License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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2007-12-14 09:35:10 +08:00
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#ifndef __KVM_X86_MMU_H
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#define __KVM_X86_MMU_H
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2007-12-16 17:02:48 +08:00
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#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
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2009-12-07 18:16:48 +08:00
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#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
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2020-07-10 23:48:03 +08:00
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#include "cpuid.h"
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2007-12-14 09:35:10 +08:00
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2008-04-25 10:17:08 +08:00
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#define PT64_PT_BITS 9
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#define PT64_ENT_PER_PAGE (1 << PT64_PT_BITS)
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#define PT32_PT_BITS 10
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#define PT32_ENT_PER_PAGE (1 << PT32_PT_BITS)
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#define PT_WRITABLE_SHIFT 1
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2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
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#define PT_USER_SHIFT 2
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2008-04-25 10:17:08 +08:00
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#define PT_PRESENT_MASK (1ULL << 0)
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#define PT_WRITABLE_MASK (1ULL << PT_WRITABLE_SHIFT)
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2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
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#define PT_USER_MASK (1ULL << PT_USER_SHIFT)
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2008-04-25 10:17:08 +08:00
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#define PT_PWT_MASK (1ULL << 3)
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#define PT_PCD_MASK (1ULL << 4)
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2008-05-15 18:51:35 +08:00
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#define PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT 5
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#define PT_ACCESSED_MASK (1ULL << PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT)
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2012-09-12 18:44:53 +08:00
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#define PT_DIRTY_SHIFT 6
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#define PT_DIRTY_MASK (1ULL << PT_DIRTY_SHIFT)
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2012-09-13 01:46:56 +08:00
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#define PT_PAGE_SIZE_SHIFT 7
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#define PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK (1ULL << PT_PAGE_SIZE_SHIFT)
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2008-04-25 10:17:08 +08:00
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#define PT_PAT_MASK (1ULL << 7)
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#define PT_GLOBAL_MASK (1ULL << 8)
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#define PT64_NX_SHIFT 63
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#define PT64_NX_MASK (1ULL << PT64_NX_SHIFT)
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#define PT_PAT_SHIFT 7
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#define PT_DIR_PAT_SHIFT 12
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#define PT_DIR_PAT_MASK (1ULL << PT_DIR_PAT_SHIFT)
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#define PT32_DIR_PSE36_SIZE 4
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#define PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT 13
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#define PT32_DIR_PSE36_MASK \
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(((1ULL << PT32_DIR_PSE36_SIZE) - 1) << PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT)
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2017-08-24 20:27:55 +08:00
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#define PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL 5
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2017-08-24 20:27:54 +08:00
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#define PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL 4
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2008-04-25 10:17:08 +08:00
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#define PT32_ROOT_LEVEL 2
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#define PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL 3
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2021-09-19 10:42:46 +08:00
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#define KVM_MMU_CR4_ROLE_BITS (X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57 | \
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X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE)
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2021-06-23 01:57:02 +08:00
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#define KVM_MMU_CR0_ROLE_BITS (X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP)
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2022-02-09 17:56:05 +08:00
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#define KVM_MMU_EFER_ROLE_BITS (EFER_LME | EFER_NX)
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2021-06-23 01:57:02 +08:00
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2021-01-14 04:45:15 +08:00
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static __always_inline u64 rsvd_bits(int s, int e)
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2014-09-01 18:44:04 +08:00
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{
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2021-01-14 04:45:15 +08:00
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BUILD_BUG_ON(__builtin_constant_p(e) && __builtin_constant_p(s) && e < s);
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if (__builtin_constant_p(e))
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BUILD_BUG_ON(e > 63);
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else
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e &= 63;
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2017-08-24 20:27:53 +08:00
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if (e < s)
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return 0;
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2020-12-22 18:20:43 +08:00
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return ((2ULL << (e - s)) - 1) << s;
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2014-09-01 18:44:04 +08:00
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}
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KVM: x86/mmu: Do not create SPTEs for GFNs that exceed host.MAXPHYADDR
Disallow memslots and MMIO SPTEs whose gpa range would exceed the host's
MAXPHYADDR, i.e. don't create SPTEs for gfns that exceed host.MAXPHYADDR.
