif
static int
create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct elfhdr *exec,
unsigned long load_addr, unsigned long interp_load_addr)
{
unsigned long p = bprm->p;
int argc = bprm->argc;
int envc = bprm->envc;
elf_addr_t __user *sp;
elf_addr_t __user *u_platform;
elf_addr_t __user *u_base_platform;
ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for glibc PRNG seeding While discussing[1] the need for glibc to have access to random bytes during program load, it seems that an earlier attempt to implement AT_RANDOM got stalled. This implements a random 16 byte string, available to every ELF program via a new auxv AT_RANDOM vector. [1] http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2008-10/msg00006.html Ulrich said: glibc needs right after startup a bit of random data for internal protections (stack canary etc). What is now in upstream glibc is that we always unconditionally open /dev/urandom, read some data, and use it. For every process startup. That's slow. ... The solution is to provide a limited amount of random data to the starting process in the aux vector. I suggested 16 bytes and this is what the patch implements. If we need only 16 bytes or less we use the data directly. If we need more we'll use the 16 bytes to see a PRNG. This avoids the costly /dev/urandom use and it allows the kernel to use the most adequate source of random data for this purpose. It might not be the same pool as that for /dev/urandom. Concerns were expressed about the depletion of the randomness pool. But this patch doesn't make the situation worse, it doesn't deplete entropy more than happens now. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-08 10:08:52 +08:00
elf_addr_t __user *u_rand_bytes;
const char *k_platform = ELF_PLATFORM;
const char *k_base_platform = ELF_BASE_PLATFORM;
ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for glibc PRNG seeding While discussing[1] the need for glibc to have access to random bytes during program load, it seems that an earlier attempt to implement AT_RANDOM got stalled. This implements a random 16 byte string, available to every ELF program via a new auxv AT_RANDOM vector. [1] http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2008-10/msg00006.html Ulrich said: glibc needs right after startup a bit of random data for internal protections (stack canary etc). What is now in upstream glibc is that we always unconditionally open /dev/urandom, read some data, and use it. For every process startup. That's slow. ... The solution is to provide a limited amount of random data to the starting process in the aux vector. I suggested 16 bytes and this is what the patch implements. If we need only 16 bytes or less we use the data directly. If we need more we'll use the 16 bytes to see a PRNG. This avoids the costly /dev/urandom use and it allows the kernel to use the most adequate source of random data for this purpose. It might not be the same pool as that for /dev/urandom. Concerns were expressed about the depletion of the randomness pool. But this patch doesn't make the situation worse, it doesn't deplete entropy more than happens now. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-08 10:08:52 +08:00
unsigned char k_rand_bytes[16];
int items;
elf_addr_t *elf_info;
int ei_index = 0;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
/*
* In some cases (e.g. Hyper-Threading), we want to avoid L1
* evictions by the processes running on the same package. One
* thing we can do is to shuffle the initial stack for them.
*/
p = arch_align_stack(p);
/*
* If this architecture has a platform capability string, copy it
* to userspace. In some cases (Sparc), this info is impossible
* for userspace to get any other way, in others (i386) it is
* merely difficult.
*/
u_platform = NULL;
if (k_platform) {
size_t len = strlen(k_platform) + 1;
u_platform = (elf_addr_t __user *)STACK_ALLOC(p, len);
if (__copy_to_user(u_platform, k_platform, len))
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* If this architecture has a "base" platform capability
* string, copy it to userspace.
*/
u_base_platform = NULL;
if (k_base_platform) {
size_t len = strlen(k_base_platform) + 1;
u_base_platform = (elf_addr_t __user *)STACK_ALLOC(p, len);
if (__copy_to_user(u_base_platform, k_base_platform, len))
return -EFAULT;
}
ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for glibc PRNG seeding While discussing[1] the need for glibc to have access to random bytes during program load, it seems that an earlier attempt to implement AT_RANDOM got stalled. This implements a random 16 byte string, available to every ELF program via a new auxv AT_RANDOM vector. [1] http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2008-10/msg00006.html Ulrich said: glibc needs right after startup a bit of random data for internal protections (stack canary etc). What is now in upstream glibc is that we always unconditionally open /dev/urandom, read some data, and use it. For every process startup. That's slow. ... The solution is to provide a limited amount of random data to the starting process in the aux vector. I suggested 16 bytes and this is what the patch implements. If we need only 16 bytes or less we use the data directly. If we need more we'll use the 16 bytes to see a PRNG. This avoids the costly /dev/urandom use and it allows the kernel to use the most adequate source of random data for this purpose. It might not be the same pool as that for /dev/urandom. Concerns were expressed about the depletion of the randomness pool. But this patch doesn't make the situation worse, it doesn't deplete entropy more than happens now. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-08 10:08:52 +08:00
/*
* Generate 16 random bytes for userspace PRNG seeding.
*/
get_random_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
u_rand_bytes = (elf_addr_t __user *)
STACK_ALLOC(p, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
if (__copy_to_user(u_rand_bytes, k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Create the ELF interpreter info */
elf_info = (elf_addr_t *)current->mm->saved_auxv;
/* update AT_VECTOR_SIZE_BASE if the number of NEW_AUX_ENT() changes */
#define NEW_AUX_ENT(id, val) \
do { \
elf_info[ei_index++] = id; \
elf_info[ei_index++] = val; \
} while (0)
#ifdef ARCH_DLINFO
/*
* ARCH_DLINFO must come first so PPC can do its special alignment of
* AUXV.
* update AT_VECTOR_SIZE_ARCH if the number of NEW_AUX_ENT() in
* ARCH_DLINFO changes
*/
ARCH_DLINFO;
#endif
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_HWCAP, ELF_HWCAP);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PAGESZ, ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_CLKTCK, CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PHDR, load_addr + exec->e_phoff);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PHENT, sizeof(struct elf_phdr));
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PHNUM, exec->e_phnum);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_BASE, interp_load_addr);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_FLAGS, 0);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_ENTRY, exec->e_entry);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_UID, from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid));
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid));
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid));
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid));
binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag The bprm_secureexec hook can be moved earlier. Right now, it is called during create_elf_tables(), via load_binary(), via search_binary_handler(), via exec_binprm(). Nearly all (see exception below) state used by bprm_secureexec is created during the bprm_set_creds hook, called from prepare_binprm(). For all LSMs (except commoncaps described next), only the first execution of bprm_set_creds takes any effect (they all check bprm->called_set_creds which prepare_binprm() sets after the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook). However, all these LSMs also only do anything with bprm_secureexec when they detected a secure state during their first run of bprm_set_creds. Therefore, it is functionally identical to move the detection into bprm_set_creds, since the results from secureexec here only need to be based on the first call to the LSM's bprm_set_creds hook. The single exception is that the commoncaps secureexec hook also examines euid/uid and egid/gid differences which are controlled by bprm_fill_uid(), via prepare_binprm(), which can be called multiple times (e.g. binfmt_script, binfmt_misc), and may clear the euid/egid for the final load (i.e. the script interpreter). However, while commoncaps specifically ignores bprm->cred_prepared, and runs its bprm_set_creds hook each time prepare_binprm() may get called, it needs to base the secureexec decision on the final call to bprm_set_creds. As a result, it will need special handling. To begin this refactoring, this adds the secureexec flag to the bprm struct, and calls the secureexec hook during setup_new_exec(). This is safe since all the cred work is finished (and past the point of no return). This explicit call will be removed in later patches once the hook has been removed. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-07-19 06:25:22 +08:00
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, bprm->secureexec);
ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for glibc PRNG seeding While discussing[1] the need for glibc to have access to random bytes during program load, it seems that an earlier attempt to implement AT_RANDOM got stalled. This implements a random 16 byte string, available to every ELF program via a new auxv AT_RANDOM vector. [1] http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2008-10/msg00006.html Ulrich said: glibc needs right after startup a bit of random data for internal protections (stack canary etc). What is now in upstream glibc is that we always unconditionally open /dev/urandom, read some data, and use it. For every process startup. That's slow. ... The solution is to provide a limited amount of random data to the starting process in the aux vector. I suggested 16 bytes and this is what the patch implements. If we need only 16 bytes or less we use the data directly. If we need more we'll use the 16 bytes to see a PRNG. This avoids the costly /dev/urandom use and it allows the kernel to use the most adequate source of random data for this purpose. It might not be the same pool as that for /dev/urandom. Concerns were expressed about the depletion of the randomness pool. But this patch doesn't make the situation worse, it doesn't deplete entropy more than happens now. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-08 10:08:52 +08:00
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_RANDOM, (elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_rand_bytes);
#ifdef ELF_HWCAP2
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_HWCAP2, ELF_HWCAP2);
#endif
execve filename: document and export via auxiliary vector The Linux kernel puts the filename argument of execve() into the new address space. Many developers are surprised to learn this. Those who know and could use it, object "But it's not documented." Those who want to use it dislike the expression (char *)(1+ strlen(env[-1+ n_env]) + env[-1+ n_env]) because it requires locating the last original environment variable, and assumes that the filename follows the characters. This patch documents the insertion of the filename, and makes it easier to find by adding a new tag AT_EXECFN in the ElfXX_auxv_t; see <elf.h>. In many cases readlink("/proc/self/exe",) gives the same answer. But if all the original pages get unmapped, then the kernel erases the symlink for /proc/self/exe. This can happen when a program decompressor does a good job of cleaning up after uncompressing directly to memory, so that the address space of the target program looks the same as if compression had never happened. One example is http://upx.sourceforge.net . One notable use of the underlying concept (what path containED the executable) is glibc expanding $ORIGIN in DT_RUNPATH. In practice for the near term, it may be a good idea for user-mode code to use both /proc/self/exe and AT_EXECFN as fall-back methods for each other. /proc/self/exe can fail due to unmapping, AT_EXECFN can fail because it won't be present on non-new systems. The auxvec or {AT_EXECFN}.d_val also can get overwritten, although in nearly all cases this would be the result of a bug. The runtime cost is one NEW_AUX_ENT using two words of stack space. The underlying value is maintained already as bprm->exec; setup_arg_pages() in fs/exec.c slides it for stack_shift, etc. Signed-off-by: John Reiser <jreiser@BitWagon.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-22 05:21:32 +08:00
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFN, bprm->exec);
if (k_platform) {
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PLATFORM,
(elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_platform);
}
if (k_base_platform) {
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_BASE_PLATFORM,
(elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_base_platform);
}
if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD) {
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFD, bprm->interp_data);
}
#undef NEW_AUX_ENT
/* AT_NULL is zero; clear the rest too */
memset(&elf_info[ei_index], 0,
sizeof current->mm->saved_auxv - ei_index * sizeof elf_info[0]);
/* And advance past the AT_NULL entry. */
ei_index += 2;
sp = STACK_ADD(p, ei_index);
items = (argc + 1) + (envc + 1) + 1;
bprm->p = STACK_ROUND(sp, items);
/* Point sp at the lowest address on the stack */
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
sp = (elf_addr_t __user *)bprm->p - items - ei_index;
bprm->exec = (unsigned long)sp; /* XXX: PARISC HACK */
#else
sp = (elf_addr_t __user *)bprm->p;
#endif
/*
* Grow the stack manually; some architectures have a limit on how
* far ahead a user-space access may be in order to grow the stack.
*/
vma = find_extend_vma(current->mm, bprm->p);
if (!vma)
return -EFAULT;
/* Now, let's put argc (and argv, envp if appropriate) on the stack */
if (__put_user(argc, sp++))
return -EFAULT;
/* Populate list of argv pointers back to argv strings. */
p = current->mm->arg_end = current->mm->arg_start;
while (argc-- > 0) {
size_t len;
if (__put_user((elf_addr_t)p, sp++))
return -EFAULT;
len = strnlen_user((void __user *)p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN);
if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN)
return -EINVAL;
p += len;
}
if (__put_user(0, sp++))
return -EFAULT;
current->mm->arg_end = p;
/* Populate list of envp pointers back to envp strings. */
current->mm->env_end = current->mm->env_start = p;
while (envc-- > 0) {
size_t len;
if (__put_user((elf_addr_t)p, sp++))
return -EFAULT;
len = strnlen_user((void __user *)p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN);
if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN)
return -EINVAL;
p += len;
}
if (__put_user(0, sp++))
return -EFAULT;
current->mm->env_end = p;
/* Put the elf_info on the stack in the right place. */
if (copy_to_user(sp, elf_info, ei_index * sizeof(elf_addr_t)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
#ifndef elf_map
static unsigned long elf_map(struct file *filep, unsigned long addr,
const struct elf_phdr *eppnt, int prot, int type,
unsigned long total_size)
{
unsigned long map_addr;
unsigned long size = eppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr);
unsigned long off = eppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr);
addr = ELF_PAGESTART(addr);
size = ELF_PAGEALIGN(size);
/* mmap() will return -EINVAL if given a zero size, but a
* segment with zero filesize is perfectly valid */
if (!size)
return addr;
/*
* total_size is the size of the ELF (interpreter) image.
* The _first_ mmap needs to know the full size, otherwise
* randomization might put this image into an overlapping
* position with the ELF binary image. (since size < total_size)
* So we first map the 'big' image - and unmap the remainder at
* the end. (which unmap is needed for ELF images with holes.)
*/
if (total_size) {
total_size = ELF_PAGEALIGN(total_size);
map_addr = vm_mmap(filep, addr, total_size, prot, type, off);
if (!BAD_ADDR(map_addr))
vm_munmap(map_addr+size, total_size-size);
} else
map_addr = vm_mmap(filep, addr, size, prot, type, off);
if ((type & MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE) &&
PTR_ERR((void *)map_addr) == -EEXIST)
pr_info("%d (%s): Uhuuh, elf segment at %px requested but the memory is mapped already\n",
task_pid_nr(current), current->comm, (void *)addr);
fs, elf: drop MAP_FIXED usage from elf_map Both load_elf_interp and load_elf_binary rely on elf_map to map segments on a controlled address and they use MAP_FIXED to enforce that. This is however dangerous thing prone to silent data corruption which can be even exploitable. Let's take CVE-2017-1000253 as an example. At the time (before commit eab09532d400: "binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE") ELF_ET_DYN_BASE was at TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2 which is not that far away from the stack top on 32b (legacy) memory layout (only 1GB away). Therefore we could end up mapping over the existing stack with some luck. The issue has been fixed since then (a87938b2e246: "fs/binfmt_elf.c: fix bug in loading of PIE binaries"), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE moved moved much further from the stack (eab09532d400 and later by c715b72c1ba4: "mm: revert x86_64 and arm64 ELF_ET_DYN_BASE base changes") and excessive stack consumption early during execve fully stopped by da029c11e6b1 ("exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM"). So we should be safe and any attack should be impractical. On the other hand this is just too subtle assumption so it can break quite easily and hard to spot. I believe that the MAP_FIXED usage in load_elf_binary (et. al) is still fundamentally dangerous. Moreover it shouldn't be even needed. We are at the early process stage and so there shouldn't be unrelated mappings (except for stack and loader) existing so mmap for a given address should succeed even without MAP_FIXED. Something is terribly wrong if this is not the case and we should rather fail than silently corrupt the underlying mapping. Address this issue by changing MAP_FIXED to the newly added MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE. This will mean that mmap will fail if there is an existing mapping clashing with the requested one without clobbering it. [mhocko@suse.com: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [avagin@openvz.org: don't use the same value for MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE and MAP_SYNC] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171218184916.24445-1-avagin@openvz.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171213092550.2774-3-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:36:01 +08:00
return(map_addr);
}
#endif /* !elf_map */
static unsigned long total_mapping_size(const struct elf_phdr *cmds, int nr)
{
int i, first_idx = -1, last_idx = -1;
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) {
if (cmds[i].p_type == PT_LOAD) {
last_idx = i;
if (first_idx == -1)
first_idx = i;
}
}
if (first_idx == -1)
return 0;
return cmds[last_idx].p_vaddr + cmds[last_idx].p_memsz -
ELF_PAGESTART(cmds[first_idx].p_vaddr);
}
/**
* load_elf_phdrs() - load ELF program headers
* @elf_ex: ELF header of the binary whose program headers should be loaded
* @elf_file: the opened ELF binary file
*
* Loads ELF program headers from the binary file elf_file, which has the ELF
* header pointed to by elf_ex, into a newly allocated array. The caller is
* responsible for freeing the allocated data. Returns an ERR_PTR upon failure.
