OpenCloudOS-Kernel/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 1995 Linus Torvalds
*
* Support of BIGMEM added by Gerhard Wichert, Siemens AG, July 1999
*
* Memory region support
* David Parsons <orc@pell.chi.il.us>, July-August 1999
*
* Added E820 sanitization routine (removes overlapping memory regions);
* Brian Moyle <bmoyle@mvista.com>, February 2001
*
* Moved CPU detection code to cpu/${cpu}.c
* Patrick Mochel <mochel@osdl.org>, March 2002
*
* Provisions for empty E820 memory regions (reported by certain BIOSes).
* Alex Achenbach <xela@slit.de>, December 2002.
*
*/
/*
* This file handles the architecture-dependent parts of initialization
*/
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mmzone.h>
#include <linux/screen_info.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/acpi.h>
#include <linux/sfi.h>
#include <linux/apm_bios.h>
#include <linux/initrd.h>
x86: Use memblock to replace early_res 1. replace find_e820_area with memblock_find_in_range 2. replace reserve_early with memblock_x86_reserve_range 3. replace free_early with memblock_x86_free_range. 4. NO_BOOTMEM will switch to use memblock too. 5. use _e820, _early wrap in the patch, in following patch, will replace them all 6. because memblock_x86_free_range support partial free, we can remove some special care 7. Need to make sure that memblock_find_in_range() is called after memblock_x86_fill() so adjust some calling later in setup.c::setup_arch() -- corruption_check and mptable_update -v2: Move reserve_brk() early Before fill_memblock_area, to avoid overlap between brk and memblock_find_in_range() that could happen We have more then 128 RAM entry in E820 tables, and memblock_x86_fill() could use memblock_find_in_range() to find a new place for memblock.memory.region array. and We don't need to use extend_brk() after fill_memblock_area() So move reserve_brk() early before fill_memblock_area(). -v3: Move find_smp_config early To make sure memblock_find_in_range not find wrong place, if BIOS doesn't put mptable in right place. -v4: Treat RESERVED_KERN as RAM in memblock.memory. and they are already in memblock.reserved already.. use __NOT_KEEP_MEMBLOCK to make sure memblock related code could be freed later. -v5: Generic version __memblock_find_in_range() is going from high to low, and for 32bit active_region for 32bit does include high pages need to replace the limit with memblock.default_alloc_limit, aka get_max_mapped() -v6: Use current_limit instead -v7: check with MEMBLOCK_ERROR instead of -1ULL or -1L -v8: Set memblock_can_resize early to handle EFI with more RAM entries -v9: update after kmemleak changes in mainline Suggested-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2010-08-26 04:39:17 +08:00
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/console.h>
#include <linux/root_dev.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/edd.h>
Firmware: add iSCSI iBFT Support Add /sysfs/firmware/ibft/[initiator|targetX|ethernetX] directories along with text properties which export the the iSCSI Boot Firmware Table (iBFT) structure. What is iSCSI Boot Firmware Table? It is a mechanism for the iSCSI tools to extract from the machine NICs the iSCSI connection information so that they can automagically mount the iSCSI share/target. Currently the iSCSI information is hard-coded in the initrd. The /sysfs entries are read-only one-name-and-value fields. The usual set of data exposed is: # for a in `find /sys/firmware/ibft/ -type f -print`; do echo -n "$a: "; cat $a; done /sys/firmware/ibft/target0/target-name: iqn.2007.com.intel-sbx44:storage-10gb /sys/firmware/ibft/target0/nic-assoc: 0 /sys/firmware/ibft/target0/chap-type: 0 /sys/firmware/ibft/target0/lun: 00000000 /sys/firmware/ibft/target0/port: 3260 /sys/firmware/ibft/target0/ip-addr: 192.168.79.116 /sys/firmware/ibft/target0/flags: 3 /sys/firmware/ibft/target0/index: 0 /sys/firmware/ibft/ethernet0/mac: 00:11:25:9d:8b:01 /sys/firmware/ibft/ethernet0/vlan: 0 /sys/firmware/ibft/ethernet0/gateway: 192.168.79.254 /sys/firmware/ibft/ethernet0/origin: 0 /sys/firmware/ibft/ethernet0/subnet-mask: 255.255.252.0 /sys/firmware/ibft/ethernet0/ip-addr: 192.168.77.41 /sys/firmware/ibft/ethernet0/flags: 7 /sys/firmware/ibft/ethernet0/index: 0 /sys/firmware/ibft/initiator/initiator-name: iqn.2007-07.com:konrad.initiator /sys/firmware/ibft/initiator/flags: 3 /sys/firmware/ibft/initiator/index: 0 For full details of the IBFT structure please take a look at: ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/systems/support/system_x_pdf/ibm_iscsi_boot_firmware_table_v1.02.pdf [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek <konradr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Christie <michaelc@cs.wisc.edu> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-04-10 10:50:41 +08:00
#include <linux/iscsi_ibft.h>
#include <linux/nodemask.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/pfn.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <asm/pci-direct.h>
x86: early boot debugging via FireWire (ohci1394_dma=early) This patch adds a new configuration option, which adds support for a new early_param which gets checked in arch/x86/kernel/setup_{32,64}.c:setup_arch() to decide wether OHCI-1394 FireWire controllers should be initialized and enabled for physical DMA access to allow remote debugging of early problems like issues ACPI or other subsystems which are executed very early. If the config option is not enabled, no code is changed, and if the boot paramenter is not given, no new code is executed, and independent of that, all new code is freed after boot, so the config option can be even enabled in standard, non-debug kernels. With specialized tools, it is then possible to get debugging information from machines which have no serial ports (notebooks) such as the printk buffer contents, or any data which can be referenced from global pointers, if it is stored below the 4GB limit and even memory dumps of of the physical RAM region below the 4GB limit can be taken without any cooperation from the CPU of the host, so the machine can be crashed early, it does not matter. In the extreme, even kernel debuggers can be accessed in this way. I wrote a small kgdb module and an accompanying gdb stub for FireWire which allows to gdb to talk to kgdb using remote remory reads and writes over FireWire. An version of the gdb stub fore FireWire is able to read all global data from a system which is running a a normal kernel without any kernel debugger, without any interruption or support of the system's CPU. That way, e.g. the task struct and so on can be read and even manipulated when the physical DMA access is granted. A HOWTO is included in this patch, in Documentation/debugging-via-ohci1394.txt and I've put a copy online at ftp://ftp.suse.de/private/bk/firewire/docs/debugging-via-ohci1394.txt It also has links to all the tools which are available to make use of it another copy of it is online at: ftp://ftp.suse.de/private/bk/firewire/kernel/ohci1394_dma_early-v2.diff Signed-Off-By: Bernhard Kaindl <bk@suse.de> Tested-By: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 20:34:11 +08:00
#include <linux/init_ohci1394_dma.h>
#include <linux/kvm_para.h>
#include <linux/dma-contiguous.h>
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
#include <linux/cpufreq.h>
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/tboot.h>
jiffies: Remove compile time assumptions about CLOCK_TICK_RATE CLOCK_TICK_RATE is used to accurately caclulate exactly how a tick will be at a given HZ. This is useful, because while we'd expect NSEC_PER_SEC/HZ, the underlying hardware will have some granularity limit, so we won't be able to have exactly HZ ticks per second. This slight error can cause timekeeping quality problems when using the jiffies or other jiffies driven clocksources. Thus we currently use compile time CLOCK_TICK_RATE value to generate SHIFTED_HZ and NSEC_PER_JIFFIES, which we then use to adjust the jiffies clocksource to correct this error. Unfortunately though, since CLOCK_TICK_RATE is a compile time value, and the jiffies clocksource is registered very early during boot, there are a number of cases where there are different possible hardware timers that have different tick rates. This causes problems in cases like ARM where there are numerous different types of hardware, each having their own compile-time CLOCK_TICK_RATE, making it hard to accurately support different hardware with a single kernel. For the most part, this doesn't matter all that much, as not too many systems actually utilize the jiffies or jiffies driven clocksource. Usually there are other highres clocksources who's granularity error is negligable. Even so, we have some complicated calcualtions that we do everywhere to handle these edge cases. This patch removes the compile time SHIFTED_HZ value, and introduces a register_refined_jiffies() function. This results in the default jiffies clock as being assumed a perfect HZ freq, and allows archtectures that care about jiffies accuracy to call register_refined_jiffies() with the tick rate, specified dynamically at boot. This allows us, where necessary, to not have a compile time CLOCK_TICK_RATE constant, simplifies the jiffies code, and still provides a way to have an accurate jiffies clock. NOTE: Since this patch does not add register_refinied_jiffies() calls for every arch, it may cause time quality regressions in some cases. Its likely these will not be noticable, but if they are an issue, adding the following to the end of setup_arch() should resolve the regression: register_refinied_jiffies(CLOCK_TICK_RATE) Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
2012-09-05 00:42:27 +08:00
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted state and are copied early in the boot process. The early page fault support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied. For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bb0d430b41efefd45ee515aaf0979dcfda8b6a44.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:11 +08:00
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
x86/kdump: Have crashkernel=X reserve under 4G by default The kdump crashkernel low reservation is limited to under 896M even for X86_64. This obscure and miserable limitation exists for compatibility with old kexec-tools but the reason is not documented anywhere. Some more tests/investigations about the background: a) Previously, old kexec-tools could only load purgatory to memory under 2G. Eric removed that limitation in 2012 in kexec-tools: b4f9f8599679 ("kexec x86_64: Make purgatory relocatable anywhere in the 64bit address space.") b) Back in 2013 Yinghai removed all the limitations in new kexec-tools, bzImage64 can be loaded anywhere: 82c3dd2280d2 ("kexec, x86_64: Load bzImage64 above 4G") c) Test results with old kexec-tools with old and latest kernels: 1. Old kexec-tools can not build with modern toolchain anymore, I built it in a RHEL6 vm. 2. 2.0.0 kexec-tools does not work with the latest kernel even with memory under 896M and gives an error: "ELF core (kcore) parse failed" For that it needs below kexec-tools fix: ed15ba1b9977 ("build_mem_phdrs(): check if p_paddr is invalid") 3. Even with patched kexec-tools which fixes 2), it still needs some other fixes to work correctly for KASLR-enabled kernels. So the situation is: * Old kexec-tools is already broken with latest kernels. * We can not keep these limitations forever just for compatibility with very old kexec-tools. * If one must use old tools then he/she can choose crashkernel=X@Y. * People have reported bugs where crashkernel=384M failed because KASLR makes the 0-896M space sparse. * Crashkernel can reserve in low or high area, it is natural to understand low as memory under 4G. Hence drop the 896M limitation and change crashkernel low reservation to reserve under 4G by default. Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Cc: piliu@redhat.com Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190421035058.943630505@redhat.com
2019-04-21 11:50:59 +08:00
#include <linux/sizes.h>
#include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
#include <video/edid.h>
#include <asm/mtrr.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/mpspec.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/timer.h>
#include <asm/i8259.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/io_apic.h>
#include <asm/ist.h>
#include <asm/setup_arch.h>
#include <asm/bios_ebda.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
x86_64: add KASan support This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer. 16TB of virtual addressed used for shadow memory. It's located in range [ffffec0000000000 - fffffc0000000000] between vmemmap and %esp fixup stacks. At early stage we map whole shadow region with zero page. Latter, after pages mapped to direct mapping address range we unmap zero pages from corresponding shadow (see kasan_map_shadow()) and allocate and map a real shadow memory reusing vmemmap_populate() function. Also replace __pa with __pa_nodebug before shadow initialized. __pa with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y make external function call (__phys_addr) __phys_addr is instrumented, so __asan_load could be called before shadow area initialized. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:25 +08:00
#include <asm/kasan.h>
#include <asm/vsyscall.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/dma.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
#include <asm/gart.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
x86: Hypervisor detection and get tsc_freq from hypervisor Impact: Changes timebase calibration on Vmware. v3->v2 : Abstract the hypervisor detection and feature (tsc_freq) request behind a hypervisor.c file v2->v1 : Add a x86_hyper_vendor field to the cpuinfo_x86 structure. This avoids multiple calls to the hypervisor detection function. This patch adds function to detect if we are running under VMware. The current way to check if we are on VMware is following, # check if "hypervisor present bit" is set, if so read the 0x40000000 cpuid leaf and check for "VMwareVMware" signature. # if the above fails, check the DMI vendors name for "VMware" string if we find one we query the VMware hypervisor port to check if we are under VMware. The DMI + "VMware hypervisor port check" is needed for older VMware products, which don't implement the hypervisor signature cpuid leaf. Also note that since we are checking for the DMI signature the hypervisor port should never be accessed on native hardware. This patch also adds a hypervisor_get_tsc_freq function, instead of calibrating the frequency which can be error prone in virtualized environment, we ask the hypervisor for it. We get the frequency from the hypervisor by accessing the hypervisor port if we are running on VMware. Other hypervisors too can add code to the generic routine to get frequency on their platform. Signed-off-by: Alok N Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Hecht <dhecht@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2008-10-28 01:41:46 +08:00
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/olpc_ofw.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/topology.h>
#include <asm/apicdef.h>
#include <asm/amd_nb.h>
#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/prom.h>
#include <asm/microcode.h>
x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory regions for x86_64. This first patch adds the infrastructure and does not randomize any region. The following patches will randomize the physical memory mapping, vmalloc and vmemmap regions. This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules base addresses or corrupt specific structures to elevate privileges bypassing the current implementation of KASLR. This feature can be enabled with the CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY option. The order of each memory region is not changed. The feature looks at the available space for the regions based on different configuration options and randomizes the base and space between each. The size of the physical memory mapping is the available physical memory. No performance impact was detected while testing the feature. Entropy is generated using the KASLR early boot functions now shared in the lib directory (originally written by Kees Cook). Randomization is done on PGD & PUD page table levels to increase possible addresses. The physical memory mapping code was adapted to support PUD level virtual addresses. This implementation on the best configuration provides 30,000 possible virtual addresses in average for each memory region. An additional low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can start with a PGD aligned virtual address (for realmode). x86/dump_pagetable was updated to correctly display each region. Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly. Performance data, after all patches in the series: Kernbench shows almost no difference (-+ less than 1%): Before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.63 (1.2695) User Time 1034.89 (1.18115) System Time 87.056 (0.456416) Percent CPU 1092.9 (13.892) Context Switches 199805 (3455.33) Sleeps 97907.8 (900.636) After: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.489 (1.10636) User Time 1034.86 (1.36053) System Time 87.764 (0.49345) Percent CPU 1095 (12.7715) Context Switches 199036 (4298.1) Sleeps 97681.6 (1031.11) Hackbench shows 0% difference on average (hackbench 90 repeated 10 times): attemp,before,after 1,0.076,0.069 2,0.072,0.069 3,0.066,0.066 4,0.066,0.068 5,0.066,0.067 6,0.066,0.069 7,0.067,0.066 8,0.063,0.067 9,0.067,0.065 10,0.068,0.071 average,0.0677,0.0677 Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 08:47:02 +08:00
