OpenCloudOS-Kernel/fs/exec.c

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/*
* linux/fs/exec.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
*/
/*
* #!-checking implemented by tytso.
*/
/*
* Demand-loading implemented 01.12.91 - no need to read anything but
* the header into memory. The inode of the executable is put into
* "current->executable", and page faults do the actual loading. Clean.
*
* Once more I can proudly say that linux stood up to being changed: it
* was less than 2 hours work to get demand-loading completely implemented.
*
* Demand loading changed July 1993 by Eric Youngdale. Use mmap instead,
* current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch
* table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep
* trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary
* formats.
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/a.out.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/rmap.h>
#include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/tlb.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_KMOD
#include <linux/kmod.h>
#endif
int core_uses_pid;
char core_pattern[CORENAME_MAX_SIZE] = "core";
[PATCH] setuid core dump Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 15:09:43 +08:00
int suid_dumpable = 0;
/* The maximal length of core_pattern is also specified in sysctl.c */
static LIST_HEAD(formats);
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(binfmt_lock);
int register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
{
if (!fmt)
return -EINVAL;
write_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_add(&fmt->lh, &formats);
write_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_binfmt);
void unregister_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
{
write_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_del(&fmt->lh);
write_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_binfmt);
static inline void put_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
{
module_put(fmt->module);
}
/*
* Note that a shared library must be both readable and executable due to
* security reasons.
*
* Also note that we take the address to load from from the file itself.
*/
asmlinkage long sys_uselib(const char __user * library)
{
struct file * file;
struct nameidata nd;
int error;
error = __user_path_lookup_open(library, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd, FMODE_READ|FMODE_EXEC);
if (error)
goto out;
error = -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(nd.path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
goto exit;
error = vfs_permission(&nd, MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
goto exit;
file = nameidata_to_filp(&nd, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE);
error = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
error = -ENOEXEC;
if(file->f_op) {
struct linux_binfmt * fmt;
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
if (!fmt->load_shlib)
continue;
if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
continue;
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
error = fmt->load_shlib(file);
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
put_binfmt(fmt);
if (error != -ENOEXEC)
break;
}
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
}
fput(file);
out:
return error;
exit:
release_open_intent(&nd);
path_put(&nd.path);
goto out;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
int write)
{
struct page *page;
int ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
if (write) {
ret = expand_stack_downwards(bprm->vma, pos);
if (ret < 0)
return NULL;
}
#endif
ret = get_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos,
1, write, 1, &page, NULL);
if (ret <= 0)
return NULL;
if (write) {
unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
struct rlimit *rlim;
/*
* We've historically supported up to 32 pages (ARG_MAX)
* of argument strings even with small stacks
*/
if (size <= ARG_MAX)
return page;
/*
* Limit to 1/4-th the stack size for the argv+env strings.
* This ensures that:
* - the remaining binfmt code will not run out of stack space,
* - the program will have a reasonable amount of stack left
* to work from.
*/
rlim = current->signal->rlim;
if (size > rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur / 4) {
put_page(page);
return NULL;
}
}
return page;
}
static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
{
put_page(page);
}
static void free_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int i)
{
}
static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
}
static void flush_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
struct page *page)
{
flush_cache_page(bprm->vma, pos, page_to_pfn(page));
}
static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int err = -ENOMEM;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
struct mm_struct *mm = bprm->mm;
bprm->vma = vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vma)
goto err;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma->vm_mm = mm;
/*
* Place the stack at the largest stack address the architecture
* supports. Later, we'll move this to an appropriate place. We don't
* use STACK_TOP because that can depend on attributes which aren't
* configured yet.
*/
vma->vm_end = STACK_TOP_MAX;
vma->vm_start = vma->vm_end - PAGE_SIZE;
vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
if (err) {
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
goto err;
}
mm->stack_vm = mm->total_vm = 1;
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
return 0;
err:
if (vma) {
bprm->vma = NULL;
kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
}
return err;
}
static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len)
{
return len <= MAX_ARG_STRLEN;
}
#else
static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
int write)
{
struct page *page;
page = bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE];
if (!page && write) {
page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER|__GFP_ZERO);
if (!page)
return NULL;
bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE] = page;
}
return page;
}
static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
{
}
static void free_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int i)
{
if (bprm->page[i]) {
__free_page(bprm->page[i]);
bprm->page[i] = NULL;
}
}
static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES; i++)
free_arg_page(bprm, i);
}
static void flush_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
struct page *page)
{
}
static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
bprm->p = PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *);
return 0;
}
static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len)
{
return len <= bprm->p;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
/*
* Create a new mm_struct and populate it with a temporary stack
* vm_area_struct. We don't have enough context at this point to set the stack
* flags, permissions, and offset, so we use temporary values. We'll update
* them later in setup_arg_pages().
*/
int bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int err;
struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
bprm->mm = mm = mm_alloc();
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!mm)
goto err;
err = init_new_context(current, mm);
if (err)
goto err;
err = __bprm_mm_init(bprm);
if (err)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
if (mm) {
bprm->mm = NULL;
mmdrop(mm);
}
return err;
}
/*
* count() counts the number of strings in array ARGV.
*/
static int count(char __user * __user * argv, int max)
{
int i = 0;
if (argv != NULL) {
for (;;) {
char __user * p;
if (get_user(p, argv))
return -EFAULT;
if (!p)
break;
argv++;
if(++i > max)
return -E2BIG;
cond_resched();
}
}
return i;
}
/*
* 'copy_strings()' copies argument/environment strings from the old
* processes's memory to the new process's stack. The call to get_user_pages()
* ensures the destination page is created and not swapped out.
*/
static int copy_strings(int argc, char __user * __user * argv,
struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct page *kmapped_page = NULL;
char *kaddr = NULL;
unsigned long kpos = 0;
int ret;
while (argc-- > 0) {
char __user *str;
int len;
unsigned long pos;
if (get_user(str, argv+argc) ||
!(len = strnlen_user(str, MAX_ARG_STRLEN))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (!valid_arg_len(bprm, len)) {
ret = -E2BIG;
goto out;
}
/* We're going to work our way backwords. */
pos = bprm->p;
str += len;
bprm->p -= len;
while (len > 0) {
int offset, bytes_to_copy;
offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE;
if (offset == 0)
offset = PAGE_SIZE;
bytes_to_copy = offset;
if (bytes_to_copy > len)
bytes_to_copy = len;
offset -= bytes_to_copy;
pos -= bytes_to_copy;
str -= bytes_to_copy;
len -= bytes_to_copy;
if (!kmapped_page || kpos != (pos & PAGE_MASK)) {
struct page *page;
page = get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 1);
if (!page) {
ret = -E2BIG;
goto out;
}
if (kmapped_page) {
flush_kernel_dcache_page(kmapped_page);
kunmap(kmapped_page);
put_arg_page(kmapped_page);
}
kmapped_page = page;
kaddr = kmap(kmapped_page);
kpos = pos & PAGE_MASK;
flush_arg_page(bprm, kpos, kmapped_page);
}
if (copy_from_user(kaddr+offset, str, bytes_to_copy)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
if (kmapped_page) {
flush_kernel_dcache_page(kmapped_page);
kunmap(kmapped_page);
put_arg_page(kmapped_page);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Like copy_strings, but get argv and its values from kernel memory.