*/
static struct elf_phdr *load_elf_phdrs(const struct elfhdr *elf_ex,
struct file *elf_file)
{
struct elf_phdr *elf_phdata = NULL;
int retval, err = -1;
loff_t pos = elf_ex->e_phoff;
unsigned int size;
/*
* If the size of this structure has changed, then punt, since
* we will be doing the wrong thing.
*/
if (elf_ex->e_phentsize != sizeof(struct elf_phdr))
goto out;
/* Sanity check the number of program headers... */
/* ...and their total size. */
size = sizeof(struct elf_phdr) * elf_ex->e_phnum;
if (size == 0 || size > 65536 || size > ELF_MIN_ALIGN)
goto out;
elf_phdata = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elf_phdata)
goto out;
/* Read in the program headers */
retval = kernel_read(elf_file, elf_phdata, size, &pos);
if (retval != size) {
err = (retval < 0) ? retval : -EIO;
goto out;
}
/* Success! */
err = 0;
out:
if (err) {
kfree(elf_phdata);
elf_phdata = NULL;
}
return elf_phdata;
}
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
/**
* struct arch_elf_state - arch-specific ELF loading state
*
* This structure is used to preserve architecture specific data during
* the loading of an ELF file, throughout the checking of architecture
* specific ELF headers & through to the point where the ELF load is
* known to be proceeding (ie. SET_PERSONALITY).
*
* This implementation is a dummy for architectures which require no
* specific state.
*/
struct arch_elf_state {
};
#define INIT_ARCH_ELF_STATE {}
/**
* arch_elf_pt_proc() - check a PT_LOPROC..PT_HIPROC ELF program header
* @ehdr: The main ELF header
* @phdr: The program header to check
* @elf: The open ELF file
* @is_interp: True if the phdr is from the interpreter of the ELF being
* loaded, else false.
* @state: Architecture-specific state preserved throughout the process
* of loading the ELF.
*
* Inspects the program header phdr to validate its correctness and/or
* suitability for the system. Called once per ELF program header in the
* range PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC, for both the ELF being loaded and its
* interpreter.
*
* Return: Zero to proceed with the ELF load, non-zero to fail the ELF load
* with that return code.
*/
static inline int arch_elf_pt_proc(struct elfhdr *ehdr,
struct elf_phdr *phdr,
struct file *elf, bool is_interp,
struct arch_elf_state *state)
{
/* Dummy implementation, always proceed */
return 0;
}
/**
* arch_check_elf() - check an ELF executable
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
* @ehdr: The main ELF header
* @has_interp: True if the ELF has an interpreter, else false.
* @interp_ehdr: The interpreter's ELF header
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
* @state: Architecture-specific state preserved throughout the process
* of loading the ELF.
*
* Provides a final opportunity for architecture code to reject the loading
* of the ELF & cause an exec syscall to return an error. This is called after
* all program headers to be checked by arch_elf_pt_proc have been.
*
* Return: Zero to proceed with the ELF load, non-zero to fail the ELF load
* with that return code.
*/
static inline int arch_check_elf(struct elfhdr *ehdr, bool has_interp,
struct elfhdr *interp_ehdr,
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
struct arch_elf_state *state)
{
/* Dummy implementation, always proceed */
return 0;
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE */
static inline int make_prot(u32 p_flags)
{
int prot = 0;
if (p_flags & PF_R)
prot |= PROT_READ;
if (p_flags & PF_W)
prot |= PROT_WRITE;
if (p_flags & PF_X)
prot |= PROT_EXEC;
return prot;
}
/* This is much more generalized than the library routine read function,
so we keep this separate. Technically the library read function
is only provided so that we can read a.out libraries that have
an ELF header */
static unsigned long load_elf_interp(struct elfhdr *interp_elf_ex,
struct file *interpreter, unsigned long *interp_map_addr,
unsigned long no_base, struct elf_phdr *interp_elf_phdata)
{
struct elf_phdr *eppnt;
unsigned long load_addr = 0;
int load_addr_set = 0;
unsigned long last_bss = 0, elf_bss = 0;
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
int bss_prot = 0;
unsigned long error = ~0UL;
unsigned long total_size;
int i;
/* First of all, some simple consistency checks */
if (interp_elf_ex->e_type != ET_EXEC &&
interp_elf_ex->e_type != ET_DYN)
goto out;
if (!elf_check_arch(interp_elf_ex) ||
elf_check_fdpic(interp_elf_ex))
goto out;
if (!interpreter->f_op->mmap)
goto out;
total_size = total_mapping_size(interp_elf_phdata,
interp_elf_ex->e_phnum);
if (!total_size) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
eppnt = interp_elf_phdata;
for (i = 0; i < interp_elf_ex->e_phnum; i++, eppnt++) {
if (eppnt->p_type == PT_LOAD) {
int elf_type = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE;
int elf_prot = make_prot(eppnt->p_flags);
unsigned long vaddr = 0;
unsigned long k, map_addr;
vaddr = eppnt->p_vaddr;
if (interp_elf_ex->e_type == ET_EXEC || load_addr_set)
fs, elf: drop MAP_FIXED usage from elf_map Both load_elf_interp and load_elf_binary rely on elf_map to map segments on a controlled address and they use MAP_FIXED to enforce that. This is however dangerous thing prone to silent data corruption which can be even exploitable. Let's take CVE-2017-1000253 as an example. At the time (before commit eab09532d400: "binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE") ELF_ET_DYN_BASE was at TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2 which is not that far away from the stack top on 32b (legacy) memory layout (only 1GB away). Therefore we could end up mapping over the existing stack with some luck. The issue has been fixed since then (a87938b2e246: "fs/binfmt_elf.c: fix bug in loading of PIE binaries"), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE moved moved much further from the stack (eab09532d400 and later by c715b72c1ba4: "mm: revert x86_64 and arm64 ELF_ET_DYN_BASE base changes") and excessive stack consumption early during execve fully stopped by da029c11e6b1 ("exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM"). So we should be safe and any attack should be impractical. On the other hand this is just too subtle assumption so it can break quite easily and hard to spot. I believe that the MAP_FIXED usage in load_elf_binary (et. al) is still fundamentally dangerous. Moreover it shouldn't be even needed. We are at the early process stage and so there shouldn't be unrelated mappings (except for stack and loader) existing so mmap for a given address should succeed even without MAP_FIXED. Something is terribly wrong if this is not the case and we should rather fail than silently corrupt the underlying mapping. Address this issue by changing MAP_FIXED to the newly added MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE. This will mean that mmap will fail if there is an existing mapping clashing with the requested one without clobbering it. [mhocko@suse.com: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [avagin@openvz.org: don't use the same value for MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE and MAP_SYNC] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171218184916.24445-1-avagin@openvz.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171213092550.2774-3-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:36:01 +08:00
elf_type |= MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE;
else if (no_base && interp_elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN)
load_addr = -vaddr;
map_addr = elf_map(interpreter, load_addr + vaddr,
x86: PIE executable randomization, checkpatch fixes #39: FILE: arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c:229: +elf32_map (struct file *filep, unsigned long addr, struct elf_phdr *eppnt, int prot, int type, unsigned long unused) WARNING: no space between function name and open parenthesis '(' #39: FILE: arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c:229: +elf32_map (struct file *filep, unsigned long addr, struct elf_phdr *eppnt, int prot, int type, unsigned long unused) WARNING: line over 80 characters #67: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:80: + new_begin = randomize_range(*begin, *begin + 0x02000000, 0); ERROR: use tabs not spaces #110: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:185: + ^I mm->cached_hole_size = 0;$ ERROR: use tabs not spaces #111: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:186: + ^I^Imm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;$ ERROR: use tabs not spaces #112: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:187: + ^I}$ ERROR: use tabs not spaces #141: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:216: + ^I^I/* remember the largest hole we saw so far */$ ERROR: use tabs not spaces #142: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:217: + ^I^Iif (addr + mm->cached_hole_size < vma->vm_start)$ ERROR: use tabs not spaces #143: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:218: + ^I^I mm->cached_hole_size = vma->vm_start - addr;$ ERROR: use tabs not spaces #157: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:232: + ^Imm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;$ ERROR: need a space before the open parenthesis '(' #291: FILE: arch/x86/mm/mmap_64.c:101: + } else if(mmap_is_legacy()) { WARNING: braces {} are not necessary for single statement blocks #302: FILE: arch/x86/mm/mmap_64.c:112: + if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) { + mm->mmap_base += ((long)rnd) << PAGE_SHIFT; + } WARNING: line over 80 characters #314: FILE: fs/binfmt_elf.c:48: +static unsigned long elf_map (struct file *, unsigned long, struct elf_phdr *, int, int, unsigned long); WARNING: no space between function name and open parenthesis '(' #314: FILE: fs/binfmt_elf.c:48: +static unsigned long elf_map (struct file *, unsigned long, struct elf_phdr *, int, int, unsigned long); WARNING: line over 80 characters #429: FILE: fs/binfmt_elf.c:438: + eppnt, elf_prot, elf_type, total_size); ERROR: need space after that ',' (ctx:VxV) #480: FILE: fs/binfmt_elf.c:939: + elf_prot, elf_flags,0); ^ total: 9 errors, 7 warnings, 461 lines checked Your patch has style problems, please review. If any of these errors are false positives report them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS. Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 20:31:07 +08:00
eppnt, elf_prot, elf_type, total_size);
total_size = 0;
if (!*interp_map_addr)
*interp_map_addr = map_addr;
error = map_addr;
if (BAD_ADDR(map_addr))
goto out;
if (!load_addr_set &&
interp_elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN) {
load_addr = map_addr - ELF_PAGESTART(vaddr);
load_addr_set = 1;
}
/*
* Check to see if the section's size will overflow the
* allowed task size. Note that p_filesz must always be
* <= p_memsize so it's only necessary to check p_memsz.
*/
k = load_addr + eppnt->p_vaddr;
[PATCH] binfmt_elf: fix checks for bad address Fix check for bad address; use macro instead of open-coding two checks. Taken from RHEL4 kernel update. From: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com> For background, the BAD_ADDR() macro should return TRUE if the address is TASK_SIZE, because that's the lowest address that is *not* valid for user-space mappings. The macro was correct in binfmt_aout.c but was wrong for the "equal to" case in binfmt_elf.c. There were two in-line validations of user-space addresses in binfmt_elf.c, which have been appropriately converted to use the corrected BAD_ADDR() macro in the patch you posted yesterday. Note that the size checks against TASK_SIZE are okay as coded. The additional changes that I propose are below. These are in the error paths for bad ELF entry addresses once load_elf_binary() has already committed to exec'ing the new image (following the tearing down of the task's original address space). The 1st hunk deals with the interp-side of the outer "if". There were two problems here. The printk() should be removed because this path can be triggered at will by a bogus interpreter image created and used by a malicious user. Further, the error code should not be ENOEXEC, because that causes the loop in search_binary_handler() to continue trying other exec handlers (twice, in fact). But it's too late for this to work correctly, because the user address space has already been torn down, and an exec() failure cannot be returned to the user code because the code no longer exists. The only recovery is to force a SIGSEGV, but it's best to terminate the search loop immediately. I somewhat arbitrarily chose EINVAL as a fallback error code, but any error returned by load_elf_interp() will override that (but this value will never be seen by user-space). The 2nd hunk deals with the non-interp-side of the outer "if". There were two problems here as well. The SIGSEGV needs to be forced, because a prior sigaction() syscall might have set the associated disposition to SIG_IGN. And the ENOEXEC should be changed to EINVAL as described above. Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com> Signed-off-by: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 15:24:14 +08:00
if (BAD_ADDR(k) ||
eppnt->p_filesz > eppnt->p_memsz ||
eppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE ||
TASK_SIZE - eppnt->p_memsz < k) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/*
* Find the end of the file mapping for this phdr, and
* keep track of the largest address we see for this.
*/
k = load_addr + eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_filesz;
if (k > elf_bss)
elf_bss = k;
/*
* Do the same thing for the memory mapping - between
* elf_bss and last_bss is the bss section.
*/
binfmt_elf: fix calculations for bss padding A double-bug exists in the bss calculation code, where an overflow can happen in the "last_bss - elf_bss" calculation, but vm_brk internally aligns the argument, underflowing it, wrapping back around safe. We shouldn't depend on these bugs staying in sync, so this cleans up the bss padding handling to avoid the overflow. This moves the bss padzero() before the last_bss > elf_bss case, since the zero-filling of the ELF_PAGE should have nothing to do with the relationship of last_bss and elf_bss: any trailing portion should be zeroed, and a zero size is already handled by padzero(). Then it handles the math on elf_bss vs last_bss correctly. These need to both be ELF_PAGE aligned to get the comparison correct, since that's the expected granularity of the mappings. Since elf_bss already had alignment-based padding happen in padzero(), the "start" of the new vm_brk() should be moved forward as done in the original code. However, since the "end" of the vm_brk() area will already become PAGE_ALIGNed in vm_brk() then last_bss should get aligned here to avoid hiding it as a side-effect. Additionally makes a cosmetic change to the initial last_bss calculation so it's easier to read in comparison to the load_addr calculation above it (i.e. the only difference is p_filesz vs p_memsz). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468014494-25291-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-03 05:04:51 +08:00
k = load_addr + eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_memsz;
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
if (k > last_bss) {
last_bss = k;
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
bss_prot = elf_prot;
}
}
}
binfmt_elf: fix calculations for bss padding A double-bug exists in the bss calculation code, where an overflow can happen in the "last_bss - elf_bss" calculation, but vm_brk internally aligns the argument, underflowing it, wrapping back around safe. We shouldn't depend on these bugs staying in sync, so this cleans up the bss padding handling to avoid the overflow. This moves the bss padzero() before the last_bss > elf_bss case, since the zero-filling of the ELF_PAGE should have nothing to do with the relationship of last_bss and elf_bss: any trailing portion should be zeroed, and a zero size is already handled by padzero(). Then it handles the math on elf_bss vs last_bss correctly. These need to both be ELF_PAGE aligned to get the comparison correct, since that's the expected granularity of the mappings. Since elf_bss already had alignment-based padding happen in padzero(), the "start" of the new vm_brk() should be moved forward as done in the original code. However, since the "end" of the vm_brk() area will already become PAGE_ALIGNed in vm_brk() then last_bss should get aligned here to avoid hiding it as a side-effect. Additionally makes a cosmetic change to the initial last_bss calculation so it's easier to read in comparison to the load_addr calculation above it (i.e. the only difference is p_filesz vs p_memsz). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468014494-25291-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-03 05:04:51 +08:00
/*
* Now fill out the bss section: first pad the last page from
* the file up to the page boundary, and zero it from elf_bss
* up to the end of the page.