#include <asm/kaslr.h>
#include <asm/unwind.h>
/*
x86, mm: Only direct map addresses that are marked as E820_RAM Currently direct mappings are created for [ 0 to max_low_pfn<<PAGE_SHIFT ) and [ 4GB to max_pfn<<PAGE_SHIFT ), which may include regions that are not backed by actual DRAM. This is fine for holes under 4GB which are covered by fixed and variable range MTRRs to be UC. However, we run into trouble on higher memory addresses which cannot be covered by MTRRs. Our system with 1TB of RAM has an e820 that looks like this: BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x00000000000983ff] usable BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000098400-0x000000000009ffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000d0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000c7ebffff] usable BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000c7ec0000-0x00000000c7ed7fff] ACPI data BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000c7ed8000-0x00000000c7ed9fff] ACPI NVS BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000c7eda000-0x00000000c7ffffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec00000-0x00000000fec0ffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fee00000-0x00000000fee00fff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fff00000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000e037ffffff] usable BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000e038000000-0x000000fcffffffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000010000000000-0x0000011ffeffffff] usable and so direct mappings are created for huge memory hole between 0x000000e038000000 to 0x0000010000000000. Even though the kernel never generates memory accesses in that region, since the page tables mark them incorrectly as being WB, our (AMD) processor ends up causing a MCE while doing some memory bookkeeping/optimizations around that area. This patch iterates through e820 and only direct maps ranges that are marked as E820_RAM, and keeps track of those pfn ranges. Depending on the alignment of E820 ranges, this may possibly result in using smaller size (i.e. 4K instead of 2M or 1G) page tables. -v2: move changes from setup.c to mm/init.c, also use for_each_mem_pfn_range instead. - Yinghai Lu -v3: add calculate_all_table_space_size() to get correct needed page table size. - Yinghai Lu -v4: fix add_pfn_range_mapped() to get correct max_low_pfn_mapped when mem map does have hole under 4g that is found by Konard on xen domU with 8g ram. - Yinghai Signed-off-by: Jacob Shin <jacob.shin@amd.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1353123563-3103-16-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-11-17 11:38:52 +08:00
* max_low_pfn_mapped: highest direct mapped pfn under 4GB
* max_pfn_mapped: highest direct mapped pfn over 4GB
*
* The direct mapping only covers E820_TYPE_RAM regions, so the ranges and gaps are
x86, mm: Only direct map addresses that are marked as E820_RAM Currently direct mappings are created for [ 0 to max_low_pfn<<PAGE_SHIFT ) and [ 4GB to max_pfn<<PAGE_SHIFT ), which may include regions that are not backed by actual DRAM. This is fine for holes under 4GB which are covered by fixed and variable range MTRRs to be UC. However, we run into trouble on higher memory addresses which cannot be covered by MTRRs. Our system with 1TB of RAM has an e820 that looks like this: BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x00000000000983ff] usable BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000098400-0x000000000009ffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000d0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000c7ebffff] usable BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000c7ec0000-0x00000000c7ed7fff] ACPI data BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000c7ed8000-0x00000000c7ed9fff] ACPI NVS BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000c7eda000-0x00000000c7ffffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec00000-0x00000000fec0ffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fee00000-0x00000000fee00fff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fff00000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000e037ffffff] usable BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000e038000000-0x000000fcffffffff] reserved BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000010000000000-0x0000011ffeffffff] usable and so direct mappings are created for huge memory hole between 0x000000e038000000 to 0x0000010000000000. Even though the kernel never generates memory accesses in that region, since the page tables mark them incorrectly as being WB, our (AMD) processor ends up causing a MCE while doing some memory bookkeeping/optimizations around that area. This patch iterates through e820 and only direct maps ranges that are marked as E820_RAM, and keeps track of those pfn ranges. Depending on the alignment of E820 ranges, this may possibly result in using smaller size (i.e. 4K instead of 2M or 1G) page tables. -v2: move changes from setup.c to mm/init.c, also use for_each_mem_pfn_range instead. - Yinghai Lu -v3: add calculate_all_table_space_size() to get correct needed page table size. - Yinghai Lu -v4: fix add_pfn_range_mapped() to get correct max_low_pfn_mapped when mem map does have hole under 4g that is found by Konard on xen domU with 8g ram. - Yinghai Signed-off-by: Jacob Shin <jacob.shin@amd.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1353123563-3103-16-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-11-17 11:38:52 +08:00
* represented by pfn_mapped
*/
unsigned long max_low_pfn_mapped;
unsigned long max_pfn_mapped;
#ifdef CONFIG_DMI
RESERVE_BRK(dmi_alloc, 65536);
#endif
2009-02-27 09:35:44 +08:00
static __initdata unsigned long _brk_start = (unsigned long)__brk_base;
unsigned long _brk_end = (unsigned long)__brk_base;
struct boot_params boot_params;
/*
* Machine setup..
*/
static struct resource data_resource = {
.name = "Kernel data",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM
};
static struct resource code_resource = {
.name = "Kernel code",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM
};
static struct resource bss_resource = {
.name = "Kernel bss",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM
};
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
x86/cpu: Drop wp_works_ok member of struct cpuinfo_x86 Remove the wp_works_ok member of struct cpuinfo_x86. It's an optimization back from Linux v0.99 times where we had no fixup support yet and did the CR0.WP test via special code in the page fault handler. The < 0 test was an optimization to not do the special casing for each NULL ptr access violation but just for the first one doing the WP test. Today it serves no real purpose as the test no longer needs special code in the page fault handler and the only call side -- mem_init() -- calls it just once, anyway. However, Xen pre-initializes it to 1, to skip the test. Doing the test again for Xen should be no issue at all, as even the commit introducing skipping the test (commit d560bc61575e ("x86, xen: Suppress WP test on Xen")) mentioned it being ban aid only. And, in fact, testing the patch on Xen showed nothing breaks. The pre-fixup times are long gone and with the removal of the fallback handling code in commit a5c2a893dbd4 ("x86, 386 removal: Remove CONFIG_X86_WP_WORKS_OK") the kernel requires a working CR0.WP anyway. So just get rid of the "optimization" and do the test unconditionally. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Arnd Hannemann <hannemann@nets.rwth-aachen.de> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486933932-585-3-git-send-email-minipli@googlemail.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-02-13 05:12:08 +08:00
/* cpu data as detected by the assembly code in head_32.S */
struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data;
/* common cpu data for all cpus */
x86/cpu: Drop wp_works_ok member of struct cpuinfo_x86 Remove the wp_works_ok member of struct cpuinfo_x86. It's an optimization back from Linux v0.99 times where we had no fixup support yet and did the CR0.WP test via special code in the page fault handler. The < 0 test was an optimization to not do the special casing for each NULL ptr access violation but just for the first one doing the WP test. Today it serves no real purpose as the test no longer needs special code in the page fault handler and the only call side -- mem_init() -- calls it just once, anyway. However, Xen pre-initializes it to 1, to skip the test. Doing the test again for Xen should be no issue at all, as even the commit introducing skipping the test (commit d560bc61575e ("x86, xen: Suppress WP test on Xen")) mentioned it being ban aid only. And, in fact, testing the patch on Xen showed nothing breaks. The pre-fixup times are long gone and with the removal of the fallback handling code in commit a5c2a893dbd4 ("x86, 386 removal: Remove CONFIG_X86_WP_WORKS_OK") the kernel requires a working CR0.WP anyway. So just get rid of the "optimization" and do the test unconditionally. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Arnd Hannemann <hannemann@nets.rwth-aachen.de> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486933932-585-3-git-send-email-minipli@googlemail.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-02-13 05:12:08 +08:00
struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data __read_mostly;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(boot_cpu_data);
unsigned int def_to_bigsmp;
/* for MCA, but anyone else can use it if they want */
unsigned int machine_id;
unsigned int machine_submodel_id;
unsigned int BIOS_revision;
struct apm_info apm_info;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(apm_info);
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_SPEEDSTEP_SMI) || \
defined(CONFIG_X86_SPEEDSTEP_SMI_MODULE)
struct ist_info ist_info;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ist_info);
#else
struct ist_info ist_info;
#endif
#else
struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data __read_mostly;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(boot_cpu_data);
#endif
#if !defined(CONFIG_X86_PAE) || defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
__visible unsigned long mmu_cr4_features __ro_after_init;
#else
__visible unsigned long mmu_cr4_features __ro_after_init = X86_CR4_PAE;
#endif
/* Boot loader ID and version as integers, for the benefit of proc_dointvec */
int bootloader_type, bootloader_version;
/*
* Setup options
*/
struct screen_info screen_info;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(screen_info);
struct edid_info edid_info;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(edid_info);
extern int root_mountflags;
unsigned long saved_video_mode;
#define RAMDISK_IMAGE_START_MASK 0x07FF
#define RAMDISK_PROMPT_FLAG 0x8000
#define RAMDISK_LOAD_FLAG 0x4000
static char __initdata command_line[COMMAND_LINE_SIZE];
#ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL
static char __initdata builtin_cmdline[COMMAND_LINE_SIZE] = CONFIG_CMDLINE;
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_EDD) || defined(CONFIG_EDD_MODULE)
struct edd edd;
#ifdef CONFIG_EDD_MODULE
EXPORT_SYMBOL(edd);
#endif
/**
* copy_edd() - Copy the BIOS EDD information
* from boot_params into a safe place.
*
*/
static inline void __init copy_edd(void)
{
memcpy(edd.mbr_signature, boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer,
sizeof(edd.mbr_signature));
memcpy(edd.edd_info, boot_params.eddbuf, sizeof(edd.edd_info));
edd.mbr_signature_nr = boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;
edd.edd_info_nr = boot_params.eddbuf_entries;
}
#else
static inline void __init copy_edd(void)
{
}
#endif
void * __init extend_brk(size_t size, size_t align)
{
size_t mask = align - 1;
void *ret;
BUG_ON(_brk_start == 0);
BUG_ON(align & mask);
_brk_end = (_brk_end + mask) & ~mask;
BUG_ON((char *)(_brk_end + size) > __brk_limit);
ret = (void *)_brk_end;
_brk_end += size;
memset(ret, 0, size);
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
static void __init cleanup_highmap(void)
{
}
#endif
static void __init reserve_brk(void)
{
if (_brk_end > _brk_start)
memblock_reserve(__pa_symbol(_brk_start),
_brk_end - _brk_start);
/* Mark brk area as locked down and no longer taking any
new allocations */
_brk_start = 0;
}
u64 relocated_ramdisk;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
static u64 __init get_ramdisk_image(void)
{
u64 ramdisk_image = boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_image;
ramdisk_image |= (u64)boot_params.ext_ramdisk_image << 32;
return ramdisk_image;
}
static u64 __init get_ramdisk_size(void)
{
u64 ramdisk_size = boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_size;
ramdisk_size |= (u64)boot_params.ext_ramdisk_size << 32;
return ramdisk_size;
}
static void __init relocate_initrd(void)
{
x86: Make sure free_init_pages() frees pages on page boundary When CONFIG_NO_BOOTMEM=y, it could use memory more effiently, or in a more compact fashion. Example: Allocated new RAMDISK: 00ec2000 - 0248ce57 Move RAMDISK from 000000002ea04000 - 000000002ffcee56 to 00ec2000 - 0248ce56 The new RAMDISK's end is not page aligned. Last page could be shared with other users. When free_init_pages are called for initrd or .init, the page could be freed and we could corrupt other data. code segment in free_init_pages(): | for (; addr < end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) { | ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr)); | init_page_count(virt_to_page(addr)); | memset((void *)(addr & ~(PAGE_SIZE-1)), | POISON_FREE_INITMEM, PAGE_SIZE); | free_page(addr); | totalram_pages++; | } last half page could be used as one whole free page. So page align the boundaries. -v2: make the original initramdisk to be aligned, according to Johannes, otherwise we have the chance to lose one page. we still need to keep initrd_end not aligned, otherwise it could confuse decompressor. -v3: change to WARN_ON instead, suggested by Johannes. -v4: use PAGE_ALIGN, suggested by Johannes. We may fix that macro name later to PAGE_ALIGN_UP, and PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN Add comments about assuming ramdisk start is aligned in relocate_initrd(), change to re get ramdisk_image instead of save it to make diff smaller. Add warning for wrong range, suggested by Johannes. -v6: remove one WARN() We need to align beginning in free_init_pages() do not copy more than ramdisk_size, noticed by Johannes Reported-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Tested-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> LKML-Reference: <1269830604-26214-3-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-03-29 10:42:55 +08:00
/* Assume only end is not page aligned */
u64 ramdisk_image = get_ramdisk_image();
u64 ramdisk_size = get_ramdisk_size();
