2019-05-27 14:55:01 +08:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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/*
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* Public Key Encryption
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation
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* Authors: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
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*/
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#ifndef _CRYPTO_AKCIPHER_H
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#define _CRYPTO_AKCIPHER_H
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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/**
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* struct akcipher_request - public key request
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*
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* @base: Common attributes for async crypto requests
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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* @src: Source data
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crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 23:51:15 +08:00
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* For verify op this is signature + digest, in that case
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* total size of @src is @src_len + @dst_len.
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* @dst: Destination data (Should be NULL for verify op)
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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* @src_len: Size of the input buffer
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crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 23:51:15 +08:00
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* For verify op it's size of signature part of @src, this part
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* is supposed to be operated by cipher.
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* @dst_len: Size of @dst buffer (for all ops except verify).
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* It needs to be at least as big as the expected result
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* depending on the operation.
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2015-12-08 16:00:23 +08:00
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* After operation it will be updated with the actual size of the
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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* result.
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* In case of error where the dst sgl size was insufficient,
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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* it will be updated to the size required for the operation.
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crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 23:51:15 +08:00
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* For verify op this is size of digest part in @src.
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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* @__ctx: Start of private context data
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*/
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struct akcipher_request {
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struct crypto_async_request base;
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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struct scatterlist *src;
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struct scatterlist *dst;
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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unsigned int src_len;
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unsigned int dst_len;
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void *__ctx[] CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR;
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};
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/**
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* struct crypto_akcipher - user-instantiated objects which encapsulate
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* algorithms and core processing logic
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*
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2022-11-22 18:03:35 +08:00
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* @reqsize: Request context size required by algorithm implementation
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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* @base: Common crypto API algorithm data structure
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*/
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struct crypto_akcipher {
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2022-11-22 18:03:35 +08:00
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unsigned int reqsize;
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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struct crypto_tfm base;
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};
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/**
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* struct akcipher_alg - generic public key algorithm
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*
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* @sign: Function performs a sign operation as defined by public key
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* algorithm. In case of error, where the dst_len was insufficient,
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* the req->dst_len will be updated to the size required for the
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* operation
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crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 23:51:15 +08:00
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* @verify: Function performs a complete verify operation as defined by
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* public key algorithm, returning verification status. Requires
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* digest value as input parameter.
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2015-12-08 16:00:23 +08:00
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* @encrypt: Function performs an encrypt operation as defined by public key
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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* algorithm. In case of error, where the dst_len was insufficient,
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* the req->dst_len will be updated to the size required for the
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* operation
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* @decrypt: Function performs a decrypt operation as defined by public key
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* algorithm. In case of error, where the dst_len was insufficient,
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* the req->dst_len will be updated to the size required for the
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* operation
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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* @set_pub_key: Function invokes the algorithm specific set public key
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* function, which knows how to decode and interpret
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2019-04-11 23:51:17 +08:00
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* the BER encoded public key and parameters
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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* @set_priv_key: Function invokes the algorithm specific set private key
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* function, which knows how to decode and interpret
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2019-04-11 23:51:17 +08:00
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* the BER encoded private key and parameters
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2015-12-08 16:00:23 +08:00
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* @max_size: Function returns dest buffer size required for a given key.
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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* @init: Initialize the cryptographic transformation object.
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* This function is used to initialize the cryptographic
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* transformation object. This function is called only once at
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* the instantiation time, right after the transformation context
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* was allocated. In case the cryptographic hardware has some
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* special requirements which need to be handled by software, this
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* function shall check for the precise requirement of the
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* transformation and put any software fallbacks in place.
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* @exit: Deinitialize the cryptographic transformation object. This is a
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* counterpart to @init, used to remove various changes set in
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* @init.
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*
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* @base: Common crypto API algorithm data structure
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*/
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struct akcipher_alg {
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int (*sign)(struct akcipher_request *req);
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int (*verify)(struct akcipher_request *req);
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int (*encrypt)(struct akcipher_request *req);
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int (*decrypt)(struct akcipher_request *req);
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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int (*set_pub_key)(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
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unsigned int keylen);
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int (*set_priv_key)(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
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unsigned int keylen);
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2017-05-25 15:18:12 +08:00
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unsigned int (*max_size)(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm);
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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int (*init)(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm);
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void (*exit)(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm);
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struct crypto_alg base;
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};
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/**
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* DOC: Generic Public Key API
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*
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* The Public Key API is used with the algorithms of type
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* CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AKCIPHER (listed as type "akcipher" in /proc/crypto)
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*/
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/**
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2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* crypto_alloc_akcipher() - allocate AKCIPHER tfm handle
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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* @alg_name: is the cra_name / name or cra_driver_name / driver name of the
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* public key algorithm e.g. "rsa"
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* @type: specifies the type of the algorithm
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* @mask: specifies the mask for the algorithm
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*
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* Allocate a handle for public key algorithm. The returned struct
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* crypto_akcipher is the handle that is required for any subsequent
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* API invocation for the public key operations.