*/
if (padzero(elf_bss)) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/*
* Next, align both the file and mem bss up to the page size,
* since this is where elf_bss was just zeroed up to, and where
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
* last_bss will end after the vm_brk_flags() below.
binfmt_elf: fix calculations for bss padding A double-bug exists in the bss calculation code, where an overflow can happen in the "last_bss - elf_bss" calculation, but vm_brk internally aligns the argument, underflowing it, wrapping back around safe. We shouldn't depend on these bugs staying in sync, so this cleans up the bss padding handling to avoid the overflow. This moves the bss padzero() before the last_bss > elf_bss case, since the zero-filling of the ELF_PAGE should have nothing to do with the relationship of last_bss and elf_bss: any trailing portion should be zeroed, and a zero size is already handled by padzero(). Then it handles the math on elf_bss vs last_bss correctly. These need to both be ELF_PAGE aligned to get the comparison correct, since that's the expected granularity of the mappings. Since elf_bss already had alignment-based padding happen in padzero(), the "start" of the new vm_brk() should be moved forward as done in the original code. However, since the "end" of the vm_brk() area will already become PAGE_ALIGNed in vm_brk() then last_bss should get aligned here to avoid hiding it as a side-effect. Additionally makes a cosmetic change to the initial last_bss calculation so it's easier to read in comparison to the load_addr calculation above it (i.e. the only difference is p_filesz vs p_memsz). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468014494-25291-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-03 05:04:51 +08:00
*/
elf_bss = ELF_PAGEALIGN(elf_bss);
last_bss = ELF_PAGEALIGN(last_bss);
/* Finally, if there is still more bss to allocate, do it. */
if (last_bss > elf_bss) {
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
error = vm_brk_flags(elf_bss, last_bss - elf_bss,
bss_prot & PROT_EXEC ? VM_EXEC : 0);
if (error)
goto out;
}
error = load_addr;
out:
return error;
}
/*
* These are the functions used to load ELF style executables and shared
* libraries. There is no binary dependent code anywhere else.
*/
#ifndef STACK_RND_MASK
#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) /* 8MB of VA */
#endif
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow. The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c": static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top) { unsigned int random_variable = 0; if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) && !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) { random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK; random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; } return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable; return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable; } Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int". Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64): random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the "random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold the (22+12) result. These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack. Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy). This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and stack_maxrandom_size(). The successful fix can be tested with: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] ... Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather than always being 7fff. Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> [ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: CVE-2015-1593 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
2015-02-15 01:33:50 +08:00
unsigned long random_variable = 0;
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) {
random_variable = get_random_long();
x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow. The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c": static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top) { unsigned int random_variable = 0; if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) && !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) { random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK; random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; } return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable; return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable; } Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int". Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64): random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the "random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold the (22+12) result. These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack. Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy). This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and stack_maxrandom_size(). The successful fix can be tested with: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] ... Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather than always being 7fff. Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> [ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: CVE-2015-1593 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
2015-02-15 01:33:50 +08:00
random_variable &= STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
#else
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
#endif
}
static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct file *interpreter = NULL; /* to shut gcc up */
unsigned long load_addr = 0, load_bias = 0;
int load_addr_set = 0;
unsigned long error;
struct elf_phdr *elf_ppnt, *elf_phdata, *interp_elf_phdata = NULL;
unsigned long elf_bss, elf_brk;
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
int bss_prot = 0;
int retval, i;
unsigned long elf_entry;
unsigned long interp_load_addr = 0;
unsigned long start_code, end_code, start_data, end_data;
unsigned long reloc_func_desc __maybe_unused = 0;
int executable_stack = EXSTACK_DEFAULT;
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
struct {
struct elfhdr elf_ex;
struct elfhdr interp_elf_ex;
} *loc;
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
struct arch_elf_state arch_state = INIT_ARCH_ELF_STATE;
loc = kmalloc(sizeof(*loc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!loc) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out_ret;
}
/* Get the exec-header */
loc->elf_ex = *((struct elfhdr *)bprm->buf);
retval = -ENOEXEC;
/* First of all, some simple consistency checks */
if (memcmp(loc->elf_ex.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0)
goto out;
if (loc->elf_ex.e_type != ET_EXEC && loc->elf_ex.e_type != ET_DYN)
goto out;
if (!elf_check_arch(&loc->elf_ex))
goto out;
if (elf_check_fdpic(&loc->elf_ex))
goto out;
if (!bprm->file->f_op->mmap)
goto out;
elf_phdata = load_elf_phdrs(&loc->elf_ex, bprm->file);
if (!elf_phdata)
goto out;
elf_ppnt = elf_phdata;
for (i = 0; i < loc->elf_ex.e_phnum; i++, elf_ppnt++) {
char *elf_interpreter;
loff_t pos;
if (elf_ppnt->p_type != PT_INTERP)
continue;
/*
* This is the program interpreter used for shared libraries -
* for now assume that this is an a.out format binary.
*/
retval = -ENOEXEC;
if (elf_ppnt->p_filesz > PATH_MAX || elf_ppnt->p_filesz < 2)
goto out_free_ph;
retval = -ENOMEM;
elf_interpreter = kmalloc(elf_ppnt->p_filesz, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elf_interpreter)
goto out_free_ph;
pos = elf_ppnt->p_offset;
retval = kernel_read(bprm->file, elf_interpreter,
elf_ppnt->p_filesz, &pos);
if (retval != elf_ppnt->p_filesz) {
if (retval >= 0)
retval = -EIO;
goto out_free_interp;
}
/* make sure path is NULL terminated */
retval = -ENOEXEC;
if (elf_interpreter[elf_ppnt->p_filesz - 1] != '\0')
goto out_free_interp;
interpreter = open_exec(elf_interpreter);
kfree(elf_interpreter);
retval = PTR_ERR(interpreter);
if (IS_ERR(interpreter))
goto out_free_ph;
/*
* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable = 0
* regardless of the interpreter's permissions.
*/
would_dump(bprm, interpreter);
/* Get the exec headers */
pos = 0;
retval = kernel_read(interpreter, &loc->interp_elf_ex,
sizeof(loc->interp_elf_ex), &pos);
if (retval != sizeof(loc->interp_elf_ex)) {
if (retval >= 0)
retval = -EIO;
goto out_free_dentry;
}
break;
out_free_interp:
kfree(elf_interpreter);
goto out_free_ph;
}
elf_ppnt = elf_phdata;
for (i = 0; i < loc->elf_ex.e_phnum; i++, elf_ppnt++)
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
switch (elf_ppnt->p_type) {
case PT_GNU_STACK:
if (elf_ppnt->p_flags & PF_X)
executable_stack = EXSTACK_ENABLE_X;
else
executable_stack = EXSTACK_DISABLE_X;
break;
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
case PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC:
retval = arch_elf_pt_proc(&loc->elf_ex, elf_ppnt,
bprm->file, false,
&arch_state);
if (retval)
goto out_free_dentry;
break;
}
/* Some simple consistency checks for the interpreter */
if (interpreter) {
retval = -ELIBBAD;
/* Not an ELF interpreter */
if (memcmp(loc->interp_elf_ex.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0)
goto out_free_dentry;
/* Verify the interpreter has a valid arch */
if (!elf_check_arch(&loc->interp_elf_ex) ||
elf_check_fdpic(&loc->interp_elf_ex))
goto out_free_dentry;
/* Load the interpreter program headers */
interp_elf_phdata = load_elf_phdrs(&loc->interp_elf_ex,
interpreter);
if (!interp_elf_phdata)
goto out_free_dentry;
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
/* Pass PT_LOPROC..PT_HIPROC headers to arch code */
elf_ppnt = interp_elf_phdata;
for (i = 0; i < loc->interp_elf_ex.e_phnum; i++, elf_ppnt++)
switch (elf_ppnt->p_type) {
case PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC:
retval = arch_elf_pt_proc(&loc->interp_elf_ex,
elf_ppnt, interpreter,
true, &arch_state);
if (retval)
goto out_free_dentry;
break;
}
}
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
/*
* Allow arch code to reject the ELF at this point, whilst it's
* still possible to return an error to the code that invoked
* the exec syscall.
*/
retval = arch_check_elf(&loc->elf_ex,
!!interpreter, &loc->interp_elf_ex,
&arch_state);
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
if (retval)
goto out_free_dentry;
/* Flush all traces of the currently running executable */
retval = flush_old_exec(bprm);
if (retval)
goto out_free_dentry;
/* Do this immediately, since STACK_TOP as used in setup_arg_pages
may depend on the personality. */
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
SET_PERSONALITY2(loc->elf_ex, &arch_state);
if (elf_read_implies_exec(loc->elf_ex, executable_stack))
current->personality |= READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
current->flags |= PF_RANDOMIZE;
setup_new_exec(bprm);
install_exec_creds(bprm);
/* Do this so that we can load the interpreter, if need be. We will
change some of these later */
retval = setup_arg_pages(bprm, randomize_stack_top(STACK_TOP),
executable_stack);
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free_dentry;
elf_bss = 0;
elf_brk = 0;
start_code = ~0UL;
end_code = 0;
start_data = 0;
end_data = 0;
/* Now we do a little grungy work by mmapping the ELF image into
the correct location in memory. */
for(i = 0, elf_ppnt = elf_phdata;
i < loc->elf_ex.e_phnum; i++, elf_ppnt++) {
int elf_prot, elf_flags, elf_fixed = MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE;
unsigned long k, vaddr;
fs/binfmt_elf.c: fix bug in loading of PIE binaries With CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE enabled, and a normal top-down address allocation strategy, load_elf_binary() will attempt to map a PIE binary into an address range immediately below mm->mmap_base. Unfortunately, load_elf_ binary() does not take account of the need to allocate sufficient space for the entire binary which means that, while the first PT_LOAD segment is mapped below mm->mmap_base, the subsequent PT_LOAD segment(s) end up being mapped above mm->mmap_base into the are that is supposed to be the "gap" between the stack and the binary. Since the size of the "gap" on x86_64 is only guaranteed to be 128MB this means that binaries with large data segments > 128MB can end up mapping part of their data segment over their stack resulting in corruption of the stack (and the data segment once the binary starts to run). Any PIE binary with a data segment > 128MB is vulnerable to this although address randomization means that the actual gap between the stack and the end of the binary is normally greater than 128MB. The larger the data segment of the binary the higher the probability of failure. Fix this by calculating the total size of the binary in the same way as load_elf_interp(). Signed-off-by: Michael Davidson <md@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:38 +08:00
unsigned long total_size = 0;
if (elf_ppnt->p_type != PT_LOAD)
continue;
if (unlikely (elf_brk > elf_bss)) {
unsigned long nbyte;
/* There was a PT_LOAD segment with p_memsz > p_filesz
before this one. Map anonymous pages, if needed,
and clear the area. */
retval = set_brk(elf_bss + load_bias,
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
elf_brk + load_bias,
bss_prot);
if (retval)
goto out_free_dentry;
nbyte = ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_bss);
if (nbyte) {
nbyte = ELF_MIN_ALIGN - nbyte;
if (nbyte > elf_brk - elf_bss)
nbyte = elf_brk - elf_bss;
if (clear_user((void __user *)elf_bss +
load_bias, nbyte)) {
/*
* This bss-zeroing can fail if the ELF
* file specifies odd protections. So
* we don't check the return value
*/
}
}
elf: enforce MAP_FIXED on overlaying elf segments Anshuman has reported that with "fs, elf: drop MAP_FIXED usage from elf_map" applied, some ELF binaries in his environment fail to start with [ 23.423642] 9148 (sed): Uhuuh, elf segment at 0000000010030000 requested but the memory is mapped already [ 23.423706] requested [10030000, 10040000] mapped [10030000, 10040000] 100073 anon The reason is that the above binary has overlapping elf segments: LOAD 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000010000000 0x0000000010000000 0x0000000000013a8c 0x0000000000013a8c R E 10000 LOAD 0x000000000001fd40 0x000000001002fd40 0x000000001002fd40 0x00000000000002c0 0x00000000000005e8 RW 10000 LOAD 0x0000000000020328 0x0000000010030328 0x0000000010030328 0x0000000000000384 0x00000000000094a0 RW 10000 That binary has two RW LOAD segments, the first crosses a page border into the second 0x1002fd40 (LOAD2-vaddr) + 0x5e8 (LOAD2-memlen) == 0x10030328 (LOAD3-vaddr) Handle this situation by enforcing MAP_FIXED when we establish a temporary brk VMA to handle overlapping segments. All other mappings will still use MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180213100440.GM3443@dhcp22.suse.cz Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reported-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:36:05 +08:00
/*
* Some binaries have overlapping elf segments and then
* we have to forcefully map over an existing mapping
* e.g. over this newly established brk mapping.
*/
elf_fixed = MAP_FIXED;
}
elf_prot = make_prot(elf_ppnt->p_flags);
elf_flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE;
vaddr = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr;
binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders away from ET_EXEC binaries. (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the loader had been loaded.) With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking at ET_DYN. However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space is unused. For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are loaded above the mmap region. This means they can be made to collide (CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with pathological stack regions. Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e. if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load instead of falling back to the mmap region). To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP) are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by the loader. Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs. For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and suggestions on how to implement this solution. Fixes: d1fd836dcf00 ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-11 06:52:37 +08:00
/*
* If we are loading ET_EXEC or we have already performed
* the ET_DYN load_addr calculations, proceed normally.
*/
if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC || load_addr_set) {
elf: enforce MAP_FIXED on overlaying elf segments Anshuman has reported that with "fs, elf: drop MAP_FIXED usage from elf_map" applied, some ELF binaries in his environment fail to start with [ 23.423642] 9148 (sed): Uhuuh, elf segment at 0000000010030000 requested but the memory is mapped already [ 23.423706] requested [10030000, 10040000] mapped [10030000, 10040000] 100073 anon The reason is that the above binary has overlapping elf segments: LOAD 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000010000000 0x0000000010000000 0x0000000000013a8c 0x0000000000013a8c R E 10000 LOAD 0x000000000001fd40 0x000000001002fd40 0x000000001002fd40 0x00000000000002c0 0x00000000000005e8 RW 10000 LOAD 0x0000000000020328 0x0000000010030328 0x0000000010030328 0x0000000000000384 0x00000000000094a0 RW 10000 That binary has two RW LOAD segments, the first crosses a page border into the second 0x1002fd40 (LOAD2-vaddr) + 0x5e8 (LOAD2-memlen) == 0x10030328 (LOAD3-vaddr) Handle this situation by enforcing MAP_FIXED when we establish a temporary brk VMA to handle overlapping segments. All other mappings will still use MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180213100440.GM3443@dhcp22.suse.cz Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reported-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:36:05 +08:00
elf_flags |= elf_fixed;
} else if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_DYN) {
binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders away from ET_EXEC binaries. (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the loader had been loaded.) With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking at ET_DYN. However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space is unused. For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are loaded above the mmap region. This means they can be made to collide (CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with pathological stack regions. Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e. if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load instead of falling back to the mmap region). To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP) are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by the loader. Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs. For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and suggestions on how to implement this solution. Fixes: d1fd836dcf00 ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-11 06:52:37 +08:00
/*
* This logic is run once for the first LOAD Program
* Header for ET_DYN binaries to calculate the
* randomization (load_bias) for all the LOAD
* Program Headers, and to calculate the entire
* size of the ELF mapping (total_size). (Note that
* load_addr_set is set to true later once the
* initial mapping is performed.)
