OpenCloudOS-Kernel/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
/*
* Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
* digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
*/
int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
size_t desc_size;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
sig->data = cert->tbs;
sig->data_size = cert->tbs_size;
sig->s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig->s)
return -ENOMEM;
sig->s_size = cert->raw_sig_size;
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
cert->unsupported_sig = true;
return 0;
}
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
ret = -ENOMEM;
sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig->digest)
goto error;
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
goto error;
desc->tfm = tfm;
ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_2;
ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, "tbs");
if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) {
pr_err("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n",
sig->digest_size, sig->digest);
cert->blacklisted = true;
ret = 0;
}
error_2:
kfree(desc);
error:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
/*
* Check for self-signedness in an X.509 cert and if found, check the signature
* immediately if we can.
*/
int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
int ret = 0;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
if (cert->raw_subject_size != cert->raw_issuer_size ||
memcmp(cert->raw_subject, cert->raw_issuer,
cert->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
goto not_self_signed;
if (cert->sig->auth_ids[0] || cert->sig->auth_ids[1]) {
/* If the AKID is present it may have one or two parts. If
* both are supplied, both must match.
*/
bool a = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->sig->auth_ids[1]);
bool b = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->sig->auth_ids[0]);
if (!a && !b)
goto not_self_signed;
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
if (((a && !b) || (b && !a)) &&
cert->sig->auth_ids[0] && cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
goto out;
}
ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
cert->unsupported_sig = true;
ret = 0;
}
goto out;
}
pr_devel("Cert Self-signature verified");
cert->self_signed = true;
out:
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
not_self_signed:
pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [not]\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
/*
* Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
*/
static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made: (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message: id: serial number + issuer skid: subjKeyId + subject authority: authKeyId + issuer (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present). (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches: (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs recorded on the key. (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will look for an exact match on the key description. (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing will turn it back into a binary ID. (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate signature. (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information block signature. Additional changes: (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG. (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint. (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-17 00:36:13 +08:00
struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
struct x509_certificate *cert;
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made: (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message: id: serial number + issuer skid: subjKeyId + subject authority: authKeyId + issuer (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present). (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches: (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs recorded on the key. (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will look for an exact match on the key description. (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing will turn it back into a binary ID. (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate signature. (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information block signature. Additional changes: (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG. (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint. (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-17 00:36:13 +08:00
const char *q;
size_t srlen, sulen;
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made: (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message: id: serial number + issuer skid: subjKeyId + subject authority: authKeyId + issuer (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present). (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches: (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs recorded on the key. (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will look for an exact match on the key description. (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing will turn it back into a binary ID. (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate signature. (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information block signature. Additional changes: (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG. (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint. (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-17 00:36:13 +08:00
char *desc = NULL, *p;
int ret;
cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
if (IS_ERR(cert))
return PTR_ERR(cert);
pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo);
pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);
cert->pub->id_type = "X509";
KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06 23:14:26 +08:00
if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
cert->sig = NULL;
} else {
pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo);
}
/* Don't permit addition of blacklisted keys */
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
if (cert->blacklisted)
goto error_free_cert;
/* Propose a description */
sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
if (cert->raw_skid) {
srlen = cert->raw_skid_size;
q = cert->raw_skid;
} else {
srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
q = cert->raw_serial;
}
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made: (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message: id: serial number + issuer skid: subjKeyId + subject authority: authKeyId + issuer (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present). (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches: (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs recorded on the key. (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will look for an exact match on the key description. (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing will turn it back into a binary ID. (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate signature. (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information block signature. Additional changes: (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG. (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint. (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-17 00:36:13 +08:00