x86: Make sure free_init_pages() frees pages on page boundary When CONFIG_NO_BOOTMEM=y, it could use memory more effiently, or in a more compact fashion. Example: Allocated new RAMDISK: 00ec2000 - 0248ce57 Move RAMDISK from 000000002ea04000 - 000000002ffcee56 to 00ec2000 - 0248ce56 The new RAMDISK's end is not page aligned. Last page could be shared with other users. When free_init_pages are called for initrd or .init, the page could be freed and we could corrupt other data. code segment in free_init_pages(): | for (; addr < end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) { | ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr)); | init_page_count(virt_to_page(addr)); | memset((void *)(addr & ~(PAGE_SIZE-1)), | POISON_FREE_INITMEM, PAGE_SIZE); | free_page(addr); | totalram_pages++; | } last half page could be used as one whole free page. So page align the boundaries. -v2: make the original initramdisk to be aligned, according to Johannes, otherwise we have the chance to lose one page. we still need to keep initrd_end not aligned, otherwise it could confuse decompressor. -v3: change to WARN_ON instead, suggested by Johannes. -v4: use PAGE_ALIGN, suggested by Johannes. We may fix that macro name later to PAGE_ALIGN_UP, and PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN Add comments about assuming ramdisk start is aligned in relocate_initrd(), change to re get ramdisk_image instead of save it to make diff smaller. Add warning for wrong range, suggested by Johannes. -v6: remove one WARN() We need to align beginning in free_init_pages() do not copy more than ramdisk_size, noticed by Johannes Reported-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Tested-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> LKML-Reference: <1269830604-26214-3-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-03-29 10:42:55 +08:00
u64 area_size = PAGE_ALIGN(ramdisk_size);
/* We need to move the initrd down into directly mapped mem */
relocated_ramdisk = memblock_find_in_range(0, PFN_PHYS(max_pfn_mapped),
area_size, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!relocated_ramdisk)
panic("Cannot find place for new RAMDISK of size %lld\n",
ramdisk_size);
/* Note: this includes all the mem currently occupied by
the initrd, we rely on that fact to keep the data intact. */
memblock_reserve(relocated_ramdisk, area_size);
initrd_start = relocated_ramdisk + PAGE_OFFSET;
initrd_end = initrd_start + ramdisk_size;
printk(KERN_INFO "Allocated new RAMDISK: [mem %#010llx-%#010llx]\n",
relocated_ramdisk, relocated_ramdisk + ramdisk_size - 1);
copy_from_early_mem((void *)initrd_start, ramdisk_image, ramdisk_size);
printk(KERN_INFO "Move RAMDISK from [mem %#010llx-%#010llx] to"
" [mem %#010llx-%#010llx]\n",
ramdisk_image, ramdisk_image + ramdisk_size - 1,
relocated_ramdisk, relocated_ramdisk + ramdisk_size - 1);
}
static void __init early_reserve_initrd(void)
{
/* Assume only end is not page aligned */
u64 ramdisk_image = get_ramdisk_image();
u64 ramdisk_size = get_ramdisk_size();
u64 ramdisk_end = PAGE_ALIGN(ramdisk_image + ramdisk_size);
if (!boot_params.hdr.type_of_loader ||
!ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
return; /* No initrd provided by bootloader */
memblock_reserve(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
}
static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
{
x86: Make sure free_init_pages() frees pages on page boundary When CONFIG_NO_BOOTMEM=y, it could use memory more effiently, or in a more compact fashion. Example: Allocated new RAMDISK: 00ec2000 - 0248ce57 Move RAMDISK from 000000002ea04000 - 000000002ffcee56 to 00ec2000 - 0248ce56 The new RAMDISK's end is not page aligned. Last page could be shared with other users. When free_init_pages are called for initrd or .init, the page could be freed and we could corrupt other data. code segment in free_init_pages(): | for (; addr < end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) { | ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr)); | init_page_count(virt_to_page(addr)); | memset((void *)(addr & ~(PAGE_SIZE-1)), | POISON_FREE_INITMEM, PAGE_SIZE); | free_page(addr); | totalram_pages++; | } last half page could be used as one whole free page. So page align the boundaries. -v2: make the original initramdisk to be aligned, according to Johannes, otherwise we have the chance to lose one page. we still need to keep initrd_end not aligned, otherwise it could confuse decompressor. -v3: change to WARN_ON instead, suggested by Johannes. -v4: use PAGE_ALIGN, suggested by Johannes. We may fix that macro name later to PAGE_ALIGN_UP, and PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN Add comments about assuming ramdisk start is aligned in relocate_initrd(), change to re get ramdisk_image instead of save it to make diff smaller. Add warning for wrong range, suggested by Johannes. -v6: remove one WARN() We need to align beginning in free_init_pages() do not copy more than ramdisk_size, noticed by Johannes Reported-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Tested-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> LKML-Reference: <1269830604-26214-3-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-03-29 10:42:55 +08:00
/* Assume only end is not page aligned */
u64 ramdisk_image = get_ramdisk_image();
u64 ramdisk_size = get_ramdisk_size();
x86: Make sure free_init_pages() frees pages on page boundary When CONFIG_NO_BOOTMEM=y, it could use memory more effiently, or in a more compact fashion. Example: Allocated new RAMDISK: 00ec2000 - 0248ce57 Move RAMDISK from 000000002ea04000 - 000000002ffcee56 to 00ec2000 - 0248ce56 The new RAMDISK's end is not page aligned. Last page could be shared with other users. When free_init_pages are called for initrd or .init, the page could be freed and we could corrupt other data. code segment in free_init_pages(): | for (; addr < end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) { | ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr)); | init_page_count(virt_to_page(addr)); | memset((void *)(addr & ~(PAGE_SIZE-1)), | POISON_FREE_INITMEM, PAGE_SIZE); | free_page(addr); | totalram_pages++; | } last half page could be used as one whole free page. So page align the boundaries. -v2: make the original initramdisk to be aligned, according to Johannes, otherwise we have the chance to lose one page. we still need to keep initrd_end not aligned, otherwise it could confuse decompressor. -v3: change to WARN_ON instead, suggested by Johannes. -v4: use PAGE_ALIGN, suggested by Johannes. We may fix that macro name later to PAGE_ALIGN_UP, and PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN Add comments about assuming ramdisk start is aligned in relocate_initrd(), change to re get ramdisk_image instead of save it to make diff smaller. Add warning for wrong range, suggested by Johannes. -v6: remove one WARN() We need to align beginning in free_init_pages() do not copy more than ramdisk_size, noticed by Johannes Reported-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Tested-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> LKML-Reference: <1269830604-26214-3-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-03-29 10:42:55 +08:00
u64 ramdisk_end = PAGE_ALIGN(ramdisk_image + ramdisk_size);
u64 mapped_size;
if (!boot_params.hdr.type_of_loader ||
!ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
return; /* No initrd provided by bootloader */
initrd_start = 0;
mapped_size = memblock_mem_size(max_pfn_mapped);
if (ramdisk_size >= (mapped_size>>1))
panic("initrd too large to handle, "
"disabling initrd (%lld needed, %lld available)\n",
ramdisk_size, mapped_size>>1);
printk(KERN_INFO "RAMDISK: [mem %#010llx-%#010llx]\n", ramdisk_image,
ramdisk_end - 1);
if (pfn_range_is_mapped(PFN_DOWN(ramdisk_image),
PFN_DOWN(ramdisk_end))) {
/* All are mapped, easy case */
initrd_start = ramdisk_image + PAGE_OFFSET;
initrd_end = initrd_start + ramdisk_size;
return;
}
relocate_initrd();
memblock_free(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
}
#else
static void __init early_reserve_initrd(void)
{
}
static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
{
}
#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */
static void __init parse_setup_data(void)
{
struct setup_data *data;
u64 pa_data, pa_next;
pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
while (pa_data) {
u32 data_len, data_type;
data = early_memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
data_len = data->len + sizeof(struct setup_data);
data_type = data->type;
pa_next = data->next;
early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
switch (data_type) {
case SETUP_E820_EXT:
e820__memory_setup_extended(pa_data, data_len);
break;
case SETUP_DTB:
add_dtb(pa_data);
break;
case SETUP_EFI:
parse_efi_setup(pa_data, data_len);
break;
default:
break;
}
pa_data = pa_next;
}
}
static void __init memblock_x86_reserve_range_setup_data(void)
{
struct setup_data *data;
u64 pa_data;
pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
while (pa_data) {
data = early_memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
memblock_reserve(pa_data, sizeof(*data) + data->len);
pa_data = data->next;
early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
}
}
/*
* --------- Crashkernel reservation ------------------------------
*/
2015-09-10 06:38:55 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
/* 16M alignment for crash kernel regions */
x86/kdump: Have crashkernel=X reserve under 4G by default The kdump crashkernel low reservation is limited to under 896M even for X86_64. This obscure and miserable limitation exists for compatibility with old kexec-tools but the reason is not documented anywhere. Some more tests/investigations about the background: a) Previously, old kexec-tools could only load purgatory to memory under 2G. Eric removed that limitation in 2012 in kexec-tools: b4f9f8599679 ("kexec x86_64: Make purgatory relocatable anywhere in the 64bit address space.") b) Back in 2013 Yinghai removed all the limitations in new kexec-tools, bzImage64 can be loaded anywhere: 82c3dd2280d2 ("kexec, x86_64: Load bzImage64 above 4G") c) Test results with old kexec-tools with old and latest kernels: 1. Old kexec-tools can not build with modern toolchain anymore, I built it in a RHEL6 vm. 2. 2.0.0 kexec-tools does not work with the latest kernel even with memory under 896M and gives an error: "ELF core (kcore) parse failed" For that it needs below kexec-tools fix: ed15ba1b9977 ("build_mem_phdrs(): check if p_paddr is invalid") 3. Even with patched kexec-tools which fixes 2), it still needs some other fixes to work correctly for KASLR-enabled kernels. So the situation is: * Old kexec-tools is already broken with latest kernels. * We can not keep these limitations forever just for compatibility with very old kexec-tools. * If one must use old tools then he/she can choose crashkernel=X@Y. * People have reported bugs where crashkernel=384M failed because KASLR makes the 0-896M space sparse. * Crashkernel can reserve in low or high area, it is natural to understand low as memory under 4G. Hence drop the 896M limitation and change crashkernel low reservation to reserve under 4G by default. Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Cc: piliu@redhat.com Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190421035058.943630505@redhat.com
2019-04-21 11:50:59 +08:00
#define CRASH_ALIGN SZ_16M
/*
* Keep the crash kernel below this limit. On 32 bits earlier kernels
* would limit the kernel to the low 512 MiB due to mapping restrictions.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
x86/kdump: Have crashkernel=X reserve under 4G by default The kdump crashkernel low reservation is limited to under 896M even for X86_64. This obscure and miserable limitation exists for compatibility with old kexec-tools but the reason is not documented anywhere. Some more tests/investigations about the background: a) Previously, old kexec-tools could only load purgatory to memory under 2G. Eric removed that limitation in 2012 in kexec-tools: b4f9f8599679 ("kexec x86_64: Make purgatory relocatable anywhere in the 64bit address space.") b) Back in 2013 Yinghai removed all the limitations in new kexec-tools, bzImage64 can be loaded anywhere: 82c3dd2280d2 ("kexec, x86_64: Load bzImage64 above 4G") c) Test results with old kexec-tools with old and latest kernels: 1. Old kexec-tools can not build with modern toolchain anymore, I built it in a RHEL6 vm. 2. 2.0.0 kexec-tools does not work with the latest kernel even with memory under 896M and gives an error: "ELF core (kcore) parse failed" For that it needs below kexec-tools fix: ed15ba1b9977 ("build_mem_phdrs(): check if p_paddr is invalid") 3. Even with patched kexec-tools which fixes 2), it still needs some other fixes to work correctly for KASLR-enabled kernels. So the situation is: * Old kexec-tools is already broken with latest kernels. * We can not keep these limitations forever just for compatibility with very old kexec-tools. * If one must use old tools then he/she can choose crashkernel=X@Y. * People have reported bugs where crashkernel=384M failed because KASLR makes the 0-896M space sparse. * Crashkernel can reserve in low or high area, it is natural to understand low as memory under 4G. Hence drop the 896M limitation and change crashkernel low reservation to reserve under 4G by default. Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Cc: piliu@redhat.com Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190421035058.943630505@redhat.com
2019-04-21 11:50:59 +08:00
# define CRASH_ADDR_LOW_MAX SZ_512M
# define CRASH_ADDR_HIGH_MAX SZ_512M
#else
x86/kdump: Have crashkernel=X reserve under 4G by default The kdump crashkernel low reservation is limited to under 896M even for X86_64. This obscure and miserable limitation exists for compatibility with old kexec-tools but the reason is not documented anywhere. Some more tests/investigations about the background: a) Previously, old kexec-tools could only load purgatory to memory under 2G. Eric removed that limitation in 2012 in kexec-tools: b4f9f8599679 ("kexec x86_64: Make purgatory relocatable anywhere in the 64bit address space.") b) Back in 2013 Yinghai removed all the limitations in new kexec-tools, bzImage64 can be loaded anywhere: 82c3dd2280d2 ("kexec, x86_64: Load bzImage64 above 4G") c) Test results with old kexec-tools with old and latest kernels: 1. Old kexec-tools can not build with modern toolchain anymore, I built it in a RHEL6 vm. 2. 2.0.0 kexec-tools does not work with the latest kernel even with memory under 896M and gives an error: "ELF core (kcore) parse failed" For that it needs below kexec-tools fix: ed15ba1b9977 ("build_mem_phdrs(): check if p_paddr is invalid") 3. Even with patched kexec-tools which fixes 2), it still needs some other fixes to work correctly for KASLR-enabled kernels. So the situation is: * Old kexec-tools is already broken with latest kernels. * We can not keep these limitations forever just for compatibility with very old kexec-tools. * If one must use old tools then he/she can choose crashkernel=X@Y. * People have reported bugs where crashkernel=384M failed because KASLR makes the 0-896M space sparse. * Crashkernel can reserve in low or high area, it is natural to understand low as memory under 4G. Hence drop the 896M limitation and change crashkernel low reservation to reserve under 4G by default. Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Cc: piliu@redhat.com Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190421035058.943630505@redhat.com
2019-04-21 11:50:59 +08:00
# define CRASH_ADDR_LOW_MAX SZ_4G
# define CRASH_ADDR_HIGH_MAX MAXMEM
#endif
x86/setup: Do not reserve crashkernel high memory if low reservation failed People reported that when allocating crashkernel memory using the ",high" and ",low" syntax, there were cases where the reservation of the high portion succeeds but the reservation of the low portion fails. Then kexec can load the kdump kernel successfully, but booting the kdump kernel fails as there's no low memory. The low memory allocation for the kdump kernel can fail on large systems for a couple of reasons. For example, the manually specified crashkernel low memory can be too large and thus no adequate memblock region would be found. Therefore, we try to reserve low memory for the crash kernel *after* the high memory portion has been allocated. If that fails, we free crashkernel high memory too and return. The user can then take measures accordingly. Tested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Massage text. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: jerry_hoemann@hp.com Cc: yinghai@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1445246268-26285-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-19 17:17:41 +08:00
static int __init reserve_crashkernel_low(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
unsigned long long base, low_base = 0, low_size = 0;
unsigned long total_low_mem;
int ret;
total_low_mem = memblock_mem_size(1UL << (32 - PAGE_SHIFT));
/* crashkernel=Y,low */
ret = parse_crashkernel_low(boot_command_line, total_low_mem, &low_size, &base);
if (ret) {
/*
* two parts from lib/swiotlb.c:
* -swiotlb size: user-specified with swiotlb= or default.
*
* -swiotlb overflow buffer: now hardcoded to 32k. We round it
* to 8M for other buffers that may need to stay low too. Also
* make sure we allocate enough extra low memory so that we
* don't run out of DMA buffers for 32-bit devices.