*/
int copy_strings_kernel(int argc,char ** argv, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int r;
mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
r = copy_strings(argc, (char __user * __user *)argv, bprm);
set_fs(oldfs);
return r;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_strings_kernel);
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
/*
* During bprm_mm_init(), we create a temporary stack at STACK_TOP_MAX. Once
* the binfmt code determines where the new stack should reside, we shift it to
* its final location. The process proceeds as follows:
*
* 1) Use shift to calculate the new vma endpoints.
* 2) Extend vma to cover both the old and new ranges. This ensures the
* arguments passed to subsequent functions are consistent.
* 3) Move vma's page tables to the new range.
* 4) Free up any cleared pgd range.
* 5) Shrink the vma to cover only the new range.
*/
static int shift_arg_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long shift)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
unsigned long old_start = vma->vm_start;
unsigned long old_end = vma->vm_end;
unsigned long length = old_end - old_start;
unsigned long new_start = old_start - shift;
unsigned long new_end = old_end - shift;
struct mmu_gather *tlb;
BUG_ON(new_start > new_end);
/*
* ensure there are no vmas between where we want to go
* and where we are
*/
if (vma != find_vma(mm, new_start))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* cover the whole range: [new_start, old_end)
*/
vma_adjust(vma, new_start, old_end, vma->vm_pgoff, NULL);
/*
* move the page tables downwards, on failure we rely on
* process cleanup to remove whatever mess we made.
*/
if (length != move_page_tables(vma, old_start,
vma, new_start, length))
return -ENOMEM;
lru_add_drain();
tlb = tlb_gather_mmu(mm, 0);
if (new_end > old_start) {
/*
* when the old and new regions overlap clear from new_end.
*/
free_pgd_range(&tlb, new_end, old_end, new_end,
vma->vm_next ? vma->vm_next->vm_start : 0);
} else {
/*
* otherwise, clean from old_start; this is done to not touch
* the address space in [new_end, old_start) some architectures
* have constraints on va-space that make this illegal (IA64) -
* for the others its just a little faster.
*/
free_pgd_range(&tlb, old_start, old_end, new_end,
vma->vm_next ? vma->vm_next->vm_start : 0);
}
tlb_finish_mmu(tlb, new_end, old_end);
/*
* shrink the vma to just the new range.
*/
vma_adjust(vma, new_start, new_end, vma->vm_pgoff, NULL);
return 0;
}
#define EXTRA_STACK_VM_PAGES 20 /* random */
/*
* Finalizes the stack vm_area_struct. The flags and permissions are updated,
* the stack is optionally relocated, and some extra space is added.
*/
int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
unsigned long stack_top,
int executable_stack)
{
unsigned long ret;
unsigned long stack_shift;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = bprm->vma;
struct vm_area_struct *prev = NULL;
unsigned long vm_flags;
unsigned long stack_base;
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
/* Limit stack size to 1GB */
stack_base = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_max;
if (stack_base > (1 << 30))
stack_base = 1 << 30;
/* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */
if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base)
return -ENOMEM;
stack_base = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top - stack_base);
stack_shift = vma->vm_start - stack_base;
mm->arg_start = bprm->p - stack_shift;
bprm->p = vma->vm_end - stack_shift;
#else
stack_top = arch_align_stack(stack_top);
stack_top = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top);
stack_shift = vma->vm_end - stack_top;
bprm->p -= stack_shift;
mm->arg_start = bprm->p;
#endif
if (bprm->loader)
bprm->loader -= stack_shift;
bprm->exec -= stack_shift;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
/*
* Adjust stack execute permissions; explicitly enable for
* EXSTACK_ENABLE_X, disable for EXSTACK_DISABLE_X and leave alone
* (arch default) otherwise.
*/
if (unlikely(executable_stack == EXSTACK_ENABLE_X))
vm_flags |= VM_EXEC;
else if (executable_stack == EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
vm_flags |= mm->def_flags;
ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
vm_flags);
if (ret)
goto out_unlock;
BUG_ON(prev != vma);
/* Move stack pages down in memory. */
if (stack_shift) {
ret = shift_arg_pages(vma, stack_shift);
if (ret) {
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
stack_base = vma->vm_end + EXTRA_STACK_VM_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE;
#else
stack_base = vma->vm_start - EXTRA_STACK_VM_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE;
#endif
ret = expand_stack(vma, stack_base);
if (ret)
ret = -EFAULT;
out_unlock:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_arg_pages);
#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
{
struct nameidata nd;
int err;
struct file *file;
err = path_lookup_open(AT_FDCWD, name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd, FMODE_READ|FMODE_EXEC);
file = ERR_PTR(err);
if (!err) {
struct inode *inode = nd.path.dentry->d_inode;
file = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
int err = vfs_permission(&nd, MAY_EXEC);
file = ERR_PTR(err);
if (!err) {
file = nameidata_to_filp(&nd,
O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE);
if (!IS_ERR(file)) {
err = deny_write_access(file);
if (err) {
fput(file);
file = ERR_PTR(err);
}
}
out:
return file;
}
}
release_open_intent(&nd);
path_put(&nd.path);
}
goto out;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(open_exec);
int kernel_read(struct file *file, unsigned long offset,
char *addr, unsigned long count)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs;
loff_t pos = offset;
int result;
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs(get_ds());
/* The cast to a user pointer is valid due to the set_fs() */
result = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, count, &pos);
set_fs(old_fs);
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_read);
static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct * old_mm, *active_mm;
/* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */
tsk = current;
old_mm = current->mm;
mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
if (old_mm) {
/*
* Make sure that if there is a core dump in progress
* for the old mm, we get out and die instead of going
* through with the exec. We must hold mmap_sem around
* checking core_waiters and changing tsk->mm. The
* core-inducing thread will increment core_waiters for
* each thread whose ->mm == old_mm.
*/
down_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(old_mm->core_waiters)) {
up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
return -EINTR;
}
}
task_lock(tsk);
active_mm = tsk->active_mm;
tsk->mm = mm;
tsk->active_mm = mm;
activate_mm(active_mm, mm);
task_unlock(tsk);
mm_update_next_owner(old_mm);
arch_pick_mmap_layout(mm);
if (old_mm) {
up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
BUG_ON(active_mm != old_mm);
mmput(old_mm);
return 0;
}
mmdrop(active_mm);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function makes sure the current process has its own signal table,
* so that flush_signal_handlers can later reset the handlers without
* disturbing other processes. (Other processes might share the signal
* table via the CLONE_SIGHAND option to clone().)
