OpenCloudOS-Kernel/fs/ecryptfs/file.c

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/**
* eCryptfs: Linux filesystem encryption layer
*
* Copyright (C) 1997-2004 Erez Zadok
* Copyright (C) 2001-2004 Stony Brook University
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 International Business Machines Corp.
* Author(s): Michael A. Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
* Michael C. Thompson <mcthomps@us.ibm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
* License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA
* 02111-1307, USA.
*/
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/fs_stack.h>
#include "ecryptfs_kernel.h"
/**
* ecryptfs_read_update_atime
*
* generic_file_read updates the atime of upper layer inode. But, it
* doesn't give us a chance to update the atime of the lower layer
* inode. This function is a wrapper to generic_file_read. It
* updates the atime of the lower level inode if generic_file_read
* returns without any errors. This is to be used only for file reads.
* The function to be used for directory reads is ecryptfs_read.
*/
static ssize_t ecryptfs_read_update_atime(struct kiocb *iocb,
struct iov_iter *to)
{
ssize_t rc;
struct path *path;
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
rc = generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
if (rc >= 0) {
path = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(file->f_path.dentry);
touch_atime(path);
}
return rc;
}
struct ecryptfs_getdents_callback {
struct dir_context ctx;
struct dir_context *caller;
struct super_block *sb;
int filldir_called;
int entries_written;
};
/* Inspired by generic filldir in fs/readdir.c */
static int
ecryptfs_filldir(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *lower_name,
int lower_namelen, loff_t offset, u64 ino, unsigned int d_type)
{
struct ecryptfs_getdents_callback *buf =
container_of(ctx, struct ecryptfs_getdents_callback, ctx);
size_t name_size;
char *name;
int rc;
buf->filldir_called++;
rc = ecryptfs_decode_and_decrypt_filename(&name, &name_size,
buf->sb, lower_name,
lower_namelen);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to decode and decrypt "
"filename [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", __func__, lower_name,
rc);
goto out;
}
buf->caller->pos = buf->ctx.pos;
rc = !dir_emit(buf->caller, name, name_size, ino, d_type);
kfree(name);
if (!rc)
buf->entries_written++;
out:
return rc;
}
/**
* ecryptfs_readdir
* @file: The eCryptfs directory file
* @ctx: The actor to feed the entries to
*/
static int ecryptfs_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
{
int rc;
struct file *lower_file;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ecryptfs_getdents_callback buf = {
.ctx.actor = ecryptfs_filldir,
.caller = ctx,
.sb = inode->i_sb,
};
lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file);
lower_file->f_pos = ctx->pos;
rc = iterate_dir(lower_file, &buf.ctx);
ctx->pos = buf.ctx.pos;
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
if (buf.filldir_called && !buf.entries_written)
goto out;
if (rc >= 0)
fsstack_copy_attr_atime(inode,
file_inode(lower_file));
out:
return rc;
}
struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_file_info_cache;
static int read_or_initialize_metadata(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
int rc;
crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->crypt_stat;
mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
inode->i_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
if (crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED &&
crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID) {
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_read_metadata(dentry);
if (!rc)
goto out;
if (mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED) {
crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_I_SIZE_INITIALIZED
| ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
if (!(mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED) &&
!i_size_read(ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(inode))) {
rc = ecryptfs_initialize_file(dentry, inode);
if (!rc)
goto out;
}
rc = -EIO;
out:
mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
return rc;
}
/**
* ecryptfs_open
* @inode: inode speciying file to open
* @file: Structure to return filled in
*
* Opens the file specified by inode.