*
* There are effectively two types of ET_DYN
* binaries: programs (i.e. PIE: ET_DYN with INTERP)
* and loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP, since they
* _are_ the ELF interpreter). The loaders must
* be loaded away from programs since the program
* may otherwise collide with the loader (especially
* for ET_EXEC which does not have a randomized
* position). For example to handle invocations of
* "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
* the loader, the subsequent program that the
* loader loads must avoid the loader itself, so
* they cannot share the same load range. Sufficient
* room for the brk must be allocated with the
* loader as well, since brk must be available with
* the loader.
*
* Therefore, programs are loaded offset from
* ELF_ET_DYN_BASE and loaders are loaded into the
* independently randomized mmap region (0 load_bias
* without MAP_FIXED).
*/
if (interpreter) {
binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders away from ET_EXEC binaries. (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the loader had been loaded.) With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking at ET_DYN. However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space is unused. For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are loaded above the mmap region. This means they can be made to collide (CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with pathological stack regions. Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e. if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load instead of falling back to the mmap region). To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP) are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by the loader. Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs. For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and suggestions on how to implement this solution. Fixes: d1fd836dcf00 ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-11 06:52:37 +08:00
load_bias = ELF_ET_DYN_BASE;
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
load_bias += arch_mmap_rnd();
elf: enforce MAP_FIXED on overlaying elf segments Anshuman has reported that with "fs, elf: drop MAP_FIXED usage from elf_map" applied, some ELF binaries in his environment fail to start with [ 23.423642] 9148 (sed): Uhuuh, elf segment at 0000000010030000 requested but the memory is mapped already [ 23.423706] requested [10030000, 10040000] mapped [10030000, 10040000] 100073 anon The reason is that the above binary has overlapping elf segments: LOAD 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000010000000 0x0000000010000000 0x0000000000013a8c 0x0000000000013a8c R E 10000 LOAD 0x000000000001fd40 0x000000001002fd40 0x000000001002fd40 0x00000000000002c0 0x00000000000005e8 RW 10000 LOAD 0x0000000000020328 0x0000000010030328 0x0000000010030328 0x0000000000000384 0x00000000000094a0 RW 10000 That binary has two RW LOAD segments, the first crosses a page border into the second 0x1002fd40 (LOAD2-vaddr) + 0x5e8 (LOAD2-memlen) == 0x10030328 (LOAD3-vaddr) Handle this situation by enforcing MAP_FIXED when we establish a temporary brk VMA to handle overlapping segments. All other mappings will still use MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180213100440.GM3443@dhcp22.suse.cz Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reported-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:36:05 +08:00
elf_flags |= elf_fixed;
binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders away from ET_EXEC binaries. (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the loader had been loaded.) With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking at ET_DYN. However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space is unused. For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are loaded above the mmap region. This means they can be made to collide (CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with pathological stack regions. Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e. if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load instead of falling back to the mmap region). To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP) are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by the loader. Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs. For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and suggestions on how to implement this solution. Fixes: d1fd836dcf00 ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-11 06:52:37 +08:00
} else
load_bias = 0;
/*
* Since load_bias is used for all subsequent loading
* calculations, we must lower it by the first vaddr
* so that the remaining calculations based on the
* ELF vaddrs will be correctly offset. The result
* is then page aligned.
*/
load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias - vaddr);
fs/binfmt_elf.c: fix bug in loading of PIE binaries With CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE enabled, and a normal top-down address allocation strategy, load_elf_binary() will attempt to map a PIE binary into an address range immediately below mm->mmap_base. Unfortunately, load_elf_ binary() does not take account of the need to allocate sufficient space for the entire binary which means that, while the first PT_LOAD segment is mapped below mm->mmap_base, the subsequent PT_LOAD segment(s) end up being mapped above mm->mmap_base into the are that is supposed to be the "gap" between the stack and the binary. Since the size of the "gap" on x86_64 is only guaranteed to be 128MB this means that binaries with large data segments > 128MB can end up mapping part of their data segment over their stack resulting in corruption of the stack (and the data segment once the binary starts to run). Any PIE binary with a data segment > 128MB is vulnerable to this although address randomization means that the actual gap between the stack and the end of the binary is normally greater than 128MB. The larger the data segment of the binary the higher the probability of failure. Fix this by calculating the total size of the binary in the same way as load_elf_interp(). Signed-off-by: Michael Davidson <md@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:38 +08:00
total_size = total_mapping_size(elf_phdata,
loc->elf_ex.e_phnum);
if (!total_size) {
retval = -EINVAL;
fs/binfmt_elf.c: fix bug in loading of PIE binaries With CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE enabled, and a normal top-down address allocation strategy, load_elf_binary() will attempt to map a PIE binary into an address range immediately below mm->mmap_base. Unfortunately, load_elf_ binary() does not take account of the need to allocate sufficient space for the entire binary which means that, while the first PT_LOAD segment is mapped below mm->mmap_base, the subsequent PT_LOAD segment(s) end up being mapped above mm->mmap_base into the are that is supposed to be the "gap" between the stack and the binary. Since the size of the "gap" on x86_64 is only guaranteed to be 128MB this means that binaries with large data segments > 128MB can end up mapping part of their data segment over their stack resulting in corruption of the stack (and the data segment once the binary starts to run). Any PIE binary with a data segment > 128MB is vulnerable to this although address randomization means that the actual gap between the stack and the end of the binary is normally greater than 128MB. The larger the data segment of the binary the higher the probability of failure. Fix this by calculating the total size of the binary in the same way as load_elf_interp(). Signed-off-by: Michael Davidson <md@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:38 +08:00
goto out_free_dentry;
}
}
error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt,
fs/binfmt_elf.c: fix bug in loading of PIE binaries With CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE enabled, and a normal top-down address allocation strategy, load_elf_binary() will attempt to map a PIE binary into an address range immediately below mm->mmap_base. Unfortunately, load_elf_ binary() does not take account of the need to allocate sufficient space for the entire binary which means that, while the first PT_LOAD segment is mapped below mm->mmap_base, the subsequent PT_LOAD segment(s) end up being mapped above mm->mmap_base into the are that is supposed to be the "gap" between the stack and the binary. Since the size of the "gap" on x86_64 is only guaranteed to be 128MB this means that binaries with large data segments > 128MB can end up mapping part of their data segment over their stack resulting in corruption of the stack (and the data segment once the binary starts to run). Any PIE binary with a data segment > 128MB is vulnerable to this although address randomization means that the actual gap between the stack and the end of the binary is normally greater than 128MB. The larger the data segment of the binary the higher the probability of failure. Fix this by calculating the total size of the binary in the same way as load_elf_interp(). Signed-off-by: Michael Davidson <md@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:38 +08:00
elf_prot, elf_flags, total_size);
if (BAD_ADDR(error)) {
retval = IS_ERR((void *)error) ?
PTR_ERR((void*)error) : -EINVAL;
goto out_free_dentry;
}
if (!load_addr_set) {
load_addr_set = 1;
load_addr = (elf_ppnt->p_vaddr - elf_ppnt->p_offset);
if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_DYN) {
load_bias += error -
ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias + vaddr);
load_addr += load_bias;
reloc_func_desc = load_bias;
}
}
k = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr;
if (k < start_code)
start_code = k;
if (start_data < k)
start_data = k;
/*
* Check to see if the section's size will overflow the
* allowed task size. Note that p_filesz must always be
* <= p_memsz so it is only necessary to check p_memsz.
*/
[PATCH] binfmt_elf: fix checks for bad address Fix check for bad address; use macro instead of open-coding two checks. Taken from RHEL4 kernel update. From: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com> For background, the BAD_ADDR() macro should return TRUE if the address is TASK_SIZE, because that's the lowest address that is *not* valid for user-space mappings. The macro was correct in binfmt_aout.c but was wrong for the "equal to" case in binfmt_elf.c. There were two in-line validations of user-space addresses in binfmt_elf.c, which have been appropriately converted to use the corrected BAD_ADDR() macro in the patch you posted yesterday. Note that the size checks against TASK_SIZE are okay as coded. The additional changes that I propose are below. These are in the error paths for bad ELF entry addresses once load_elf_binary() has already committed to exec'ing the new image (following the tearing down of the task's original address space). The 1st hunk deals with the interp-side of the outer "if". There were two problems here. The printk() should be removed because this path can be triggered at will by a bogus interpreter image created and used by a malicious user. Further, the error code should not be ENOEXEC, because that causes the loop in search_binary_handler() to continue trying other exec handlers (twice, in fact). But it's too late for this to work correctly, because the user address space has already been torn down, and an exec() failure cannot be returned to the user code because the code no longer exists. The only recovery is to force a SIGSEGV, but it's best to terminate the search loop immediately. I somewhat arbitrarily chose EINVAL as a fallback error code, but any error returned by load_elf_interp() will override that (but this value will never be seen by user-space). The 2nd hunk deals with the non-interp-side of the outer "if". There were two problems here as well. The SIGSEGV needs to be forced, because a prior sigaction() syscall might have set the associated disposition to SIG_IGN. And the ENOEXEC should be changed to EINVAL as described above. Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com> Signed-off-by: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 15:24:14 +08:00
if (BAD_ADDR(k) || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz ||
elf_ppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE ||
TASK_SIZE - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) {
/* set_brk can never work. Avoid overflows. */
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_dentry;
}
k = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr + elf_ppnt->p_filesz;
if (k > elf_bss)
elf_bss = k;
if ((elf_ppnt->p_flags & PF_X) && end_code < k)
end_code = k;
if (end_data < k)
end_data = k;
k = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr + elf_ppnt->p_memsz;
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
if (k > elf_brk) {
bss_prot = elf_prot;
elf_brk = k;
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
}
}
loc->elf_ex.e_entry += load_bias;
elf_bss += load_bias;
elf_brk += load_bias;
start_code += load_bias;
end_code += load_bias;
start_data += load_bias;
end_data += load_bias;
/* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need
* for the bss and break sections. We must do this before
* mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind
* up getting placed where the bss needs to go.
*/
powerpc: do not make the entire heap executable On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-23 07:45:16 +08:00
retval = set_brk(elf_bss, elf_brk, bss_prot);
if (retval)
goto out_free_dentry;
if (likely(elf_bss != elf_brk) && unlikely(padzero(elf_bss))) {
retval = -EFAULT; /* Nobody gets to see this, but.. */
goto out_free_dentry;
}
if (interpreter) {
unsigned long interp_map_addr = 0;
elf_entry = load_elf_interp(&loc->interp_elf_ex,
interpreter,
&interp_map_addr,
load_bias, interp_elf_phdata);
if (!IS_ERR((void *)elf_entry)) {
/*
* load_elf_interp() returns relocation
* adjustment
*/
interp_load_addr = elf_entry;
elf_entry += loc->interp_elf_ex.e_entry;
}
if (BAD_ADDR(elf_entry)) {
[PATCH] binfmt_elf: fix checks for bad address Fix check for bad address; use macro instead of open-coding two checks. Taken from RHEL4 kernel update. From: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com> For background, the BAD_ADDR() macro should return TRUE if the address is TASK_SIZE, because that's the lowest address that is *not* valid for user-space mappings. The macro was correct in binfmt_aout.c but was wrong for the "equal to" case in binfmt_elf.c. There were two in-line validations of user-space addresses in binfmt_elf.c, which have been appropriately converted to use the corrected BAD_ADDR() macro in the patch you posted yesterday. Note that the size checks against TASK_SIZE are okay as coded. The additional changes that I propose are below. These are in the error paths for bad ELF entry addresses once load_elf_binary() has already committed to exec'ing the new image (following the tearing down of the task's original address space). The 1st hunk deals with the interp-side of the outer "if". There were two problems here. The printk() should be removed because this path can be triggered at will by a bogus interpreter image created and used by a malicious user. Further, the error code should not be ENOEXEC, because that causes the loop in search_binary_handler() to continue trying other exec handlers (twice, in fact). But it's too late for this to work correctly, because the user address space has already been torn down, and an exec() failure cannot be returned to the user code because the code no longer exists. The only recovery is to force a SIGSEGV, but it's best to terminate the search loop immediately. I somewhat arbitrarily chose EINVAL as a fallback error code, but any error returned by load_elf_interp() will override that (but this value will never be seen by user-space). The 2nd hunk deals with the non-interp-side of the outer "if". There were two problems here as well. The SIGSEGV needs to be forced, because a prior sigaction() syscall might have set the associated disposition to SIG_IGN. And the ENOEXEC should be changed to EINVAL as described above. Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com> Signed-off-by: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 15:24:14 +08:00
retval = IS_ERR((void *)elf_entry) ?
