License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
|
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* security/tomoyo/realpath.c
|
|
|
|
*
|
2011-07-14 13:46:51 +08:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2005-2011 NTT DATA CORPORATION
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "common.h"
|
2011-12-08 02:06:11 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/magic.h>
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2011-09-10 14:23:54 +08:00
|
|
|
* tomoyo_encode2 - Encode binary string to ascii string.
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2011-09-10 14:23:54 +08:00
|
|
|
* @str: String in binary format.
|
|
|
|
* @str_len: Size of @str in byte.
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
* Returns pointer to @str in ascii format on success, NULL otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
|
|
|
|
* didn't return NULL.
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-09-10 14:23:54 +08:00
|
|
|
char *tomoyo_encode2(const char *str, int str_len)
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-09-10 14:23:54 +08:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int len = 0;
|
|
|
|
const char *p = str;
|
|
|
|
char *cp;
|
|
|
|
char *cp0;
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2011-09-10 14:23:54 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < str_len; i++) {
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char c = p[i];
|
|
|
|
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (c == '\\')
|
|
|
|
len += 2;
|
|
|
|
else if (c > ' ' && c < 127)
|
|
|
|
len++;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
len += 4;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len++;
|
|
|
|
/* Reserve space for appending "/". */
|
|
|
|
cp = kzalloc(len + 10, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
|
|
if (!cp)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
cp0 = cp;
|
|
|
|
p = str;
|
2011-09-10 14:23:54 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < str_len; i++) {
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char c = p[i];
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (c == '\\') {
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = '\\';
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = '\\';
|
|
|
|
} else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) {
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = c;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = '\\';
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = (c >> 6) + '0';
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = (c & 7) + '0';
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
return cp0;
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-10 14:23:54 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* tomoyo_encode - Encode binary string to ascii string.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @str: String in binary format.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns pointer to @str in ascii format on success, NULL otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
|
|
|
|
* didn't return NULL.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char *tomoyo_encode(const char *str)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return str ? tomoyo_encode2(str, strlen(str)) : NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* tomoyo_get_absolute_path - Get the path of a dentry but ignores chroot'ed root.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
|
|
|
|
* @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the buffer on success, an error code otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-03-09 07:24:30 +08:00
|
|
|
static char *tomoyo_get_absolute_path(const struct path *path, char * const buffer,
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
const int buflen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *pos = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (buflen >= 256) {
|
|
|
|
/* go to whatever namespace root we are under */
|
fix apparmor dereferencing potentially freed dentry, sanitize __d_path() API
__d_path() API is asking for trouble and in case of apparmor d_namespace_path()
getting just that. The root cause is that when __d_path() misses the root
it had been told to look for, it stores the location of the most remote ancestor
in *root. Without grabbing references. Sure, at the moment of call it had
been pinned down by what we have in *path. And if we raced with umount -l, we
could have very well stopped at vfsmount/dentry that got freed as soon as
prepend_path() dropped vfsmount_lock.
It is safe to compare these pointers with pre-existing (and known to be still
alive) vfsmount and dentry, as long as all we are asking is "is it the same
address?". Dereferencing is not safe and apparmor ended up stepping into
that. d_namespace_path() really wants to examine the place where we stopped,
even if it's not connected to our namespace. As the result, it looked
at ->d_sb->s_magic of a dentry that might've been already freed by that point.
All other callers had been careful enough to avoid that, but it's really
a bad interface - it invites that kind of trouble.
The fix is fairly straightforward, even though it's bigger than I'd like:
* prepend_path() root argument becomes const.
* __d_path() is never called with NULL/NULL root. It was a kludge
to start with. Instead, we have an explicit function - d_absolute_root().
Same as __d_path(), except that it doesn't get root passed and stops where
it stops. apparmor and tomoyo are using it.
* __d_path() returns NULL on path outside of root. The main
caller is show_mountinfo() and that's precisely what we pass root for - to
skip those outside chroot jail. Those who don't want that can (and do)
use d_path().
* __d_path() root argument becomes const. Everyone agrees, I hope.
* apparmor does *NOT* try to use __d_path() or any of its variants
when it sees that path->mnt is an internal vfsmount. In that case it's
definitely not mounted anywhere and dentry_path() is exactly what we want
there. Handling of sysctl()-triggered weirdness is moved to that place.
* if apparmor is asked to do pathname relative to chroot jail
and __d_path() tells it we it's not in that jail, the sucker just calls
d_absolute_path() instead. That's the other remaining caller of __d_path(),
BTW.
* seq_path_root() does _NOT_ return -ENAMETOOLONG (it's stupid anyway -
the normal seq_file logics will take care of growing the buffer and redoing
the call of ->show() just fine). However, if it gets path not reachable
from root, it returns SEQ_SKIP. The only caller adjusted (i.e. stopped
ignoring the return value as it used to do).