*
* Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
*/
static int ecryptfs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int rc = 0;
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat = NULL;
struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
/* Private value of ecryptfs_dentry allocated in
* ecryptfs_lookup() */
struct ecryptfs_file_info *file_info;
/* Released in ecryptfs_release or end of function if failure */
file_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_file_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
ecryptfs_set_file_private(file, file_info);
if (!file_info) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR,
"Error attempting to allocate memory\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->crypt_stat;
mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Setting flags for stat...\n");
/* Policy code enabled in future release */
crypt_stat->flags |= (ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED
| ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
}
mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
rc = ecryptfs_get_lower_file(ecryptfs_dentry, inode);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to initialize "
"the lower file for the dentry with name "
"[%pd]; rc = [%d]\n", __func__,
ecryptfs_dentry, rc);
goto out_free;
}
if ((ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->lower_file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE)
== O_RDONLY && (file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) {
rc = -EPERM;
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Lower file is RO; eCryptfs "
"file must hence be opened RO\n", __func__);
goto out_put;
}
ecryptfs_set_file_lower(
file, ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->lower_file);
VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry) Convert the following where appropriate: (1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry). (2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry). (3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with a ->d_automount op. In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer). Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the type of the lower dentry. However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem. There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes. The following perl+coccinelle script was used: use strict; my @callers; open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') || die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers"; @callers = <$fd>; close($fd); unless (@callers) { print "No matches\n"; exit(0); } my @cocci = ( '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_symlink(E)', '', '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_dir(E)', '', '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_reg(E)' ); my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci"; open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile; print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci); close($fd); foreach my $file (@callers) { chomp $file; print "Processing ", $file, "\n"; system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 || die "spatch failed"; } [AV: overlayfs parts skipped] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-01-29 20:02:35 +08:00
if (d_is_dir(ecryptfs_dentry)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This is a directory\n");
mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
rc = read_or_initialize_metadata(ecryptfs_dentry);
if (rc)
goto out_put;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "inode w/ addr = [0x%p], i_ino = "
"[0x%.16lx] size: [0x%.16llx]\n", inode, inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)i_size_read(inode));
goto out;
out_put:
ecryptfs_put_lower_file(inode);
out_free:
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_file_info_cache,
ecryptfs_file_to_private(file));
out:
return rc;
}
static int ecryptfs_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t td)
{
struct file *lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file);
if (lower_file->f_op->flush) {
filemap_write_and_wait(file->f_mapping);
return lower_file->f_op->flush(lower_file, td);
}
return 0;
}
static int ecryptfs_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
ecryptfs_put_lower_file(inode);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_file_info_cache,
ecryptfs_file_to_private(file));
return 0;
}
static int
ecryptfs_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
{
int rc;
rc = filemap_write_and_wait(file->f_mapping);
if (rc)
return rc;
eCryptfs: Revert to a writethrough cache model A change was made about a year ago to get eCryptfs to better utilize its page cache during writes. The idea was to do the page encryption operations during page writeback, rather than doing them when initially writing into the page cache, to reduce the number of page encryption operations during sequential writes. This meant that the encrypted page would only be written to the lower filesystem during page writeback, which was a change from how eCryptfs had previously wrote to the lower filesystem in ecryptfs_write_end(). The change caused a few eCryptfs-internal bugs that were shook out. Unfortunately, more grave side effects have been identified that will force changes outside of eCryptfs. Because the lower filesystem isn't consulted until page writeback, eCryptfs has no way to pass lower write errors (ENOSPC, mainly) back to userspace. Additionaly, it was reported that quotas could be bypassed because of the way eCryptfs may sometimes open the lower filesystem using a privileged kthread. It would be nice to resolve the latest issues, but it is best if the eCryptfs commits be reverted to the old behavior in the meantime. This reverts: 32001d6f "eCryptfs: Flush file in vma close" 5be79de2 "eCryptfs: Flush dirty pages in setattr" 57db4e8d "ecryptfs: modify write path to encrypt page in writepage" Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Tested-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Thieu Le <thieule@google.com>
2012-07-04 07:50:57 +08:00
return vfs_fsync(ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file), datasync);
}
static int ecryptfs_fasync(int fd, struct file *file, int flag)
{
int rc = 0;
struct file *lower_file = NULL;
lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file);
if (lower_file->f_op->fasync)
rc = lower_file->f_op->fasync(fd, lower_file, flag);
return rc;
}
static long
ecryptfs_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct file *lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file);
long rc = -ENOTTY;
if (!lower_file->f_op->unlocked_ioctl)
return rc;
switch (cmd) {
case FITRIM:
case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
rc = lower_file->f_op->unlocked_ioctl(lower_file, cmd, arg);
fsstack_copy_attr_all(file_inode(file), file_inode(lower_file));
return rc;
default:
return rc;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static long
ecryptfs_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct file *lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file);
long rc = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
if (!lower_file->f_op->compat_ioctl)
return rc;
switch (cmd) {
case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
case FS_IOC32_GETVERSION:
case FS_IOC32_SETVERSION:
rc = lower_file->f_op->compat_ioctl(lower_file, cmd, arg);
fsstack_copy_attr_all(file_inode(file), file_inode(lower_file));
return rc;
default:
return rc;
}
}
#endif
const struct file_operations ecryptfs_dir_fops = {
.iterate = ecryptfs_readdir,
.read = generic_read_dir,
.unlocked_ioctl = ecryptfs_unlocked_ioctl,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
.compat_ioctl = ecryptfs_compat_ioctl,
#endif
.open = ecryptfs_open,
.flush = ecryptfs_flush,
.release = ecryptfs_release,
.fsync = ecryptfs_fsync,
.fasync = ecryptfs_fasync,
.splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