*/
static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand;
spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock;
struct task_struct *leader = NULL;
int count;
if (thread_group_empty(tsk))
goto no_thread_group;
/*
* Kill all other threads in the thread group.
*/
spin_lock_irq(lock);
if (signal_group_exit(sig)) {
/*
* Another group action in progress, just
* return so that the signal is processed.
*/
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
return -EAGAIN;
}
sig->group_exit_task = tsk;
zap_other_threads(tsk);
/* Account for the thread group leader hanging around: */
count = thread_group_leader(tsk) ? 1 : 2;
sig->notify_count = count;
while (atomic_read(&sig->count) > count) {
__set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
schedule();
spin_lock_irq(lock);
}
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
/*
* At this point all other threads have exited, all we have to
* do is to wait for the thread group leader to become inactive,
* and to assume its PID:
*/
if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) {
leader = tsk->group_leader;
sig->notify_count = -1; /* for exit_notify() */
for (;;) {
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
if (likely(leader->exit_state))
break;
__set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
schedule();
}
if (unlikely(task_child_reaper(tsk) == leader))
task_active_pid_ns(tsk)->child_reaper = tsk;
/*
* The only record we have of the real-time age of a
* process, regardless of execs it's done, is start_time.
* All the past CPU time is accumulated in signal_struct
* from sister threads now dead. But in this non-leader
* exec, nothing survives from the original leader thread,
* whose birth marks the true age of this process now.
* When we take on its identity by switching to its PID, we
* also take its birthdate (always earlier than our own).
*/
tsk->start_time = leader->start_time;
BUG_ON(!same_thread_group(leader, tsk));
BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid(tsk));
/*
* An exec() starts a new thread group with the
* TGID of the previous thread group. Rehash the
* two threads with a switched PID, and release
* the former thread group leader:
*/
[PATCH] pidhash: kill switch_exec_pids switch_exec_pids is only called from de_thread by way of exec, and it is only called when we are exec'ing from a non thread group leader. Currently switch_exec_pids gives the leader the pid of the thread and unhashes and rehashes all of the process groups. The leader is already in the EXIT_DEAD state so no one cares about it's pids. The only concern for the leader is that __unhash_process called from release_task will function correctly. If we don't touch the leader at all we know that __unhash_process will work fine so there is no need to touch the leader. For the task becomming the thread group leader, we just need to give it the pid of the old thread group leader, add it to the task list, and attach it to the session and the process group of the thread group. Currently de_thread is also adding the task to the task list which is just silly. Currently the only leader of __detach_pid besides detach_pid is switch_exec_pids because of the ugly extra work that was being performed. So this patch removes switch_exec_pids because it is doing too much, it is creating an unnecessary special case in pid.c, duing work duplicated in de_thread, and generally obscuring what it is going on. The necessary work is added to de_thread, and it seems to be a little clearer there what is going on. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-29 08:11:03 +08:00
/* Become a process group leader with the old leader's pid.
* The old leader becomes a thread of the this thread group.
* Note: The old leader also uses this pid until release_task
[PATCH] pidhash: kill switch_exec_pids switch_exec_pids is only called from de_thread by way of exec, and it is only called when we are exec'ing from a non thread group leader. Currently switch_exec_pids gives the leader the pid of the thread and unhashes and rehashes all of the process groups. The leader is already in the EXIT_DEAD state so no one cares about it's pids. The only concern for the leader is that __unhash_process called from release_task will function correctly. If we don't touch the leader at all we know that __unhash_process will work fine so there is no need to touch the leader. For the task becomming the thread group leader, we just need to give it the pid of the old thread group leader, add it to the task list, and attach it to the session and the process group of the thread group. Currently de_thread is also adding the task to the task list which is just silly. Currently the only leader of __detach_pid besides detach_pid is switch_exec_pids because of the ugly extra work that was being performed. So this patch removes switch_exec_pids because it is doing too much, it is creating an unnecessary special case in pid.c, duing work duplicated in de_thread, and generally obscuring what it is going on. The necessary work is added to de_thread, and it seems to be a little clearer there what is going on. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-29 08:11:03 +08:00
* is called. Odd but simple and correct.
*/
detach_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_PID);
tsk->pid = leader->pid;
attach_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_PID, task_pid(leader));
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_PGID);
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_SID);
list_replace_rcu(&leader->tasks, &tsk->tasks);
tsk->group_leader = tsk;
leader->group_leader = tsk;
[PATCH] de_thread: Don't confuse users do_each_thread. Oleg Nesterov spotted two interesting bugs with the current de_thread code. The simplest is a long standing double decrement of __get_cpu_var(process_counts) in __unhash_process. Caused by two processes exiting when only one was created. The other is that since we no longer detach from the thread_group list it is possible for do_each_thread when run under the tasklist_lock to see the same task_struct twice. Once on the task list as a thread_group_leader, and once on the thread list of another thread. The double appearance in do_each_thread can cause a double increment of mm_core_waiters in zap_threads resulting in problems later on in coredump_wait. To remedy those two problems this patch takes the simple approach of changing the old thread group leader into a child thread. The only routine in release_task that cares is __unhash_process, and it can be trivially seen that we handle cleaning up a thread group leader properly. Since de_thread doesn't change the pid of the exiting leader process and instead shares it with the new leader process. I change thread_group_leader to recognize group leadership based on the group_leader field and not based on pids. This should also be slightly cheaper then the existing thread_group_leader macro. I performed a quick audit and I couldn't see any user of thread_group_leader that cared about the difference. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-04-11 07:16:49 +08:00
tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
BUG_ON(leader->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE);
leader->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD;
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
}
sig->group_exit_task = NULL;
sig->notify_count = 0;
no_thread_group:
exit_itimers(sig);
if (leader)
release_task(leader);
if (atomic_read(&oldsighand->count) != 1) {
struct sighand_struct *newsighand;
/*
* This ->sighand is shared with the CLONE_SIGHAND
* but not CLONE_THREAD task, switch to the new one.
