OpenCloudOS-Kernel/include/linux/bpf.h

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/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_BPF_H
#define _LINUX_BPF_H 1
#include <uapi/linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
struct bpf_map;
/* map is generic key/value storage optionally accesible by eBPF programs */
struct bpf_map_ops {
/* funcs callable from userspace (via syscall) */
struct bpf_map *(*map_alloc)(union bpf_attr *attr);
void (*map_free)(struct bpf_map *);
int (*map_get_next_key)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *next_key);
/* funcs callable from userspace and from eBPF programs */
void *(*map_lookup_elem)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key);
int (*map_update_elem)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, u64 flags);
int (*map_delete_elem)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key);
};
struct bpf_map {
atomic_t refcnt;
enum bpf_map_type map_type;
u32 key_size;
u32 value_size;
u32 max_entries;
const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
struct work_struct work;
};
struct bpf_map_type_list {
struct list_head list_node;
const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
enum bpf_map_type type;
};
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* function argument constraints */
enum bpf_arg_type {
ARG_DONTCARE = 0, /* unused argument in helper function */
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* the following constraints used to prototype
* bpf_map_lookup/update/delete_elem() functions
*/
ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, /* const argument used as pointer to bpf_map */
ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, /* pointer to stack used as map key */
ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, /* pointer to stack used as map value */
/* the following constraints used to prototype bpf_memcmp() and other
* functions that access data on eBPF program stack
*/
ARG_PTR_TO_STACK, /* any pointer to eBPF program stack */
ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE, /* number of bytes accessed from stack */
ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, /* pointer to context */
ARG_ANYTHING, /* any (initialized) argument is ok */
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
};
/* type of values returned from helper functions */
enum bpf_return_type {
RET_INTEGER, /* function returns integer */
RET_VOID, /* function doesn't return anything */
RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, /* returns a pointer to map elem value or NULL */
};
/* eBPF function prototype used by verifier to allow BPF_CALLs from eBPF programs
* to in-kernel helper functions and for adjusting imm32 field in BPF_CALL
* instructions after verifying
*/
struct bpf_func_proto {
u64 (*func)(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5);
bool gpl_only;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
enum bpf_return_type ret_type;
enum bpf_arg_type arg1_type;
enum bpf_arg_type arg2_type;
enum bpf_arg_type arg3_type;
enum bpf_arg_type arg4_type;
enum bpf_arg_type arg5_type;
};
/* bpf_context is intentionally undefined structure. Pointer to bpf_context is
* the first argument to eBPF programs.
* For socket filters: 'struct bpf_context *' == 'struct sk_buff *'
*/
struct bpf_context;
enum bpf_access_type {
BPF_READ = 1,
BPF_WRITE = 2
};
struct bpf_verifier_ops {
/* return eBPF function prototype for verification */
const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* return true if 'size' wide access at offset 'off' within bpf_context
* with 'type' (read or write) is allowed
*/
bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type);
u32 (*convert_ctx_access)(int dst_reg, int src_reg, int ctx_off,
struct bpf_insn *insn);
};
struct bpf_prog_type_list {
struct list_head list_node;
const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;
enum bpf_prog_type type;
};
struct bpf_prog;
struct bpf_prog_aux {
atomic_t refcnt;
u32 used_map_cnt;
const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;
struct bpf_map **used_maps;
struct bpf_prog *prog;
struct work_struct work;
};
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
struct bpf_array {
struct bpf_map map;
u32 elem_size;
/* 'ownership' of prog_array is claimed by the first program that
* is going to use this map or by the first program which FD is stored
* in the map to make sure that all callers and callees have the same
* prog_type and JITed flag
*/
enum bpf_prog_type owner_prog_type;
bool owner_jited;
union {
char value[0] __aligned(8);
struct bpf_prog *prog[0] __aligned(8);
};
};
#define MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT 32
u64 bpf_tail_call(u64 ctx, u64 r2, u64 index, u64 r4, u64 r5);
void bpf_prog_array_map_clear(struct bpf_map *map);
bool bpf_prog_array_compatible(struct bpf_array *array, const struct bpf_prog *fp);
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
void bpf_register_prog_type(struct bpf_prog_type_list *tl);
void bpf_register_map_type(struct bpf_map_type_list *tl);
struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd);
void bpf_prog_put(struct bpf_prog *prog);
struct bpf_map *bpf_map_get(struct fd f);
void bpf_map_put(struct bpf_map *map);
/* verify correctness of eBPF program */
int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **fp, union bpf_attr *attr);
#else
static inline void bpf_register_prog_type(struct bpf_prog_type_list *tl)
{
}
static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
{
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
static inline void bpf_prog_put(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
}
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
/* verifier prototypes for helper functions called from eBPF programs */
extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto;
extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_update_elem_proto;
extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_delete_elem_proto;
extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_prandom_u32_proto;
extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_smp_processor_id_proto;
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tail_call_proto;
#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_H */