*/
low_size = max(swiotlb_size_or_default() + (8UL << 20), 256UL << 20);
} else {
/* passed with crashkernel=0,low ? */
if (!low_size)
x86/setup: Do not reserve crashkernel high memory if low reservation failed People reported that when allocating crashkernel memory using the ",high" and ",low" syntax, there were cases where the reservation of the high portion succeeds but the reservation of the low portion fails. Then kexec can load the kdump kernel successfully, but booting the kdump kernel fails as there's no low memory. The low memory allocation for the kdump kernel can fail on large systems for a couple of reasons. For example, the manually specified crashkernel low memory can be too large and thus no adequate memblock region would be found. Therefore, we try to reserve low memory for the crash kernel *after* the high memory portion has been allocated. If that fails, we free crashkernel high memory too and return. The user can then take measures accordingly. Tested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Massage text. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: jerry_hoemann@hp.com Cc: yinghai@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1445246268-26285-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-19 17:17:41 +08:00
return 0;
}
low_base = memblock_find_in_range(0, 1ULL << 32, low_size, CRASH_ALIGN);
if (!low_base) {
x86/setup: Do not reserve crashkernel high memory if low reservation failed People reported that when allocating crashkernel memory using the ",high" and ",low" syntax, there were cases where the reservation of the high portion succeeds but the reservation of the low portion fails. Then kexec can load the kdump kernel successfully, but booting the kdump kernel fails as there's no low memory. The low memory allocation for the kdump kernel can fail on large systems for a couple of reasons. For example, the manually specified crashkernel low memory can be too large and thus no adequate memblock region would be found. Therefore, we try to reserve low memory for the crash kernel *after* the high memory portion has been allocated. If that fails, we free crashkernel high memory too and return. The user can then take measures accordingly. Tested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Massage text. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: jerry_hoemann@hp.com Cc: yinghai@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1445246268-26285-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-19 17:17:41 +08:00
pr_err("Cannot reserve %ldMB crashkernel low memory, please try smaller size.\n",
(unsigned long)(low_size >> 20));
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = memblock_reserve(low_base, low_size);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s: Error reserving crashkernel low memblock.\n", __func__);
return ret;
}
pr_info("Reserving %ldMB of low memory at %ldMB for crashkernel (System low RAM: %ldMB)\n",
(unsigned long)(low_size >> 20),
(unsigned long)(low_base >> 20),
(unsigned long)(total_low_mem >> 20));
crashk_low_res.start = low_base;
crashk_low_res.end = low_base + low_size - 1;
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &crashk_low_res);
#endif
x86/setup: Do not reserve crashkernel high memory if low reservation failed People reported that when allocating crashkernel memory using the ",high" and ",low" syntax, there were cases where the reservation of the high portion succeeds but the reservation of the low portion fails. Then kexec can load the kdump kernel successfully, but booting the kdump kernel fails as there's no low memory. The low memory allocation for the kdump kernel can fail on large systems for a couple of reasons. For example, the manually specified crashkernel low memory can be too large and thus no adequate memblock region would be found. Therefore, we try to reserve low memory for the crash kernel *after* the high memory portion has been allocated. If that fails, we free crashkernel high memory too and return. The user can then take measures accordingly. Tested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Massage text. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: jerry_hoemann@hp.com Cc: yinghai@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1445246268-26285-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-19 17:17:41 +08:00
return 0;
}
static void __init reserve_crashkernel(void)
{
unsigned long long crash_size, crash_base, total_mem;
bool high = false;
int ret;
total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size();
/* crashkernel=XM */
ret = parse_crashkernel(boot_command_line, total_mem, &crash_size, &crash_base);
if (ret != 0 || crash_size <= 0) {
/* crashkernel=X,high */
ret = parse_crashkernel_high(boot_command_line, total_mem,
&crash_size, &crash_base);
if (ret != 0 || crash_size <= 0)
return;
high = true;
}
if (xen_pv_domain()) {
pr_info("Ignoring crashkernel for a Xen PV domain\n");
return;
}
/* 0 means: find the address automatically */
x86/kdump: Fall back to reserve high crashkernel memory crashkernel=xM tries to reserve memory for the crash kernel under 4G, which is enough, usually. But this could fail sometimes, for example when one tries to reserve a big chunk like 2G, for example. So let the crashkernel=xM just fall back to use high memory in case it fails to find a suitable low range. Do not set the ,high as default because it allocates extra low memory for DMA buffers and swiotlb, and this is not always necessary for all machines. Typically, crashkernel=128M usually works with low reservation under 4G, so keep <4G as default. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Cc: piliu@redhat.com Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thymo van Beers <thymovanbeers@gmail.com> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190422031905.GA8387@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com
2019-04-22 11:19:05 +08:00
if (!crash_base) {
/*
* Set CRASH_ADDR_LOW_MAX upper bound for crash memory,
x86/kdump: Fall back to reserve high crashkernel memory crashkernel=xM tries to reserve memory for the crash kernel under 4G, which is enough, usually. But this could fail sometimes, for example when one tries to reserve a big chunk like 2G, for example. So let the crashkernel=xM just fall back to use high memory in case it fails to find a suitable low range. Do not set the ,high as default because it allocates extra low memory for DMA buffers and swiotlb, and this is not always necessary for all machines. Typically, crashkernel=128M usually works with low reservation under 4G, so keep <4G as default. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Cc: piliu@redhat.com Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thymo van Beers <thymovanbeers@gmail.com> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190422031905.GA8387@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com
2019-04-22 11:19:05 +08:00
* crashkernel=x,high reserves memory over 4G, also allocates
* 256M extra low memory for DMA buffers and swiotlb.
* But the extra memory is not required for all machines.
* So try low memory first and fall back to high memory
* unless "crashkernel=size[KMG],high" is specified.
*/
x86/kdump: Fall back to reserve high crashkernel memory crashkernel=xM tries to reserve memory for the crash kernel under 4G, which is enough, usually. But this could fail sometimes, for example when one tries to reserve a big chunk like 2G, for example. So let the crashkernel=xM just fall back to use high memory in case it fails to find a suitable low range. Do not set the ,high as default because it allocates extra low memory for DMA buffers and swiotlb, and this is not always necessary for all machines. Typically, crashkernel=128M usually works with low reservation under 4G, so keep <4G as default. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Cc: piliu@redhat.com Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thymo van Beers <thymovanbeers@gmail.com> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190422031905.GA8387@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com
2019-04-22 11:19:05 +08:00
if (!high)
crash_base = memblock_find_in_range(CRASH_ALIGN,
CRASH_ADDR_LOW_MAX,
crash_size, CRASH_ALIGN);
if (!crash_base)
crash_base = memblock_find_in_range(CRASH_ALIGN,
CRASH_ADDR_HIGH_MAX,
crash_size, CRASH_ALIGN);
if (!crash_base) {
pr_info("crashkernel reservation failed - No suitable area found.\n");
return;
}
} else {
unsigned long long start;
start = memblock_find_in_range(crash_base,
crash_base + crash_size,
crash_size, 1 << 20);
if (start != crash_base) {
pr_info("crashkernel reservation failed - memory is in use.\n");
return;
}
}
ret = memblock_reserve(crash_base, crash_size);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s: Error reserving crashkernel memblock.\n", __func__);
return;
}
x86/setup: Do not reserve crashkernel high memory if low reservation failed People reported that when allocating crashkernel memory using the ",high" and ",low" syntax, there were cases where the reservation of the high portion succeeds but the reservation of the low portion fails. Then kexec can load the kdump kernel successfully, but booting the kdump kernel fails as there's no low memory. The low memory allocation for the kdump kernel can fail on large systems for a couple of reasons. For example, the manually specified crashkernel low memory can be too large and thus no adequate memblock region would be found. Therefore, we try to reserve low memory for the crash kernel *after* the high memory portion has been allocated. If that fails, we free crashkernel high memory too and return. The user can then take measures accordingly. Tested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Massage text. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: jerry_hoemann@hp.com Cc: yinghai@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1445246268-26285-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-19 17:17:41 +08:00
if (crash_base >= (1ULL << 32) && reserve_crashkernel_low()) {
memblock_free(crash_base, crash_size);
return;
}
pr_info("Reserving %ldMB of memory at %ldMB for crashkernel (System RAM: %ldMB)\n",
(unsigned long)(crash_size >> 20),
(unsigned long)(crash_base >> 20),
(unsigned long)(total_mem >> 20));
crashk_res.start = crash_base;
crashk_res.end = crash_base + crash_size - 1;
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &crashk_res);
}
#else
static void __init reserve_crashkernel(void)
{
}
#endif
static struct resource standard_io_resources[] = {
{ .name = "dma1", .start = 0x00, .end = 0x1f,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_IO },
{ .name = "pic1", .start = 0x20, .end = 0x21,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_IO },
{ .name = "timer0", .start = 0x40, .end = 0x43,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_IO },
{ .name = "timer1", .start = 0x50, .end = 0x53,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_IO },
{ .name = "keyboard", .start = 0x60, .end = 0x60,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_IO },
{ .name = "keyboard", .start = 0x64, .end = 0x64,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_IO },
{ .name = "dma page reg", .start = 0x80, .end = 0x8f,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_IO },
{ .name = "pic2", .start = 0xa0, .end = 0xa1,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_IO },
{ .name = "dma2", .start = 0xc0, .end = 0xdf,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_IO },
{ .name = "fpu", .start = 0xf0, .end = 0xff,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_IO }
};
void __init reserve_standard_io_resources(void)
{
int i;
/* request I/O space for devices used on all i[345]86 PCs */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(standard_io_resources); i++)
request_resource(&ioport_resource, &standard_io_resources[i]);
}
static __init void reserve_ibft_region(void)
{
unsigned long addr, size = 0;
addr = find_ibft_region(&size);
if (size)
memblock_reserve(addr, size);
}
static bool __init snb_gfx_workaround_needed(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PCI
int i;
u16 vendor, devid;
static const __initconst u16 snb_ids[] = {
0x0102,
0x0112,
0x0122,
0x0106,
0x0116,
0x0126,
0x010a,
};
/* Assume no if something weird is going on with PCI */
if (!early_pci_allowed())
return false;
vendor = read_pci_config_16(0, 2, 0, PCI_VENDOR_ID);
if (vendor != 0x8086)
return false;
devid = read_pci_config_16(0, 2, 0, PCI_DEVICE_ID);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(snb_ids); i++)
if (devid == snb_ids[i])
return true;
#endif
return false;
}
/*
* Sandy Bridge graphics has trouble with certain ranges, exclude
* them from allocation.
*/
static void __init trim_snb_memory(void)
{
static const __initconst unsigned long bad_pages[] = {
0x20050000,
0x20110000,
0x20130000,
0x20138000,
0x40004000,
};
int i;
if (!snb_gfx_workaround_needed())
return;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "reserving inaccessible SNB gfx pages\n");
/*
* Reserve all memory below the 1 MB mark that has not
* already been reserved.
*/
memblock_reserve(0, 1<<20);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bad_pages); i++) {
if (memblock_reserve(bad_pages[i], PAGE_SIZE))
printk(KERN_WARNING "failed to reserve 0x%08lx\n",
bad_pages[i]);
}
}
/*
* Here we put platform-specific memory range workarounds, i.e.
* memory known to be corrupt or otherwise in need to be reserved on
* specific platforms.
*
* If this gets used more widely it could use a real dispatch mechanism.
*/
static void __init trim_platform_memory_ranges(void)
{
trim_snb_memory();
}
static void __init trim_bios_range(void)
{
/*
* A special case is the first 4Kb of memory;
* This is a BIOS owned area, not kernel ram, but generally
* not listed as such in the E820 table.
*
* This typically reserves additional memory (64KiB by default)
* since some BIOSes are known to corrupt low memory. See the
* Kconfig help text for X86_RESERVE_LOW.
*/
e820__range_update(0, PAGE_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
/*
* special case: Some BIOSen report the PC BIOS
* area (640->1Mb) as ram even though it is not.
* take them out.
*/
e820__range_remove(BIOS_BEGIN, BIOS_END - BIOS_BEGIN, E820_TYPE_RAM, 1);
x86/boot/e820: Simplify the e820__update_table() interface The e820__update_table() parameters are pretty complex: arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h:extern int e820__update_table(struct e820_entry *biosmap, int max_nr_map, u32 *pnr_map); But 90% of the usage is trivial: arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries)) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries) < 0) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(boot_params.e820_table, ARRAY_SIZE(boot_params.e820_table), &new_nr); arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(xen_e820_table.entries, ARRAY_SIZE(xen_e820_table.entries), arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(xen_e820_table.entries, ARRAY_SIZE(xen_e820_table.entries), as it only uses an exiting struct e820_table's entries array, its size and its current number of entries as input and output arguments. Only one use is non-trivial: arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(boot_params.e820_table, ARRAY_SIZE(boot_params.e820_table), &new_nr); ... which call updates the E820 table in the zeropage in-situ, and the layout there does not match that of 'struct e820_table' (in particular nr_entries is at a different offset, hardcoded by the boot protocol). Simplify all this by introducing a low level __e820__update_table() API that the zeropage update call can use, and simplifying the main e820__update_table() call signature down to: int e820__update_table(struct e820_table *table); This visibly simplifies all the call sites: arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h:extern int e820__update_table(struct e820_table *table); arch/x86/include/asm/e820/types.h: * call to e820__update_table() to remove duplicates. The allowance arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: * The return value from e820__update_table() is zero if it arch/x86/kernel/e820.c:int __init e820__update_table(struct e820_table *table) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table)) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table_firmware); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table) < 0) arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(&xen_e820_table); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(&xen_e820_table); No change in functionality. Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-29 01:00:35 +08:00
e820__update_table(e820_table);
}
/* called before trim_bios_range() to spare extra sanitize */
static void __init e820_add_kernel_range(void)
{
u64 start = __pa_symbol(_text);
u64 size = __pa_symbol(_end) - start;
/*
* Complain if .text .data and .bss are not marked as E820_TYPE_RAM and
* attempt to fix it by adding the range. We may have a confused BIOS,
* or the user may have used memmap=exactmap or memmap=xxM$yyM to
* exclude kernel range. If we really are running on top non-RAM,
* we will crash later anyways.
*/
if (e820__mapped_all(start, start + size, E820_TYPE_RAM))
return;
pr_warn(".text .data .bss are not marked as E820_TYPE_RAM!\n");
e820__range_remove(start, size, E820_TYPE_RAM, 0);
e820__range_add(start, size, E820_TYPE_RAM);
}
static unsigned reserve_low = CONFIG_X86_RESERVE_LOW << 10;
static int __init parse_reservelow(char *p)
{
unsigned long long size;
if (!p)
return -EINVAL;
size = memparse(p, &p);
if (size < 4096)
size = 4096;
if (size > 640*1024)
size = 640*1024;
reserve_low = size;
return 0;
}
early_param("reservelow", parse_reservelow);
static void __init trim_low_memory_range(void)
{
memblock_reserve(0, ALIGN(reserve_low, PAGE_SIZE));
}
/*
* Dump out kernel offset information on panic.
