OpenCloudOS-Kernel/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S

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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active. Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available (CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR (0xc0010131, bit 0). This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly. After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-10-20 22:30:54 +08:00
/*
* AMD Memory Encryption Support
*
* Copyright (C) 2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
*
* Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
.text
.code32
x86/asm: Change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_* These are all functions which are invoked from elsewhere, so annotate them as global using the new SYM_FUNC_START and their ENDPROC's by SYM_FUNC_END. Make sure ENTRY/ENDPROC is not defined on X86_64, given these were the last users. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [hibernate] Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> [xen bits] Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [crypto] Cc: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011115108.12392-25-jslaby@suse.cz
2019-10-11 19:51:04 +08:00
SYM_FUNC_START(get_sev_encryption_bit)
x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active. Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available (CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR (0xc0010131, bit 0). This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly. After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-10-20 22:30:54 +08:00
xor %eax, %eax
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
push %ebx
push %ecx
push %edx
/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
movl $1, %eax
cpuid
bt $31, %ecx /* Check the hypervisor bit */
jnc .Lno_sev
movl $0x80000000, %eax /* CPUID to check the highest leaf */
cpuid
cmpl $0x8000001f, %eax /* See if 0x8000001f is available */
jb .Lno_sev
/*
* Check for the SEV feature:
* CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 1
* CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
* Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
*/
movl $0x8000001f, %eax
cpuid
bt $1, %eax /* Check if SEV is available */
jnc .Lno_sev
movl $MSR_AMD64_SEV, %ecx /* Read the SEV MSR */
rdmsr
bt $MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT, %eax /* Check if SEV is active */
jnc .Lno_sev
movl %ebx, %eax
andl $0x3f, %eax /* Return the encryption bit location */
jmp .Lsev_exit
.Lno_sev:
xor %eax, %eax
.Lsev_exit:
pop %edx
pop %ecx
pop %ebx
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
ret
x86/asm: Change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_* These are all functions which are invoked from elsewhere, so annotate them as global using the new SYM_FUNC_START and their ENDPROC's by SYM_FUNC_END. Make sure ENTRY/ENDPROC is not defined on X86_64, given these were the last users. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [hibernate] Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> [xen bits] Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [crypto] Cc: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011115108.12392-25-jslaby@suse.cz
2019-10-11 19:51:04 +08:00
SYM_FUNC_END(get_sev_encryption_bit)
x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active. Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available (CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR (0xc0010131, bit 0). This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly. After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-10-20 22:30:54 +08:00
.code64
x86/asm: Change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_* These are all functions which are invoked from elsewhere, so annotate them as global using the new SYM_FUNC_START and their ENDPROC's by SYM_FUNC_END. Make sure ENTRY/ENDPROC is not defined on X86_64, given these were the last users. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [hibernate] Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> [xen bits] Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [crypto] Cc: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011115108.12392-25-jslaby@suse.cz
2019-10-11 19:51:04 +08:00
SYM_FUNC_START(set_sev_encryption_mask)
x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active. Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available (CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR (0xc0010131, bit 0). This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly. After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-10-20 22:30:54 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
push %rbp
push %rdx
movq %rsp, %rbp /* Save current stack pointer */
call get_sev_encryption_bit /* Get the encryption bit position */
testl %eax, %eax
jz .Lno_sev_mask
x86/boot: Fix SEV boot failure from change to __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT In arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c, CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT support was initially #undef'd to support SME with minimal effort. When support for SEV was added, the #undef remained and some minimal support for setting the encryption bit was added for building identity mapped pagetable entries. Commit b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52") changed __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT from 46 to 52 in support of 5-level paging. This change resulted in SEV guests failing to boot because the encryption bit was no longer being automatically masked out. The compressed boot path now requires sme_me_mask to be defined in order for the pagetable functions, such as pud_present(), to properly mask out the encryption bit (currently bit 47) when evaluating pagetable entries. Add an sme_me_mask variable in arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S, which is set when SEV is active, delete the #undef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT from arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c and use sme_me_mask when building the identify mapped pagetable entries. Fixes: b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52") Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180327220711.8702.55842.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
2018-03-28 06:07:11 +08:00
bts %rax, sme_me_mask(%rip) /* Create the encryption mask */
