OpenCloudOS-Kernel/arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c

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/*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
* Copyright (C) 1997 Martin Mares
* Copyright (C) 2007 H. Peter Anvin
*/
/*
* This file builds a disk-image from three different files:
*
* - setup: 8086 machine code, sets up system parm
* - system: 80386 code for actual system
* - zoffset.h: header with ZO_* defines
*
* It does some checking that all files are of the correct type, and writes
* the result to the specified destination, removing headers and padding to
* the right amount. It also writes some system data to stdout.
*/
/*
* Changes by tytso to allow root device specification
* High loaded stuff by Hans Lermen & Werner Almesberger, Feb. 1996
* Cross compiling fixes by Gertjan van Wingerde, July 1996
* Rewritten by Martin Mares, April 1997
* Substantially overhauled by H. Peter Anvin, April 2007
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <tools/le_byteshift.h>
typedef unsigned char u8;
typedef unsigned short u16;
typedef unsigned int u32;
#define DEFAULT_MAJOR_ROOT 0
#define DEFAULT_MINOR_ROOT 0
#define DEFAULT_ROOT_DEV (DEFAULT_MAJOR_ROOT << 8 | DEFAULT_MINOR_ROOT)
/* Minimal number of setup sectors */
#define SETUP_SECT_MIN 5
#define SETUP_SECT_MAX 64
/* This must be large enough to hold the entire setup */
u8 buf[SETUP_SECT_MAX*512];
#define PECOFF_RELOC_RESERVE 0x20
2014-01-10 23:54:31 +08:00
unsigned long efi32_stub_entry;
unsigned long efi64_stub_entry;
x86, build: Dynamically find entry points in compressed startup code We have historically hard-coded entry points in head.S just so it's easy to build the executable/bzImage headers with references to them. Unfortunately, this leads to boot loaders abusing these "known" addresses even when they are *explicitly* told that they "should look at the ELF header to find this address, as it may change in the future". And even when the address in question *has* actually been changed in the past, without fanfare or thought to compatibility. Thus we have bootloaders doing stunningly broken things like jumping to offset 0x200 in the kernel startup code in 64-bit mode, *hoping* that startup_64 is still there (it has moved at least once before). And hoping that it's actually a 64-bit kernel despite the fact that we don't give them any indication of that fact. This patch should hopefully remove the temptation to abuse internal addresses in future, where sternly worded comments have not sufficed. Instead of having hard-coded addresses and saying "please don't abuse these", we actually pull the addresses out of the ELF payload into zoffset.h, and make build.c shove them back into the right places in the bzImage header. Rather than including zoffset.h into build.c and thus having to rebuild the tool for every kernel build, we parse it instead. The parsing code is small and simple. This patch doesn't actually move any of the interesting entry points, so any offending bootloader will still continue to "work" after this patch is applied. For some version of "work" which includes jumping into the compressed payload and crashing, if the bzImage it's given is a 32-bit kernel. No change there then. [ hpa: some of the issues in the description are addressed or retconned by the 2.12 boot protocol. This patch has been edited to only remove fixed addresses that were *not* thus retconned. ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358513837.2397.247.camel@shinybook.infradead.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-10 22:31:59 +08:00
unsigned long efi_pe_entry;
unsigned long startup_64;
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
static const u32 crctab32[] = {
0x00000000, 0x77073096, 0xee0e612c, 0x990951ba, 0x076dc419,
0x706af48f, 0xe963a535, 0x9e6495a3, 0x0edb8832, 0x79dcb8a4,