llseek: automatically add .llseek fop All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a .llseek pointer. The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek. New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek and call nonseekable_open at open time. Existing drivers can be converted to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code relies on calling seek on the device file. The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle. Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window. Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic patch that does all this. ===== begin semantic patch ===== // This adds an llseek= method to all file operations, // as a preparation for making no_llseek the default. // // The rules are // - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open // - use seq_lseek for sequential files // - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos // - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos, // but we still want to allow users to call lseek // @ open1 exists @ identifier nested_open; @@ nested_open(...) { <+... nonseekable_open(...) ...+> } @ open exists@ identifier open_f; identifier i, f; identifier open1.nested_open; @@ int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f) { <+... ( nonseekable_open(...) | nested_open(...) ) ...+> } @ read disable optional_qualifier exists @ identifier read_f; identifier f, p, s, off; type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t; expression E; identifier func; @@ ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off) { <+... ( *off = E | *off += E | func(..., off, ...) | E = *off ) ...+> } @ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @ identifier read_f; identifier f, p, s, off; type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t; @@ ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off) { ... when != off } @ write @ identifier write_f; identifier f, p, s, off; type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t; expression E; identifier func; @@ ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off) { <+... ( *off = E | *off += E | func(..., off, ...) | E = *off ) ...+> } @ write_no_fpos @ identifier write_f; identifier f, p, s, off; type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t; @@ ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off) { ... when != off } @ fops0 @ identifier fops; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... }; @ has_llseek depends on fops0 @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier llseek_f; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... .llseek = llseek_f, ... }; @ has_read depends on fops0 @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier read_f; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... .read = read_f, ... }; @ has_write depends on fops0 @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier write_f; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... .write = write_f, ... }; @ has_open depends on fops0 @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier open_f; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... .open = open_f, ... }; // use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open //////////////////////////////////////////// @ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open"; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... .open = nso, ... +.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */ }; @ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier open.open_f; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... .open = open_f, ... +.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */ }; // use seq_lseek for sequential files ///////////////////////////////////// @ seq depends on !has_llseek @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier sr ~= "seq_read"; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... .read = sr, ... +.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */ }; // use default_llseek if there is a readdir /////////////////////////////////////////// @ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier readdir_e; @@ // any other fop is used that changes pos struct file_operations fops = { ... .readdir = readdir_e, ... +.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */ }; // use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// @ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier read.read_f; @@ // read fops use offset struct file_operations fops = { ... .read = read_f, ... +.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */ }; @ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier write.write_f; @@ // write fops use offset struct file_operations fops = { ... .write = write_f, ... + .llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */ }; // Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// @ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier read_no_fpos.read_f; identifier write_no_fpos.write_f; @@ // write fops use offset struct file_operations fops = { ... .write = write_f, .read = read_f, ... +.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */ }; @ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier write_no_fpos.write_f; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... .write = write_f, ... +.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */ }; @ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @ identifier fops0.fops; identifier read_no_fpos.read_f; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... .read = read_f, ... +.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */ }; @ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @ identifier fops0.fops; @@ struct file_operations fops = { ... +.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */ }; ===== End semantic patch ===== Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
2010-08-16 00:52:59 +08:00
.llseek = default_llseek,
};
const struct file_operations ecryptfs_main_fops = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
.read_iter = ecryptfs_read_update_atime,
.write_iter = generic_file_write_iter,
.iterate = ecryptfs_readdir,
.unlocked_ioctl = ecryptfs_unlocked_ioctl,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
.compat_ioctl = ecryptfs_compat_ioctl,
#endif
eCryptfs: Revert to a writethrough cache model A change was made about a year ago to get eCryptfs to better utilize its page cache during writes. The idea was to do the page encryption operations during page writeback, rather than doing them when initially writing into the page cache, to reduce the number of page encryption operations during sequential writes. This meant that the encrypted page would only be written to the lower filesystem during page writeback, which was a change from how eCryptfs had previously wrote to the lower filesystem in ecryptfs_write_end(). The change caused a few eCryptfs-internal bugs that were shook out. Unfortunately, more grave side effects have been identified that will force changes outside of eCryptfs. Because the lower filesystem isn't consulted until page writeback, eCryptfs has no way to pass lower write errors (ENOSPC, mainly) back to userspace. Additionaly, it was reported that quotas could be bypassed because of the way eCryptfs may sometimes open the lower filesystem using a privileged kthread. It would be nice to resolve the latest issues, but it is best if the eCryptfs commits be reverted to the old behavior in the meantime. This reverts: 32001d6f "eCryptfs: Flush file in vma close" 5be79de2 "eCryptfs: Flush dirty pages in setattr" 57db4e8d "ecryptfs: modify write path to encrypt page in writepage" Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Tested-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Thieu Le <thieule@google.com>
2012-07-04 07:50:57 +08:00
.mmap = generic_file_mmap,
.open = ecryptfs_open,
.flush = ecryptfs_flush,
.release = ecryptfs_release,
.fsync = ecryptfs_fsync,
.fasync = ecryptfs_fasync,
.splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
};