x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active. Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available (CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR (0xc0010131, bit 0). This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly. After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-10-20 22:30:54 +08:00
.Lno_sev_mask:
movq %rbp, %rsp /* Restore original stack pointer */
pop %rdx
pop %rbp
#endif
x86/boot: Fix SEV boot failure from change to __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT In arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c, CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT support was initially #undef'd to support SME with minimal effort. When support for SEV was added, the #undef remained and some minimal support for setting the encryption bit was added for building identity mapped pagetable entries. Commit b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52") changed __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT from 46 to 52 in support of 5-level paging. This change resulted in SEV guests failing to boot because the encryption bit was no longer being automatically masked out. The compressed boot path now requires sme_me_mask to be defined in order for the pagetable functions, such as pud_present(), to properly mask out the encryption bit (currently bit 47) when evaluating pagetable entries. Add an sme_me_mask variable in arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S, which is set when SEV is active, delete the #undef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT from arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c and use sme_me_mask when building the identify mapped pagetable entries. Fixes: b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52") Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180327220711.8702.55842.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
2018-03-28 06:07:11 +08:00
xor %rax, %rax
x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active. Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available (CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR (0xc0010131, bit 0). This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly. After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-10-20 22:30:54 +08:00
ret
x86/asm: Change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_* These are all functions which are invoked from elsewhere, so annotate them as global using the new SYM_FUNC_START and their ENDPROC's by SYM_FUNC_END. Make sure ENTRY/ENDPROC is not defined on X86_64, given these were the last users. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [hibernate] Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> [xen bits] Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [crypto] Cc: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011115108.12392-25-jslaby@suse.cz
2019-10-11 19:51:04 +08:00
SYM_FUNC_END(set_sev_encryption_mask)
x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active. Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available (CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR (0xc0010131, bit 0). This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly. After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-10-20 22:30:54 +08:00
.data
x86/boot: Fix SEV boot failure from change to __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT In arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c, CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT support was initially #undef'd to support SME with minimal effort. When support for SEV was added, the #undef remained and some minimal support for setting the encryption bit was added for building identity mapped pagetable entries. Commit b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52") changed __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT from 46 to 52 in support of 5-level paging. This change resulted in SEV guests failing to boot because the encryption bit was no longer being automatically masked out. The compressed boot path now requires sme_me_mask to be defined in order for the pagetable functions, such as pud_present(), to properly mask out the encryption bit (currently bit 47) when evaluating pagetable entries. Add an sme_me_mask variable in arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S, which is set when SEV is active, delete the #undef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT from arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c and use sme_me_mask when building the identify mapped pagetable entries. Fixes: b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52") Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180327220711.8702.55842.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
2018-03-28 06:07:11 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
.balign 8
SYM_DATA(sme_me_mask, .quad 0)
x86/boot: Fix SEV boot failure from change to __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT In arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c, CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT support was initially #undef'd to support SME with minimal effort. When support for SEV was added, the #undef remained and some minimal support for setting the encryption bit was added for building identity mapped pagetable entries. Commit b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52") changed __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT from 46 to 52 in support of 5-level paging. This change resulted in SEV guests failing to boot because the encryption bit was no longer being automatically masked out. The compressed boot path now requires sme_me_mask to be defined in order for the pagetable functions, such as pud_present(), to properly mask out the encryption bit (currently bit 47) when evaluating pagetable entries. Add an sme_me_mask variable in arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S, which is set when SEV is active, delete the #undef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT from arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c and use sme_me_mask when building the identify mapped pagetable entries. Fixes: b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52") Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180327220711.8702.55842.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
2018-03-28 06:07:11 +08:00
#endif