*/
newsighand = kmem_cache_alloc(sighand_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newsighand)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_set(&newsighand->count, 1);
memcpy(newsighand->action, oldsighand->action,
sizeof(newsighand->action));
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
spin_lock(&oldsighand->siglock);
rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->sighand, newsighand);
spin_unlock(&oldsighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
signal/timer/event: signalfd core This patch series implements the new signalfd() system call. I took part of the original Linus code (and you know how badly it can be broken :), and I added even more breakage ;) Signals are fetched from the same signal queue used by the process, so signalfd will compete with standard kernel delivery in dequeue_signal(). If you want to reliably fetch signals on the signalfd file, you need to block them with sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK). This seems to be working fine on my Dual Opteron machine. I made a quick test program for it: http://www.xmailserver.org/signafd-test.c The signalfd() system call implements signal delivery into a file descriptor receiver. The signalfd file descriptor if created with the following API: int signalfd(int ufd, const sigset_t *mask, size_t masksize); The "ufd" parameter allows to change an existing signalfd sigmask, w/out going to close/create cycle (Linus idea). Use "ufd" == -1 if you want a brand new signalfd file. The "mask" allows to specify the signal mask of signals that we are interested in. The "masksize" parameter is the size of "mask". The signalfd fd supports the poll(2) and read(2) system calls. The poll(2) will return POLLIN when signals are available to be dequeued. As a direct consequence of supporting the Linux poll subsystem, the signalfd fd can use used together with epoll(2) too. The read(2) system call will return a "struct signalfd_siginfo" structure in the userspace supplied buffer. The return value is the number of bytes copied in the supplied buffer, or -1 in case of error. The read(2) call can also return 0, in case the sighand structure to which the signalfd was attached, has been orphaned. The O_NONBLOCK flag is also supported, and read(2) will return -EAGAIN in case no signal is available. If the size of the buffer passed to read(2) is lower than sizeof(struct signalfd_siginfo), -EINVAL is returned. A read from the signalfd can also return -ERESTARTSYS in case a signal hits the process. The format of the struct signalfd_siginfo is, and the valid fields depends of the (->code & __SI_MASK) value, in the same way a struct siginfo would: struct signalfd_siginfo { __u32 signo; /* si_signo */ __s32 err; /* si_errno */ __s32 code; /* si_code */ __u32 pid; /* si_pid */ __u32 uid; /* si_uid */ __s32 fd; /* si_fd */ __u32 tid; /* si_fd */ __u32 band; /* si_band */ __u32 overrun; /* si_overrun */ __u32 trapno; /* si_trapno */ __s32 status; /* si_status */ __s32 svint; /* si_int */ __u64 svptr; /* si_ptr */ __u64 utime; /* si_utime */ __u64 stime; /* si_stime */ __u64 addr; /* si_addr */ }; [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix signalfd_copyinfo() on i386] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-11 13:23:13 +08:00
__cleanup_sighand(oldsighand);
}
BUG_ON(!thread_group_leader(tsk));
return 0;
}
/*
* These functions flushes out all traces of the currently running executable
* so that a new one can be started
*/
static void flush_old_files(struct files_struct * files)
{
long j = -1;
struct fdtable *fdt;
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
for (;;) {
unsigned long set, i;
j++;
i = j * __NFDBITS;
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
break;
set = fdt->close_on_exec->fds_bits[j];
if (!set)
continue;
fdt->close_on_exec->fds_bits[j] = 0;
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
if (set & 1) {
sys_close(i);
}
}
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
}
char *get_task_comm(char *buf, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/* buf must be at least sizeof(tsk->comm) in size */
task_lock(tsk);
strncpy(buf, tsk->comm, sizeof(tsk->comm));
task_unlock(tsk);
return buf;
}
void set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, char *buf)
{
task_lock(tsk);
strlcpy(tsk->comm, buf, sizeof(tsk->comm));
task_unlock(tsk);
}
int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
char * name;
int i, ch, retval;
char tcomm[sizeof(current->comm)];
/*
* Make sure we have a private signal table and that
* we are unassociated from the previous thread group.
*/
retval = de_thread(current);
if (retval)
goto out;
set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
/*
* Release all of the old mmap stuff
*/
retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm);
if (retval)
goto out;
bprm->mm = NULL; /* We're using it now */
/* This is the point of no return */
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid)
set_dumpable(current->mm, 1);
[PATCH] setuid core dump Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 15:09:43 +08:00
else
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
[PATCH] setuid core dump Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 15:09:43 +08:00
name = bprm->filename;
/* Copies the binary name from after last slash */
for (i=0; (ch = *(name++)) != '\0';) {
if (ch == '/')
i = 0; /* overwrite what we wrote */
else
if (i < (sizeof(tcomm) - 1))
tcomm[i++] = ch;
}
tcomm[i] = '\0';
set_task_comm(current, tcomm);
current->flags &= ~PF_RANDOMIZE;
flush_thread();
/* Set the new mm task size. We have to do that late because it may
* depend on TIF_32BIT which is only updated in flush_thread() on
* some architectures like powerpc
*/
current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
if (bprm->e_uid != current->euid || bprm->e_gid != current->egid) {
suid_keys(current);
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
} else if (file_permission(bprm->file, MAY_READ) ||
(bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP)) {
suid_keys(current);
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
}
/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
group */
current->self_exec_id++;
flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
flush_old_files(current->files);
return 0;
out:
return retval;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(flush_old_exec);
/*
* Fill the binprm structure from the inode.
* Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes
*/
int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int mode;
struct inode * inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
int retval;
mode = inode->i_mode;
if (bprm->file->f_op == NULL)
return -EACCES;
bprm->e_uid = current->euid;
bprm->e_gid = current->egid;
if(!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
/* Set-uid? */
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->e_uid = inode->i_uid;
}
/* Set-gid? */
/*
* If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this
* is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
* executable.
*/
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->e_gid = inode->i_gid;
}
}
/* fill in binprm security blob */
retval = security_bprm_set(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
memset(bprm->buf,0,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file,0,bprm->buf,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_binprm);
static int unsafe_exec(struct task_struct *p)
{
int unsafe = 0;
if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP)
unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP;
else
unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE;
}
if (atomic_read(&p->fs->count) > 1 ||
atomic_read(&p->files->count) > 1 ||
atomic_read(&p->sighand->count) > 1)
unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
return unsafe;
}
void compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int unsafe;
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid) {
suid_keys(current);
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
}
exec_keys(current);
task_lock(current);
unsafe = unsafe_exec(current);
security_bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
task_unlock(current);
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(bprm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(compute_creds);
/*
* Arguments are '\0' separated strings found at the location bprm->p
* points to; chop off the first by relocating brpm->p to right after
* the first '\0' encountered.