0xe0d5e91e, 0x97d2d988, 0x09b64c2b, 0x7eb17cbd, 0xe7b82d07,
0x90bf1d91, 0x1db71064, 0x6ab020f2, 0xf3b97148, 0x84be41de,
0x1adad47d, 0x6ddde4eb, 0xf4d4b551, 0x83d385c7, 0x136c9856,
0x646ba8c0, 0xfd62f97a, 0x8a65c9ec, 0x14015c4f, 0x63066cd9,
0xfa0f3d63, 0x8d080df5, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x4c69105e, 0xd56041e4,
0xa2677172, 0x3c03e4d1, 0x4b04d447, 0xd20d85fd, 0xa50ab56b,
0x35b5a8fa, 0x42b2986c, 0xdbbbc9d6, 0xacbcf940, 0x32d86ce3,
0x45df5c75, 0xdcd60dcf, 0xabd13d59, 0x26d930ac, 0x51de003a,
0xc8d75180, 0xbfd06116, 0x21b4f4b5, 0x56b3c423, 0xcfba9599,
0xb8bda50f, 0x2802b89e, 0x5f058808, 0xc60cd9b2, 0xb10be924,
0x2f6f7c87, 0x58684c11, 0xc1611dab, 0xb6662d3d, 0x76dc4190,
0x01db7106, 0x98d220bc, 0xefd5102a, 0x71b18589, 0x06b6b51f,
0x9fbfe4a5, 0xe8b8d433, 0x7807c9a2, 0x0f00f934, 0x9609a88e,
0xe10e9818, 0x7f6a0dbb, 0x086d3d2d, 0x91646c97, 0xe6635c01,
0x6b6b51f4, 0x1c6c6162, 0x856530d8, 0xf262004e, 0x6c0695ed,
0x1b01a57b, 0x8208f4c1, 0xf50fc457, 0x65b0d9c6, 0x12b7e950,
0x8bbeb8ea, 0xfcb9887c, 0x62dd1ddf, 0x15da2d49, 0x8cd37cf3,
0xfbd44c65, 0x4db26158, 0x3ab551ce, 0xa3bc0074, 0xd4bb30e2,
0x4adfa541, 0x3dd895d7, 0xa4d1c46d, 0xd3d6f4fb, 0x4369e96a,
0x346ed9fc, 0xad678846, 0xda60b8d0, 0x44042d73, 0x33031de5,
0xaa0a4c5f, 0xdd0d7cc9, 0x5005713c, 0x270241aa, 0xbe0b1010,
0xc90c2086, 0x5768b525, 0x206f85b3, 0xb966d409, 0xce61e49f,
0x5edef90e, 0x29d9c998, 0xb0d09822, 0xc7d7a8b4, 0x59b33d17,
0x2eb40d81, 0xb7bd5c3b, 0xc0ba6cad, 0xedb88320, 0x9abfb3b6,
0x03b6e20c, 0x74b1d29a, 0xead54739, 0x9dd277af, 0x04db2615,
0x73dc1683, 0xe3630b12, 0x94643b84, 0x0d6d6a3e, 0x7a6a5aa8,
0xe40ecf0b, 0x9309ff9d, 0x0a00ae27, 0x7d079eb1, 0xf00f9344,
0x8708a3d2, 0x1e01f268, 0x6906c2fe, 0xf762575d, 0x806567cb,
0x196c3671, 0x6e6b06e7, 0xfed41b76, 0x89d32be0, 0x10da7a5a,
0x67dd4acc, 0xf9b9df6f, 0x8ebeeff9, 0x17b7be43, 0x60b08ed5,
0xd6d6a3e8, 0xa1d1937e, 0x38d8c2c4, 0x4fdff252, 0xd1bb67f1,
0xa6bc5767, 0x3fb506dd, 0x48b2364b, 0xd80d2bda, 0xaf0a1b4c,
0x36034af6, 0x41047a60, 0xdf60efc3, 0xa867df55, 0x316e8eef,
0x4669be79, 0xcb61b38c, 0xbc66831a, 0x256fd2a0, 0x5268e236,
0xcc0c7795, 0xbb0b4703, 0x220216b9, 0x5505262f, 0xc5ba3bbe,
0xb2bd0b28, 0x2bb45a92, 0x5cb36a04, 0xc2d7ffa7, 0xb5d0cf31,
0x2cd99e8b, 0x5bdeae1d, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xec63f226, 0x756aa39c,
0x026d930a, 0x9c0906a9, 0xeb0e363f, 0x72076785, 0x05005713,
0x95bf4a82, 0xe2b87a14, 0x7bb12bae, 0x0cb61b38, 0x92d28e9b,
0xe5d5be0d, 0x7cdcefb7, 0x0bdbdf21, 0x86d3d2d4, 0xf1d4e242,
0x68ddb3f8, 0x1fda836e, 0x81be16cd, 0xf6b9265b, 0x6fb077e1,
0x18b74777, 0x88085ae6, 0xff0f6a70, 0x66063bca, 0x11010b5c,
0x8f659eff, 0xf862ae69, 0x616bffd3, 0x166ccf45, 0xa00ae278,
0xd70dd2ee, 0x4e048354, 0x3903b3c2, 0xa7672661, 0xd06016f7,
0x4969474d, 0x3e6e77db, 0xaed16a4a, 0xd9d65adc, 0x40df0b66,
0x37d83bf0, 0xa9bcae53, 0xdebb9ec5, 0x47b2cf7f, 0x30b5ffe9,
0xbdbdf21c, 0xcabac28a, 0x53b39330, 0x24b4a3a6, 0xbad03605,
0xcdd70693, 0x54de5729, 0x23d967bf, 0xb3667a2e, 0xc4614ab8,
0x5d681b02, 0x2a6f2b94, 0xb40bbe37, 0xc30c8ea1, 0x5a05df1b,
0x2d02ef8d
};
static u32 partial_crc32_one(u8 c, u32 crc)
{
return crctab32[(crc ^ c) & 0xff] ^ (crc >> 8);
}
static u32 partial_crc32(const u8 *s, int len, u32 crc)
{
while (len--)
crc = partial_crc32_one(*s++, crc);
return crc;
}
static void die(const char * str, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, str);
vfprintf(stderr, str, args);
fputc('\n', stderr);
exit(1);
}
static void usage(void)
{
die("Usage: build setup system zoffset.h image");
}
