OpenCloudOS-Kernel/lib/test_user_copy.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Kernel module for testing copy_to/from_user infrastructure.
*
* Copyright 2013 Google Inc. All Rights Reserved
*
* Authors:
* Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
/*
* Several 32-bit architectures support 64-bit {get,put}_user() calls.
* As there doesn't appear to be anything that can safely determine
* their capability at compile-time, we just have to opt-out certain archs.
*/
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 || (!(defined(CONFIG_ARM) && !defined(MMU)) && \
!defined(CONFIG_M68K) && \
!defined(CONFIG_MICROBLAZE) && \
!defined(CONFIG_NIOS2) && \
!defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && \
!defined(CONFIG_SUPERH))
# define TEST_U64
#endif
lib: introduce copy_struct_from_user() helper A common pattern for syscall extensions is increasing the size of a struct passed from userspace, such that the zero-value of the new fields result in the old kernel behaviour (allowing for a mix of userspace and kernel vintages to operate on one another in most cases). While this interface exists for communication in both directions, only one interface is straightforward to have reasonable semantics for (userspace passing a struct to the kernel). For kernel returns to userspace, what the correct semantics are (whether there should be an error if userspace is unaware of a new extension) is very syscall-dependent and thus probably cannot be unified between syscalls (a good example of this problem is [1]). Previously there was no common lib/ function that implemented the necessary extension-checking semantics (and different syscalls implemented them slightly differently or incompletely[2]). Future patches replace common uses of this pattern to make use of copy_struct_from_user(). Some in-kernel selftests that insure that the handling of alignment and various byte patterns are all handled identically to memchr_inv() usage. [1]: commit 1251201c0d34 ("sched/core: Fix uclamp ABI bug, clean up and robustify sched_read_attr() ABI logic and code") [2]: For instance {sched_setattr,perf_event_open,clone3}(2) all do do similar checks to copy_struct_from_user() while rt_sigprocmask(2) always rejects differently-sized struct arguments. Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191001011055.19283-2-cyphar@cyphar.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2019-10-01 09:10:52 +08:00
#define test(condition, msg, ...) \
({ \
int cond = (condition); \
if (cond) \
pr_warn("[%d] " msg "\n", __LINE__, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
cond; \
})
lib: introduce copy_struct_from_user() helper A common pattern for syscall extensions is increasing the size of a struct passed from userspace, such that the zero-value of the new fields result in the old kernel behaviour (allowing for a mix of userspace and kernel vintages to operate on one another in most cases). While this interface exists for communication in both directions, only one interface is straightforward to have reasonable semantics for (userspace passing a struct to the kernel). For kernel returns to userspace, what the correct semantics are (whether there should be an error if userspace is unaware of a new extension) is very syscall-dependent and thus probably cannot be unified between syscalls (a good example of this problem is [1]). Previously there was no common lib/ function that implemented the necessary extension-checking semantics (and different syscalls implemented them slightly differently or incompletely[2]). Future patches replace common uses of this pattern to make use of copy_struct_from_user(). Some in-kernel selftests that insure that the handling of alignment and various byte patterns are all handled identically to memchr_inv() usage. [1]: commit 1251201c0d34 ("sched/core: Fix uclamp ABI bug, clean up and robustify sched_read_attr() ABI logic and code") [2]: For instance {sched_setattr,perf_event_open,clone3}(2) all do do similar checks to copy_struct_from_user() while rt_sigprocmask(2) always rejects differently-sized struct arguments. Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191001011055.19283-2-cyphar@cyphar.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2019-10-01 09:10:52 +08:00
static bool is_zeroed(void *from, size_t size)
{
return memchr_inv(from, 0x0, size) == NULL;
}
static int test_check_nonzero_user(char *kmem, char __user *umem, size_t size)
{
int ret = 0;
size_t start, end, i;
size_t zero_start = size / 4;
size_t zero_end = size - zero_start;
/*
* We conduct a series of check_nonzero_user() tests on a block of memory
* with the following byte-pattern (trying every possible [start,end]
* pair):
*
* [ 00 ff 00 ff ... 00 00 00 00 ... ff 00 ff 00 ]
*
* And we verify that check_nonzero_user() acts identically to memchr_inv().