*/
int remove_arg_zero(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned long offset;
char *kaddr;
struct page *page;
if (!bprm->argc)
return 0;
do {
offset = bprm->p & ~PAGE_MASK;
page = get_arg_page(bprm, bprm->p, 0);
if (!page) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0);
for (; offset < PAGE_SIZE && kaddr[offset];
offset++, bprm->p++)
;
kunmap_atomic(kaddr, KM_USER0);
put_arg_page(page);
if (offset == PAGE_SIZE)
free_arg_page(bprm, (bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1);
} while (offset == PAGE_SIZE);
bprm->p++;
bprm->argc--;
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_arg_zero);
/*
* cycle the list of binary formats handler, until one recognizes the image
*/
int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int try,retval;
struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
#if defined(__alpha__) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_AOUT)
/* handle /sbin/loader.. */
{
struct exec * eh = (struct exec *) bprm->buf;
if (!bprm->loader && eh->fh.f_magic == 0x183 &&
(eh->fh.f_flags & 0x3000) == 0x3000)
{
struct file * file;
unsigned long loader;
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
fput(bprm->file);
bprm->file = NULL;
loader = bprm->vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
file = open_exec("/sbin/loader");
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
return retval;
/* Remember if the application is TASO. */
bprm->sh_bang = eh->ah.entry < 0x100000000UL;
bprm->file = file;
bprm->loader = loader;
retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
if (retval<0)
return retval;
/* should call search_binary_handler recursively here,
but it does not matter */
}
}
#endif
retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* kernel module loader fixup */
/* so we don't try to load run modprobe in kernel space. */
set_fs(USER_DS);
retval = audit_bprm(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = -ENOENT;
for (try=0; try<2; try++) {
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
int (*fn)(struct linux_binprm *, struct pt_regs *) = fmt->load_binary;
if (!fn)
continue;
if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
continue;
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
retval = fn(bprm, regs);
if (retval >= 0) {
put_binfmt(fmt);
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
if (bprm->file)
fput(bprm->file);
bprm->file = NULL;
current->did_exec = 1;
proc_exec_connector(current);
return retval;
}
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
put_binfmt(fmt);
if (retval != -ENOEXEC || bprm->mm == NULL)
break;
if (!bprm->file) {
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
return retval;
}
}
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
if (retval != -ENOEXEC || bprm->mm == NULL) {
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_KMOD
}else{
#define printable(c) (((c)=='\t') || ((c)=='\n') || (0x20<=(c) && (c)<=0x7e))
if (printable(bprm->buf[0]) &&
printable(bprm->buf[1]) &&
printable(bprm->buf[2]) &&
printable(bprm->buf[3]))
break; /* -ENOEXEC */
request_module("binfmt-%04x", *(unsigned short *)(&bprm->buf[2]));
#endif
}
}
return retval;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(search_binary_handler);
/*
* sys_execve() executes a new program.
*/
int do_execve(char * filename,
char __user *__user *argv,
char __user *__user *envp,
struct pt_regs * regs)
{
struct linux_binprm *bprm;
struct file *file;
struct files_struct *displaced;
int retval;
retval = unshare_files(&displaced);
if (retval)
goto out_ret;
retval = -ENOMEM;
bprm = kzalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bprm)
goto out_files;
file = open_exec(filename);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out_kfree;
sched_exec();
bprm->file = file;
bprm->filename = filename;
bprm->interp = filename;
retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
if (retval)
goto out_file;
bprm->argc = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
if ((retval = bprm->argc) < 0)
goto out_mm;
bprm->envc = count(envp, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
if ((retval = bprm->envc) < 0)
goto out_mm;
retval = security_bprm_alloc(bprm);
if (retval)
goto out;
retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm->filename, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
bprm->exec = bprm->p;
retval = copy_strings(bprm->envc, envp, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
retval = copy_strings(bprm->argc, argv, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
retval = search_binary_handler(bprm,regs);
if (retval >= 0) {
/* execve success */
free_arg_pages(bprm);
security_bprm_free(bprm);
acct_update_integrals(current);
kfree(bprm);
if (displaced)
put_files_struct(displaced);
return retval;
}
out:
free_arg_pages(bprm);
if (bprm->security)
security_bprm_free(bprm);
out_mm:
if (bprm->mm)
mmput (bprm->mm);
out_file:
if (bprm->file) {
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
fput(bprm->file);
}
out_kfree:
kfree(bprm);
out_files:
if (displaced)
reset_files_struct(displaced);
out_ret:
return retval;
}
int set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new)
{
struct linux_binfmt *old = current->binfmt;
if (new) {
if (!try_module_get(new->module))
return -1;
}
current->binfmt = new;
if (old)
module_put(old->module);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_binfmt);
/* format_corename will inspect the pattern parameter, and output a
* name into corename, which must have space for at least
* CORENAME_MAX_SIZE bytes plus one byte for the zero terminator.
*/
static int format_corename(char *corename, const char *pattern, long signr)
{
const char *pat_ptr = pattern;
char *out_ptr = corename;
char *const out_end = corename + CORENAME_MAX_SIZE;
int rc;
int pid_in_pattern = 0;
int ispipe = 0;
if (*pattern == '|')
ispipe = 1;
/* Repeat as long as we have more pattern to process and more output
space */
while (*pat_ptr) {
if (*pat_ptr != '%') {
if (out_ptr == out_end)
goto out;
*out_ptr++ = *pat_ptr++;
} else {
switch (*++pat_ptr) {
case 0:
goto out;
/* Double percent, output one percent */
case '%':
if (out_ptr == out_end)
goto out;
*out_ptr++ = '%';
break;
/* pid */
case 'p':
pid_in_pattern = 1;
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
"%d", task_tgid_vnr(current));
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
break;
/* uid */
case 'u':
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
"%d", current->uid);
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
break;
/* gid */
case 'g':
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
"%d", current->gid);
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
break;
/* signal that caused the coredump */
case 's':
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
"%ld", signr);
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
break;
/* UNIX time of coredump */
case 't': {
struct timeval tv;
do_gettimeofday(&tv);
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
"%lu", tv.tv_sec);
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
break;
}
/* hostname */
case 'h':
down_read(&uts_sem);
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
"%s", utsname()->nodename);
up_read(&uts_sem);
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
break;
/* executable */
case 'e':
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
"%s", current->comm);
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
break;
/* core limit size */
case 'c':
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
"%lu", current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur);
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
break;
default:
break;
}
++pat_ptr;
}
}
/* Backward compatibility with core_uses_pid:
*
* If core_pattern does not include a %p (as is the default)
* and core_uses_pid is set, then .%pid will be appended to
* the filename. Do not do this for piped commands. */
if (!ispipe && !pid_in_pattern
&& (core_uses_pid || atomic_read(&current->mm->mm_users) != 1)) {
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
".%d", task_tgid_vnr(current));
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
}
out:
*out_ptr = 0;
return ispipe;
}
static void zap_process(struct task_struct *start)
{
struct task_struct *t;
start->signal->flags = SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT;
start->signal->group_stop_count = 0;
t = start;
do {
if (t != current && t->mm) {
t->mm->core_waiters++;
sigaddset(&t->pending.signal, SIGKILL);
signal_wake_up(t, 1);
}
} while ((t = next_thread(t)) != start);
}
static inline int zap_threads(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
int exit_code)
{
struct task_struct *g, *p;
unsigned long flags;
int err = -EAGAIN;
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
if (!signal_group_exit(tsk->signal)) {
tsk->signal->group_exit_code = exit_code;
zap_process(tsk);
err = 0;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
if (err)
return err;
if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) == mm->core_waiters + 1)
goto done;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_process(g) {
if (g == tsk->group_leader)
continue;
p = g;
do {
if (p->mm) {
if (p->mm == mm) {
/*
* p->sighand can't disappear, but
* may be changed by de_thread()
*/
lock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
zap_process(p);
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
}
break;
}
} while ((p = next_thread(p)) != g);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
done:
return mm->core_waiters;
}
static int coredump_wait(int exit_code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
struct completion startup_done;
struct completion *vfork_done;
int core_waiters;
init_completion(&mm->core_done);
init_completion(&startup_done);
mm->core_startup_done = &startup_done;
core_waiters = zap_threads(tsk, mm, exit_code);
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(core_waiters < 0))
goto fail;
/*
* Make sure nobody is waiting for us to release the VM,
* otherwise we can deadlock when we wait on each other
*/
vfork_done = tsk->vfork_done;
if (vfork_done) {
tsk->vfork_done = NULL;
complete(vfork_done);
}
if (core_waiters)
wait_for_completion(&startup_done);
fail:
BUG_ON(mm->core_waiters);
return core_waiters;
}
/*
* set_dumpable converts traditional three-value dumpable to two flags and
* stores them into mm->flags. It modifies lower two bits of mm->flags, but
* these bits are not changed atomically. So get_dumpable can observe the
* intermediate state. To avoid doing unexpected behavior, get get_dumpable
* return either old dumpable or new one by paying attention to the order of
* modifying the bits.