x86, efi: EFI boot stub support There is currently a large divide between kernel development and the development of EFI boot loaders. The idea behind this patch is to give the kernel developers full control over the EFI boot process. As H. Peter Anvin put it, "The 'kernel carries its own stub' approach been very successful in dealing with BIOS, and would make a lot of sense to me for EFI as well." This patch introduces an EFI boot stub that allows an x86 bzImage to be loaded and executed by EFI firmware. The bzImage appears to the firmware as an EFI application. Luckily there are enough free bits within the bzImage header so that it can masquerade as an EFI application, thereby coercing the EFI firmware into loading it and jumping to its entry point. The beauty of this masquerading approach is that both BIOS and EFI boot loaders can still load and run the same bzImage, thereby allowing a single kernel image to work in any boot environment. The EFI boot stub supports multiple initrds, but they must exist on the same partition as the bzImage. Command-line arguments for the kernel can be appended after the bzImage name when run from the EFI shell, e.g. Shell> bzImage console=ttyS0 root=/dev/sdb initrd=initrd.img v7: - Fix checkpatch warnings. v6: - Try to allocate initrd memory just below hdr->inird_addr_max. v5: - load_options_size is UTF-16, which needs dividing by 2 to convert to the corresponding ASCII size. v4: - Don't read more than image->load_options_size v3: - Fix following warnings when compiling CONFIG_EFI_STUB=n arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c: In function ‘main’: arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c:138:24: warning: unused variable ‘pe_header’ arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c:138:15: warning: unused variable ‘file_sz’ - As reported by Matthew Garrett, some Apple machines have GOPs that don't have hardware attached. We need to weed these out by searching for ones that handle the PCIIO protocol. - Don't allocate memory if no initrds are on cmdline - Don't trust image->load_options_size Maarten Lankhorst noted: - Don't strip first argument when booted from efibootmgr - Don't allocate too much memory for cmdline - Don't update cmdline_size, the kernel considers it read-only - Don't accept '\n' for initrd names v2: - File alignment was too large, was 8192 should be 512. Reported by Maarten Lankhorst on LKML. - Added UGA support for graphics - Use VIDEO_TYPE_EFI instead of hard-coded number. - Move linelength assignment until after we've assigned depth - Dynamically fill out AddressOfEntryPoint in tools/build.c - Don't use magic number for GDT/TSS stuff. Requested by Andi Kleen - The bzImage may need to be relocated as it may have been loaded at a high address address by the firmware. This was required to get my macbook booting because the firmware loaded it at 0x7cxxxxxx, which triggers this error in decompress_kernel(), if (heap > ((-__PAGE_OFFSET-(128<<20)-1) & 0x7fffffff)) error("Destination address too large"); Cc: Mike Waychison <mikew@google.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Tested-by: Henrik Rydberg <rydberg@euromail.se> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1321383097.2657.9.camel@mfleming-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2011-12-13 05:27:52 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
static void update_pecoff_section_header_fields(char *section_name, u32 vma, u32 size, u32 datasz, u32 offset)
{
unsigned int pe_header;
unsigned short num_sections;
u8 *section;
pe_header = get_unaligned_le32(&buf[0x3c]);
num_sections = get_unaligned_le16(&buf[pe_header + 6]);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
section = &buf[pe_header + 0xa8];
#else
section = &buf[pe_header + 0xb8];