The TDP MMU bounds its zapping based on host.MAXPHYADDR, and so if the
guest, possibly with help from userspace, manages to coerce KVM into
creating a SPTE for an "impossible" gfn, KVM will leak the associated
shadow pages (page tables):
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 1122 at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:57
kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu+0x4b/0x60 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 10 PID: 1122 Comm: set_memory_regi Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc1+ #293
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu+0x4b/0x60 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x130/0x1b0 [kvm]
kvm_destroy_vm+0x162/0x2d0 [kvm]
kvm_vm_release+0x1d/0x30 [kvm]
__fput+0x82/0x240
task_work_run+0x5b/0x90
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xd2/0xe0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
On bare metal, encountering an impossible gpa in the page fault path is
well and truly impossible, barring CPU bugs, as the CPU will signal #PF
during the gva=>gpa translation (or a similar failure when stuffing a
physical address into e.g. the VMCS/VMCB). But if KVM is running as a VM
itself, the MAXPHYADDR enumerated to KVM may not be the actual MAXPHYADDR
of the underlying hardware, in which case the hardware will not fault on
the illegal-from-KVM's-perspective gpa.
Alternatively, KVM could continue allowing the dodgy behavior and simply
zap the max possible range. But, for hosts with MAXPHYADDR < 52, that's
a (minor) waste of cycles, and more importantly, KVM can't reasonably
support impossible memslots when running on bare metal (or with an
accurate MAXPHYADDR as a VM). Note, limiting the overhead by checking if
KVM is running as a guest is not a safe option as the host isn't required
to announce itself to the guest in any way, e.g. doesn't need to set the
HYPERVISOR CPUID bit.
A second alternative to disallowing the memslot behavior would be to
disallow creating a VM with guest.MAXPHYADDR > host.MAXPHYADDR. That
restriction is undesirable as there are legitimate use cases for doing
so, e.g. using the highest host.MAXPHYADDR out of a pool of heterogeneous
systems so that VMs can be migrated between hosts with different
MAXPHYADDRs without running afoul of the allow_smaller_maxphyaddr mess.
Note that any guest.MAXPHYADDR is valid with shadow paging, and it is
even useful in order to test KVM with MAXPHYADDR=52 (i.e. without
any reserved physical address bits).
The now common kvm_mmu_max_gfn() is inclusive instead of exclusive.
The memslot and TDP MMU code want an exclusive value, but the name
implies the returned value is inclusive, and the MMIO path needs an
inclusive check.
Fixes: faaf05b00aec ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support zapping SPTEs in the TDP MMU")
Fixes: 524a1e4e381f ("KVM: x86/mmu: Don't leak non-leaf SPTEs when zapping all SPTEs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220428233416.2446833-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-04-29 07:34:16 +08:00
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/*
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* The number of non-reserved physical address bits irrespective of features
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* that repurpose legal bits, e.g. MKTME.
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*/
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extern u8 __read_mostly shadow_phys_bits;
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static inline gfn_t kvm_mmu_max_gfn(void)
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{
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/*
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* Note that this uses the host MAXPHYADDR, not the guest's.
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* EPT/NPT cannot support GPAs that would exceed host.MAXPHYADDR;
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* assuming KVM is running on bare metal, guest accesses beyond
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* host.MAXPHYADDR will hit a #PF(RSVD) and never cause a vmexit
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* (either EPT Violation/Misconfig or #NPF), and so KVM will never
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* install a SPTE for such addresses. If KVM is running as a VM
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* itself, on the other hand, it might see a MAXPHYADDR that is less
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* than hardware's real MAXPHYADDR. Using the host MAXPHYADDR
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* disallows such SPTEs entirely and simplifies the TDP MMU.