*/
static int
dump_kernel_offset(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long v, void *p)
{
if (kaslr_enabled()) {
pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: 0x%lx from 0x%lx (relocation range: 0x%lx-0x%lx)\n",
kaslr_offset(),
__START_KERNEL,
__START_KERNEL_map,
MODULES_VADDR-1);
} else {
pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: disabled\n");
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Determine if we were loaded by an EFI loader. If so, then we have also been
* passed the efi memmap, systab, etc., so we should use these data structures
* for initialization. Note, the efi init code path is determined by the
* global efi_enabled. This allows the same kernel image to be used on existing
* systems (with a traditional BIOS) as well as on EFI systems.
*/
/*
* setup_arch - architecture-specific boot-time initializations
*
* Note: On x86_64, fixmaps are ready for use even before this is called.
*/
void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
{
memblock_reserve(__pa_symbol(_text),
(unsigned long)__bss_stop - (unsigned long)_text);
/*
* Make sure page 0 is always reserved because on systems with
* L1TF its contents can be leaked to user processes.
*/
memblock_reserve(0, PAGE_SIZE);
early_reserve_initrd();
/*
* At this point everything still needed from the boot loader
* or BIOS or kernel text should be early reserved or marked not
* RAM in e820. All other memory is free game.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
memcpy(&boot_cpu_data, &new_cpu_data, sizeof(new_cpu_data));
/*
* copy kernel address range established so far and switch
* to the proper swapper page table
*/
clone_pgd_range(swapper_pg_dir + KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY,
initial_page_table + KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY,
KERNEL_PGD_PTRS);
load_cr3(swapper_pg_dir);
/*
* Note: Quark X1000 CPUs advertise PGE incorrectly and require
* a cr3 based tlb flush, so the following __flush_tlb_all()
* will not flush anything because the cpu quirk which clears
* X86_FEATURE_PGE has not been invoked yet. Though due to the
* load_cr3() above the TLB has been flushed already. The
* quirk is invoked before subsequent calls to __flush_tlb_all()
* so proper operation is guaranteed.
*/
__flush_tlb_all();
#else
printk(KERN_INFO "Command line: %s\n", boot_command_line);
boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits = MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS;
#endif
/*
* If we have OLPC OFW, we might end up relocating the fixmap due to
* reserve_top(), so do this before touching the ioremap area.
*/
olpc_ofw_detect();
idt_setup_early_traps();
early_cpu_init();
x86/jump_label: Initialize static branching early Static branching is useful to runtime patch branches that are used in hot path, but are infrequently changed. The x86 clock framework is one example that uses static branches to setup the best clock during boot and never changes it again. It is desired to enable the TSC based sched clock early to allow fine grained boot time analysis early on. That requires the static branching functionality to be functional early as well. Static branching requires patching nop instructions, thus, arch_init_ideal_nops() must be called prior to jump_label_init(). Do all the necessary steps to call arch_init_ideal_nops() right after early_cpu_init(), which also allows to insert a call to jump_label_init() right after that. jump_label_init() will be called again from the generic init code, but the code is protected against reinitialization already. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: steven.sistare@oracle.com Cc: daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org Cc: sboyd@codeaurora.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: prarit@redhat.com Cc: feng.tang@intel.com Cc: pmladek@suse.com Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: jgross@suse.com Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180719205545.16512-10-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
2018-07-20 04:55:28 +08:00
arch_init_ideal_nops();
jump_label_init();
early_ioremap_init();
setup_olpc_ofw_pgd();
ROOT_DEV = old_decode_dev(boot_params.hdr.root_dev);
screen_info = boot_params.screen_info;
edid_info = boot_params.edid_info;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
apm_info.bios = boot_params.apm_bios_info;
ist_info = boot_params.ist_info;
#endif
saved_video_mode = boot_params.hdr.vid_mode;
bootloader_type = boot_params.hdr.type_of_loader;
if ((bootloader_type >> 4) == 0xe) {
bootloader_type &= 0xf;
bootloader_type |= (boot_params.hdr.ext_loader_type+0x10) << 4;
}
bootloader_version = bootloader_type & 0xf;
bootloader_version |= boot_params.hdr.ext_loader_ver << 4;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM
rd_image_start = boot_params.hdr.ram_size & RAMDISK_IMAGE_START_MASK;
rd_prompt = ((boot_params.hdr.ram_size & RAMDISK_PROMPT_FLAG) != 0);
rd_doload = ((boot_params.hdr.ram_size & RAMDISK_LOAD_FLAG) != 0);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
if (!strncmp((char *)&boot_params.efi_info.efi_loader_signature,
EFI32_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4)) {
set_bit(EFI_BOOT, &efi.flags);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)&boot_params.efi_info.efi_loader_signature,
EFI64_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4)) {
set_bit(EFI_BOOT, &efi.flags);
set_bit(EFI_64BIT, &efi.flags);
}
#endif
x86_init.oem.arch_setup();
iomem_resource.end = (1ULL << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits) - 1;
e820__memory_setup();
parse_setup_data();
copy_edd();
if (!boot_params.hdr.root_flags)
root_mountflags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
init_mm.start_code = (unsigned long) _text;
init_mm.end_code = (unsigned long) _etext;
init_mm.end_data = (unsigned long) _edata;
2009-02-27 09:35:44 +08:00
init_mm.brk = _brk_end;
x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables This is really the meat of the MPX patch set. If there is one patch to review in the entire series, this is the one. There is a new ABI here and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a relatively unusual manner. (small FAQ below). Long Description: This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables") and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application needs bounds table management from the MPX registers. The prctl() is an explicit signal from userspace. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to require kernel's help in managing bounds tables. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into a new field (->bd_addr) in the 'mm_struct'. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address. Using this scheme, we can use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in kernel is enabled. Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves, which can be expensive. Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time. Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS. ==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ==== MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information. If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers and some new "bounds tables". They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory over to it. The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall) to access the tables would obviously destroy performance. ==== Why not do this in userspace? ==== This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel. However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel. It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are practical in the real-world, but here they are. Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so that we never have to allocate them? A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB, which is larger than the entire virtual address space today. This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories. Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually need bounds tables? A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small, constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls. Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel? A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the allocation state there. Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in the kernel. Based-on-patch-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2014-11-14 23:18:29 +08:00
mpx_mm_init(&init_mm);
code_resource.start = __pa_symbol(_text);
code_resource.end = __pa_symbol(_etext)-1;
data_resource.start = __pa_symbol(_etext);
data_resource.end = __pa_symbol(_edata)-1;
bss_resource.start = __pa_symbol(__bss_start);
bss_resource.end = __pa_symbol(__bss_stop)-1;
#ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL
#ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_OVERRIDE
strlcpy(boot_command_line, builtin_cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
#else
if (builtin_cmdline[0]) {
/* append boot loader cmdline to builtin */
strlcat(builtin_cmdline, " ", COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
strlcat(builtin_cmdline, boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
strlcpy(boot_command_line, builtin_cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
}
#endif
#endif
strlcpy(command_line, boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
*cmdline_p = command_line;
/*
* x86_configure_nx() is called before parse_early_param() to detect
* whether hardware doesn't support NX (so that the early EHCI debug
* console setup can safely call set_fixmap()). It may then be called
* again from within noexec_setup() during parsing early parameters
* to honor the respective command line option.
*/
x86_configure_nx();
parse_early_param();
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_memblock_x86_reserve_range();
mm: remove x86-only restriction of movable_node In commit c5320926e370 ("mem-hotplug: introduce movable_node boot option"), the memblock allocation direction is changed to bottom-up and then back to top-down like this: 1. memblock_set_bottom_up(true), called by cmdline_parse_movable_node(). 2. memblock_set_bottom_up(false), called by x86's numa_init(). Even though (1) occurs in generic mm code, it is wrapped by #ifdef CONFIG_MOVABLE_NODE, which depends on X86_64. This means that when we extend CONFIG_MOVABLE_NODE to non-x86 arches, things will be unbalanced. (1) will happen for them, but (2) will not. This toggle was added in the first place because x86 has a delay between adding memblocks and marking them as hotpluggable. Since other arches do this marking either immediately or not at all, they do not require the bottom-up toggle. So, resolve things by moving (1) from cmdline_parse_movable_node() to x86's setup_arch(), immediately after the movable_node parameter has been parsed. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1479160961-25840-3-git-send-email-arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Reza Arbab <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Frank Rowand <frowand.list@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nathan Fontenot <nfont@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-13 08:42:55 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
/*
* Memory used by the kernel cannot be hot-removed because Linux
* cannot migrate the kernel pages. When memory hotplug is
* enabled, we should prevent memblock from allocating memory
* for the kernel.
*
* ACPI SRAT records all hotpluggable memory ranges. But before
* SRAT is parsed, we don't know about it.
*
* The kernel image is loaded into memory at very early time. We
* cannot prevent this anyway. So on NUMA system, we set any
* node the kernel resides in as un-hotpluggable.
*
* Since on modern servers, one node could have double-digit
* gigabytes memory, we can assume the memory around the kernel
* image is also un-hotpluggable. So before SRAT is parsed, just
* allocate memory near the kernel image to try the best to keep
* the kernel away from hotpluggable memory.
*/
if (movable_node_is_enabled())
memblock_set_bottom_up(true);
#endif
x86_report_nx();
/* after early param, so could get panic from serial */
memblock_x86_reserve_range_setup_data();
if (acpi_mps_check()) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
disable_apic = 1;
#endif
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_APIC);
}
e820__reserve_setup_data();
e820__finish_early_params();
efi: Make 'efi_enabled' a function to query EFI facilities Originally 'efi_enabled' indicated whether a kernel was booted from EFI firmware. Over time its semantics have changed, and it now indicates whether or not we are booted on an EFI machine with bit-native firmware, e.g. 64-bit kernel with 64-bit firmware. The immediate motivation for this patch is the bug report at, https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu-cdimage/+bug/1040557 which details how running a platform driver on an EFI machine that is designed to run under BIOS can cause the machine to become bricked. Also, the following report, https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=47121 details how running said driver can also cause Machine Check Exceptions. Drivers need a new means of detecting whether they're running on an EFI machine, as sadly the expression, if (!efi_enabled) hasn't been a sufficient condition for quite some time. Users actually want to query 'efi_enabled' for different reasons - what they really want access to is the list of available EFI facilities. For instance, the x86 reboot code needs to know whether it can invoke the ResetSystem() function provided by the EFI runtime services, while the ACPI OSL code wants to know whether the EFI config tables were mapped successfully. There are also checks in some of the platform driver code to simply see if they're running on an EFI machine (which would make it a bad idea to do BIOS-y things). This patch is a prereq for the samsung-laptop fix patch. Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Steve Langasek <steve.langasek@canonical.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-11-14 17:42:35 +08:00
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_init();
dmi_setup();
x86: Hypervisor detection and get tsc_freq from hypervisor Impact: Changes timebase calibration on Vmware. v3->v2 : Abstract the hypervisor detection and feature (tsc_freq) request behind a hypervisor.c file v2->v1 : Add a x86_hyper_vendor field to the cpuinfo_x86 structure. This avoids multiple calls to the hypervisor detection function. This patch adds function to detect if we are running under VMware. The current way to check if we are on VMware is following, # check if "hypervisor present bit" is set, if so read the 0x40000000 cpuid leaf and check for "VMwareVMware" signature. # if the above fails, check the DMI vendors name for "VMware" string if we find one we query the VMware hypervisor port to check if we are under VMware. The DMI + "VMware hypervisor port check" is needed for older VMware products, which don't implement the hypervisor signature cpuid leaf. Also note that since we are checking for the DMI signature the hypervisor port should never be accessed on native hardware. This patch also adds a hypervisor_get_tsc_freq function, instead of calibrating the frequency which can be error prone in virtualized environment, we ask the hypervisor for it. We get the frequency from the hypervisor by accessing the hypervisor port if we are running on VMware. Other hypervisors too can add code to the generic routine to get frequency on their platform. Signed-off-by: Alok N Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Hecht <dhecht@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2008-10-28 01:41:46 +08:00
/*
* VMware detection requires dmi to be available, so this
* needs to be done after dmi_setup(), for the boot CPU.
x86: Hypervisor detection and get tsc_freq from hypervisor Impact: Changes timebase calibration on Vmware. v3->v2 : Abstract the hypervisor detection and feature (tsc_freq) request behind a hypervisor.c file v2->v1 : Add a x86_hyper_vendor field to the cpuinfo_x86 structure. This avoids multiple calls to the hypervisor detection function. This patch adds function to detect if we are running under VMware. The current way to check if we are on VMware is following, # check if "hypervisor present bit" is set, if so read the 0x40000000 cpuid leaf and check for "VMwareVMware" signature. # if the above fails, check the DMI vendors name for "VMware" string if we find one we query the VMware hypervisor port to check if we are under VMware. The DMI + "VMware hypervisor port check" is needed for older VMware products, which don't implement the hypervisor signature cpuid leaf. Also note that since we are checking for the DMI signature the hypervisor port should never be accessed on native hardware. This patch also adds a hypervisor_get_tsc_freq function, instead of calibrating the frequency which can be error prone in virtualized environment, we ask the hypervisor for it. We get the frequency from the hypervisor by accessing the hypervisor port if we are running on VMware. Other hypervisors too can add code to the generic routine to get frequency on their platform. Signed-off-by: Alok N Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Hecht <dhecht@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2008-10-28 01:41:46 +08:00
*/
init_hypervisor_platform();
x86: Hypervisor detection and get tsc_freq from hypervisor Impact: Changes timebase calibration on Vmware. v3->v2 : Abstract the hypervisor detection and feature (tsc_freq) request behind a hypervisor.c file v2->v1 : Add a x86_hyper_vendor field to the cpuinfo_x86 structure. This avoids multiple calls to the hypervisor detection function. This patch adds function to detect if we are running under VMware. The current way to check if we are on VMware is following, # check if "hypervisor present bit" is set, if so read the 0x40000000 cpuid leaf and check for "VMwareVMware" signature. # if the above fails, check the DMI vendors name for "VMware" string if we find one we query the VMware hypervisor port to check if we are under VMware. The DMI + "VMware hypervisor port check" is needed for older VMware products, which don't implement the hypervisor signature cpuid leaf. Also note that since we are checking for the DMI signature the hypervisor port should never be accessed on native hardware. This patch also adds a hypervisor_get_tsc_freq function, instead of calibrating the frequency which can be error prone in virtualized environment, we ask the hypervisor for it. We get the frequency from the hypervisor by accessing the hypervisor port if we are running on VMware. Other hypervisors too can add code to the generic routine to get frequency on their platform. Signed-off-by: Alok N Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Hecht <dhecht@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2008-10-28 01:41:46 +08:00
tsc_early_init();
x86_init.resources.probe_roms();
/* after parse_early_param, so could debug it */
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &code_resource);
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &data_resource);
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &bss_resource);
e820_add_kernel_range();
trim_bios_range();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
if (ppro_with_ram_bug()) {
e820__range_update(0x70000000ULL, 0x40000ULL, E820_TYPE_RAM,
E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
x86/boot/e820: Simplify the e820__update_table() interface The e820__update_table() parameters are pretty complex: arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h:extern int e820__update_table(struct e820_entry *biosmap, int max_nr_map, u32 *pnr_map); But 90% of the usage is trivial: arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries)) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries) < 0) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(boot_params.e820_table, ARRAY_SIZE(boot_params.e820_table), &new_nr); arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(xen_e820_table.entries, ARRAY_SIZE(xen_e820_table.entries), arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(xen_e820_table.entries, ARRAY_SIZE(xen_e820_table.entries), as it only uses an exiting struct e820_table's entries array, its size and its current number of entries as input and output arguments. Only one use is non-trivial: arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(boot_params.e820_table, ARRAY_SIZE(boot_params.e820_table), &new_nr); ... which call updates the E820 table in the zeropage in-situ, and the layout there does not match that of 'struct e820_table' (in particular nr_entries is at a different offset, hardcoded by the boot protocol). Simplify all this by introducing a low level __e820__update_table() API that the zeropage update call can use, and simplifying the main e820__update_table() call signature down to: int e820__update_table(struct e820_table *table); This visibly simplifies all the call sites: arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h:extern int e820__update_table(struct e820_table *table); arch/x86/include/asm/e820/types.h: * call to e820__update_table() to remove duplicates. The allowance arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: * The return value from e820__update_table() is zero if it arch/x86/kernel/e820.c:int __init e820__update_table(struct e820_table *table) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table)) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table_firmware); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table) < 0) arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(&xen_e820_table); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(&xen_e820_table); No change in functionality. Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-29 01:00:35 +08:00
e820__update_table(e820_table);
printk(KERN_INFO "fixed physical RAM map:\n");
e820__print_table("bad_ppro");
}
#else
early_gart_iommu_check();
#endif
/*
* partially used pages are not usable - thus
* we are rounding upwards:
*/
max_pfn = e820__end_of_ram_pfn();
/* update e820 for memory not covered by WB MTRRs */
mtrr_bp_init();
if (mtrr_trim_uncached_memory(max_pfn))
max_pfn = e820__end_of_ram_pfn();
max_possible_pfn = max_pfn;
2017-07-05 07:04:23 +08:00
/*
* This call is required when the CPU does not support PAT. If
* mtrr_bp_init() invoked it already via pat_init() the call has no
* effect.