*/
memset(kmem, 0x0, size);
for (i = 1; i < zero_start; i += 2)
kmem[i] = 0xff;
for (i = zero_end; i < size; i += 2)
kmem[i] = 0xff;
ret |= test(copy_to_user(umem, kmem, size),
"legitimate copy_to_user failed");
for (start = 0; start <= size; start++) {
for (end = start; end <= size; end++) {
size_t len = end - start;
int retval = check_zeroed_user(umem + start, len);
int expected = is_zeroed(kmem + start, len);
ret |= test(retval != expected,
"check_nonzero_user(=%d) != memchr_inv(=%d) mismatch (start=%zu, end=%zu)",
retval, expected, start, end);
}
}
return ret;
}
static int test_copy_struct_from_user(char *kmem, char __user *umem,
size_t size)
{
int ret = 0;
char *umem_src = NULL, *expected = NULL;
size_t ksize, usize;
umem_src = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret |= test(umem_src == NULL, "kmalloc failed"))
goto out_free;
expected = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret |= test(expected == NULL, "kmalloc failed"))
goto out_free;
/* Fill umem with a fixed byte pattern. */
memset(umem_src, 0x3e, size);
ret |= test(copy_to_user(umem, umem_src, size),
"legitimate copy_to_user failed");
/* Check basic case -- (usize == ksize). */
ksize = size;
usize = size;
memcpy(expected, umem_src, ksize);
memset(kmem, 0x0, size);
ret |= test(copy_struct_from_user(kmem, ksize, umem, usize),
"copy_struct_from_user(usize == ksize) failed");
ret |= test(memcmp(kmem, expected, ksize),
"copy_struct_from_user(usize == ksize) gives unexpected copy");
/* Old userspace case -- (usize < ksize). */
ksize = size;
usize = size / 2;
memcpy(expected, umem_src, usize);
memset(expected + usize, 0x0, ksize - usize);
memset(kmem, 0x0, size);
ret |= test(copy_struct_from_user(kmem, ksize, umem, usize),
"copy_struct_from_user(usize < ksize) failed");
ret |= test(memcmp(kmem, expected, ksize),
"copy_struct_from_user(usize < ksize) gives unexpected copy");
/* New userspace (-E2BIG) case -- (usize > ksize). */
ksize = size / 2;
usize = size;
memset(kmem, 0x0, size);
ret |= test(copy_struct_from_user(kmem, ksize, umem, usize) != -E2BIG,
"copy_struct_from_user(usize > ksize) didn't give E2BIG");
/* New userspace (success) case -- (usize > ksize). */
ksize = size / 2;
usize = size;
memcpy(expected, umem_src, ksize);
ret |= test(clear_user(umem + ksize, usize - ksize),
"legitimate clear_user failed");
memset(kmem, 0x0, size);
ret |= test(copy_struct_from_user(kmem, ksize, umem, usize),
"copy_struct_from_user(usize > ksize) failed");
ret |= test(memcmp(kmem, expected, ksize),
"copy_struct_from_user(usize > ksize) gives unexpected copy");
out_free:
kfree(expected);
kfree(umem_src);
return ret;
}
static int __init test_user_copy_init(void)
{
int ret = 0;
char *kmem;
char __user *usermem;
char *bad_usermem;
unsigned long user_addr;
u8 val_u8;
u16 val_u16;
u32 val_u32;
#ifdef TEST_U64
u64 val_u64;
#endif
kmem = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kmem)
return -ENOMEM;
user_addr = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE * 2,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0);
if (user_addr >= (unsigned long)(TASK_SIZE)) {
pr_warn("Failed to allocate user memory\n");
kfree(kmem);
return -ENOMEM;
}
usermem = (char __user *)user_addr;
bad_usermem = (char *)user_addr;
/*
* Legitimate usage: none of these copies should fail.