x86, efi: EFI boot stub support There is currently a large divide between kernel development and the development of EFI boot loaders. The idea behind this patch is to give the kernel developers full control over the EFI boot process. As H. Peter Anvin put it, "The 'kernel carries its own stub' approach been very successful in dealing with BIOS, and would make a lot of sense to me for EFI as well." This patch introduces an EFI boot stub that allows an x86 bzImage to be loaded and executed by EFI firmware. The bzImage appears to the firmware as an EFI application. Luckily there are enough free bits within the bzImage header so that it can masquerade as an EFI application, thereby coercing the EFI firmware into loading it and jumping to its entry point. The beauty of this masquerading approach is that both BIOS and EFI boot loaders can still load and run the same bzImage, thereby allowing a single kernel image to work in any boot environment. The EFI boot stub supports multiple initrds, but they must exist on the same partition as the bzImage. Command-line arguments for the kernel can be appended after the bzImage name when run from the EFI shell, e.g. Shell> bzImage console=ttyS0 root=/dev/sdb initrd=initrd.img v7: - Fix checkpatch warnings. v6: - Try to allocate initrd memory just below hdr->inird_addr_max. v5: - load_options_size is UTF-16, which needs dividing by 2 to convert to the corresponding ASCII size. v4: - Don't read more than image->load_options_size v3: - Fix following warnings when compiling CONFIG_EFI_STUB=n arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c: In function ‘main’: arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c:138:24: warning: unused variable ‘pe_header’ arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c:138:15: warning: unused variable ‘file_sz’ - As reported by Matthew Garrett, some Apple machines have GOPs that don't have hardware attached. We need to weed these out by searching for ones that handle the PCIIO protocol. - Don't allocate memory if no initrds are on cmdline - Don't trust image->load_options_size Maarten Lankhorst noted: - Don't strip first argument when booted from efibootmgr - Don't allocate too much memory for cmdline - Don't update cmdline_size, the kernel considers it read-only - Don't accept '\n' for initrd names v2: - File alignment was too large, was 8192 should be 512. Reported by Maarten Lankhorst on LKML. - Added UGA support for graphics - Use VIDEO_TYPE_EFI instead of hard-coded number. - Move linelength assignment until after we've assigned depth - Dynamically fill out AddressOfEntryPoint in tools/build.c - Don't use magic number for GDT/TSS stuff. Requested by Andi Kleen - The bzImage may need to be relocated as it may have been loaded at a high address address by the firmware. This was required to get my macbook booting because the firmware loaded it at 0x7cxxxxxx, which triggers this error in decompress_kernel(), if (heap > ((-__PAGE_OFFSET-(128<<20)-1) & 0x7fffffff)) error("Destination address too large"); Cc: Mike Waychison <mikew@google.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Tested-by: Henrik Rydberg <rydberg@euromail.se> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1321383097.2657.9.camel@mfleming-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2011-12-13 05:27:52 +08:00
#endif
while (num_sections > 0) {
if (strncmp((char*)section, section_name, 8) == 0) {
/* section header size field */
put_unaligned_le32(size, section + 0x8);
/* section header vma field */
put_unaligned_le32(vma, section + 0xc);
/* section header 'size of initialised data' field */
put_unaligned_le32(datasz, section + 0x10);
/* section header 'file offset' field */
put_unaligned_le32(offset, section + 0x14);
break;
}
section += 0x28;
num_sections--;
}
}
static void update_pecoff_section_header(char *section_name, u32 offset, u32 size)
{
update_pecoff_section_header_fields(section_name, offset, size, size, offset);
}
static void update_pecoff_setup_and_reloc(unsigned int size)
{
u32 setup_offset = 0x200;
u32 reloc_offset = size - PECOFF_RELOC_RESERVE;
u32 setup_size = reloc_offset - setup_offset;
update_pecoff_section_header(".setup", setup_offset, setup_size);
update_pecoff_section_header(".reloc", reloc_offset, PECOFF_RELOC_RESERVE);
/*
* Modify .reloc section contents with a single entry. The