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
ACKed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2011-12-05 21:43:34 +08:00
|
|
|
pos = d_absolute_path(path, buffer, buflen - 1);
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(pos) && *pos == '/' && pos[1]) {
|
2015-03-18 06:26:22 +08:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
|
|
buffer[buflen - 2] = '/';
|
|
|
|
buffer[buflen - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* tomoyo_get_dentry_path - Get the path of a dentry.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
|
|
|
|
* @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the buffer on success, an error code otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static char *tomoyo_get_dentry_path(struct dentry *dentry, char * const buffer,
|
|
|
|
const int buflen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *pos = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (buflen >= 256) {
|
|
|
|
pos = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, buflen - 1);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(pos) && *pos == '/' && pos[1]) {
|
2015-03-18 06:26:22 +08:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
|
|
buffer[buflen - 2] = '/';
|
|
|
|
buffer[buflen - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* tomoyo_get_local_path - Get the path of a dentry.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
|
|
|
|
* @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the buffer on success, an error code otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static char *tomoyo_get_local_path(struct dentry *dentry, char * const buffer,
|
|
|
|
const int buflen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
|
|
|
|
char *pos = tomoyo_get_dentry_path(dentry, buffer, buflen);
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(pos))
|
|
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
/* Convert from $PID to self if $PID is current thread. */
|
|
|
|
if (sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC && *pos == '/') {
|
|
|
|
char *ep;
|
|
|
|
const pid_t pid = (pid_t) simple_strtoul(pos + 1, &ep, 10);
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*ep == '/' && pid && pid ==
|
|
|
|
task_tgid_nr_ns(current, sb->s_fs_info)) {
|
|
|
|
pos = ep - 5;
|
|
|
|
if (pos < buffer)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
memmove(pos, "/self", 5);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto prepend_filesystem_name;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Use filesystem name for unnamed devices. */
|
|
|
|
if (!MAJOR(sb->s_dev))
|
|
|
|
goto prepend_filesystem_name;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-18 06:26:22 +08:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root);
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Use filesystem name if filesystem does not support rename()
|
|
|
|
* operation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-09-27 17:03:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!inode->i_op->rename)
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
goto prepend_filesystem_name;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Prepend device name. */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char name[64];
|
|
|
|
int name_len;
|
|
|
|
const dev_t dev = sb->s_dev;
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
snprintf(name, sizeof(name) - 1, "dev(%u,%u):", MAJOR(dev),
|
|
|
|
MINOR(dev));
|
|
|
|
name_len = strlen(name);
|
|
|
|
pos -= name_len;
|
|
|
|
if (pos < buffer)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
memmove(pos, name, name_len);
|
|
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Prepend filesystem name. */
|
|
|
|
prepend_filesystem_name:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
|
|
|
|
const int name_len = strlen(name);
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
pos -= name_len + 1;
|
|
|
|
if (pos < buffer)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
memmove(pos, name, name_len);
|
|
|
|
pos[name_len] = ':';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
* tomoyo_realpath_from_path - Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
* Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise.
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
|
|
|
|
* Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to
|
|
|
|
* \ooo style octal string.
|
|
|
|
* Character \ is converted to \\ string.
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* These functions use kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree()
|
|
|
|
* if these functions didn't return NULL.
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-03-09 07:24:30 +08:00
|
|
|
char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(const struct path *path)
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
char *buf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int buf_len = PAGE_SIZE / 2;
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
struct super_block *sb;
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!dentry)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
sb = dentry->d_sb;
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
|
|
char *pos;
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
buf_len <<= 1;
|
|
|
|
kfree(buf);
|
|
|
|
buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
|
|
if (!buf)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
/* To make sure that pos is '\0' terminated. */
|
|
|
|
buf[buf_len - 1] = '\0';
|
2024-06-11 20:08:33 +08:00
|
|
|
/* For "pipe:[\$]" and "socket:[\$]". */
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) {
|
|
|
|
pos = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, buf, buf_len - 1);
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
goto encode;
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-18 06:26:22 +08:00
|
|
|
inode = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root);
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get local name for filesystems without rename() operation
|
|
|
|
* or dentry without vfsmount.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-08-20 13:14:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!path->mnt ||
|
2019-02-27 22:19:24 +08:00
|
|
|
(!inode->i_op->rename &&
|
|
|
|
!(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV)))
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
pos = tomoyo_get_local_path(path->dentry, buf,
|
|
|
|
buf_len - 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Get absolute name for the rest. */
|
2011-12-08 20:24:06 +08:00
|
|
|
else {
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
pos = tomoyo_get_absolute_path(path, buf, buf_len - 1);
|
2011-12-08 20:24:06 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fall back to local name if absolute name is not
|
|
|
|
* available.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (pos == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
|
|
|
|
pos = tomoyo_get_local_path(path->dentry, buf,
|
|
|
|
buf_len - 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-06-26 22:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
encode:
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(pos))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
name = tomoyo_encode(pos);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-01-26 19:45:27 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(buf);
|
2010-06-03 19:36:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!name)
|
|
|
|
tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__);
|
|
|
|
return name;
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* tomoyo_realpath_nofollow - Get realpath of a pathname.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @pathname: The pathname to solve.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-04-03 09:17:03 +08:00
|
|
|
struct path path;
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 09:17:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pathname && kern_path(pathname, 0, &path) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
|
2019-01-24 17:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 09:17:03 +08:00
|
|
|
path_put(&path);
|
Memory and pathname management functions.
TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".
The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause
"fabrication of logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file denied.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied.
and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat .
Likewise, a crazy request like
open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600)
will be processed safely by converting to
Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|