ret = -ENOMEM;
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made: (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message: id: serial number + issuer skid: subjKeyId + subject authority: authKeyId + issuer (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present). (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches: (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs recorded on the key. (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will look for an exact match on the key description. (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing will turn it back into a binary ID. (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate signature. (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information block signature. Additional changes: (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG. (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint. (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-17 00:36:13 +08:00
desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
goto error_free_cert;
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made: (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message: id: serial number + issuer skid: subjKeyId + subject authority: authKeyId + issuer (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present). (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches: (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs recorded on the key. (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will look for an exact match on the key description. (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing will turn it back into a binary ID. (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate signature. (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information block signature. Additional changes: (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG. (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint. (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-17 00:36:13 +08:00
p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
p += sulen;
*p++ = ':';
*p++ = ' ';
p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
*p = 0;
kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kids)
goto error_free_desc;
kids->id[0] = cert->id;
kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID There are non-root X.509 v3 certificates in use out there that contain no Authority Key Identifier extension (RFC5280 section 4.2.1.1). For trust verification purposes the kernel asymmetric key type keeps two struct asymmetric_key_id instances that the key can be looked up by, and another two to look up the key's issuer. The x509 public key type and the PKCS7 type generate them from the SKID and AKID extensions in the certificate. In effect current code has no way to look up the issuer certificate for verification without the AKID. To remedy this, add a third asymmetric_key_id blob to the arrays in both asymmetric_key_id's (for certficate subject) and in the public_keys_signature's auth_ids (for issuer lookup), using just raw subject and issuer DNs from the certificate. Adapt asymmetric_key_ids() and its callers to use the third ID for lookups when none of the other two are available. Attempt to keep the logic intact when they are, to minimise behaviour changes. Adapt the restrict functions' NULL-checks to include that ID too. Do not modify the lookup logic in pkcs7_verify.c, the AKID extensions are still required there. Internally use a new "dn:" prefix to the search specifier string generated for the key lookup in find_asymmetric_key(). This tells asymmetric_key_match_preparse to only match the data against the raw DN in the third ID and shouldn't conflict with search specifiers already in use. In effect implement what (2) in the struct asymmetric_key_id comment (include/keys/asymmetric-type.h) is probably talking about already, so do not modify that comment. It is also how "openssl verify" looks up issuer certificates without the AKID available. Lookups by the raw DN are unambiguous only provided that the CAs respect the condition in RFC5280 4.2.1.1 that the AKID may only be omitted if the CA uses a single signing key. The following is an example of two things that this change enables. A self-signed ceritficate is generated following the example from https://letsencrypt.org/docs/certificates-for-localhost/, and can be looked up by an identifier and verified against itself by linking to a restricted keyring -- both things not possible before due to the missing AKID extension: $ openssl req -x509 -out localhost.crt -outform DER -keyout localhost.key \ -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -sha256 \ -subj '/CN=localhost' -extensions EXT -config <( \ echo -e "[dn]\nCN=localhost\n[req]\ndistinguished_name = dn\n[EXT]\n" \ "subjectAltName=DNS:localhost\nkeyUsage=digitalSignature\n" \ "extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth") $ keyring=`keyctl newring test @u` $ trusted=`keyctl padd asymmetric trusted $keyring < localhost.crt`; \ echo $trusted 39726322 $ keyctl search $keyring asymmetric dn:3112301006035504030c096c6f63616c686f7374 39726322 $ keyctl restrict_keyring $keyring asymmetric key_or_keyring:$trusted $ keyctl padd asymmetric verified $keyring < localhost.crt Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-11-09 23:16:49 +08:00
kids->id[2] = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_subject,
cert->raw_subject_size,
"", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kids->id[2])) {
ret = PTR_ERR(kids->id[2]);
goto error_free_kids;
}
/* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype;
prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = kids;
prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = cert->pub;
prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = cert->sig;
prep->description = desc;
prep->quotalen = 100;
/* We've finished with the certificate */
cert->pub = NULL;
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made: (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message: id: serial number + issuer skid: subjKeyId + subject authority: authKeyId + issuer (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present). (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches: (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs recorded on the key. (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will look for an exact match on the key description. (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing will turn it back into a binary ID. (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate signature. (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information block signature. Additional changes: (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG. (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint. (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-17 00:36:13 +08:00
cert->id = NULL;
cert->skid = NULL;
cert->sig = NULL;
desc = NULL;
keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID There are non-root X.509 v3 certificates in use out there that contain no Authority Key Identifier extension (RFC5280 section 4.2.1.1). For trust verification purposes the kernel asymmetric key type keeps two struct asymmetric_key_id instances that the key can be looked up by, and another two to look up the key's issuer. The x509 public key type and the PKCS7 type generate them from the SKID and AKID extensions in the certificate. In effect current code has no way to look up the issuer certificate for verification without the AKID. To remedy this, add a third asymmetric_key_id blob to the arrays in both asymmetric_key_id's (for certficate subject) and in the public_keys_signature's auth_ids (for issuer lookup), using just raw subject and issuer DNs from the certificate. Adapt asymmetric_key_ids() and its callers to use the third ID for lookups when none of the other two are available. Attempt to keep the logic intact when they are, to minimise behaviour changes. Adapt the restrict functions' NULL-checks to include that ID too. Do not modify the lookup logic in pkcs7_verify.c, the AKID extensions are still required there. Internally use a new "dn:" prefix to the search specifier string generated for the key lookup in find_asymmetric_key(). This tells asymmetric_key_match_preparse to only match the data against the raw DN in the third ID and shouldn't conflict with search specifiers already in use. In effect implement what (2) in the struct asymmetric_key_id comment (include/keys/asymmetric-type.h) is probably talking about already, so do not modify that comment. It is also how "openssl verify" looks up issuer certificates without the AKID available. Lookups by the raw DN are unambiguous only provided that the CAs respect the condition in RFC5280 4.2.1.1 that the AKID may only be omitted if the CA uses a single signing key. The following is an example of two things that this change enables. A self-signed ceritficate is generated following the example from https://letsencrypt.org/docs/certificates-for-localhost/, and can be looked up by an identifier and verified against itself by linking to a restricted keyring -- both things not possible before due to the missing AKID extension: $ openssl req -x509 -out localhost.crt -outform DER -keyout localhost.key \ -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -sha256 \ -subj '/CN=localhost' -extensions EXT -config <( \ echo -e "[dn]\nCN=localhost\n[req]\ndistinguished_name = dn\n[EXT]\n" \ "subjectAltName=DNS:localhost\nkeyUsage=digitalSignature\n" \ "extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth") $ keyring=`keyctl newring test @u` $ trusted=`keyctl padd asymmetric trusted $keyring < localhost.crt`; \ echo $trusted 39726322 $ keyctl search $keyring asymmetric dn:3112301006035504030c096c6f63616c686f7374 39726322 $ keyctl restrict_keyring $keyring asymmetric key_or_keyring:$trusted $ keyctl padd asymmetric verified $keyring < localhost.crt Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-11-09 23:16:49 +08:00
kids = NULL;
ret = 0;
keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID There are non-root X.509 v3 certificates in use out there that contain no Authority Key Identifier extension (RFC5280 section 4.2.1.1). For trust verification purposes the kernel asymmetric key type keeps two struct asymmetric_key_id instances that the key can be looked up by, and another two to look up the key's issuer. The x509 public key type and the PKCS7 type generate them from the SKID and AKID extensions in the certificate. In effect current code has no way to look up the issuer certificate for verification without the AKID. To remedy this, add a third asymmetric_key_id blob to the arrays in both asymmetric_key_id's (for certficate subject) and in the public_keys_signature's auth_ids (for issuer lookup), using just raw subject and issuer DNs from the certificate. Adapt asymmetric_key_ids() and its callers to use the third ID for lookups when none of the other two are available. Attempt to keep the logic intact when they are, to minimise behaviour changes. Adapt the restrict functions' NULL-checks to include that ID too. Do not modify the lookup logic in pkcs7_verify.c, the AKID extensions are still required there. Internally use a new "dn:" prefix to the search specifier string generated for the key lookup in find_asymmetric_key(). This tells asymmetric_key_match_preparse to only match the data against the raw DN in the third ID and shouldn't conflict with search specifiers already in use. In effect implement what (2) in the struct asymmetric_key_id comment (include/keys/asymmetric-type.h) is probably talking about already, so do not modify that comment. It is also how "openssl verify" looks up issuer certificates without the AKID available. Lookups by the raw DN are unambiguous only provided that the CAs respect the condition in RFC5280 4.2.1.1 that the AKID may only be omitted if the CA uses a single signing key. The following is an example of two things that this change enables. A self-signed ceritficate is generated following the example from https://letsencrypt.org/docs/certificates-for-localhost/, and can be looked up by an identifier and verified against itself by linking to a restricted keyring -- both things not possible before due to the missing AKID extension: $ openssl req -x509 -out localhost.crt -outform DER -keyout localhost.key \ -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -sha256 \ -subj '/CN=localhost' -extensions EXT -config <( \ echo -e "[dn]\nCN=localhost\n[req]\ndistinguished_name = dn\n[EXT]\n" \ "subjectAltName=DNS:localhost\nkeyUsage=digitalSignature\n" \ "extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth") $ keyring=`keyctl newring test @u` $ trusted=`keyctl padd asymmetric trusted $keyring < localhost.crt`; \ echo $trusted 39726322 $ keyctl search $keyring asymmetric dn:3112301006035504030c096c6f63616c686f7374 39726322 $ keyctl restrict_keyring $keyring asymmetric key_or_keyring:$trusted $ keyctl padd asymmetric verified $keyring < localhost.crt Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-11-09 23:16:49 +08:00
error_free_kids:
kfree(kids);
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made: (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message: id: serial number + issuer skid: subjKeyId + subject authority: authKeyId + issuer (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present). (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches: (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs recorded on the key. (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will look for an exact match on the key description. (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing will turn it back into a binary ID. (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate signature. (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information block signature. Additional changes: (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG. (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint. (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-17 00:36:13 +08:00
error_free_desc:
kfree(desc);
error_free_cert:
x509_free_certificate(cert);
return ret;
}
static struct asymmetric_key_parser x509_key_parser = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "x509",
.parse = x509_key_preparse,
};
/*
* Module stuff
*/
static int __init x509_key_init(void)
{
return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser);
}
static void __exit x509_key_exit(void)
{
unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser);
}
module_init(x509_key_init);
module_exit(x509_key_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("X.509 certificate parser");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");