* relocation is applied to offset 10 of the relocation section.
*/
put_unaligned_le32(reloc_offset + 10, &buf[reloc_offset]);
put_unaligned_le32(10, &buf[reloc_offset + 4]);
}
static void update_pecoff_text(unsigned int text_start, unsigned int file_sz)
{
unsigned int pe_header;
unsigned int text_sz = file_sz - text_start;
pe_header = get_unaligned_le32(&buf[0x3c]);
/*
* Size of code: Subtract the size of the first sector (512 bytes)
* which includes the header.
*/
put_unaligned_le32(file_sz - 512, &buf[pe_header + 0x1c]);
/*
x86, build: Dynamically find entry points in compressed startup code We have historically hard-coded entry points in head.S just so it's easy to build the executable/bzImage headers with references to them. Unfortunately, this leads to boot loaders abusing these "known" addresses even when they are *explicitly* told that they "should look at the ELF header to find this address, as it may change in the future". And even when the address in question *has* actually been changed in the past, without fanfare or thought to compatibility. Thus we have bootloaders doing stunningly broken things like jumping to offset 0x200 in the kernel startup code in 64-bit mode, *hoping* that startup_64 is still there (it has moved at least once before). And hoping that it's actually a 64-bit kernel despite the fact that we don't give them any indication of that fact. This patch should hopefully remove the temptation to abuse internal addresses in future, where sternly worded comments have not sufficed. Instead of having hard-coded addresses and saying "please don't abuse these", we actually pull the addresses out of the ELF payload into zoffset.h, and make build.c shove them back into the right places in the bzImage header. Rather than including zoffset.h into build.c and thus having to rebuild the tool for every kernel build, we parse it instead. The parsing code is small and simple. This patch doesn't actually move any of the interesting entry points, so any offending bootloader will still continue to "work" after this patch is applied. For some version of "work" which includes jumping into the compressed payload and crashing, if the bzImage it's given is a 32-bit kernel. No change there then. [ hpa: some of the issues in the description are addressed or retconned by the 2.12 boot protocol. This patch has been edited to only remove fixed addresses that were *not* thus retconned. ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358513837.2397.247.camel@shinybook.infradead.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-10 22:31:59 +08:00
* Address of entry point for PE/COFF executable
*/
x86, build: Dynamically find entry points in compressed startup code We have historically hard-coded entry points in head.S just so it's easy to build the executable/bzImage headers with references to them. Unfortunately, this leads to boot loaders abusing these "known" addresses even when they are *explicitly* told that they "should look at the ELF header to find this address, as it may change in the future". And even when the address in question *has* actually been changed in the past, without fanfare or thought to compatibility. Thus we have bootloaders doing stunningly broken things like jumping to offset 0x200 in the kernel startup code in 64-bit mode, *hoping* that startup_64 is still there (it has moved at least once before). And hoping that it's actually a 64-bit kernel despite the fact that we don't give them any indication of that fact. This patch should hopefully remove the temptation to abuse internal addresses in future, where sternly worded comments have not sufficed. Instead of having hard-coded addresses and saying "please don't abuse these", we actually pull the addresses out of the ELF payload into zoffset.h, and make build.c shove them back into the right places in the bzImage header. Rather