*
* dumpable | mm->flags (binary)
* old new | initial interim final
* ---------+-----------------------
* 0 1 | 00 01 01
* 0 2 | 00 10(*) 11
* 1 0 | 01 00 00
* 1 2 | 01 11 11
* 2 0 | 11 10(*) 00
* 2 1 | 11 11 01
*
* (*) get_dumpable regards interim value of 10 as 11.
*/
void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
{
switch (value) {
case 0:
clear_bit(MMF_DUMPABLE, &mm->flags);
smp_wmb();
clear_bit(MMF_DUMP_SECURELY, &mm->flags);
break;
case 1:
set_bit(MMF_DUMPABLE, &mm->flags);
smp_wmb();
clear_bit(MMF_DUMP_SECURELY, &mm->flags);
break;
case 2:
set_bit(MMF_DUMP_SECURELY, &mm->flags);
smp_wmb();
set_bit(MMF_DUMPABLE, &mm->flags);
break;
}
}
int get_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
int ret;
ret = mm->flags & 0x3;
return (ret >= 2) ? 2 : ret;
}
int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
char corename[CORENAME_MAX_SIZE + 1];
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct linux_binfmt * binfmt;
struct inode * inode;
struct file * file;
int retval = 0;
[PATCH] setuid core dump Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 15:09:43 +08:00
int fsuid = current->fsuid;
int flag = 0;
[PATCH] Support piping into commands in /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern Using the infrastructure created in previous patches implement support to pipe core dumps into programs. This is done by overloading the existing core_pattern sysctl with a new syntax: |program When the first character of the pattern is a '|' the kernel will instead threat the rest of the pattern as a command to run. The core dump will be written to the standard input of that program instead of to a file. This is useful for having automatic core dump analysis without filling up disks. The program can do some simple analysis and save only a summary of the core dump. The core dump proces will run with the privileges and in the name space of the process that caused the core dump. I also increased the core pattern size to 128 bytes so that longer command lines fit. Most of the changes comes from allowing core dumps without seeks. They are fairly straight forward though. One small incompatibility is that if someone had a core pattern previously that started with '|' they will get suddenly new behaviour. I think that's unlikely to be a real problem though. Additional background: > Very nice, do you happen to have a program that can accept this kind of > input for crash dumps? I'm guessing that the embedded people will > really want this functionality. I had a cheesy demo/prototype. Basically it wrote the dump to a file again, ran gdb on it to get a backtrace and wrote the summary to a shared directory. Then there was a simple CGI script to generate a "top 10" crashes HTML listing. Unfortunately this still had the disadvantage to needing full disk space for a dump except for deleting it afterwards (in fact it was worse because over the pipe holes didn't work so if you have a holey address map it would require more space). Fortunately gdb seems to be happy to handle /proc/pid/fd/xxx input pipes as cores (at least it worked with zsh's =(cat core) syntax), so it would be likely possible to do it without temporary space with a simple wrapper that calls it in the right way. I ran out of time before doing that though. The demo prototype scripts weren't very good. If there is really interest I can dig them out (they are currently on a laptop disk on the desk with the laptop itself being in service), but I would recommend to rewrite them for any serious application of this and fix the disk space problem. Also to be really useful it should probably find a way to automatically fetch the debuginfos (I cheated and just installed them in advance). If nobody else does it I can probably do the rewrite myself again at some point. My hope at some point was that desktops would support it in their builtin crash reporters, but at least the KDE people I talked too seemed to be happy with their user space only solution. Alan sayeth: I don't believe that piping as such as neccessarily the right model, but the ability to intercept and processes core dumps from user space is asked for by many enterprise users as well. They want to know about, capture, analyse and process core dumps, often centrally and in automated form. [akpm@osdl.org: loff_t != unsigned long] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-01 14:29:28 +08:00
int ispipe = 0;
core_pattern: ignore RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe For some time /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern has been able to set its output destination as a pipe, allowing a user space helper to receive and intellegently process a core. This infrastructure however has some shortcommings which can be enhanced. Specifically: 1) The coredump code in the kernel should ignore RLIMIT_CORE limitation when core_pattern is a pipe, since file system resources are not being consumed in this case, unless the user application wishes to save the core, at which point the app is restricted by usual file system limits and restrictions. 2) The core_pattern code should be able to parse and pass options to the user space helper as an argv array. The real core limit of the uid of the crashing proces should also be passable to the user space helper (since it is overridden to zero when called). 3) Some miscellaneous bugs need to be cleaned up (specifically the recognition of a recursive core dump, should the user mode helper itself crash. Also, the core dump code in the kernel should not wait for the user mode helper to exit, since the same context is responsible for writing to the pipe, and a read of the pipe by the user mode helper will result in a deadlock. This patch: Remove the check of RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe. In the event that core_pattern is a pipe, the entire core will be fed to the user mode helper. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com> Cc: <wwoods@redhat.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:26:34 +08:00
unsigned long core_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur;
char **helper_argv = NULL;
int helper_argc = 0;
char *delimit;
audit_core_dumps(signr);
binfmt = current->binfmt;
if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump)
goto fail;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* If another thread got here first, or we are not dumpable, bail out.
*/
if (mm->core_waiters || !get_dumpable(mm)) {
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
goto fail;
}
[PATCH] setuid core dump Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 15:09:43 +08:00
/*
* We cannot trust fsuid as being the "true" uid of the
* process nor do we know its entire history. We only know it
* was tainted so we dump it as root in mode 2.