(int)elf_entry : -EINVAL;
goto out_free_dentry;
}
reloc_func_desc = interp_load_addr;
allow_write_access(interpreter);
fput(interpreter);
} else {
elf_entry = loc->elf_ex.e_entry;
if (BAD_ADDR(elf_entry)) {
[PATCH] binfmt_elf: fix checks for bad address Fix check for bad address; use macro instead of open-coding two checks. Taken from RHEL4 kernel update. From: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com> For background, the BAD_ADDR() macro should return TRUE if the address is TASK_SIZE, because that's the lowest address that is *not* valid for user-space mappings. The macro was correct in binfmt_aout.c but was wrong for the "equal to" case in binfmt_elf.c. There were two in-line validations of user-space addresses in binfmt_elf.c, which have been appropriately converted to use the corrected BAD_ADDR() macro in the patch you posted yesterday. Note that the size checks against TASK_SIZE are okay as coded. The additional changes that I propose are below. These are in the error paths for bad ELF entry addresses once load_elf_binary() has already committed to exec'ing the new image (following the tearing down of the task's original address space). The 1st hunk deals with the interp-side of the outer "if". There were two problems here. The printk() should be removed because this path can be triggered at will by a bogus interpreter image created and used by a malicious user. Further, the error code should not be ENOEXEC, because that causes the loop in search_binary_handler() to continue trying other exec handlers (twice, in fact). But it's too late for this to work correctly, because the user address space has already been torn down, and an exec() failure cannot be returned to the user code because the code no longer exists. The only recovery is to force a SIGSEGV, but it's best to terminate the search loop immediately. I somewhat arbitrarily chose EINVAL as a fallback error code, but any error returned by load_elf_interp() will override that (but this value will never be seen by user-space). The 2nd hunk deals with the non-interp-side of the outer "if". There were two problems here as well. The SIGSEGV needs to be forced, because a prior sigaction() syscall might have set the associated disposition to SIG_IGN. And the ENOEXEC should be changed to EINVAL as described above. Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com> Signed-off-by: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 15:24:14 +08:00
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_dentry;
}
}
binfmt_elf: allow arch code to examine PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC headers MIPS is introducing new variants of its O32 ABI which differ in their handling of floating point, in order to enable a gradual transition towards a world where mips32 binaries can take advantage of new hardware features only available when configured for certain FP modes. In order to do this ELF binaries are being augmented with a new section that indicates, amongst other things, the FP mode requirements of the binary. The presence & location of such a section is indicated by a program header in the PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC range. In order to allow the MIPS architecture code to examine the program header & section in question, pass all program headers in this range to an architecture-specific arch_elf_pt_proc function. This function may return an error if the header is deemed invalid or unsuitable for the system, in which case that error will be returned from load_elf_binary and upwards through the execve syscall. A means is required for the architecture code to make a decision once it is known that all such headers have been seen, but before it is too late to return from an execve syscall. For this purpose the arch_check_elf function is added, and called once, after all PT_LOPROC to PT_HIPROC headers have been passed to arch_elf_pt_proc but before the code which invoked execve has been lost. This enables the architecture code to make a decision based upon all the headers present in an ELF binary and its interpreter, as is required to forbid conflicting FP ABI requirements between an ELF & its interpreter. In order to allow data to be stored throughout the calls to the above functions, struct arch_elf_state is introduced. Finally a variant of the SET_PERSONALITY macro is introduced which accepts a pointer to the struct arch_elf_state, allowing it to act based upon state observed from the architecture specific program headers. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7679/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
2014-09-11 15:30:16 +08:00
kfree(interp_elf_phdata);
kfree(elf_phdata);
set_binfmt(&elf_format);
#ifdef ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES
retval = arch_setup_additional_pages(bprm, !!interpreter);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
#endif /* ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES */
retval = create_elf_tables(bprm, &loc->elf_ex,
load_addr, interp_load_addr);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
/* N.B. passed_fileno might not be initialized? */
current->mm->end_code = end_code;
current->mm->start_code = start_code;
current->mm->start_data = start_data;
current->mm->end_data = end_data;
current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) && (randomize_va_space > 1)) {
x86: randomize brk Randomize the location of the heap (brk) for i386 and x86_64. The range is randomized in the range starting at current brk location up to 0x02000000 offset for both architectures. This, together with pie-executable-randomization.patch and pie-executable-randomization-fix.patch, should make the address space randomization on i386 and x86_64 complete. Arjan says: This is known to break older versions of some emacs variants, whose dumper code assumed that the last variable declared in the program is equal to the start of the dynamically allocated memory region. (The dumper is the code where emacs effectively dumps core at the end of it's compilation stage; this coredump is then loaded as the main program during normal use) iirc this was 5 years or so; we found this way back when I was at RH and we first did the security stuff there (including this brk randomization). It wasn't all variants of emacs, and it got fixed as a result (I vaguely remember that emacs already had code to deal with it for other archs/oses, just ifdeffed wrongly). It's a rare and wrong assumption as a general thing, just on x86 it mostly happened to be true (but to be honest, it'll break too if gcc does something fancy or if the linker does a non-standard order). Still its something we should at least document. Note 2: afaik it only broke the emacs *build*. I'm not 100% sure about that (it IS 5 years ago) though. [ akpm@linux-foundation.org: deuglification ] Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 20:30:40 +08:00
current->mm->brk = current->mm->start_brk =
arch_randomize_brk(current->mm);
mm: fold arch_randomize_brk into ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE The arch_randomize_brk() function is used on several architectures, even those that don't support ET_DYN ASLR. To avoid bulky extern/#define tricks, consolidate the support under CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for the architectures that support it, while still handling CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:48:12 +08:00
#ifdef compat_brk_randomized
current->brk_randomized = 1;
#endif
}
x86: randomize brk Randomize the location of the heap (brk) for i386 and x86_64. The range is randomized in the range starting at current brk location up to 0x02000000 offset for both architectures. This, together with pie-executable-randomization.patch and pie-executable-randomization-fix.patch, should make the address space randomization on i386 and x86_64 complete. Arjan says: This is known to break older versions of some emacs variants, whose dumper code assumed that the last variable declared in the program is equal to the start of the dynamically allocated memory region. (The dumper is the code where emacs effectively dumps core at the end of it's compilation stage; this coredump is then loaded as the main program during normal use) iirc this was 5 years or so; we found this way back when I was at RH and we first did the security stuff there (including this brk randomization). It wasn't all variants of emacs, and it got fixed as a result (I vaguely remember that emacs already had code to deal with it for other archs/oses, just ifdeffed wrongly). It's a rare and wrong assumption as a general thing, just on x86 it mostly happened to be true (but to be honest, it'll break too if gcc does something fancy or if the linker does a non-standard order). Still its something we should at least document. Note 2: afaik it only broke the emacs *build*. I'm not 100% sure about that (it IS 5 years ago) though. [ akpm@linux-foundation.org: deuglification ] Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 20:30:40 +08:00
if (current->personality & MMAP_PAGE_ZERO) {
/* Why this, you ask??? Well SVr4 maps page 0 as read-only,
and some applications "depend" upon this behavior.
Since we do not have the power to recompile these, we
emulate the SVr4 behavior. Sigh. */
error = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE, 0);
}
#ifdef ELF_PLAT_INIT
/*
* The ABI may specify that certain registers be set up in special
* ways (on i386 %edx is the address of a DT_FINI function, for
* example. In addition, it may also specify (eg, PowerPC64 ELF)
* that the e_entry field is the address of the function descriptor
* for the startup routine, rather than the address of the startup
* routine itself. This macro performs whatever initialization to
* the regs structure is required as well as any relocations to the
* function descriptor entries when executing dynamically links apps.
*/
ELF_PLAT_INIT(regs, reloc_func_desc);
#endif
finalize_exec(bprm);
start_thread(regs, elf_entry, bprm->p);
retval = 0;
out:
kfree(loc);
out_ret:
return retval;
/* error cleanup */
out_free_dentry:
kfree(interp_elf_phdata);
allow_write_access(interpreter);
if (interpreter)
fput(interpreter);
out_free_ph:
kfree(elf_phdata);
goto out;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_USELIB
/* This is really simpleminded and specialized - we are loading an
a.out library that is given an ELF header. */
static int load_elf_library(struct file *file)
{
struct elf_phdr *elf_phdata;
struct elf_phdr *eppnt;
unsigned long elf_bss, bss, len;
int retval, error, i, j;
struct elfhdr elf_ex;
loff_t pos = 0;
error = -ENOEXEC;
retval = kernel_read(file, &elf_ex, sizeof(elf_ex), &pos);
if (retval != sizeof(elf_ex))
goto out;
if (memcmp(elf_ex.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0)
goto out;
/* First of all, some simple consistency checks */
if (elf_ex.e_type != ET_EXEC || elf_ex.e_phnum > 2 ||
!elf_check_arch(&elf_ex) || !file->f_op->mmap)
goto out;
if (elf_check_fdpic(&elf_ex))
goto out;
/* Now read in all of the header information */
j = sizeof(struct elf_phdr) * elf_ex.e_phnum;
/* j < ELF_MIN_ALIGN because elf_ex.e_phnum <= 2 */
error = -ENOMEM;
elf_phdata = kmalloc(j, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elf_phdata)
goto out;
eppnt = elf_phdata;
error = -ENOEXEC;
pos = elf_ex.e_phoff;
retval = kernel_read(file, eppnt, j, &pos);
if (retval != j)
goto out_free_ph;
for (j = 0, i = 0; i<elf_ex.e_phnum; i++)
if ((eppnt + i)->p_type == PT_LOAD)
j++;
if (j != 1)
goto out_free_ph;
while (eppnt->p_type != PT_LOAD)
eppnt++;
/* Now use mmap to map the library into memory. */
error = vm_mmap(file,
ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr),
(eppnt->p_filesz +
ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr)),
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
fs, elf: drop MAP_FIXED usage from elf_map Both load_elf_interp and load_elf_binary rely on elf_map to map segments on a controlled address and they use MAP_FIXED to enforce that. This is however dangerous thing prone to silent data corruption which can be even exploitable. Let's take CVE-2017-1000253 as an example. At the time (before commit eab09532d400: "binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE") ELF_ET_DYN_BASE was at TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2 which is not that far away from the stack top on 32b (legacy) memory layout (only 1GB away). Therefore we could end up mapping over the existing stack with some luck. The issue has been fixed since then (a87938b2e246: "fs/binfmt_elf.c: fix bug in loading of PIE binaries"), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE moved moved much further from the stack (eab09532d400 and later by c715b72c1ba4: "mm: revert x86_64 and arm64 ELF_ET_DYN_BASE base changes") and excessive stack consumption early during execve fully stopped by da029c11e6b1 ("exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM"). So we should be safe and any attack should be impractical. On the other hand this is just too subtle assumption so it can break quite easily and hard to spot. I believe that the MAP_FIXED usage in load_elf_binary (et. al) is still fundamentally dangerous. Moreover it shouldn't be even needed. We are at the early process stage and so there shouldn't be unrelated mappings (except for stack and loader) existing so mmap for a given address should succeed even without MAP_FIXED. Something is terribly wrong if this is not the case and we should rather fail than silently corrupt the underlying mapping. Address this issue by changing MAP_FIXED to the newly added MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE. This will mean that mmap will fail if there is an existing mapping clashing with the requested one without clobbering it. [mhocko@suse.com: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [avagin@openvz.org: don't use the same value for MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE and MAP_SYNC] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171218184916.24445-1-avagin@openvz.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171213092550.2774-3-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:36:01 +08:00
MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE,
(eppnt->p_offset -
ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr)));
if (error != ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr))
goto out_free_ph;
elf_bss = eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_filesz;
if (padzero(elf_bss)) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto out_free_ph;
}
len = ELF_PAGEALIGN(eppnt->p_filesz + eppnt->p_vaddr);
bss = ELF_PAGEALIGN(eppnt->p_memsz + eppnt->p_vaddr);
if (bss > len) {
error = vm_brk(len, bss - len);
if (error)
goto out_free_ph;
}
error = 0;
out_free_ph:
kfree(elf_phdata);
out:
return error;
}
#endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_USELIB */
#ifdef CONFIG_ELF_CORE
/*
* ELF core dumper
*
* Modelled on fs/exec.c:aout_core_dump()
* Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@sw.oz.au>
*/
coredump: remove VM_ALWAYSDUMP flag The motivation for this patchset was that I was looking at a way for a qemu-kvm process, to exclude the guest memory from its core dump, which can be quite large. There are already a number of filter flags in /proc/<pid>/coredump_filter, however, these allow one to specify 'types' of kernel memory, not specific address ranges (which is needed in this case). Since there are no more vma flags available, the first patch eliminates the need for the 'VM_ALWAYSDUMP' flag. The flag is used internally by the kernel to mark vdso and vsyscall pages. However, it is simple enough to check if a vma covers a vdso or vsyscall page without the need for this flag. The second patch then replaces the 'VM_ALWAYSDUMP' flag with a new 'VM_NODUMP' flag, which can be set by userspace using new madvise flags: 'MADV_DONTDUMP', and unset via 'MADV_DODUMP'. The core dump filters continue to work the same as before unless 'MADV_DONTDUMP' is set on the region. The qemu code which implements this features is at: http://people.redhat.com/~jbaron/qemu-dump/qemu-dump.patch In my testing the qemu core dump shrunk from 383MB -> 13MB with this patch. I also believe that the 'MADV_DONTDUMP' flag might be useful for security sensitive apps, which might want to select which areas are dumped. This patch: The VM_ALWAYSDUMP flag is currently used by the coredump code to indicate that a vma is part of a vsyscall or vdso section. However, we can determine if a vma is in one these sections by checking it against the gate_vma and checking for a non-NULL return value from arch_vma_name(). Thus, freeing a valuable vma bit. Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-24 06:02:51 +08:00
/*
* The purpose of always_dump_vma() is to make sure that special kernel mappings
* that are useful for post-mortem analysis are included in every core dump.
* In that way we ensure that the core dump is fully interpretable later
* without matching up the same kernel and hardware config to see what PC values
* meant. These special mappings include - vDSO, vsyscall, and other
* architecture specific mappings
*/
static bool always_dump_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
/* Any vsyscall mappings? */
if (vma == get_gate_vma(vma->vm_mm))
return true;
/*
* Assume that all vmas with a .name op should always be dumped.
* If this changes, a new vm_ops field can easily be added.
*/
if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->name && vma->vm_ops->name(vma))
return true;
coredump: remove VM_ALWAYSDUMP flag The motivation for this patchset was that I was looking at a way for a qemu-kvm process, to exclude the guest memory from its core dump, which can be quite large. There are already a number of filter flags in /proc/<pid>/coredump_filter, however, these allow one to specify 'types' of kernel memory, not specific address ranges (which is needed in this case). Since there are no more vma flags available, the first patch eliminates the need for the 'VM_ALWAYSDUMP' flag. The flag is used internally by the kernel to mark vdso and vsyscall pages. However, it is simple enough to check if a vma covers a vdso or vsyscall page without the need for this flag. The second patch then replaces the 'VM_ALWAYSDUMP' flag with a new 'VM_NODUMP' flag, which can be set by userspace using new madvise flags: 'MADV_DONTDUMP', and unset via 'MADV_DODUMP'. The core dump filters continue to work the same as before unless 'MADV_DONTDUMP' is set on the region. The qemu code which implements this features is at: http://people.redhat.com/~jbaron/qemu-dump/qemu-dump.patch In my testing the qemu core dump shrunk from 383MB -> 13MB with this patch. I also believe that the 'MADV_DONTDUMP' flag might be useful for security sensitive apps, which might want to select which areas are dumped. This patch: The VM_ALWAYSDUMP flag is currently used by the coredump code to indicate that a vma is part of a vsyscall or vdso section. However, we can determine if a vma is in one these sections by checking it against the gate_vma and checking for a non-NULL return value from arch_vma_name(). Thus, freeing a valuable vma bit. Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-24 06:02:51 +08:00
/*
* arch_vma_name() returns non-NULL for special architecture mappings,
* such as vDSO sections.
*/
if (arch_vma_name(vma))
return true;
return false;
}
/*
* Decide what to dump of a segment, part, all or none.