than including zoffset.h into build.c and thus having to rebuild the tool for every kernel build, we parse it instead. The parsing code is small and simple. This patch doesn't actually move any of the interesting entry points, so any offending bootloader will still continue to "work" after this patch is applied. For some version of "work" which includes jumping into the compressed payload and crashing, if the bzImage it's given is a 32-bit kernel. No change there then. [ hpa: some of the issues in the description are addressed or retconned by the 2.12 boot protocol. This patch has been edited to only remove fixed addresses that were *not* thus retconned. ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358513837.2397.247.camel@shinybook.infradead.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-10 22:31:59 +08:00
put_unaligned_le32(text_start + efi_pe_entry, &buf[pe_header + 0x28]);
update_pecoff_section_header(".text", text_start, text_sz);
}
static void update_pecoff_bss(unsigned int file_sz, unsigned int init_sz)
{
unsigned int pe_header;
unsigned int bss_sz = init_sz - file_sz;
pe_header = get_unaligned_le32(&buf[0x3c]);
/* Size of uninitialized data */
put_unaligned_le32(bss_sz, &buf[pe_header + 0x24]);
/* Size of image */
put_unaligned_le32(init_sz, &buf[pe_header + 0x50]);
update_pecoff_section_header_fields(".bss", file_sz, bss_sz, 0, 0);
}
static int reserve_pecoff_reloc_section(int c)
{
/* Reserve 0x20 bytes for .reloc section */
memset(buf+c, 0, PECOFF_RELOC_RESERVE);
return PECOFF_RELOC_RESERVE;
}
static void efi_stub_defaults(void)
{
/* Defaults for old kernel */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
efi_pe_entry = 0x10;
#else
efi_pe_entry = 0x210;
startup_64 = 0x200;
#endif
}
static void efi_stub_entry_update(void)
{
2014-01-10 23:54:31 +08:00
unsigned long addr = efi32_stub_entry;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* Yes, this is really how we defined it :( */
addr = efi64_stub_entry - 0x200;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED
if (efi32_stub_entry != addr)
die("32-bit and 64-bit EFI entry points do not match\n");
#endif
2014-01-10 23:54:31 +08:00
put_unaligned_le32(addr, &buf[0x264]);
}
#else
static inline void update_pecoff_setup_and_reloc(unsigned int size) {}
static inline void update_pecoff_text(unsigned int text_start,
unsigned int file_sz) {}
static inline void update_pecoff_bss(unsigned int file_sz,
unsigned int init_sz) {}
static inline void efi_stub_defaults(void) {}
static inline void efi_stub_entry_update(void) {}
static inline int reserve_pecoff_reloc_section(int c)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_STUB */
x86, build: Dynamically find entry points in compressed startup code We have historically hard-coded entry points in head.S just so it's easy to build the executable/bzImage headers with references to them. Unfortunately, this leads to boot loaders abusing these "known" addresses even when they are *explicitly* told that they "should look at the ELF header to find this address, as it may change in the future". And even when the address in question *has* actually been changed in the past, without fanfare or thought to compatibility. Thus we have bootloaders doing stunningly broken things like jumping to offset 0x200 in the kernel startup code in 64-bit mode, *hoping* that startup_64 is still there (it has moved at least once before). And hoping that it's actually a 64-bit kernel despite the fact that we don't give them any indication of that fact. This patch should hopefully remove the temptation to abuse internal addresses in future, where sternly worded comments have not sufficed. Instead of having hard-coded addresses and saying "please don't abuse these", we actually pull the addresses out of the ELF payload into zoffset.h, and make build.c shove them back into the right places in the