*/
if (get_dumpable(mm) == 2) { /* Setuid core dump mode */
[PATCH] setuid core dump Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 15:09:43 +08:00
flag = O_EXCL; /* Stop rewrite attacks */
current->fsuid = 0; /* Dump root private */
}
retval = coredump_wait(exit_code);
if (retval < 0)
goto fail;
/*
* Clear any false indication of pending signals that might
* be seen by the filesystem code called to write the core file.
*/
clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING);
/*
* lock_kernel() because format_corename() is controlled by sysctl, which
* uses lock_kernel()
*/
lock_kernel();
ispipe = format_corename(corename, core_pattern, signr);
unlock_kernel();
core_pattern: ignore RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe For some time /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern has been able to set its output destination as a pipe, allowing a user space helper to receive and intellegently process a core. This infrastructure however has some shortcommings which can be enhanced. Specifically: 1) The coredump code in the kernel should ignore RLIMIT_CORE limitation when core_pattern is a pipe, since file system resources are not being consumed in this case, unless the user application wishes to save the core, at which point the app is restricted by usual file system limits and restrictions. 2) The core_pattern code should be able to parse and pass options to the user space helper as an argv array. The real core limit of the uid of the crashing proces should also be passable to the user space helper (since it is overridden to zero when called). 3) Some miscellaneous bugs need to be cleaned up (specifically the recognition of a recursive core dump, should the user mode helper itself crash. Also, the core dump code in the kernel should not wait for the user mode helper to exit, since the same context is responsible for writing to the pipe, and a read of the pipe by the user mode helper will result in a deadlock. This patch: Remove the check of RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe. In the event that core_pattern is a pipe, the entire core will be fed to the user mode helper. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com> Cc: <wwoods@redhat.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:26:34 +08:00
/*
* Don't bother to check the RLIMIT_CORE value if core_pattern points
* to a pipe. Since we're not writing directly to the filesystem
* RLIMIT_CORE doesn't really apply, as no actual core file will be
* created unless the pipe reader choses to write out the core file
* at which point file size limits and permissions will be imposed
* as it does with any other process
*/
if ((!ispipe) && (core_limit < binfmt->min_coredump))
core_pattern: ignore RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe For some time /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern has been able to set its output destination as a pipe, allowing a user space helper to receive and intellegently process a core. This infrastructure however has some shortcommings which can be enhanced. Specifically: 1) The coredump code in the kernel should ignore RLIMIT_CORE limitation when core_pattern is a pipe, since file system resources are not being consumed in this case, unless the user application wishes to save the core, at which point the app is restricted by usual file system limits and restrictions. 2) The core_pattern code should be able to parse and pass options to the user space helper as an argv array. The real core limit of the uid of the crashing proces should also be passable to the user space helper (since it is overridden to zero when called). 3) Some miscellaneous bugs need to be cleaned up (specifically the recognition of a recursive core dump, should the user mode helper itself crash. Also, the core dump code in the kernel should not wait for the user mode helper to exit, since the same context is responsible for writing to the pipe, and a read of the pipe by the user mode helper will result in a deadlock. This patch: Remove the check of RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe. In the event that core_pattern is a pipe, the entire core will be fed to the user mode helper. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com> Cc: <wwoods@redhat.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:26:34 +08:00
goto fail_unlock;
if (ispipe) {
helper_argv = argv_split(GFP_KERNEL, corename+1, &helper_argc);
/* Terminate the string before the first option */
delimit = strchr(corename, ' ');
if (delimit)
*delimit = '\0';
delimit = strrchr(helper_argv[0], '/');
if (delimit)
delimit++;
else
delimit = helper_argv[0];
if (!strcmp(delimit, current->comm)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "Recursive core dump detected, "
"aborting\n");
goto fail_unlock;
}
core_limit = RLIM_INFINITY;
[PATCH] Support piping into commands in /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern Using the infrastructure created in previous patches implement support to pipe core dumps into programs. This is done by overloading the existing core_pattern sysctl with a new syntax: |program When the first character of the pattern is a '|' the kernel will instead threat the rest of the pattern as a command to run. The core dump will be written to the standard input of that program instead of to a file. This is useful for having automatic core dump analysis without filling up disks. The program can do some simple analysis and save only a summary of the core dump. The core dump proces will run with the privileges and in the name space of the process that caused the core dump. I also increased the core pattern size to 128 bytes so that longer command lines fit. Most of the changes comes from allowing core dumps without seeks. They are fairly straight forward though. One small incompatibility is that if someone had a core pattern previously that started with '|' they will get suddenly new behaviour. I think that's unlikely to be a real problem though. Additional background: > Very nice, do you happen to have a program that can accept this kind of > input for crash dumps? I'm guessing that the embedded people will > really want this functionality. I had a cheesy demo/prototype. Basically it wrote the dump to a file again, ran gdb on it to get a backtrace and wrote the summary to a shared directory. Then there was a simple CGI script to generate a "top 10" crashes HTML listing. Unfortunately this still had the disadvantage to needing full disk space for a dump except for deleting it afterwards (in fact it was worse because over the pipe holes didn't work so if you have a holey address map it would require more space). Fortunately gdb seems to be happy to handle /proc/pid/fd/xxx input pipes as cores (at least it worked with zsh's =(cat core) syntax), so it would be likely possible to do it without temporary space with a simple wrapper that calls it in the right way. I ran out of time before doing that though. The demo prototype scripts weren't very good. If there is really interest I can dig them out (they are currently on a laptop disk on the desk with the laptop itself being in service), but I would recommend to rewrite them for any serious application of this and fix the disk space problem. Also to be really useful it should probably find a way to automatically fetch the debuginfos (I cheated and just installed them in advance). If nobody else does it I can probably do the rewrite myself again at some point. My hope at some point was that desktops would support it in their builtin crash reporters, but at least the KDE people I talked too seemed to be happy with their user space only solution. Alan sayeth: I don't believe that piping as such as neccessarily the right model, but the ability to intercept and processes core dumps from user space is asked for by many enterprise users as well. They want to know about, capture, analyse and process core dumps, often centrally and in automated form. [akpm@osdl.org: loff_t != unsigned long] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-01 14:29:28 +08:00
/* SIGPIPE can happen, but it's just never processed */
if (call_usermodehelper_pipe(corename+1, helper_argv, NULL,
&file)) {