*/
static unsigned long vma_dump_size(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long mm_flags)
{
coredump_filter: add hugepage dumping Presently hugepage's vma has a VM_RESERVED flag in order not to be swapped. But a VM_RESERVED vma isn't core dumped because this flag is often used for some kernel vmas (e.g. vmalloc, sound related). Thus hugepages are never dumped and it can't be debugged easily. Many developers want hugepages to be included into core-dump. However, We can't read generic VM_RESERVED area because this area is often IO mapping area. then these area reading may change device state. it is definitly undesiable side-effect. So adding a hugepage specific bit to the coredump filter is better. It will be able to hugepage core dumping and doesn't cause any side-effect to any i/o devices. In additional, libhugetlb use hugetlb private mapping pages as anonymous page. Then, hugepage private mapping pages should be core dumped by default. Then, /proc/[pid]/core_dump_filter has two new bits. - bit 5 mean hugetlb private mapping pages are dumped or not. (default: yes) - bit 6 mean hugetlb shared mapping pages are dumped or not. (default: no) I tested by following method. % ulimit -c unlimited % ./crash_hugepage 50 % ./crash_hugepage 50 -p % ls -lh % gdb ./crash_hugepage core % % echo 0x43 > /proc/self/coredump_filter % ./crash_hugepage 50 % ./crash_hugepage 50 -p % ls -lh % gdb ./crash_hugepage core #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <string.h> #include "hugetlbfs.h" int main(int argc, char** argv){ char* p; int ch; int mmap_flags = MAP_SHARED; int fd; int nr_pages; while((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "p")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'p': mmap_flags &= ~MAP_SHARED; mmap_flags |= MAP_PRIVATE; break; default: /* nothing*/ break; } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (argc == 0){ printf("need # of pages\n"); exit(1); } nr_pages = atoi(argv[0]); if (nr_pages < 2) { printf("nr_pages must >2\n"); exit(1); } fd = hugetlbfs_unlinked_fd(); p = mmap(NULL, nr_pages * gethugepagesize(), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, mmap_flags, fd, 0); sleep(2); *(p + gethugepagesize()) = 1; /* COW */ sleep(2); /* crash! */ *(int*)0 = 1; return 0; } Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Kawai Hidehiro <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: William Irwin <wli@holomorphy.com> Cc: Adam Litke <agl@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-19 11:27:08 +08:00
#define FILTER(type) (mm_flags & (1UL << MMF_DUMP_##type))
coredump: remove VM_ALWAYSDUMP flag The motivation for this patchset was that I was looking at a way for a qemu-kvm process, to exclude the guest memory from its core dump, which can be quite large. There are already a number of filter flags in /proc/<pid>/coredump_filter, however, these allow one to specify 'types' of kernel memory, not specific address ranges (which is needed in this case). Since there are no more vma flags available, the first patch eliminates the need for the 'VM_ALWAYSDUMP' flag. The flag is used internally by the kernel to mark vdso and vsyscall pages. However, it is simple enough to check if a vma covers a vdso or vsyscall page without the need for this flag. The second patch then replaces the 'VM_ALWAYSDUMP' flag with a new 'VM_NODUMP' flag, which can be set by userspace using new madvise flags: 'MADV_DONTDUMP', and unset via 'MADV_DODUMP'. The core dump filters continue to work the same as before unless 'MADV_DONTDUMP' is set on the region. The qemu code which implements this features is at: http://people.redhat.com/~jbaron/qemu-dump/qemu-dump.patch In my testing the qemu core dump shrunk from 383MB -> 13MB with this patch. I also believe that the 'MADV_DONTDUMP' flag might be useful for security sensitive apps, which might want to select which areas are dumped. This patch: The VM_ALWAYSDUMP flag is currently used by the coredump code to indicate that a vma is part of a vsyscall or vdso section. However, we can determine if a vma is in one these sections by checking it against the gate_vma and checking for a non-NULL return value from arch_vma_name(). Thus, freeing a valuable vma bit. Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-24 06:02:51 +08:00
/* always dump the vdso and vsyscall sections */
if (always_dump_vma(vma))
goto whole;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_DONTDUMP)
return 0;
/* support for DAX */
if (vma_is_dax(vma)) {
if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && FILTER(DAX_SHARED))
goto whole;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && FILTER(DAX_PRIVATE))
goto whole;
return 0;
}
coredump_filter: add hugepage dumping Presently hugepage's vma has a VM_RESERVED flag in order not to be swapped. But a VM_RESERVED vma isn't core dumped because this flag is often used for some kernel vmas (e.g. vmalloc, sound related). Thus hugepages are never dumped and it can't be debugged easily. Many developers want hugepages to be included into core-dump. However, We can't read generic VM_RESERVED area because this area is often IO mapping area. then these area reading may change device state. it is definitly undesiable side-effect. So adding a hugepage specific bit to the coredump filter is better. It will be able to hugepage core dumping and doesn't cause any side-effect to any i/o devices. In additional, libhugetlb use hugetlb private mapping pages as anonymous page. Then, hugepage private mapping pages should be core dumped by default. Then, /proc/[pid]/core_dump_filter has two new bits. - bit 5 mean hugetlb private mapping pages are dumped or not. (default: yes) - bit 6 mean hugetlb shared mapping pages are dumped or not. (default: no) I tested by following method. % ulimit -c unlimited % ./crash_hugepage 50 % ./crash_hugepage 50 -p % ls -lh % gdb ./crash_hugepage core % % echo 0x43 > /proc/self/coredump_filter % ./crash_hugepage 50 % ./crash_hugepage 50 -p % ls -lh % gdb ./crash_hugepage core #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <string.h> #include "hugetlbfs.h" int main(int argc, char** argv){ char* p; int ch; int mmap_flags = MAP_SHARED; int fd; int nr_pages; while((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "p")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'p': mmap_flags &= ~MAP_SHARED; mmap_flags |= MAP_PRIVATE; break; default: /* nothing*/ break; } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (argc == 0){ printf("need # of pages\n"); exit(1); } nr_pages = atoi(argv[0]); if (nr_pages < 2) { printf("nr_pages must >2\n"); exit(1); } fd = hugetlbfs_unlinked_fd(); p = mmap(NULL, nr_pages * gethugepagesize(), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, mmap_flags, fd, 0); sleep(2); *(p + gethugepagesize()) = 1; /* COW */ sleep(2); /* crash! */ *(int*)0 = 1; return 0; } Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Kawai Hidehiro <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: William Irwin <wli@holomorphy.com> Cc: Adam Litke <agl@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-19 11:27:08 +08:00
/* Hugetlb memory check */
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGETLB) {
if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && FILTER(HUGETLB_SHARED))
goto whole;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && FILTER(HUGETLB_PRIVATE))
goto whole;
return 0;
coredump_filter: add hugepage dumping Presently hugepage's vma has a VM_RESERVED flag in order not to be swapped. But a VM_RESERVED vma isn't core dumped because this flag is often used for some kernel vmas (e.g. vmalloc, sound related). Thus hugepages are never dumped and it can't be debugged easily. Many developers want hugepages to be included into core-dump. However, We can't read generic VM_RESERVED area because this area is often IO mapping area. then these area reading may change device state. it is definitly undesiable side-effect. So adding a hugepage specific bit to the coredump filter is better. It will be able to hugepage core dumping and doesn't cause any side-effect to any i/o devices. In additional, libhugetlb use hugetlb private mapping pages as anonymous page. Then, hugepage private mapping pages should be core dumped by default. Then, /proc/[pid]/core_dump_filter has two new bits. - bit 5 mean hugetlb private mapping pages are dumped or not. (default: yes) - bit 6 mean hugetlb shared mapping pages are dumped or not. (default: no) I tested by following method. % ulimit -c unlimited % ./crash_hugepage 50 % ./crash_hugepage 50 -p % ls -lh % gdb ./crash_hugepage core % % echo 0x43 > /proc/self/coredump_filter % ./crash_hugepage 50 % ./crash_hugepage 50 -p % ls -lh % gdb ./crash_hugepage core #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <string.h> #include "hugetlbfs.h" int main(int argc, char** argv){ char* p; int ch; int mmap_flags = MAP_SHARED; int fd; int nr_pages; while((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "p")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'p': mmap_flags &= ~MAP_SHARED; mmap_flags |= MAP_PRIVATE; break; default: /* nothing*/ break; } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (argc == 0){ printf("need # of pages\n"); exit(1); } nr_pages = atoi(argv[0]); if (nr_pages < 2) { printf("nr_pages must >2\n"); exit(1); } fd = hugetlbfs_unlinked_fd(); p = mmap(NULL, nr_pages * gethugepagesize(), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, mmap_flags, fd, 0); sleep(2); *(p + gethugepagesize()) = 1; /* COW */ sleep(2); /* crash! */ *(int*)0 = 1; return 0; } Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Kawai Hidehiro <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: William Irwin <wli@holomorphy.com> Cc: Adam Litke <agl@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-19 11:27:08 +08:00
}
/* Do not dump I/O mapped devices or special mappings */
mm: kill vma flag VM_RESERVED and mm->reserved_vm counter A long time ago, in v2.4, VM_RESERVED kept swapout process off VMA, currently it lost original meaning but still has some effects: | effect | alternative flags -+------------------------+--------------------------------------------- 1| account as reserved_vm | VM_IO 2| skip in core dump | VM_IO, VM_DONTDUMP 3| do not merge or expand | VM_IO, VM_DONTEXPAND, VM_HUGETLB, VM_PFNMAP 4| do not mlock | VM_IO, VM_DONTEXPAND, VM_HUGETLB, VM_PFNMAP This patch removes reserved_vm counter from mm_struct. Seems like nobody cares about it, it does not exported into userspace directly, it only reduces total_vm showed in proc. Thus VM_RESERVED can be replaced with VM_IO or pair VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP. remap_pfn_range() and io_remap_pfn_range() set VM_IO|VM_DONTEXPAND|VM_DONTDUMP. remap_vmalloc_range() set VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c fixup] Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com> Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-09 07:29:02 +08:00
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_IO)
return 0;
/* By default, dump shared memory if mapped from an anonymous file. */
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
if (file_inode(vma->vm_file)->i_nlink == 0 ?
FILTER(ANON_SHARED) : FILTER(MAPPED_SHARED))
goto whole;
return 0;
}
/* Dump segments that have been written to. */
if (vma->anon_vma && FILTER(ANON_PRIVATE))
goto whole;
if (vma->vm_file == NULL)
return 0;
if (FILTER(MAPPED_PRIVATE))
goto whole;
/*
* If this looks like the beginning of a DSO or executable mapping,
* check for an ELF header. If we find one, dump the first page to
* aid in determining what was mapped here.
*/
if (FILTER(ELF_HEADERS) &&
vma->vm_pgoff == 0 && (vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)) {
u32 __user *header = (u32 __user *) vma->vm_start;
u32 word;
mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
/*
* Doing it this way gets the constant folded by GCC.
*/
union {
u32 cmp;
char elfmag[SELFMAG];
} magic;
BUILD_BUG_ON(SELFMAG != sizeof word);
magic.elfmag[EI_MAG0] = ELFMAG0;
magic.elfmag[EI_MAG1] = ELFMAG1;
magic.elfmag[EI_MAG2] = ELFMAG2;
magic.elfmag[EI_MAG3] = ELFMAG3;
/*
* Switch to the user "segment" for get_user(),
* then put back what elf_core_dump() had in place.
*/
set_fs(USER_DS);
if (unlikely(get_user(word, header)))
word = 0;
set_fs(fs);
if (word == magic.cmp)
return PAGE_SIZE;
}
#undef FILTER
return 0;
whole:
return vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
}
/* An ELF note in memory */
struct memelfnote
{
const char *name;
int type;
unsigned int datasz;
void *data;
};
static int notesize(struct memelfnote *en)
{
int sz;
sz = sizeof(struct elf_note);
sz += roundup(strlen(en->name) + 1, 4);
sz += roundup(en->datasz, 4);
return sz;
}
static int writenote(struct memelfnote *men, struct coredump_params *cprm)
[PATCH] Support piping into commands in /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern Using the infrastructure created in previous patches implement support to pipe core dumps into programs. This is done by overloading the existing core_pattern sysctl with a new syntax: |program When the first character of the pattern is a '|' the kernel will instead threat the rest of the pattern as a command to run. The core dump will be written to the standard input of that program instead of to a file. This is useful for having automatic core dump analysis without filling up disks. The program can do some simple analysis and save only a summary of the core dump. The core dump proces will run with the privileges and in the name space of the process that caused the core dump. I also increased the core pattern size to 128 bytes so that longer command lines fit. Most of the changes comes from allowing core dumps without seeks. They are fairly straight forward though. One small incompatibility is that if someone had a core pattern previously that started with '|' they will get suddenly new behaviour. I think that's unlikely to be a real problem though. Additional background: > Very nice, do you happen to have a program that can accept this kind of > input for crash dumps? I'm guessing that the embedded people will > really want this functionality. I had a cheesy demo/prototype. Basically it wrote the dump to a file again, ran gdb on it to get a backtrace and wrote the summary to a shared directory. Then there was a simple CGI script to generate a "top 10" crashes HTML listing. Unfortunately this still had the disadvantage to needing full disk space for a dump except for deleting it afterwards (in fact it was worse because over the pipe holes didn't work so if you have a holey address map it would require more space). Fortunately gdb seems to be happy to handle /proc/pid/fd/xxx input pipes as cores (at least it worked with zsh's =(cat core) syntax), so it would be likely possible to do it without temporary space with a simple wrapper that calls it in the right way. I ran out of time before doing that though. The demo prototype scripts weren't very good. If there is really interest I can dig them out (they are currently on a laptop disk on the desk with the laptop itself being in service), but I would recommend to rewrite them for any serious application of this and fix the disk space problem. Also to be really useful it should probably find a way to automatically fetch the debuginfos (I cheated and just installed them in advance). If nobody else does it I can probably do the rewrite myself again at some point. My hope at some point was that desktops would support it in their builtin crash reporters, but at least the KDE people I talked too seemed to be happy with their user space only solution. Alan sayeth: I don't believe that piping as such as neccessarily the right model, but the ability to intercept and processes core dumps from user space is asked for by many enterprise users as well. They want to know about, capture, analyse and process core dumps, often centrally and in automated form. [akpm@osdl.org: loff_t != unsigned long] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-01 14:29:28 +08:00
{
struct elf_note en;
en.n_namesz = strlen(men->name) + 1;
en.n_descsz = men->datasz;
en.n_type = men->type;
return dump_emit(cprm, &en, sizeof(en)) &&
dump_emit(cprm, men->name, en.n_namesz) && dump_align(cprm, 4) &&
dump_emit(cprm, men->data, men->datasz) && dump_align(cprm, 4);
}
static void fill_elf_header(struct elfhdr *elf, int segs,
u16 machine, u32 flags)
{
memset(elf, 0, sizeof(*elf));
memcpy(elf->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG);
elf->e_ident[EI_CLASS] = ELF_CLASS;
elf->e_ident[EI_DATA] = ELF_DATA;
elf->e_ident[EI_VERSION] = EV_CURRENT;
elf->e_ident[EI_OSABI] = ELF_OSABI;
elf->e_type = ET_CORE;
elf->e_machine = machine;
elf->e_version = EV_CURRENT;
elf->e_phoff = sizeof(struct elfhdr);
elf->e_flags = flags;
elf->e_ehsize = sizeof(struct elfhdr);
elf->e_phentsize = sizeof(struct elf_phdr);
elf->e_phnum = segs;
}
static void fill_elf_note_phdr(struct elf_phdr *phdr, int sz, loff_t offset)
{
phdr->p_type = PT_NOTE;
phdr->p_offset = offset;
phdr->p_vaddr = 0;
phdr->p_paddr = 0;
phdr->p_filesz = sz;
phdr->p_memsz = 0;
phdr->p_flags = 0;
phdr->p_align = 0;
}
static void fill_note(struct memelfnote *note, const char *name, int type,
unsigned int sz, void *data)
{
note->name = name;
note->type = type;
note->datasz = sz;
note->data = data;
}
/*
* fill up all the fields in prstatus from the given task struct, except
* registers which need to be filled up separately.