*/
memset(kmem, 0x3a, PAGE_SIZE * 2);
ret |= test(copy_to_user(usermem, kmem, PAGE_SIZE),
"legitimate copy_to_user failed");
memset(kmem, 0x0, PAGE_SIZE);
ret |= test(copy_from_user(kmem, usermem, PAGE_SIZE),
"legitimate copy_from_user failed");
ret |= test(memcmp(kmem, kmem + PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE),
"legitimate usercopy failed to copy data");
#define test_legit(size, check) \
do { \
val_##size = check; \
ret |= test(put_user(val_##size, (size __user *)usermem), \
"legitimate put_user (" #size ") failed"); \
val_##size = 0; \
ret |= test(get_user(val_##size, (size __user *)usermem), \
"legitimate get_user (" #size ") failed"); \
ret |= test(val_##size != check, \
"legitimate get_user (" #size ") failed to do copy"); \
if (val_##size != check) { \
pr_info("0x%llx != 0x%llx\n", \
(unsigned long long)val_##size, \
(unsigned long long)check); \
} \
} while (0)
test_legit(u8, 0x5a);
test_legit(u16, 0x5a5b);
test_legit(u32, 0x5a5b5c5d);
#ifdef TEST_U64
test_legit(u64, 0x5a5b5c5d6a6b6c6d);
#endif
#undef test_legit
lib: introduce copy_struct_from_user() helper A common pattern for syscall extensions is increasing the size of a struct passed from userspace, such that the zero-value of the new fields result in the old kernel behaviour (allowing for a mix of userspace and kernel vintages to operate on one another in most cases). While this interface exists for communication in both directions, only one interface is straightforward to have reasonable semantics for (userspace passing a struct to the kernel). For kernel returns to userspace, what the correct semantics are (whether there should be an error if userspace is unaware of a new extension) is very syscall-dependent and thus probably cannot be unified between syscalls (a good example of this problem is [1]). Previously there was no common lib/ function that implemented the necessary extension-checking semantics (and different syscalls implemented them slightly differently or incompletely[2]). Future patches replace common uses of this pattern to make use of copy_struct_from_user(). Some in-kernel selftests that insure that the handling of alignment and various byte patterns are all handled identically to memchr_inv() usage. [1]: commit 1251201c0d34 ("sched/core: Fix uclamp ABI bug, clean up and robustify sched_read_attr() ABI logic and code") [2]: For instance {sched_setattr,perf_event_open,clone3}(2) all do do similar checks to copy_struct_from_user() while rt_sigprocmask(2) always rejects differently-sized struct arguments. Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191001011055.19283-2-cyphar@cyphar.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2019-10-01 09:10:52 +08:00
/* Test usage of check_nonzero_user(). */
ret |= test_check_nonzero_user(kmem, usermem, 2 * PAGE_SIZE);
/* Test usage of copy_struct_from_user(). */
ret |= test_copy_struct_from_user(kmem, usermem, 2 * PAGE_SIZE);
/*
* Invalid usage: none of these copies should succeed.
*/
/* Prepare kernel memory with check values. */
memset(kmem, 0x5a, PAGE_SIZE);
memset(kmem + PAGE_SIZE, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Reject kernel-to-kernel copies through copy_from_user(). */
ret |= test(!copy_from_user(kmem, (char __user *)(kmem + PAGE_SIZE),
PAGE_SIZE),
"illegal all-kernel copy_from_user passed");
/* Destination half of buffer should have been zeroed. */
ret |= test(memcmp(kmem + PAGE_SIZE, kmem, PAGE_SIZE),
"zeroing failure for illegal all-kernel copy_from_user");
#if 0
/*
* When running with SMAP/PAN/etc, this will Oops the kernel
* due to the zeroing of userspace memory on failure. This needs
* to be tested in LKDTM instead, since this test module does not
* expect to explode.
*/
ret |= test(!copy_from_user(bad_usermem, (char __user *)kmem,
PAGE_SIZE),
"illegal reversed copy_from_user passed");
#endif
ret |= test(!copy_to_user((char __user *)kmem, kmem + PAGE_SIZE,
PAGE_SIZE),
"illegal all-kernel copy_to_user passed");
ret |= test(!copy_to_user((char __user *)kmem, bad_usermem,
PAGE_SIZE),
"illegal reversed copy_to_user passed");
#define test_illegal(size, check) \
do { \
val_##size = (check); \
ret |= test(!get_user(val_##size, (size __user *)kmem), \
"illegal get_user (" #size ") passed"); \
ret |= test(val_##size != (size)0, \
"zeroing failure for illegal get_user (" #size ")"); \
if (val_##size != (size)0) { \
pr_info("0x%llx != 0\n", \
(unsigned long long)val_##size); \
} \
ret |= test(!put_user(val_##size, (size __user *)kmem), \
"illegal put_user (" #size ") passed"); \
} while (0)
test_illegal(u8, 0x5a);
test_illegal(u16, 0x5a5b);
test_illegal(u32, 0x5a5b5c5d);
#ifdef TEST_U64
test_illegal(u64, 0x5a5b5c5d6a6b6c6d);
#endif
#undef test_illegal
vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE * 2);
kfree(kmem);
if (ret == 0) {
pr_info("tests passed.\n");
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
module_init(test_user_copy_init);
static void __exit test_user_copy_exit(void)
{
pr_info("unloaded.\n");
}
module_exit(test_user_copy_exit);
MODULE_AUTHOR("Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");