*/
init_cache_modes();
x86/mm/KASLR: Fix physical memory calculation on KASLR memory randomization Initialize KASLR memory randomization after max_pfn is initialized. Also ensure the size is rounded up. It could create problems on machines with more than 1Tb of memory on certain random addresses. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Aleksey Makarov <aleksey.makarov@linaro.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Fixes: 021182e52fe0 ("Enable KASLR for physical mapping memory regions") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470762665-88032-1-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-08-10 01:11:04 +08:00
/*
* Define random base addresses for memory sections after max_pfn is
* defined and before each memory section base is used.
*/
kernel_randomize_memory();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/* max_low_pfn get updated here */
find_low_pfn_range();
#else
check_x2apic();
/* How many end-of-memory variables you have, grandma! */
/* need this before calling reserve_initrd */
if (max_pfn > (1UL<<(32 - PAGE_SHIFT)))
max_low_pfn = e820__end_of_low_ram_pfn();
else
max_low_pfn = max_pfn;
high_memory = (void *)__va(max_pfn * PAGE_SIZE - 1) + 1;
#endif
/*
* Find and reserve possible boot-time SMP configuration:
*/
find_smp_config();
reserve_ibft_region();
early_alloc_pgt_buf();
x86: Use memblock to replace early_res 1. replace find_e820_area with memblock_find_in_range 2. replace reserve_early with memblock_x86_reserve_range 3. replace free_early with memblock_x86_free_range. 4. NO_BOOTMEM will switch to use memblock too. 5. use _e820, _early wrap in the patch, in following patch, will replace them all 6. because memblock_x86_free_range support partial free, we can remove some special care 7. Need to make sure that memblock_find_in_range() is called after memblock_x86_fill() so adjust some calling later in setup.c::setup_arch() -- corruption_check and mptable_update -v2: Move reserve_brk() early Before fill_memblock_area, to avoid overlap between brk and memblock_find_in_range() that could happen We have more then 128 RAM entry in E820 tables, and memblock_x86_fill() could use memblock_find_in_range() to find a new place for memblock.memory.region array. and We don't need to use extend_brk() after fill_memblock_area() So move reserve_brk() early before fill_memblock_area(). -v3: Move find_smp_config early To make sure memblock_find_in_range not find wrong place, if BIOS doesn't put mptable in right place. -v4: Treat RESERVED_KERN as RAM in memblock.memory. and they are already in memblock.reserved already.. use __NOT_KEEP_MEMBLOCK to make sure memblock related code could be freed later. -v5: Generic version __memblock_find_in_range() is going from high to low, and for 32bit active_region for 32bit does include high pages need to replace the limit with memblock.default_alloc_limit, aka get_max_mapped() -v6: Use current_limit instead -v7: check with MEMBLOCK_ERROR instead of -1ULL or -1L -v8: Set memblock_can_resize early to handle EFI with more RAM entries -v9: update after kmemleak changes in mainline Suggested-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2010-08-26 04:39:17 +08:00
/*
x86/boot/e820: Rename memblock_x86_fill() to e820__memblock_setup() and improve the explanations So memblock_x86_fill() is another E820 code misnomer: - nothing in its name tells us that it's part of the E820 subsystem ... - The 'fill' wording is ambiguous and doesn't tell us whether it's a single entry or some process - while the _real_ purpose of the function is hidden, which is to do a complete setup of the (platform independent) memblock regions. So rename it accordingly, to e820__memblock_setup(). Also translate this incomprehensible and misleading comment: /* * EFI may have more than 128 entries * We are safe to enable resizing, beause memblock_x86_fill() * is rather later for x86 */ memblock_allow_resize(); The worst aspect of this comment isn't even the sloppy typos, but that it casually mentions a '128' number with no explanation, which makes one lead to the assumption that this is related to the well-known limit of a maximum of 128 E820 entries passed via legacy bootloaders. But no, the _real_ meaning of 128 here is that of the memblock subsystem, which too happens to have a 128 entries limit for very early memblock regions (which is unrelated to E820), via INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS ... So change the comment to a more comprehensible version: /* * The bootstrap memblock region count maximum is 128 entries * (INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS), but EFI might pass us more E820 entries * than that - so allow memblock resizing. * * This is safe, because this call happens pretty late during x86 setup, * so we know about reserved memory regions already. (This is important * so that memblock resizing does no stomp over reserved areas.) */ memblock_allow_resize(); No change in functionality. Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-28 18:37:42 +08:00
* Need to conclude brk, before e820__memblock_setup()
x86: Use memblock to replace early_res 1. replace find_e820_area with memblock_find_in_range 2. replace reserve_early with memblock_x86_reserve_range 3. replace free_early with memblock_x86_free_range. 4. NO_BOOTMEM will switch to use memblock too. 5. use _e820, _early wrap in the patch, in following patch, will replace them all 6. because memblock_x86_free_range support partial free, we can remove some special care 7. Need to make sure that memblock_find_in_range() is called after memblock_x86_fill() so adjust some calling later in setup.c::setup_arch() -- corruption_check and mptable_update -v2: Move reserve_brk() early Before fill_memblock_area, to avoid overlap between brk and memblock_find_in_range() that could happen We have more then 128 RAM entry in E820 tables, and memblock_x86_fill() could use memblock_find_in_range() to find a new place for memblock.memory.region array. and We don't need to use extend_brk() after fill_memblock_area() So move reserve_brk() early before fill_memblock_area(). -v3: Move find_smp_config early To make sure memblock_find_in_range not find wrong place, if BIOS doesn't put mptable in right place. -v4: Treat RESERVED_KERN as RAM in memblock.memory. and they are already in memblock.reserved already.. use __NOT_KEEP_MEMBLOCK to make sure memblock related code could be freed later. -v5: Generic version __memblock_find_in_range() is going from high to low, and for 32bit active_region for 32bit does include high pages need to replace the limit with memblock.default_alloc_limit, aka get_max_mapped() -v6: Use current_limit instead -v7: check with MEMBLOCK_ERROR instead of -1ULL or -1L -v8: Set memblock_can_resize early to handle EFI with more RAM entries -v9: update after kmemleak changes in mainline Suggested-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2010-08-26 04:39:17 +08:00
* it could use memblock_find_in_range, could overlap with
* brk area.
*/
reserve_brk();
cleanup_highmap();
memblock_set_current_limit(ISA_END_ADDRESS);
x86/boot/e820: Rename memblock_x86_fill() to e820__memblock_setup() and improve the explanations So memblock_x86_fill() is another E820 code misnomer: - nothing in its name tells us that it's part of the E820 subsystem ... - The 'fill' wording is ambiguous and doesn't tell us whether it's a single entry or some process - while the _real_ purpose of the function is hidden, which is to do a complete setup of the (platform independent) memblock regions. So rename it accordingly, to e820__memblock_setup(). Also translate this incomprehensible and misleading comment: /* * EFI may have more than 128 entries * We are safe to enable resizing, beause memblock_x86_fill() * is rather later for x86 */ memblock_allow_resize(); The worst aspect of this comment isn't even the sloppy typos, but that it casually mentions a '128' number with no explanation, which makes one lead to the assumption that this is related to the well-known limit of a maximum of 128 E820 entries passed via legacy bootloaders. But no, the _real_ meaning of 128 here is that of the memblock subsystem, which too happens to have a 128 entries limit for very early memblock regions (which is unrelated to E820), via INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS ... So change the comment to a more comprehensible version: /* * The bootstrap memblock region count maximum is 128 entries * (INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS), but EFI might pass us more E820 entries * than that - so allow memblock resizing. * * This is safe, because this call happens pretty late during x86 setup, * so we know about reserved memory regions already. (This is important * so that memblock resizing does no stomp over reserved areas.) */ memblock_allow_resize(); No change in functionality. Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-28 18:37:42 +08:00
e820__memblock_setup();
x86: Use memblock to replace early_res 1. replace find_e820_area with memblock_find_in_range 2. replace reserve_early with memblock_x86_reserve_range 3. replace free_early with memblock_x86_free_range. 4. NO_BOOTMEM will switch to use memblock too. 5. use _e820, _early wrap in the patch, in following patch, will replace them all 6. because memblock_x86_free_range support partial free, we can remove some special care 7. Need to make sure that memblock_find_in_range() is called after memblock_x86_fill() so adjust some calling later in setup.c::setup_arch() -- corruption_check and mptable_update -v2: Move reserve_brk() early Before fill_memblock_area, to avoid overlap between brk and memblock_find_in_range() that could happen We have more then 128 RAM entry in E820 tables, and memblock_x86_fill() could use memblock_find_in_range() to find a new place for memblock.memory.region array. and We don't need to use extend_brk() after fill_memblock_area() So move reserve_brk() early before fill_memblock_area(). -v3: Move find_smp_config early To make sure memblock_find_in_range not find wrong place, if BIOS doesn't put mptable in right place. -v4: Treat RESERVED_KERN as RAM in memblock.memory. and they are already in memblock.reserved already.. use __NOT_KEEP_MEMBLOCK to make sure memblock related code could be freed later. -v5: Generic version __memblock_find_in_range() is going from high to low, and for 32bit active_region for 32bit does include high pages need to replace the limit with memblock.default_alloc_limit, aka get_max_mapped() -v6: Use current_limit instead -v7: check with MEMBLOCK_ERROR instead of -1ULL or -1L -v8: Set memblock_can_resize early to handle EFI with more RAM entries -v9: update after kmemleak changes in mainline Suggested-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2010-08-26 04:39:17 +08:00
reserve_bios_regions();
if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP)) {
efi_fake_memmap();
efi_find_mirror();
x86/efi: Defer efi_esrt_init until after memblock_x86_fill Commit 7b02d53e7852 ("efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever") introduced a new efi_mem_reserve to reserve the boot services memory regions forever. This reservation involves allocating a new EFI memory range descriptor. However, allocation can only succeed if there is memory available for the allocation. Otherwise, error such as the following may occur: esrt: Reserving ESRT space from 0x000000003dd6a000 to 0x000000003dd6a010. Kernel panic - not syncing: ERROR: Failed to allocate 0x9f0 bytes below \ 0x0. CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.7.0-rc5+ #503 0000000000000000 ffffffff81e03ce0 ffffffff8131dae8 ffffffff81bb6c50 ffffffff81e03d70 ffffffff81e03d60 ffffffff8111f4df 0000000000000018 ffffffff81e03d70 ffffffff81e03d08 00000000000009f0 00000000000009f0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8131dae8>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x65 [<ffffffff8111f4df>] panic+0xc5/0x206 [<ffffffff81f7c6d3>] memblock_alloc_base+0x29/0x2e [<ffffffff81f7c6e3>] memblock_alloc+0xb/0xd [<ffffffff81f6c86d>] efi_arch_mem_reserve+0xbc/0x134 [<ffffffff81fa3280>] efi_mem_reserve+0x2c/0x31 [<ffffffff81fa3280>] ? efi_mem_reserve+0x2c/0x31 [<ffffffff81fa40d3>] efi_esrt_init+0x19e/0x1b4 [<ffffffff81f6d2dd>] efi_init+0x398/0x44a [<ffffffff81f5c782>] setup_arch+0x415/0xc30 [<ffffffff81f55af1>] start_kernel+0x5b/0x3ef [<ffffffff81f55434>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2f/0x31 [<ffffffff81f55520>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xea/0xed ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: ERROR: Failed to allocate 0x9f0 bytes below 0x0. An inspection of the memblock configuration reveals that there is no memory available for the allocation: MEMBLOCK configuration: memory size = 0x0 reserved size = 0x4f339c0 memory.cnt = 0x1 memory[0x0] [0x00000000000000-0xffffffffffffffff], 0x0 bytes on node 0\ flags: 0x0 reserved.cnt = 0x4 reserved[0x0] [0x0000000008c000-0x0000000008c9bf], 0x9c0 bytes flags: 0x0 reserved[0x1] [0x0000000009f000-0x000000000fffff], 0x61000 bytes\ flags: 0x0 reserved[0x2] [0x00000002800000-0x0000000394bfff], 0x114c000 bytes\ flags: 0x0 reserved[0x3] [0x000000304e4000-0x00000034269fff], 0x3d86000 bytes\ flags: 0x0 This situation can be avoided if we call efi_esrt_init after memblock has memory regions for the allocation. Also, the EFI ESRT driver makes use of early_memremap'pings. Therfore, we do not want to defer efi_esrt_init for too long. We must call such function while calls to early_memremap are still valid. A good place to meet the two aforementioned conditions is right after memblock_x86_fill, grouped with other EFI-related functions. Reported-by: Scott Lawson <scott.lawson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
2016-08-17 08:32:31 +08:00
efi_esrt_init();
/*
* The EFI specification says that boot service code won't be
* called after ExitBootServices(). This is, in fact, a lie.