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*
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* Return: allocated handle in case of success; IS_ERR() is true in case
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* of an error, PTR_ERR() returns the error code.
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*/
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struct crypto_akcipher *crypto_alloc_akcipher(const char *alg_name, u32 type,
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u32 mask);
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static inline struct crypto_tfm *crypto_akcipher_tfm(
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
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{
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return &tfm->base;
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}
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static inline struct akcipher_alg *__crypto_akcipher_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
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{
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return container_of(alg, struct akcipher_alg, base);
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}
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static inline struct crypto_akcipher *__crypto_akcipher_tfm(
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struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
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{
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return container_of(tfm, struct crypto_akcipher, base);
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}
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static inline struct akcipher_alg *crypto_akcipher_alg(
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
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{
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return __crypto_akcipher_alg(crypto_akcipher_tfm(tfm)->__crt_alg);
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}
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static inline unsigned int crypto_akcipher_reqsize(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
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{
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2022-11-22 18:03:35 +08:00
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return tfm->reqsize;
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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}
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static inline void akcipher_request_set_tfm(struct akcipher_request *req,
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
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{
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req->base.tfm = crypto_akcipher_tfm(tfm);
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}
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static inline struct crypto_akcipher *crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(
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struct akcipher_request *req)
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{
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return __crypto_akcipher_tfm(req->base.tfm);
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}
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/**
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2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* crypto_free_akcipher() - free AKCIPHER tfm handle
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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*
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* @tfm: AKCIPHER tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_akcipher()
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2021-03-03 04:33:03 +08:00
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*
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* If @tfm is a NULL or error pointer, this function does nothing.
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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*/
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static inline void crypto_free_akcipher(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
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{
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crypto_destroy_tfm(tfm, crypto_akcipher_tfm(tfm));
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}
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/**
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2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* akcipher_request_alloc() - allocates public key request
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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*
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* @tfm: AKCIPHER tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_akcipher()
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* @gfp: allocation flags
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*
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* Return: allocated handle in case of success or NULL in case of an error.
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*/
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static inline struct akcipher_request *akcipher_request_alloc(
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, gfp_t gfp)
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{
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struct akcipher_request *req;
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req = kmalloc(sizeof(*req) + crypto_akcipher_reqsize(tfm), gfp);
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if (likely(req))
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akcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
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return req;
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}
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/**
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2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* akcipher_request_free() - zeroize and free public key request
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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*
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* @req: request to free
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*/
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static inline void akcipher_request_free(struct akcipher_request *req)
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{
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2020-08-07 14:18:13 +08:00
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kfree_sensitive(req);
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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}
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/**
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2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* akcipher_request_set_callback() - Sets an asynchronous callback.
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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*
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* Callback will be called when an asynchronous operation on a given
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* request is finished.
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*
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* @req: request that the callback will be set for
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* @flgs: specify for instance if the operation may backlog
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2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* @cmpl: callback which will be called
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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* @data: private data used by the caller
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*/
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static inline void akcipher_request_set_callback(struct akcipher_request *req,
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u32 flgs,
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crypto_completion_t cmpl,
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void *data)
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{
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req->base.complete = cmpl;
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req->base.data = data;
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req->base.flags = flgs;
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}
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/**
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2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* akcipher_request_set_crypt() - Sets request parameters
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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*
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* Sets parameters required by crypto operation
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*
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* @req: public key request
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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* @src: ptr to input scatter list
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crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 23:51:15 +08:00
|
|
|
* @dst: ptr to output scatter list or NULL for verify op
|
2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
* @src_len: size of the src input scatter list to be processed
|
crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 23:51:15 +08:00
|
|
|
* @dst_len: size of the dst output scatter list or size of signature
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* portion in @src for verify op
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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*/
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static inline void akcipher_request_set_crypt(struct akcipher_request *req,
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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struct scatterlist *src,
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struct scatterlist *dst,
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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unsigned int src_len,
|
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|
|
unsigned int dst_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
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req->src = src;
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req->dst = dst;
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req->src_len = src_len;
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req->dst_len = dst_len;
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|
}
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* crypto_akcipher_maxsize() - Get len for output buffer
|
2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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*
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2017-05-25 15:18:12 +08:00
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|
* Function returns the dest buffer size required for a given key.