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*/
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int max_gpa_bits = likely(tdp_enabled) ? shadow_phys_bits : 52;
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return (1ULL << (max_gpa_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1;
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}
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2021-02-26 04:47:35 +08:00
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void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask);
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2021-02-26 04:47:42 +08:00
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void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only);
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2013-06-07 16:51:25 +08:00
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2021-06-10 07:42:33 +08:00
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void kvm_init_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
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2021-06-23 01:56:59 +08:00
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void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0,
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unsigned long cr4, u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3);
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2017-03-30 17:55:30 +08:00
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void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly,
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2021-11-24 20:20:49 +08:00
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int huge_page_level, bool accessed_dirty,
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gpa_t new_eptp);
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2017-06-09 11:13:40 +08:00
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bool kvm_can_do_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
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2017-07-14 09:30:40 +08:00
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int kvm_handle_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 error_code,
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2017-08-12 00:36:43 +08:00
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u64 fault_address, char *insn, int insn_len);
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2009-06-11 23:07:42 +08:00
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2021-03-05 09:10:59 +08:00
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int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
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void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
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2022-02-26 02:22:45 +08:00
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void kvm_mmu_free_obsolete_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
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2021-03-05 09:10:59 +08:00
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void kvm_mmu_sync_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
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2021-10-19 19:01:54 +08:00
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void kvm_mmu_sync_prev_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
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2021-03-05 09:10:59 +08:00
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2007-12-14 09:35:10 +08:00
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static inline int kvm_mmu_reload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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2022-02-21 22:28:33 +08:00
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if (likely(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa != INVALID_PAGE))
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2007-12-14 09:35:10 +08:00
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return 0;
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return kvm_mmu_load(vcpu);
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}
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2018-06-28 05:59:13 +08:00
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static inline unsigned long kvm_get_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr3)
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{
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BUILD_BUG_ON((X86_CR3_PCID_MASK & PAGE_MASK) != 0);
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return kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE)
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? cr3 & X86_CR3_PCID_MASK
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: 0;
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}
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static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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return kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
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}
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2020-03-03 17:11:10 +08:00
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static inline void kvm_mmu_load_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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2018-06-28 05:59:08 +08:00
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{
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2022-02-21 22:28:33 +08:00
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u64 root_hpa = vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa;
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2020-07-16 11:41:18 +08:00
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if (!VALID_PAGE(root_hpa))
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return;
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KVM: x86: Get active PCID only when writing a CR3 value
Retrieve the active PCID only when writing a guest CR3 value, i.e. don't
get the PCID when using EPT or NPT. The PCID is especially problematic
for EPT as the bits have different meaning, and so the PCID and must be
manually stripped, which is annoying and unnecessary. And on VMX,
getting the active PCID also involves reading the guest's CR3 and
CR4.PCIDE, i.e. may add pointless VMREADs.
Opportunistically rename the pgd/pgd_level params to root_hpa and
root_level to better reflect their new roles. Keep the function names,
as "load the guest PGD" is still accurate/correct.
Last, and probably least, pass root_hpa as a hpa_t/u64 instead of an
unsigned long. The EPTP holds a 64-bit value, even in 32-bit mode, so
in theory EPT could support HIGHMEM for 32-bit KVM. Never mind that
doing so would require changing the MMU page allocators and reworking
the MMU to use kmap().
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210305183123.3978098-2-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-03-06 02:31:13 +08:00
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static_call(kvm_x86_load_mmu_pgd)(vcpu, root_hpa,
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2022-02-10 20:41:19 +08:00
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vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level);
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2020-02-07 06:14:34 +08:00
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}
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KVM: MMU: Optimize pte permission checks
walk_addr_generic() permission checks are a maze of branchy code, which is
performed four times per lookup. It depends on the type of access, efer.nxe,
cr0.wp, cr4.smep, and in the near future, cr4.smap.
Optimize this away by precalculating all variants and storing them in a
bitmap. The bitmap is recalculated when rarely-changing variables change
(cr0, cr4) and is indexed by the often-changing variables (page fault error
code, pte access permissions).