*/
x86, efi: Retain boot service code until after switching to virtual mode UEFI stands for "Unified Extensible Firmware Interface", where "Firmware" is an ancient African word meaning "Why do something right when you can do it so wrong that children will weep and brave adults will cower before you", and "UEI" is Celtic for "We missed DOS so we burned it into your ROMs". The UEFI specification provides for runtime services (ie, another way for the operating system to be forced to depend on the firmware) and we rely on these for certain trivial tasks such as setting up the bootloader. But some hardware fails to work if we attempt to use these runtime services from physical mode, and so we have to switch into virtual mode. So far so dreadful. The specification makes it clear that the operating system is free to do whatever it wants with boot services code after ExitBootServices() has been called. SetVirtualAddressMap() can't be called until ExitBootServices() has been. So, obviously, a whole bunch of EFI implementations call into boot services code when we do that. Since we've been charmingly naive and trusted that the specification may be somehow relevant to the real world, we've already stuffed a picture of a penguin or something in that address space. And just to make things more entertaining, we've also marked it non-executable. This patch allocates the boot services regions during EFI init and makes sure that they're executable. Then, after SetVirtualAddressMap(), it discards them and everyone lives happily ever after. Except for the ones who have to work on EFI, who live sad lives haunted by the knowledge that someone's eventually going to write yet another firmware specification. [ hpa: adding this to urgent with a stable tag since it fixes currently-broken hardware. However, I do not know what the dependencies are and so I do not know which -stable versions this may be a candidate for. ] Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1306331593-28715-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2011-05-25 21:53:13 +08:00
efi_reserve_boot_services();
}
x86, efi: Retain boot service code until after switching to virtual mode UEFI stands for "Unified Extensible Firmware Interface", where "Firmware" is an ancient African word meaning "Why do something right when you can do it so wrong that children will weep and brave adults will cower before you", and "UEI" is Celtic for "We missed DOS so we burned it into your ROMs". The UEFI specification provides for runtime services (ie, another way for the operating system to be forced to depend on the firmware) and we rely on these for certain trivial tasks such as setting up the bootloader. But some hardware fails to work if we attempt to use these runtime services from physical mode, and so we have to switch into virtual mode. So far so dreadful. The specification makes it clear that the operating system is free to do whatever it wants with boot services code after ExitBootServices() has been called. SetVirtualAddressMap() can't be called until ExitBootServices() has been. So, obviously, a whole bunch of EFI implementations call into boot services code when we do that. Since we've been charmingly naive and trusted that the specification may be somehow relevant to the real world, we've already stuffed a picture of a penguin or something in that address space. And just to make things more entertaining, we've also marked it non-executable. This patch allocates the boot services regions during EFI init and makes sure that they're executable. Then, after SetVirtualAddressMap(), it discards them and everyone lives happily ever after. Except for the ones who have to work on EFI, who live sad lives haunted by the knowledge that someone's eventually going to write yet another firmware specification. [ hpa: adding this to urgent with a stable tag since it fixes currently-broken hardware. However, I do not know what the dependencies are and so I do not know which -stable versions this may be a candidate for. ] Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1306331593-28715-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2011-05-25 21:53:13 +08:00
x86: Use memblock to replace early_res 1. replace find_e820_area with memblock_find_in_range 2. replace reserve_early with memblock_x86_reserve_range 3. replace free_early with memblock_x86_free_range. 4. NO_BOOTMEM will switch to use memblock too. 5. use _e820, _early wrap in the patch, in following patch, will replace them all 6. because memblock_x86_free_range support partial free, we can remove some special care 7. Need to make sure that memblock_find_in_range() is called after memblock_x86_fill() so adjust some calling later in setup.c::setup_arch() -- corruption_check and mptable_update -v2: Move reserve_brk() early Before fill_memblock_area, to avoid overlap between brk and memblock_find_in_range() that could happen We have more then 128 RAM entry in E820 tables, and memblock_x86_fill() could use memblock_find_in_range() to find a new place for memblock.memory.region array. and We don't need to use extend_brk() after fill_memblock_area() So move reserve_brk() early before fill_memblock_area(). -v3: Move find_smp_config early To make sure memblock_find_in_range not find wrong place, if BIOS doesn't put mptable in right place. -v4: Treat RESERVED_KERN as RAM in memblock.memory. and they are already in memblock.reserved already.. use __NOT_KEEP_MEMBLOCK to make sure memblock related code could be freed later. -v5: Generic version __memblock_find_in_range() is going from high to low, and for 32bit active_region for 32bit does include high pages need to replace the limit with memblock.default_alloc_limit, aka get_max_mapped() -v6: Use current_limit instead -v7: check with MEMBLOCK_ERROR instead of -1ULL or -1L -v8: Set memblock_can_resize early to handle EFI with more RAM entries -v9: update after kmemleak changes in mainline Suggested-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2010-08-26 04:39:17 +08:00
/* preallocate 4k for mptable mpc */
x86/boot/e820: Rename early_reserve_e820() to e820__memblock_alloc() and document it early_reserve_e820() is an early hack for kexec that does a limited fixup of the mptable and passes it to the kexec kernel as if it was the real thing. For this it needs to allocate memory - but no memory allocator is available yet beyond the memblock allocator, so early_reserve_e820() is really a wrapper around memblock_alloc() plus a hack to update the e820_table_firmware entries. The name 'reserve' is really a bit of a misnomer, as 'reserved' memory typically means memory completely inaccessible to the kernel - while here what we want to do is a special RAM allocation for our own purposes and insert that as RAM_RESERVED. Rename the function to e820__memblock_alloc_reserved() to better signal this dual purpose, plus document it better, which was omitted when it was merged. The barely comprehensible and cryptic comment: /* * pre allocated 4k and reserved it in memblock and e820_table_firmware */ u64 __init e820__memblock_alloc_reserved(u64 size, u64 align) ... does not count as documentation, replace it with: /* * Allocate the requested number of bytes with the requsted alignment * and return (the physical address) to the caller. Also register this * range in the 'firmware' E820 table. * * This allows kexec to fake a new mptable, as if it came from the real * system. */ u64 __init e820__memblock_alloc_reserved(u64 size, u64 align) No change in functionality. Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-28 20:46:28 +08:00
e820__memblock_alloc_reserved_mpc_new();
x86: Use memblock to replace early_res 1. replace find_e820_area with memblock_find_in_range 2. replace reserve_early with memblock_x86_reserve_range 3. replace free_early with memblock_x86_free_range. 4. NO_BOOTMEM will switch to use memblock too. 5. use _e820, _early wrap in the patch, in following patch, will replace them all 6. because memblock_x86_free_range support partial free, we can remove some special care 7. Need to make sure that memblock_find_in_range() is called after memblock_x86_fill() so adjust some calling later in setup.c::setup_arch() -- corruption_check and mptable_update -v2: Move reserve_brk() early Before fill_memblock_area, to avoid overlap between brk and memblock_find_in_range() that could happen We have more then 128 RAM entry in E820 tables, and memblock_x86_fill() could use memblock_find_in_range() to find a new place for memblock.memory.region array. and We don't need to use extend_brk() after fill_memblock_area() So move reserve_brk() early before fill_memblock_area(). -v3: Move find_smp_config early To make sure memblock_find_in_range not find wrong place, if BIOS doesn't put mptable in right place. -v4: Treat RESERVED_KERN as RAM in memblock.memory. and they are already in memblock.reserved already.. use __NOT_KEEP_MEMBLOCK to make sure memblock related code could be freed later. -v5: Generic version __memblock_find_in_range() is going from high to low, and for 32bit active_region for 32bit does include high pages need to replace the limit with memblock.default_alloc_limit, aka get_max_mapped() -v6: Use current_limit instead -v7: check with MEMBLOCK_ERROR instead of -1ULL or -1L -v8: Set memblock_can_resize early to handle EFI with more RAM entries -v9: update after kmemleak changes in mainline Suggested-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2010-08-26 04:39:17 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CHECK_BIOS_CORRUPTION
setup_bios_corruption_check();
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
printk(KERN_DEBUG "initial memory mapped: [mem 0x00000000-%#010lx]\n",
(max_pfn_mapped<<PAGE_SHIFT) - 1);
#endif
x86: Use memblock to replace early_res 1. replace find_e820_area with memblock_find_in_range 2. replace reserve_early with memblock_x86_reserve_range 3. replace free_early with memblock_x86_free_range. 4. NO_BOOTMEM will switch to use memblock too. 5. use _e820, _early wrap in the patch, in following patch, will replace them all 6. because memblock_x86_free_range support partial free, we can remove some special care 7. Need to make sure that memblock_find_in_range() is called after memblock_x86_fill() so adjust some calling later in setup.c::setup_arch() -- corruption_check and mptable_update -v2: Move reserve_brk() early Before fill_memblock_area, to avoid overlap between brk and memblock_find_in_range() that could happen We have more then 128 RAM entry in E820 tables, and memblock_x86_fill() could use memblock_find_in_range() to find a new place for memblock.memory.region array. and We don't need to use extend_brk() after fill_memblock_area() So move reserve_brk() early before fill_memblock_area(). -v3: Move find_smp_config early To make sure memblock_find_in_range not find wrong place, if BIOS doesn't put mptable in right place. -v4: Treat RESERVED_KERN as RAM in memblock.memory. and they are already in memblock.reserved already.. use __NOT_KEEP_MEMBLOCK to make sure memblock related code could be freed later. -v5: Generic version __memblock_find_in_range() is going from high to low, and for 32bit active_region for 32bit does include high pages need to replace the limit with memblock.default_alloc_limit, aka get_max_mapped() -v6: Use current_limit instead -v7: check with MEMBLOCK_ERROR instead of -1ULL or -1L -v8: Set memblock_can_resize early to handle EFI with more RAM entries -v9: update after kmemleak changes in mainline Suggested-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2010-08-26 04:39:17 +08:00
reserve_real_mode();
trim_platform_memory_ranges();
trim_low_memory_range();
init_mem_mapping();
idt_setup_early_pf();
2016-08-10 17:29:14 +08:00
/*
* Update mmu_cr4_features (and, indirectly, trampoline_cr4_features)
* with the current CR4 value. This may not be necessary, but
* auditing all the early-boot CR4 manipulation would be needed to
* rule it out.
x86/mm/64: Initialize CR4.PCIDE early cpu_init() is weird: it's called rather late (after early identification and after most MMU state is initialized) on the boot CPU but is called extremely early (before identification) on secondary CPUs. It's called just late enough on the boot CPU that its CR4 value isn't propagated to mmu_cr4_features. Even if we put CR4.PCIDE into mmu_cr4_features, we'd hit two problems. First, we'd crash in the trampoline code. That's fixable, and I tried that. It turns out that mmu_cr4_features is totally ignored by secondary_start_64(), though, so even with the trampoline code fixed, it wouldn't help. This means that we don't currently have CR4.PCIDE reliably initialized before we start playing with cpu_tlbstate. This is very fragile and tends to cause boot failures if I make even small changes to the TLB handling code. Make it more robust: initialize CR4.PCIDE earlier on the boot CPU and propagate it to secondary CPUs in start_secondary(). ( Yes, this is ugly. I think we should have improved mmu_cr4_features to actually control CR4 during secondary bootup, but that would be fairly intrusive at this stage. ) Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reported-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Tested-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 660da7c9228f ("x86/mm: Enable CR4.PCIDE on supported systems") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-11 08:48:27 +08:00
*
* Mask off features that don't work outside long mode (just
* PCIDE for now).