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|
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* Function assumes that the key is already set in the transformation. If this
|
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|
* function is called without a setkey or with a failed setkey, you will end up
|
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* in a NULL dereference.
|
2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
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*
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* @tfm: AKCIPHER tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_akcipher()
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*/
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2017-05-25 15:18:12 +08:00
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static inline unsigned int crypto_akcipher_maxsize(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
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2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
|
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|
{
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struct akcipher_alg *alg = crypto_akcipher_alg(tfm);
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return alg->max_size(tfm);
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}
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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/**
|
2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* crypto_akcipher_encrypt() - Invoke public key encrypt operation
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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*
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* Function invokes the specific public key encrypt operation for a given
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* public key algorithm
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*
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* @req: asymmetric key request
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*
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* Return: zero on success; error code in case of error
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*/
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static inline int crypto_akcipher_encrypt(struct akcipher_request *req)
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{
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
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struct akcipher_alg *alg = crypto_akcipher_alg(tfm);
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2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
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struct crypto_alg *calg = tfm->base.__crt_alg;
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unsigned int src_len = req->src_len;
|
2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
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int ret;
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
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crypto_stats_get(calg);
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2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
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ret = alg->encrypt(req);
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2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
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crypto_stats_akcipher_encrypt(src_len, ret, calg);
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2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
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return ret;
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
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/**
|
2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* crypto_akcipher_decrypt() - Invoke public key decrypt operation
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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*
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* Function invokes the specific public key decrypt operation for a given
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* public key algorithm
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*
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* @req: asymmetric key request
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*
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* Return: zero on success; error code in case of error
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|
*/
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static inline int crypto_akcipher_decrypt(struct akcipher_request *req)
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{
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
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struct akcipher_alg *alg = crypto_akcipher_alg(tfm);
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2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
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struct crypto_alg *calg = tfm->base.__crt_alg;
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unsigned int src_len = req->src_len;
|
2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
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int ret;
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
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crypto_stats_get(calg);
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2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
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ret = alg->decrypt(req);
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2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
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crypto_stats_akcipher_decrypt(src_len, ret, calg);
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2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
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return ret;
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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}
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/**
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2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
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* crypto_akcipher_sign() - Invoke public key sign operation
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2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
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*
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* Function invokes the specific public key sign operation for a given
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* public key algorithm
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*
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* @req: asymmetric key request
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*
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* Return: zero on success; error code in case of error
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*/
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static inline int crypto_akcipher_sign(struct akcipher_request *req)
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{
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
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struct akcipher_alg *alg = crypto_akcipher_alg(tfm);
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2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
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struct crypto_alg *calg = tfm->base.__crt_alg;
|
2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
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int ret;
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
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|
2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
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crypto_stats_get(calg);
|
2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
|
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ret = alg->sign(req);
|
2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
|
|
|
crypto_stats_akcipher_sign(ret, calg);
|
2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
|
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|
return ret;
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 23:51:15 +08:00
|
|
|
* crypto_akcipher_verify() - Invoke public key signature verification
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 23:51:15 +08:00
|
|
|
* Function invokes the specific public key signature verification operation
|
|
|
|
* for a given public key algorithm.
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @req: asymmetric key request
|
|
|
|
*
|
crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 23:51:15 +08:00
|
|
|
* Note: req->dst should be NULL, req->src should point to SG of size
|
|
|
|
* (req->src_size + req->dst_size), containing signature (of req->src_size
|
|
|
|
* length) with appended digest (of req->dst_size length).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: zero on verification success; error code in case of error.
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int crypto_akcipher_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
|
|
|
|
struct akcipher_alg *alg = crypto_akcipher_alg(tfm);
|
2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
|
|
|
struct crypto_alg *calg = tfm->base.__crt_alg;
|
2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
|
|
|
crypto_stats_get(calg);
|
2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = alg->verify(req);
|
2018-11-29 22:42:21 +08:00
|
|
|
crypto_stats_akcipher_verify(ret, calg);
|
2018-09-19 18:10:54 +08:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
|
|
|
* crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key() - Invoke set public key operation
|
2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Function invokes the algorithm specific set key function, which knows
|
2019-04-11 23:51:17 +08:00
|
|
|
* how to decode and interpret the encoded key and parameters
|
2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @tfm: tfm handle
|
2019-04-11 23:51:17 +08:00
|
|
|
* @key: BER encoded public key, algo OID, paramlen, BER encoded
|
|
|
|
* parameters
|
|
|
|
* @keylen: length of the key (not including other data)
|
2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: zero on success; error code in case of error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm,
|
|
|
|
const void *key,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct akcipher_alg *alg = crypto_akcipher_alg(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return alg->set_pub_key(tfm, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2016-02-16 18:32:06 +08:00
|
|
|
* crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key() - Invoke set private key operation
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Function invokes the algorithm specific set key function, which knows
|
2019-04-11 23:51:17 +08:00
|
|
|
* how to decode and interpret the encoded key and parameters
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @tfm: tfm handle
|
2019-04-11 23:51:17 +08:00
|
|
|
* @key: BER encoded private key, algo OID, paramlen, BER encoded
|
|
|
|
* parameters
|
|
|
|
* @keylen: length of the key (not including other data)
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: zero on success; error code in case of error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline int crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm,
|
|
|
|
const void *key,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct akcipher_alg *alg = crypto_akcipher_alg(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-09 00:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return alg->set_priv_key(tfm, key, keylen);
|
2015-06-17 01:30:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|