The permission check is moved to the end of the loop, otherwise an SMEP
fault could be reported as a false positive, when PDE.U=1 but PTE.U=0.
Noted by Xiao Guangrong.
The result is short, branch-free code.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
2012-09-12 19:52:00 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-03-08 17:08:16 +08:00
|
|
|
* Check if a given access (described through the I/D, W/R and U/S bits of a
|
|
|
|
* page fault error code pfec) causes a permission fault with the given PTE
|
|
|
|
* access rights (in ACC_* format).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return zero if the access does not fault; return the page fault error code
|
|
|
|
* if the access faults.
|
KVM: MMU: Optimize pte permission checks
walk_addr_generic() permission checks are a maze of branchy code, which is
performed four times per lookup. It depends on the type of access, efer.nxe,
cr0.wp, cr4.smep, and in the near future, cr4.smap.
Optimize this away by precalculating all variants and storing them in a
bitmap. The bitmap is recalculated when rarely-changing variables change
(cr0, cr4) and is indexed by the often-changing variables (page fault error
code, pte access permissions).
The permission check is moved to the end of the loop, otherwise an SMEP
fault could be reported as a false positive, when PDE.U=1 but PTE.U=0.
Noted by Xiao Guangrong.
The result is short, branch-free code.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
2012-09-12 19:52:00 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-03-08 17:08:16 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
|
2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
|
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|
unsigned pte_access, unsigned pte_pkey,
|
2022-03-11 15:03:41 +08:00
|
|
|
u64 access)
|
2011-07-12 03:23:20 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-03-11 15:03:41 +08:00
|
|
|
/* strip nested paging fault error codes */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pfec = access;
|
2021-01-15 11:27:56 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long rflags = static_call(kvm_x86_get_rflags)(vcpu);
|
2014-04-01 17:46:34 +08:00
|
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|
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|
|
|
/*
|
2022-03-11 15:03:44 +08:00
|
|
|
* For explicit supervisor accesses, SMAP is disabled if EFLAGS.AC = 1.
|
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|
|
* For implicit supervisor accesses, SMAP cannot be overridden.
|
2014-04-01 17:46:34 +08:00
|
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|
*
|
2022-03-11 15:03:44 +08:00
|
|
|
* SMAP works on supervisor accesses only, and not_smap can
|
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|
|
* be set or not set when user access with neither has any bearing
|
|
|
|
* on the result.
|
2014-04-01 17:46:34 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2022-03-11 15:03:44 +08:00
|
|
|
* We put the SMAP checking bit in place of the PFERR_RSVD_MASK bit;
|
|
|
|
* this bit will always be zero in pfec, but it will be one in index
|
|
|
|
* if SMAP checks are being disabled.
|
2014-04-01 17:46:34 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-03-11 15:03:44 +08:00
|
|
|
u64 implicit_access = access & PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS;
|
|
|
|
bool not_smap = ((rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC) | implicit_access) == X86_EFLAGS_AC;
|
|
|
|
int index = (pfec + (not_smap << PFERR_RSVD_BIT)) >> 1;
|
2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
|
|
|
bool fault = (mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1;
|
2016-03-25 21:19:35 +08:00
|
|
|
u32 errcode = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
|
2014-04-01 17:46:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ON(pfec & (PFERR_PK_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK));
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(mmu->pkru_mask)) {
|
|
|
|
u32 pkru_bits, offset;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* PKRU defines 32 bits, there are 16 domains and 2
|
|
|
|
* attribute bits per domain in pkru. pte_pkey is the
|
|
|
|
* index of the protection domain, so pte_pkey * 2 is
|
|
|
|
* is the index of the first bit for the domain.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-24 05:14:38 +08:00
|
|
|
pkru_bits = (vcpu->arch.pkru >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3;
|
2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* clear present bit, replace PFEC.RSVD with ACC_USER_MASK. */
|
2016-03-25 21:19:35 +08:00
|
|
|
offset = (pfec & ~1) +
|
2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
|
|
|
((pte_access & PT_USER_MASK) << (PFERR_RSVD_BIT - PT_USER_SHIFT));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkru_bits &= mmu->pkru_mask >> offset;
|
2016-03-25 21:19:35 +08:00
|
|
|
errcode |= -pkru_bits & PFERR_PK_MASK;
|
2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
|
|
|
fault |= (pkru_bits != 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-25 21:19:35 +08:00
|
|
|
return -(u32)fault & errcode;
|
2011-07-12 03:23:20 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
KVM: MMU: Optimize pte permission checks
walk_addr_generic() permission checks are a maze of branchy code, which is
performed four times per lookup. It depends on the type of access, efer.nxe,
cr0.wp, cr4.smep, and in the near future, cr4.smap.