*/
static void fill_prstatus(struct elf_prstatus *prstatus,
struct task_struct *p, long signr)
{
prstatus->pr_info.si_signo = prstatus->pr_cursig = signr;
prstatus->pr_sigpend = p->pending.signal.sig[0];
prstatus->pr_sighold = p->blocked.sig[0];
rcu_read_lock();
prstatus->pr_ppid = task_pid_vnr(rcu_dereference(p->real_parent));
rcu_read_unlock();
prstatus->pr_pid = task_pid_vnr(p);
prstatus->pr_pgrp = task_pgrp_vnr(p);
prstatus->pr_sid = task_session_vnr(p);
if (thread_group_leader(p)) {
struct task_cputime cputime;
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang Overview This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code. The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse. Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at which point things degrade rather quickly. This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF." Code Changes This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single- or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function uses those fields to make its decisions. We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and scheduler times and use these in appropriate places: struct task_cputime { cputime_t utime; cputime_t stime; unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime; }; This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer: struct thread_group_cputime { struct task_cputime totals; }; struct thread_group_cputime { struct task_cputime *totals; }; We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr(). We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init() function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task. The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free() function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields; in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and, if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure. Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further. The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal(). It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from cleanup_signal(). All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated. Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting. With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest expiration; this is checked in the fast path. Performance The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those two cases. I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system. Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system, all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many voluntary context switches with the fix as without it. Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023 seconds per tick). Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel. With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus 5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel. Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits. Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results were essentially the same with no itimer running. Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds (where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running, the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise, performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases. In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below. On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720 for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of 0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this test computed the primes up to 25,000,000. I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at 1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of 629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix. Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-13 00:54:39 +08:00
/*
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang Overview This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code. The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse. Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at which point things degrade rather quickly. This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF." Code Changes This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single- or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function uses those fields to make its decisions. We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and scheduler times and use these in appropriate places: struct task_cputime { cputime_t utime; cputime_t stime; unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime; }; This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer: struct thread_group_cputime { struct task_cputime totals; }; struct thread_group_cputime { struct task_cputime *totals; }; We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr(). We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init() function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task. The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free() function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields; in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and, if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure. Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further. The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal(). It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from cleanup_signal(). All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated. Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting. With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest expiration; this is checked in the fast path. Performance The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those two cases. I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system. Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system, all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many voluntary context switches with the fix as without it. Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023 seconds per tick). Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel. With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus 5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel. Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits. Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results were essentially the same with no itimer running. Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds (where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running, the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise, performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases. In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below. On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720 for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of 0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this test computed the primes up to 25,000,000. I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at 1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of 629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix. Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-13 00:54:39 +08:00
* This is the record for the group leader. It shows the
* group-wide total, not its individual thread total.
*/
thread_group_cputime(p, &cputime);
prstatus->pr_utime = ns_to_timeval(cputime.utime);
prstatus->pr_stime = ns_to_timeval(cputime.stime);
} else {
u64 utime, stime;
task_cputime(p, &utime, &stime);
prstatus->pr_utime = ns_to_timeval(utime);
prstatus->pr_stime = ns_to_timeval(stime);
}
prstatus->pr_cutime = ns_to_timeval(p->signal->cutime);
prstatus->pr_cstime = ns_to_timeval(p->signal->cstime);
}
static int fill_psinfo(struct elf_prpsinfo *psinfo, struct task_struct *p,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
const struct cred *cred;
unsigned int i, len;
/* first copy the parameters from user space */
memset(psinfo, 0, sizeof(struct elf_prpsinfo));
len = mm->arg_end - mm->arg_start;
if (len >= ELF_PRARGSZ)
len = ELF_PRARGSZ-1;
if (copy_from_user(&psinfo->pr_psargs,
(const char __user *)mm->arg_start, len))
return -EFAULT;
for(i = 0; i < len; i++)
if (psinfo->pr_psargs[i] == 0)
psinfo->pr_psargs[i] = ' ';
psinfo->pr_psargs[len] = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
psinfo->pr_ppid = task_pid_vnr(rcu_dereference(p->real_parent));
rcu_read_unlock();
psinfo->pr_pid = task_pid_vnr(p);
psinfo->pr_pgrp = task_pgrp_vnr(p);
psinfo->pr_sid = task_session_vnr(p);
i = p->state ? ffz(~p->state) + 1 : 0;
psinfo->pr_state = i;
psinfo->pr_sname = (i > 5) ? '.' : "RSDTZW"[i];
psinfo->pr_zomb = psinfo->pr_sname == 'Z';
psinfo->pr_nice = task_nice(p);
psinfo->pr_flag = p->flags;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(p);
SET_UID(psinfo->pr_uid, from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid));
SET_GID(psinfo->pr_gid, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid));
rcu_read_unlock();
strncpy(psinfo->pr_fname, p->comm, sizeof(psinfo->pr_fname));
return 0;
}
static void fill_auxv_note(struct memelfnote *note, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
elf_addr_t *auxv = (elf_addr_t *) mm->saved_auxv;
int i = 0;
do
i += 2;
while (auxv[i - 2] != AT_NULL);
fill_note(note, "CORE", NT_AUXV, i * sizeof(elf_addr_t), auxv);
}
static void fill_siginfo_note(struct memelfnote *note, user_siginfo_t *csigdata,
const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
copy_siginfo_to_user((user_siginfo_t __user *) csigdata, siginfo);
set_fs(old_fs);
fill_note(note, "CORE", NT_SIGINFO, sizeof(*csigdata), csigdata);
}
#define MAX_FILE_NOTE_SIZE (4*1024*1024)
/*
* Format of NT_FILE note:
*
* long count -- how many files are mapped
* long page_size -- units for file_ofs
* array of [COUNT] elements of
* long start
* long end
* long file_ofs
* followed by COUNT filenames in ASCII: "FILE1" NUL "FILE2" NUL...
*/
static int fill_files_note(struct memelfnote *note)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned count, size, names_ofs, remaining, n;
user_long_t *data;
user_long_t *start_end_ofs;
char *name_base, *name_curpos;
/* *Estimated* file count and total data size needed */
count = current->mm->map_count;
if (count > UINT_MAX / 64)
return -EINVAL;
size = count * 64;
names_ofs = (2 + 3 * count) * sizeof(data[0]);
alloc:
if (size >= MAX_FILE_NOTE_SIZE) /* paranoia check */
return -EINVAL;
size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE);
data = kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(data))
return -ENOMEM;
start_end_ofs = data + 2;
name_base = name_curpos = ((char *)data) + names_ofs;
remaining = size - names_ofs;
count = 0;
for (vma = current->mm->mmap; vma != NULL; vma = vma->vm_next) {
struct file *file;
const char *filename;
file = vma->vm_file;
if (!file)
continue;
filename = file_path(file, name_curpos, remaining);
if (IS_ERR(filename)) {
if (PTR_ERR(filename) == -ENAMETOOLONG) {
kvfree(data);
size = size * 5 / 4;
goto alloc;
}
continue;
}
/* file_path() fills at the end, move name down */
/* n = strlen(filename) + 1: */
n = (name_curpos + remaining) - filename;
remaining = filename - name_curpos;
memmove(name_curpos, filename, n);
name_curpos += n;
*start_end_ofs++ = vma->vm_start;
*start_end_ofs++ = vma->vm_end;
*start_end_ofs++ = vma->vm_pgoff;
count++;
}
/* Now we know exact count of files, can store it */
data[0] = count;
data[1] = PAGE_SIZE;
/*
* Count usually is less than current->mm->map_count,
* we need to move filenames down.
*/
n = current->mm->map_count - count;
if (n != 0) {
unsigned shift_bytes = n * 3 * sizeof(data[0]);
memmove(name_base - shift_bytes, name_base,
name_curpos - name_base);
name_curpos -= shift_bytes;
}
size = name_curpos - (char *)data;
fill_note(note, "CORE", NT_FILE, size, data);
return 0;
}
#ifdef CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET
#include <linux/regset.h>
struct elf_thread_core_info {
struct elf_thread_core_info *next;
struct task_struct *task;
struct elf_prstatus prstatus;
struct memelfnote notes[0];
};
struct elf_note_info {
struct elf_thread_core_info *thread;
struct memelfnote psinfo;
struct memelfnote signote;
struct memelfnote auxv;
struct memelfnote files;
user_siginfo_t csigdata;
size_t size;
int thread_notes;
};
/*
* When a regset has a writeback hook, we call it on each thread before
* dumping user memory. On register window machines, this makes sure the
* user memory backing the register data is up to date before we read it.
*/
static void do_thread_regset_writeback(struct task_struct *task,
const struct user_regset *regset)
{
if (regset->writeback)
regset->writeback(task, regset, 1);
}
#ifndef PRSTATUS_SIZE
#define PRSTATUS_SIZE(S, R) sizeof(S)
#endif
#ifndef SET_PR_FPVALID
#define SET_PR_FPVALID(S, V, R) ((S)->pr_fpvalid = (V))
#endif
static int fill_thread_core_info(struct elf_thread_core_info *t,
const struct user_regset_view *view,
long signr, size_t *total)
{
unsigned int i;
unsigned int regset0_size = regset_size(t->task, &view->regsets[0]);
/*
* NT_PRSTATUS is the one special case, because the regset data
* goes into the pr_reg field inside the note contents, rather
* than being the whole note contents. We fill the reset in here.
* We assume that regset 0 is NT_PRSTATUS.
*/
fill_prstatus(&t->prstatus, t->task, signr);
(void) view->regsets[0].get(t->task, &view->regsets[0], 0, regset0_size,
&t->prstatus.pr_reg, NULL);
fill_note(&t->notes[0], "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS,
PRSTATUS_SIZE(t->prstatus, regset0_size), &t->prstatus);
*total += notesize(&t->notes[0]);
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, &view->regsets[0]);
/*
* Each other regset might generate a note too. For each regset
* that has no core_note_type or is inactive, we leave t->notes[i]
* all zero and we'll know to skip writing it later.
*/
for (i = 1; i < view->n; ++i) {
const struct user_regset *regset = &view->regsets[i];
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, regset);
if (regset->core_note_type && regset->get &&
(!regset->active || regset->active(t->task, regset) > 0)) {
int ret;
size_t size = regset_size(t->task, regset);
void *data = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!data))
return 0;
ret = regset->get(t->task, regset,
0, size, data, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret))
kfree(data);
else {
if (regset->core_note_type != NT_PRFPREG)
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "LINUX",
regset->core_note_type,
size, data);
else {
SET_PR_FPVALID(&t->prstatus,
1, regset0_size);
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "CORE",
NT_PRFPREG, size, data);
}
*total += notesize(&t->notes[i]);
}
}
}
return 1;
}
static int fill_note_info(struct elfhdr *elf, int phdrs,
struct elf_note_info *info,
const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *dump_task = current;
const struct user_regset_view *view = task_user_regset_view(dump_task);
struct elf_thread_core_info *t;
struct elf_prpsinfo *psinfo;
struct core_thread *ct;
unsigned int i;
info->size = 0;
info->thread = NULL;
psinfo = kmalloc(sizeof(*psinfo), GFP_KERNEL);
if (psinfo == NULL) {
info->psinfo.data = NULL; /* So we don't free this wrongly */
return 0;
}
fill_note(&info->psinfo, "CORE", NT_PRPSINFO, sizeof(*psinfo), psinfo);
/*
* Figure out how many notes we're going to need for each thread.
*/
info->thread_notes = 0;
for (i = 0; i < view->n; ++i)
if (view->regsets[i].core_note_type != 0)
++info->thread_notes;
/*
* Sanity check. We rely on regset 0 being in NT_PRSTATUS,
* since it is our one special case.
*/
if (unlikely(info->thread_notes == 0) ||
unlikely(view->regsets[0].core_note_type != NT_PRSTATUS)) {
WARN_ON(1);
return 0;
}
/*
* Initialize the ELF file header.
*/
fill_elf_header(elf, phdrs,
view->e_machine, view->e_flags);
/*
* Allocate a structure for each thread.
*/
for (ct = &dump_task->mm->core_state->dumper; ct; ct = ct->next) {
t = kzalloc(offsetof(struct elf_thread_core_info,
notes[info->thread_notes]),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!t))
return 0;
t->task = ct->task;
if (ct->task == dump_task || !info->thread) {
t->next = info->thread;
info->thread = t;
} else {
/*
* Make sure to keep the original task at
* the head of the list.
*/
t->next = info->thread->next;
info->thread->next = t;
}
}
/*
* Now fill in each thread's information.
*/
for (t = info->thread; t != NULL; t = t->next)
if (!fill_thread_core_info(t, view, siginfo->si_signo, &info->size))
return 0;
/*
* Fill in the two process-wide notes.
*/
fill_psinfo(psinfo, dump_task->group_leader, dump_task->mm);
info->size += notesize(&info->psinfo);
fill_siginfo_note(&info->signote, &info->csigdata, siginfo);
info->size += notesize(&info->signote);
fill_auxv_note(&info->auxv, current->mm);
info->size += notesize(&info->auxv);
if (fill_files_note(&info->files) == 0)
info->size += notesize(&info->files);
return 1;
}
static size_t get_note_info_size(struct elf_note_info *info)
{
return info->size;
}
/*
* Write all the notes for each thread. When writing the first thread, the
* process-wide notes are interleaved after the first thread-specific note.
*/
static int write_note_info(struct elf_note_info *info,
struct coredump_params *cprm)
{
bool first = true;
struct elf_thread_core_info *t = info->thread;
do {
int i;
if (!writenote(&t->notes[0], cprm))
return 0;
if (first && !writenote(&info->psinfo, cprm))
return 0;
if (first && !writenote(&info->signote, cprm))
return 0;
if (first && !writenote(&info->auxv, cprm))
return 0;
if (first && info->files.data &&
!writenote(&info->files, cprm))
return 0;
for (i = 1; i < info->thread_notes; ++i)
if (t->notes[i].data &&
!writenote(&t->notes[i], cprm))
return 0;
first = false;
t = t->next;
} while (t);
return 1;
}
static void free_note_info(struct elf_note_info *info)
{
struct elf_thread_core_info *threads = info->thread;
while (threads) {
unsigned int i;
struct elf_thread_core_info *t = threads;
threads = t->next;
WARN_ON(t->notes[0].data && t->notes[0].data != &t->prstatus);
for (i = 1; i < info->thread_notes; ++i)
kfree(t->notes[i].data);
kfree(t);
}
kfree(info->psinfo.data);
kvfree(info->files.data);
}
#else
/* Here is the structure in which status of each thread is captured. */
struct elf_thread_status
{
struct list_head list;
struct elf_prstatus prstatus; /* NT_PRSTATUS */
elf_fpregset_t fpu; /* NT_PRFPREG */
struct task_struct *thread;
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
elf_fpxregset_t xfpu; /* ELF_CORE_XFPREG_TYPE */
#endif
struct memelfnote notes[3];
int num_notes;
};
/*
* In order to add the specific thread information for the elf file format,
* we need to keep a linked list of every threads pr_status and then create
* a single section for them in the final core file.