[PATCH] Support piping into commands in /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern Using the infrastructure created in previous patches implement support to pipe core dumps into programs. This is done by overloading the existing core_pattern sysctl with a new syntax: |program When the first character of the pattern is a '|' the kernel will instead threat the rest of the pattern as a command to run. The core dump will be written to the standard input of that program instead of to a file. This is useful for having automatic core dump analysis without filling up disks. The program can do some simple analysis and save only a summary of the core dump. The core dump proces will run with the privileges and in the name space of the process that caused the core dump. I also increased the core pattern size to 128 bytes so that longer command lines fit. Most of the changes comes from allowing core dumps without seeks. They are fairly straight forward though. One small incompatibility is that if someone had a core pattern previously that started with '|' they will get suddenly new behaviour. I think that's unlikely to be a real problem though. Additional background: > Very nice, do you happen to have a program that can accept this kind of > input for crash dumps? I'm guessing that the embedded people will > really want this functionality. I had a cheesy demo/prototype. Basically it wrote the dump to a file again, ran gdb on it to get a backtrace and wrote the summary to a shared directory. Then there was a simple CGI script to generate a "top 10" crashes HTML listing. Unfortunately this still had the disadvantage to needing full disk space for a dump except for deleting it afterwards (in fact it was worse because over the pipe holes didn't work so if you have a holey address map it would require more space). Fortunately gdb seems to be happy to handle /proc/pid/fd/xxx input pipes as cores (at least it worked with zsh's =(cat core) syntax), so it would be likely possible to do it without temporary space with a simple wrapper that calls it in the right way. I ran out of time before doing that though. The demo prototype scripts weren't very good. If there is really interest I can dig them out (they are currently on a laptop disk on the desk with the laptop itself being in service), but I would recommend to rewrite them for any serious application of this and fix the disk space problem. Also to be really useful it should probably find a way to automatically fetch the debuginfos (I cheated and just installed them in advance). If nobody else does it I can probably do the rewrite myself again at some point. My hope at some point was that desktops would support it in their builtin crash reporters, but at least the KDE people I talked too seemed to be happy with their user space only solution. Alan sayeth: I don't believe that piping as such as neccessarily the right model, but the ability to intercept and processes core dumps from user space is asked for by many enterprise users as well. They want to know about, capture, analyse and process core dumps, often centrally and in automated form. [akpm@osdl.org: loff_t != unsigned long] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-01 14:29:28 +08:00
printk(KERN_INFO "Core dump to %s pipe failed\n",
corename);
goto fail_unlock;
}
} else
file = filp_open(corename,
O_CREAT | 2 | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE | flag,
0600);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto fail_unlock;
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (inode->i_nlink > 1)
goto close_fail; /* multiple links - don't dump */
if (!ispipe && d_unhashed(file->f_path.dentry))
goto close_fail;
[PATCH] Support piping into commands in /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern Using the infrastructure created in previous patches implement support to pipe core dumps into programs. This is done by overloading the existing core_pattern sysctl with a new syntax: |program When the first character of the pattern is a '|' the kernel will instead threat the rest of the pattern as a command to run. The core dump will be written to the standard input of that program instead of to a file. This is useful for having automatic core dump analysis without filling up disks. The program can do some simple analysis and save only a summary of the core dump. The core dump proces will run with the privileges and in the name space of the process that caused the core dump. I also increased the core pattern size to 128 bytes so that longer command lines fit. Most of the changes comes from allowing core dumps without seeks. They are fairly straight forward though. One small incompatibility is that if someone had a core pattern previously that started with '|' they will get suddenly new behaviour. I think that's unlikely to be a real problem though. Additional background: > Very nice, do you happen to have a program that can accept this kind of > input for crash dumps? I'm guessing that the embedded people will > really want this functionality. I had a cheesy demo/prototype. Basically it wrote the dump to a file again, ran gdb on it to get a backtrace and wrote the summary to a shared directory. Then there was a simple CGI script to generate a "top 10" crashes HTML listing. Unfortunately this still had the disadvantage to needing full disk space for a dump except for deleting it afterwards (in fact it was worse because over the pipe holes didn't work so if you have a holey address map it would require more space). Fortunately gdb seems to be happy to handle /proc/pid/fd/xxx input pipes as cores (at least it worked with zsh's =(cat core) syntax), so it would be likely possible to do it without temporary space with a simple wrapper that calls it in the right way. I ran out of time before doing that though. The demo prototype scripts weren't very good. If there is really interest I can dig them out (they are currently on a laptop disk on the desk with the laptop itself being in service), but I would recommend to rewrite them for any serious application of this and fix the disk space problem. Also to be really useful it should probably find a way to automatically fetch the debuginfos (I cheated and just installed them in advance). If nobody else does it I can probably do the rewrite myself again at some point. My hope at some point was that desktops would support it in their builtin crash reporters, but at least the KDE people I talked too seemed to be happy with their user space only solution. Alan sayeth: I don't believe that piping as such as neccessarily the right model, but the ability to intercept and processes core dumps from user space is asked for by many enterprise users as well. They want to know about, capture, analyse and process core dumps, often centrally and in automated form. [akpm@osdl.org: loff_t != unsigned long] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-01 14:29:28 +08:00
/* AK: actually i see no reason to not allow this for named pipes etc.,
but keep the previous behaviour for now. */
if (!ispipe && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
goto close_fail;
/*
* Dont allow local users get cute and trick others to coredump
* into their pre-created files:
*/
if (inode->i_uid != current->fsuid)
goto close_fail;
if (!file->f_op)
goto close_fail;
if (!file->f_op->write)
goto close_fail;
if (!ispipe && do_truncate(file->f_path.dentry, 0, 0, file) != 0)
goto close_fail;
core_pattern: ignore RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe For some time /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern has been able to set its output destination as a pipe, allowing a user space helper to receive and intellegently process a core. This infrastructure however has some shortcommings which can be enhanced. Specifically: 1) The coredump code in the kernel should ignore RLIMIT_CORE limitation when core_pattern is a pipe, since file system resources are not being consumed in this case, unless the user application wishes to save the core, at which point the app is restricted by usual file system limits and restrictions. 2) The core_pattern code should be able to parse and pass options to the user space helper as an argv array. The real core limit of the uid of the crashing proces should also be passable to the user space helper (since it is overridden to zero when called). 3) Some miscellaneous bugs need to be cleaned up (specifically the recognition of a recursive core dump, should the user mode helper itself crash. Also, the core dump code in the kernel should not wait for the user mode helper to exit, since the same context is responsible for writing to the pipe, and a read of the pipe by the user mode helper will result in a deadlock. This patch: Remove the check of RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe. In the event that core_pattern is a pipe, the entire core will be fed to the user mode helper. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com> Cc: <wwoods@redhat.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:26:34 +08:00
retval = binfmt->core_dump(signr, regs, file, core_limit);
if (retval)
current->signal->group_exit_code |= 0x80;
close_fail:
filp_close(file, NULL);
fail_unlock:
if (helper_argv)
argv_free(helper_argv);
[PATCH] setuid core dump Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 15:09:43 +08:00
current->fsuid = fsuid;
complete_all(&mm->core_done);
fail:
return retval;
}