Optimize this away by precalculating all variants and storing them in a
bitmap. The bitmap is recalculated when rarely-changing variables change
(cr0, cr4) and is indexed by the often-changing variables (page fault error
code, pte access permissions).
The permission check is moved to the end of the loop, otherwise an SMEP
fault could be reported as a false positive, when PDE.U=1 but PTE.U=0.
Noted by Xiao Guangrong.
The result is short, branch-free code.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
2012-09-12 19:52:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-13 14:42:27 +08:00
|
|
|
void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end);
|
2016-02-24 17:51:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-06-23 04:20:31 +08:00
|
|
|
int kvm_arch_write_log_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
|
2019-11-05 03:26:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
|
|
|
|
void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-16 00:30:21 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline bool kvm_shadow_root_allocated(struct kvm *kvm)
|
2021-05-19 01:34:13 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2021-05-19 01:34:14 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-10-16 00:30:21 +08:00
|
|
|
* Read shadow_root_allocated before related pointers. Hence, threads
|
|
|
|
* reading shadow_root_allocated in any lock context are guaranteed to
|
|
|
|
* see the pointers. Pairs with smp_store_release in
|
|
|
|
* mmu_first_shadow_root_alloc.
|
2021-05-19 01:34:14 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-10-16 00:30:21 +08:00
|
|
|
return smp_load_acquire(&kvm->arch.shadow_root_allocated);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
|
|
|
|
static inline bool is_tdp_mmu_enabled(struct kvm *kvm) { return kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_enabled; }
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static inline bool is_tdp_mmu_enabled(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; }
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(struct kvm *kvm)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return !is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm) || kvm_shadow_root_allocated(kvm);
|
2021-05-19 01:34:13 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-07-31 06:04:51 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline gfn_t gfn_to_index(gfn_t gfn, gfn_t base_gfn, int level)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_4K) must be 0. */
|
|
|
|
return (gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level)) -
|
|
|
|
(base_gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long
|
|
|
|
__kvm_mmu_slot_lpages(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned long npages,
|
|
|
|
int level)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return gfn_to_index(slot->base_gfn + npages - 1,
|
|
|
|
slot->base_gfn, level) + 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long
|
|
|
|
kvm_mmu_slot_lpages(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, int level)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return __kvm_mmu_slot_lpages(slot, slot->npages, level);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-03 12:46:07 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline void kvm_update_page_stats(struct kvm *kvm, int level, int count)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
atomic64_add(count, &kvm->stat.pages[level - 1]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-11-24 20:20:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-03-11 15:03:41 +08:00
|
|
|
gpa_t translate_nested_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 access,
|
2021-11-24 20:20:45 +08:00
|
|
|
struct x86_exception *exception);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline gpa_t kvm_translate_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
|
|
|
|
struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
|
2022-03-11 15:03:41 +08:00
|
|
|
gpa_t gpa, u64 access,
|
2021-11-24 20:20:45 +08:00
|
|
|
struct x86_exception *exception)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (mmu != &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu)
|
|
|
|
return gpa;
|
|
|
|
return translate_nested_gpa(vcpu, gpa, access, exception);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-14 09:35:10 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|