*/
static int elf_dump_thread_status(long signr, struct elf_thread_status *t)
{
int sz = 0;
struct task_struct *p = t->thread;
t->num_notes = 0;
fill_prstatus(&t->prstatus, p, signr);
elf_core_copy_task_regs(p, &t->prstatus.pr_reg);
fill_note(&t->notes[0], "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS, sizeof(t->prstatus),
&(t->prstatus));
t->num_notes++;
sz += notesize(&t->notes[0]);
if ((t->prstatus.pr_fpvalid = elf_core_copy_task_fpregs(p, NULL,
&t->fpu))) {
fill_note(&t->notes[1], "CORE", NT_PRFPREG, sizeof(t->fpu),
&(t->fpu));
t->num_notes++;
sz += notesize(&t->notes[1]);
}
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
if (elf_core_copy_task_xfpregs(p, &t->xfpu)) {
fill_note(&t->notes[2], "LINUX", ELF_CORE_XFPREG_TYPE,
sizeof(t->xfpu), &t->xfpu);
t->num_notes++;
sz += notesize(&t->notes[2]);
}
#endif
return sz;
}
struct elf_note_info {
struct memelfnote *notes;
struct memelfnote *notes_files;
struct elf_prstatus *prstatus; /* NT_PRSTATUS */
struct elf_prpsinfo *psinfo; /* NT_PRPSINFO */
struct list_head thread_list;
elf_fpregset_t *fpu;
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
elf_fpxregset_t *xfpu;
#endif
user_siginfo_t csigdata;
int thread_status_size;
int numnote;
};
static int elf_note_info_init(struct elf_note_info *info)
{
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->thread_list);
/* Allocate space for ELF notes */
treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array() The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This patch replaces cases of: kmalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own implementation of kmalloc(). The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kmalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kmalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-13 04:55:00 +08:00
info->notes = kmalloc_array(8, sizeof(struct memelfnote), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info->notes)
return 0;
info->psinfo = kmalloc(sizeof(*info->psinfo), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info->psinfo)
return 0;
info->prstatus = kmalloc(sizeof(*info->prstatus), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info->prstatus)
return 0;
info->fpu = kmalloc(sizeof(*info->fpu), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info->fpu)
return 0;
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
info->xfpu = kmalloc(sizeof(*info->xfpu), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info->xfpu)
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
}
static int fill_note_info(struct elfhdr *elf, int phdrs,
struct elf_note_info *info,
const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct core_thread *ct;
struct elf_thread_status *ets;
if (!elf_note_info_init(info))
return 0;
for (ct = current->mm->core_state->dumper.next;
ct; ct = ct->next) {
ets = kzalloc(sizeof(*ets), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ets)
return 0;
ets->thread = ct->task;
list_add(&ets->list, &info->thread_list);
}
list_for_each_entry(ets, &info->thread_list, list) {
int sz;
sz = elf_dump_thread_status(siginfo->si_signo, ets);
info->thread_status_size += sz;
}
/* now collect the dump for the current */
memset(info->prstatus, 0, sizeof(*info->prstatus));
fill_prstatus(info->prstatus, current, siginfo->si_signo);
elf_core_copy_regs(&info->prstatus->pr_reg, regs);
/* Set up header */
fill_elf_header(elf, phdrs, ELF_ARCH, ELF_CORE_EFLAGS);
/*
* Set up the notes in similar form to SVR4 core dumps made
* with info from their /proc.
*/
fill_note(info->notes + 0, "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS,
sizeof(*info->prstatus), info->prstatus);
fill_psinfo(info->psinfo, current->group_leader, current->mm);
fill_note(info->notes + 1, "CORE", NT_PRPSINFO,
sizeof(*info->psinfo), info->psinfo);
fill_siginfo_note(info->notes + 2, &info->csigdata, siginfo);
fill_auxv_note(info->notes + 3, current->mm);
info->numnote = 4;
if (fill_files_note(info->notes + info->numnote) == 0) {
info->notes_files = info->notes + info->numnote;
info->numnote++;
}
/* Try to dump the FPU. */
info->prstatus->pr_fpvalid = elf_core_copy_task_fpregs(current, regs,
info->fpu);
if (info->prstatus->pr_fpvalid)
fill_note(info->notes + info->numnote++,
"CORE", NT_PRFPREG, sizeof(*info->fpu), info->fpu);
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
if (elf_core_copy_task_xfpregs(current, info->xfpu))
fill_note(info->notes + info->numnote++,
"LINUX", ELF_CORE_XFPREG_TYPE,
sizeof(*info->xfpu), info->xfpu);
#endif
return 1;
}
static size_t get_note_info_size(struct elf_note_info *info)
{
int sz = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < info->numnote; i++)
sz += notesize(info->notes + i);
sz += info->thread_status_size;
return sz;
}
static int write_note_info(struct elf_note_info *info,
struct coredump_params *cprm)
{
struct elf_thread_status *ets;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < info->numnote; i++)
if (!writenote(info->notes + i, cprm))
return 0;
/* write out the thread status notes section */
list_for_each_entry(ets, &info->thread_list, list) {
for (i = 0; i < ets->num_notes; i++)
if (!writenote(&ets->notes[i], cprm))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void free_note_info(struct elf_note_info *info)
{
while (!list_empty(&info->thread_list)) {
struct list_head *tmp = info->thread_list.next;
list_del(tmp);
kfree(list_entry(tmp, struct elf_thread_status, list));
}
/* Free data possibly allocated by fill_files_note(): */
if (info->notes_files)
kvfree(info->notes_files->data);
kfree(info->prstatus);
kfree(info->psinfo);
kfree(info->notes);
kfree(info->fpu);
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
kfree(info->xfpu);
#endif
}
#endif
static struct vm_area_struct *first_vma(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct vm_area_struct *gate_vma)
{
struct vm_area_struct *ret = tsk->mm->mmap;
if (ret)
return ret;
return gate_vma;
}
/*
* Helper function for iterating across a vma list. It ensures that the caller
* will visit `gate_vma' prior to terminating the search.
*/
static struct vm_area_struct *next_vma(struct vm_area_struct *this_vma,
struct vm_area_struct *gate_vma)
{
struct vm_area_struct *ret;
ret = this_vma->vm_next;
if (ret)
return ret;
if (this_vma == gate_vma)
return NULL;
return gate_vma;
}
static void fill_extnum_info(struct elfhdr *elf, struct elf_shdr *shdr4extnum,
elf_addr_t e_shoff, int segs)
{
elf->e_shoff = e_shoff;
elf->e_shentsize = sizeof(*shdr4extnum);
elf->e_shnum = 1;
elf->e_shstrndx = SHN_UNDEF;
memset(shdr4extnum, 0, sizeof(*shdr4extnum));
shdr4extnum->sh_type = SHT_NULL;
shdr4extnum->sh_size = elf->e_shnum;
shdr4extnum->sh_link = elf->e_shstrndx;
shdr4extnum->sh_info = segs;
}
/*
* Actual dumper
*
* This is a two-pass process; first we find the offsets of the bits,
* and then they are actually written out. If we run out of core limit
* we just truncate.
*/
static int elf_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm)
{
int has_dumped = 0;
mm_segment_t fs;
int segs, i;
size_t vma_data_size = 0;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *gate_vma;
struct elfhdr *elf = NULL;
loff_t offset = 0, dataoff;
struct elf_note_info info = { };
struct elf_phdr *phdr4note = NULL;
struct elf_shdr *shdr4extnum = NULL;
Elf_Half e_phnum;
elf_addr_t e_shoff;
elf_addr_t *vma_filesz = NULL;
/*
* We no longer stop all VM operations.
*
* This is because those proceses that could possibly change map_count
* or the mmap / vma pages are now blocked in do_exit on current
* finishing this core dump.
*
* Only ptrace can touch these memory addresses, but it doesn't change
* the map_count or the pages allocated. So no possibility of crashing
* exists while dumping the mm->vm_next areas to the core file.
*/
/* alloc memory for large data structures: too large to be on stack */
elf = kmalloc(sizeof(*elf), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elf)
goto out;
/*
* The number of segs are recored into ELF header as 16bit value.
* Please check DEFAULT_MAX_MAP_COUNT definition when you modify here.
*/
segs = current->mm->map_count;
segs += elf_core_extra_phdrs();
gate_vma = get_gate_vma(current->mm);
if (gate_vma != NULL)
segs++;
/* for notes section */
segs++;
/* If segs > PN_XNUM(0xffff), then e_phnum overflows. To avoid
* this, kernel supports extended numbering. Have a look at
* include/linux/elf.h for further information. */
e_phnum = segs > PN_XNUM ? PN_XNUM : segs;
/*
* Collect all the non-memory information about the process for the
* notes. This also sets up the file header.
*/
if (!fill_note_info(elf, e_phnum, &info, cprm->siginfo, cprm->regs))
goto cleanup;
has_dumped = 1;
fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
offset += sizeof(*elf); /* Elf header */
offset += segs * sizeof(struct elf_phdr); /* Program headers */
/* Write notes phdr entry */
{
size_t sz = get_note_info_size(&info);
sz += elf_coredump_extra_notes_size();
phdr4note = kmalloc(sizeof(*phdr4note), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!phdr4note)
goto end_coredump;
fill_elf_note_phdr(phdr4note, sz, offset);
offset += sz;
}
dataoff = offset = roundup(offset, ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE);
if (segs - 1 > ULONG_MAX / sizeof(*vma_filesz))
goto end_coredump;
vma_filesz = kvmalloc(array_size(sizeof(*vma_filesz), (segs - 1)),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(vma_filesz))
goto end_coredump;
for (i = 0, vma = first_vma(current, gate_vma); vma != NULL;
vma = next_vma(vma, gate_vma)) {
unsigned long dump_size;
dump_size = vma_dump_size(vma, cprm->mm_flags);
vma_filesz[i++] = dump_size;
vma_data_size += dump_size;
}
offset += vma_data_size;
offset += elf_core_extra_data_size();
e_shoff = offset;
if (e_phnum == PN_XNUM) {
shdr4extnum = kmalloc(sizeof(*shdr4extnum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!shdr4extnum)
goto end_coredump;
fill_extnum_info(elf, shdr4extnum, e_shoff, segs);
}
offset = dataoff;
if (!dump_emit(cprm, elf, sizeof(*elf)))
goto end_coredump;
if (!dump_emit(cprm, phdr4note, sizeof(*phdr4note)))
goto end_coredump;
/* Write program headers for segments dump */
for (i = 0, vma = first_vma(current, gate_vma); vma != NULL;
vma = next_vma(vma, gate_vma)) {
struct elf_phdr phdr;
phdr.p_type = PT_LOAD;
phdr.p_offset = offset;
phdr.p_vaddr = vma->vm_start;
phdr.p_paddr = 0;
phdr.p_filesz = vma_filesz[i++];
phdr.p_memsz = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
offset += phdr.p_filesz;
phdr.p_flags = vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PF_R : 0;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
phdr.p_flags |= PF_W;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
phdr.p_flags |= PF_X;
phdr.p_align = ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE;
if (!dump_emit(cprm, &phdr, sizeof(phdr)))
goto end_coredump;
}
if (!elf_core_write_extra_phdrs(cprm, offset))
goto end_coredump;
/* write out the notes section */
if (!write_note_info(&info, cprm))
goto end_coredump;
if (elf_coredump_extra_notes_write(cprm))
goto end_coredump;
[PATCH] Support piping into commands in /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern Using the infrastructure created in previous patches implement support to pipe core dumps into programs. This is done by overloading the existing core_pattern sysctl with a new syntax: |program When the first character of the pattern is a '|' the kernel will instead threat the rest of the pattern as a command to run. The core dump will be written to the standard input of that program instead of to a file. This is useful for having automatic core dump analysis without filling up disks. The program can do some simple analysis and save only a summary of the core dump. The core dump proces will run with the privileges and in the name space of the process that caused the core dump. I also increased the core pattern size to 128 bytes so that longer command lines fit. Most of the changes comes from allowing core dumps without seeks. They are fairly straight forward though. One small incompatibility is that if someone had a core pattern previously that started with '|' they will get suddenly new behaviour. I think that's unlikely to be a real problem though. Additional background: > Very nice, do you happen to have a program that can accept this kind of > input for crash dumps? I'm guessing that the embedded people will > really want this functionality. I had a cheesy demo/prototype. Basically it wrote the dump to a file again, ran gdb on it to get a backtrace and wrote the summary to a shared directory. Then there was a simple CGI script to generate a "top 10" crashes HTML listing. Unfortunately this still had the disadvantage to needing full disk space for a dump except for deleting it afterwards (in fact it was worse because over the pipe holes didn't work so if you have a holey address map it would require more space). Fortunately gdb seems to be happy to handle /proc/pid/fd/xxx input pipes as cores (at least it worked with zsh's =(cat core) syntax), so it would be likely possible to do it without temporary space with a simple wrapper that calls it in the right way. I ran out of time before doing that though. The demo prototype scripts weren't very good. If there is really interest I can dig them out (they are currently on a laptop disk on the desk with the laptop itself being in service), but I would recommend to rewrite them for any serious application of this and fix the disk space problem. Also to be really useful it should probably find a way to automatically fetch the debuginfos (I cheated and just installed them in advance). If nobody else does it I can probably do the rewrite myself again at some point. My hope at some point was that desktops would support it in their builtin crash reporters, but at least the KDE people I talked too seemed to be happy with their user space only solution. Alan sayeth: I don't believe that piping as such as neccessarily the right model, but the ability to intercept and processes core dumps from user space is asked for by many enterprise users as well. They want to know about, capture, analyse and process core dumps, often centrally and in automated form. [akpm@osdl.org: loff_t != unsigned long] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-01 14:29:28 +08:00
/* Align to page */
if (!dump_skip(cprm, dataoff - cprm->pos))
goto end_coredump;
for (i = 0, vma = first_vma(current, gate_vma); vma != NULL;
vma = next_vma(vma, gate_vma)) {
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long end;
end = vma->vm_start + vma_filesz[i++];
for (addr = vma->vm_start; addr < end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
struct page *page;
int stop;
page = get_dump_page(addr);
if (page) {
void *kaddr = kmap(page);
stop = !dump_emit(cprm, kaddr, PAGE_SIZE);
kunmap(page);
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 20:29:47 +08:00
put_page(page);
} else
stop = !dump_skip(cprm, PAGE_SIZE);
if (stop)
goto end_coredump;
}
}
dump_truncate(cprm);
if (!elf_core_write_extra_data(cprm))
goto end_coredump;
if (e_phnum == PN_XNUM) {
if (!dump_emit(cprm, shdr4extnum, sizeof(*shdr4extnum)))
goto end_coredump;
}
end_coredump:
set_fs(fs);
cleanup:
free_note_info(&info);
kfree(shdr4extnum);
kvfree(vma_filesz);
kfree(phdr4note);
kfree(elf);
out:
return has_dumped;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ELF_CORE */
static int __init init_elf_binfmt(void)
{
register_binfmt(&elf_format);
return 0;
}
static void __exit exit_elf_binfmt(void)
{
/* Remove the COFF and ELF loaders. */
unregister_binfmt(&elf_format);
}
core_initcall(init_elf_binfmt);
module_exit(exit_elf_binfmt);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");