2016-08-10 17:29:14 +08:00
*/
x86/mm/64: Initialize CR4.PCIDE early cpu_init() is weird: it's called rather late (after early identification and after most MMU state is initialized) on the boot CPU but is called extremely early (before identification) on secondary CPUs. It's called just late enough on the boot CPU that its CR4 value isn't propagated to mmu_cr4_features. Even if we put CR4.PCIDE into mmu_cr4_features, we'd hit two problems. First, we'd crash in the trampoline code. That's fixable, and I tried that. It turns out that mmu_cr4_features is totally ignored by secondary_start_64(), though, so even with the trampoline code fixed, it wouldn't help. This means that we don't currently have CR4.PCIDE reliably initialized before we start playing with cpu_tlbstate. This is very fragile and tends to cause boot failures if I make even small changes to the TLB handling code. Make it more robust: initialize CR4.PCIDE earlier on the boot CPU and propagate it to secondary CPUs in start_secondary(). ( Yes, this is ugly. I think we should have improved mmu_cr4_features to actually control CR4 during secondary bootup, but that would be fairly intrusive at this stage. ) Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reported-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Tested-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 660da7c9228f ("x86/mm: Enable CR4.PCIDE on supported systems") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-11 08:48:27 +08:00
mmu_cr4_features = __read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_PCIDE;
2016-08-10 17:29:14 +08:00
memblock_set_current_limit(get_max_mapped());
/*
* NOTE: On x86-32, only from this point on, fixmaps are ready for use.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVIDE_OHCI1394_DMA_INIT
if (init_ohci1394_dma_early)
init_ohci1394_dma_on_all_controllers();
#endif
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
break;
case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
break;
default:
pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
break;
}
}
reserve_initrd();
acpi_table_upgrade();
vsmp_init();
io_delay_init();
treewide: Consolidate Apple DMI checks We're about to amend ACPI bus scan with DMI checks whether we're running on a Mac to support Apple device properties in AML. The DMI checks are performed for every single device, adding overhead for everything x86 that isn't Apple, which is the majority. Rafael and Andy therefore request to perform the DMI match only once and cache the result. Outside of ACPI various other Apple DMI checks exist and it seems reasonable to use the cached value there as well. Rafael, Andy and Darren suggest performing the DMI check in arch code and making it available with a header in include/linux/platform_data/x86/. To this end, add early_platform_quirks() to arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c to perform the DMI check and invoke it from setup_arch(). Switch over all existing Apple DMI checks, thereby fixing two deficiencies: * They are now #defined to false on non-x86 arches and can thus be optimized away if they're located in cross-arch code. * Some of them only match "Apple Inc." but not "Apple Computer, Inc.", which is used by BIOSes released between January 2006 (when the first x86 Macs started shipping) and January 2007 (when the company name changed upon introduction of the iPhone). Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Suggested-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2017-08-01 20:10:41 +08:00
early_platform_quirks();
/*
* Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
*/
x86, ACPI, mm: Revert movablemem_map support Tim found: WARNING: at arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:324 topology_sane.isra.2+0x6f/0x80() Hardware name: S2600CP sched: CPU #1's llc-sibling CPU #0 is not on the same node! [node: 1 != 0]. Ignoring dependency. smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #1 Modules linked in: Pid: 0, comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.9.0-0-generic #1 Call Trace: set_cpu_sibling_map+0x279/0x449 start_secondary+0x11d/0x1e5 Don Morris reproduced on a HP z620 workstation, and bisected it to commit e8d195525809 ("acpi, memory-hotplug: parse SRAT before memblock is ready") It turns out movable_map has some problems, and it breaks several things 1. numa_init is called several times, NOT just for srat. so those nodes_clear(numa_nodes_parsed) memset(&numa_meminfo, 0, sizeof(numa_meminfo)) can not be just removed. Need to consider sequence is: numaq, srat, amd, dummy. and make fall back path working. 2. simply split acpi_numa_init to early_parse_srat. a. that early_parse_srat is NOT called for ia64, so you break ia64. b. for (i = 0; i < MAX_LOCAL_APIC; i++) set_apicid_to_node(i, NUMA_NO_NODE) still left in numa_init. So it will just clear result from early_parse_srat. it should be moved before that.... c. it breaks ACPI_TABLE_OVERIDE...as the acpi table scan is moved early before override from INITRD is settled. 3. that patch TITLE is total misleading, there is NO x86 in the title, but it changes critical x86 code. It caused x86 guys did not pay attention to find the problem early. Those patches really should be routed via tip/x86/mm. 4. after that commit, following range can not use movable ram: a. real_mode code.... well..funny, legacy Node0 [0,1M) could be hot-removed? b. initrd... it will be freed after booting, so it could be on movable... c. crashkernel for kdump...: looks like we can not put kdump kernel above 4G anymore. d. init_mem_mapping: can not put page table high anymore. e. initmem_init: vmemmap can not be high local node anymore. That is not good. If node is hotplugable, the mem related range like page table and vmemmap could be on the that node without problem and should be on that node. We have workaround patch that could fix some problems, but some can not be fixed. So just remove that offending commit and related ones including: f7210e6c4ac7 ("mm/memblock.c: use CONFIG_HAVE_MEMBLOCK_NODE_MAP to protect movablecore_map in memblock_overlaps_region().") 01a178a94e8e ("acpi, memory-hotplug: support getting hotplug info from SRAT") 27168d38fa20 ("acpi, memory-hotplug: extend movablemem_map ranges to the end of node") e8d195525809 ("acpi, memory-hotplug: parse SRAT before memblock is ready") fb06bc8e5f42 ("page_alloc: bootmem limit with movablecore_map") 42f47e27e761 ("page_alloc: make movablemem_map have higher priority") 6981ec31146c ("page_alloc: introduce zone_movable_limit[] to keep movable limit for nodes") 34b71f1e04fc ("page_alloc: add movable_memmap kernel parameter") 4d59a75125d5 ("x86: get pg_data_t's memory from other node") Later we should have patches that will make sure kernel put page table and vmemmap on local node ram instead of push them down to node0. Also need to find way to put other kernel used ram to local node ram. Reported-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Reported-by: Don Morris <don.morris@hp.com> Bisected-by: Don Morris <don.morris@hp.com> Tested-by: Don Morris <don.morris@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-03-02 06:51:27 +08:00
acpi_boot_table_init();
early_acpi_boot_init();
initmem_init();
dma_contiguous_reserve(max_pfn_mapped << PAGE_SHIFT);
/*
* Reserve memory for crash kernel after SRAT is parsed so that it
* won't consume hotpluggable memory.
*/
reserve_crashkernel();
memblock_find_dma_reserve();
if (!early_xdbc_setup_hardware())
early_xdbc_register_console();
x86_init.paging.pagetable_init();
x86: early boot debugging via FireWire (ohci1394_dma=early) This patch adds a new configuration option, which adds support for a new early_param which gets checked in arch/x86/kernel/setup_{32,64}.c:setup_arch() to decide wether OHCI-1394 FireWire controllers should be initialized and enabled for physical DMA access to allow remote debugging of early problems like issues ACPI or other subsystems which are executed very early. If the config option is not enabled, no code is changed, and if the boot paramenter is not given, no new code is executed, and independent of that, all new code is freed after boot, so the config option can be even enabled in standard, non-debug kernels. With specialized tools, it is then possible to get debugging information from machines which have no serial ports (notebooks) such as the printk buffer contents, or any data which can be referenced from global pointers, if it is stored below the 4GB limit and even memory dumps of of the physical RAM region below the 4GB limit can be taken without any cooperation from the CPU of the host, so the machine can be crashed early, it does not matter. In the extreme, even kernel debuggers can be accessed in this way. I wrote a small kgdb module and an accompanying gdb stub for FireWire which allows to gdb to talk to kgdb using remote remory reads and writes over FireWire. An version of the gdb stub fore FireWire is able to read all global data from a system which is running a a normal kernel without any kernel debugger, without any interruption or support of the system's CPU. That way, e.g. the task struct and so on can be read and even manipulated when the physical DMA access is granted. A HOWTO is included in this patch, in Documentation/debugging-via-ohci1394.txt and I've put a copy online at ftp://ftp.suse.de/private/bk/firewire/docs/debugging-via-ohci1394.txt It also has links to all the tools which are available to make use of it another copy of it is online at: ftp://ftp.suse.de/private/bk/firewire/kernel/ohci1394_dma_early-v2.diff Signed-Off-By: Bernhard Kaindl <bk@suse.de> Tested-By: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 20:34:11 +08:00
x86_64: add KASan support This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer. 16TB of virtual addressed used for shadow memory. It's located in range [ffffec0000000000 - fffffc0000000000] between vmemmap and %esp fixup stacks. At early stage we map whole shadow region with zero page. Latter, after pages mapped to direct mapping address range we unmap zero pages from corresponding shadow (see kasan_map_shadow()) and allocate and map a real shadow memory reusing vmemmap_populate() function. Also replace __pa with __pa_nodebug before shadow initialized. __pa with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y make external function call (__phys_addr) __phys_addr is instrumented, so __asan_load could be called before shadow area initialized. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:25 +08:00
kasan_init();
/*
* Sync back kernel address range.
*
* FIXME: Can the later sync in setup_cpu_entry_areas() replace
* this call?
*/
sync_initial_page_table();
x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT boot support This patch adds kernel configuration and boot support for Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT). Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms. Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT). Intel TXT in Brief: o Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM) o Data protection in case of improper shutdown o Measurement and verification of launched environment Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some non-vPro systems. It is currently available on desktop systems based on the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell Optiplex 755, HP dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45, PM45, and GS45 Express chipsets. For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/. This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, which has been updated for the new released platforms. A much more complete description of how these patches support TXT, how to configure a system for it, etc. is in the Documentation/intel_txt.txt file in this patch. This patch provides the TXT support routines for complete functionality, documentation for TXT support and for the changes to the boot_params structure, and boot detection of a TXT launch. Attempts to shutdown (reboot, Sx) the system will result in platform resets; subsequent patches will support these shutdown modes properly. Documentation/intel_txt.txt | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h | 3 arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 3 arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 379 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/Kconfig | 30 +++ 9 files changed, 827 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: Joseph Cihula <joseph.cihula@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Gang Wei <gang.wei@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-07-01 10:30:59 +08:00
tboot_probe();
map_vsyscall();
generic_apic_probe();
early_quirks();
/*
* Read APIC and some other early information from ACPI tables.
*/
acpi_boot_init();
sfi_init();
x86_dtb_init();
/*
* get boot-time SMP configuration:
*/
get_smp_config();
/*
* Systems w/o ACPI and mptables might not have it mapped the local
* APIC yet, but prefill_possible_map() might need to access it.
*/
init_apic_mappings();
prefill_possible_map();
init_cpu_to_node();
io_apic_init_mappings();
x86_init.hyper.guest_late_init();
e820__reserve_resources();
x86, hibernate: Fix nosave_regions setup for hibernation On 32bit systems, nosave_regions(non RAM areas) located between max_low_pfn and max_pfn are not excluded from hibernation snapshot currently, which may result in a machine check exception when trying to access these unsafe regions during hibernation: [ 612.800453] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 612.805786] mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 0: Machine Check Exception: 5 Bank 6: fe00000000801136 [ 612.814344] mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP !INEXACT! 60:<00000000d90be566> {swsusp_save+0x436/0x560} [ 612.823167] mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC 1f5939fe276 ADDR dd000000 MISC 30e0000086 [ 612.830677] mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 0:306c3 TIME 1529487426 SOCKET 0 APIC 0 microcode 24 [ 612.839581] mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii' [ 612.846394] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Processor context corrupt [ 612.853380] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal machine check [ 612.858978] Kernel Offset: 0x18000000 from 0xc1000000 (relocation range: 0xc0000000-0xf7ffdfff) This is because on 32bit systems, pages above max_low_pfn are regarded as high memeory, and accessing unsafe pages might cause expected MCE. On the problematic 32bit system, there are reserved memory above low memory, which triggered the MCE: e820 memory mapping: [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009d7ff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009d800-0x000000000009ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000e0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000d160cfff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d160d000-0x00000000d1613fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d1614000-0x00000000d1a44fff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d1a45000-0x00000000d1ecffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d1ed0000-0x00000000d7eeafff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d7eeb000-0x00000000d7ffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d8000000-0x00000000d875ffff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d8760000-0x00000000d87fffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d8800000-0x00000000d8fadfff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d8fae000-0x00000000d8ffffff] ACPI data [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d9000000-0x00000000da71bfff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000da71c000-0x00000000da7fffff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000da800000-0x00000000dbb8bfff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000dbb8c000-0x00000000dbffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000dd000000-0x00000000df1fffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000f8000000-0x00000000fbffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec00000-0x00000000fec00fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed00000-0x00000000fed03fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed1c000-0x00000000fed1ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fee00000-0x00000000fee00fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000ff000000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000041edfffff] usable Fix this problem by changing pfn limit from max_low_pfn to max_pfn. This fix does not impact 64bit system because on 64bit max_low_pfn is the same as max_pfn. Signed-off-by: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2018-09-21 14:26:24 +08:00
e820__register_nosave_regions(max_pfn);
x86_init.resources.reserve_resources();
e820__setup_pci_gap();
#ifdef CONFIG_VT
#if defined(CONFIG_VGA_CONSOLE)
efi: Make 'efi_enabled' a function to query EFI facilities Originally 'efi_enabled' indicated whether a kernel was booted from EFI firmware. Over time its semantics have changed, and it now indicates whether or not we are booted on an EFI machine with bit-native firmware, e.g. 64-bit kernel with 64-bit firmware. The immediate motivation for this patch is the bug report at, https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu-cdimage/+bug/1040557 which details how running a platform driver on an EFI machine that is designed to run under BIOS can cause the machine to become bricked. Also, the following report, https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=47121 details how running said driver can also cause Machine Check Exceptions. Drivers need a new means of detecting whether they're running on an EFI machine, as sadly the expression, if (!efi_enabled) hasn't been a sufficient condition for quite some time. Users actually want to query 'efi_enabled' for different reasons - what they really want access to is the list of available EFI facilities. For instance, the x86 reboot code needs to know whether it can invoke the ResetSystem() function provided by the EFI runtime services, while the ACPI OSL code wants to know whether the EFI config tables were mapped successfully. There are also checks in some of the platform driver code to simply see if they're running on an EFI machine (which would make it a bad idea to do BIOS-y things). This patch is a prereq for the samsung-laptop fix patch. Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Steve Langasek <steve.langasek@canonical.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-11-14 17:42:35 +08:00
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) || (efi_mem_type(0xa0000) != EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY))
conswitchp = &vga_con;
#elif defined(CONFIG_DUMMY_CONSOLE)
conswitchp = &dummy_con;
#endif
#endif
x86_init.oem.banner();
x86_init.timers.wallclock_init();
mcheck_init();
jiffies: Remove compile time assumptions about CLOCK_TICK_RATE CLOCK_TICK_RATE is used to accurately caclulate exactly how a tick will be at a given HZ. This is useful, because while we'd expect NSEC_PER_SEC/HZ, the underlying hardware will have some granularity limit, so we won't be able to have exactly HZ ticks per second. This slight error can cause timekeeping quality problems when using the jiffies or other jiffies driven clocksources. Thus we currently use compile time CLOCK_TICK_RATE value to generate SHIFTED_HZ and NSEC_PER_JIFFIES, which we then use to adjust the jiffies clocksource to correct this error. Unfortunately though, since CLOCK_TICK_RATE is a compile time value, and the jiffies clocksource is registered very early during boot, there are a number of cases where there are different possible hardware timers that have different tick rates. This causes problems in cases like ARM where there are numerous different types of hardware, each having their own compile-time CLOCK_TICK_RATE, making it hard to accurately support different hardware with a single kernel. For the most part, this doesn't matter all that much, as not too many systems actually utilize the jiffies or jiffies driven clocksource. Usually there are other highres clocksources who's granularity error is negligable. Even so, we have some complicated calcualtions that we do everywhere to handle these edge cases. This patch removes the compile time SHIFTED_HZ value, and introduces a register_refined_jiffies() function. This results in the default jiffies clock as being assumed a perfect HZ freq, and allows archtectures that care about jiffies accuracy to call register_refined_jiffies() with the tick rate, specified dynamically at boot. This allows us, where necessary, to not have a compile time CLOCK_TICK_RATE constant, simplifies the jiffies code, and still provides a way to have an accurate jiffies clock. NOTE: Since this patch does not add register_refinied_jiffies() calls for every arch, it may cause time quality regressions in some cases. Its likely these will not be noticable, but if they are an issue, adding the following to the end of setup_arch() should resolve the regression: register_refinied_jiffies(CLOCK_TICK_RATE) Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
2012-09-05 00:42:27 +08:00
register_refined_jiffies(CLOCK_TICK_RATE);
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_apply_memmap_quirks();
#endif
unwind_init();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
static struct resource video_ram_resource = {
.name = "Video RAM area",
.start = 0xa0000,
.end = 0xbffff,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_MEM
};
void __init i386_reserve_resources(void)
{
request_resource(&iomem_resource, &video_ram_resource);
reserve_standard_io_resources();
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
static struct notifier_block kernel_offset_notifier = {
.notifier_call = dump_kernel_offset
};
static int __init register_kernel_offset_dumper(void)
{
atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list,
&kernel_offset_notifier);
return 0;
}
__initcall(register_kernel_offset_dumper);