bzImage header. Rather than including zoffset.h into build.c and thus having to rebuild the tool for every kernel build, we parse it instead. The parsing code is small and simple. This patch doesn't actually move any of the interesting entry points, so any offending bootloader will still continue to "work" after this patch is applied. For some version of "work" which includes jumping into the compressed payload and crashing, if the bzImage it's given is a 32-bit kernel. No change there then. [ hpa: some of the issues in the description are addressed or retconned by the 2.12 boot protocol. This patch has been edited to only remove fixed addresses that were *not* thus retconned. ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358513837.2397.247.camel@shinybook.infradead.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-10 22:31:59 +08:00
/*
* Parse zoffset.h and find the entry points. We could just #include zoffset.h
* but that would mean tools/build would have to be rebuilt every time. It's
* not as if parsing it is hard...
*/
#define PARSE_ZOFS(p, sym) do { \
if (!strncmp(p, "#define ZO_" #sym " ", 11+sizeof(#sym))) \
sym = strtoul(p + 11 + sizeof(#sym), NULL, 16); \
} while (0)
static void parse_zoffset(char *fname)
{
FILE *file;
char *p;
int c;
file = fopen(fname, "r");
if (!file)
die("Unable to open `%s': %m", fname);
c = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf) - 1, file);
if (ferror(file))
die("read-error on `zoffset.h'");
fclose(file);
x86, build: Dynamically find entry points in compressed startup code We have historically hard-coded entry points in head.S just so it's easy to build the executable/bzImage headers with references to them. Unfortunately, this leads to boot loaders abusing these "known" addresses even when they are *explicitly* told that they "should look at the ELF header to find this address, as it may change in the future". And even when the address in question *has* actually been changed in the past, without fanfare or thought to compatibility. Thus we have bootloaders doing stunningly broken things like jumping to offset 0x200 in the kernel startup code in 64-bit mode, *hoping* that startup_64 is still there (it has moved at least once before). And hoping that it's actually a 64-bit kernel despite the fact that we don't give them any indication of that fact. This patch should hopefully remove the temptation to abuse internal addresses in future, where sternly worded comments have not sufficed. Instead of having hard-coded addresses and saying "please don't abuse these", we actually pull the addresses out of the ELF payload into zoffset.h, and make build.c shove them back into the right places in the bzImage header. Rather than including zoffset.h into build.c and thus having to rebuild the tool for every kernel build, we parse it instead. The parsing code is small and simple. This patch doesn't actually move any of the interesting entry points, so any offending bootloader will still continue to "work" after this patch is applied. For some version of "work" which includes jumping into the compressed payload and crashing, if the bzImage it's given is a 32-bit kernel. No change there then. [ hpa: some of the issues in the description are addressed or retconned by the 2.12 boot protocol. This patch has been edited to only remove fixed addresses that were *not* thus retconned. ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358513837.2397.247.camel@shinybook.infradead.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-10 22:31:59 +08:00
buf[c] = 0;
p = (char *)buf;
while (p && *p) {
2014-01-10 23:54:31 +08:00
PARSE_ZOFS(p, efi32_stub_entry);
PARSE_ZOFS(p, efi64_stub_entry);
x86, build: Dynamically find entry points in compressed startup code We have historically hard-coded entry points in head.S just so it's easy to build the executable/bzImage headers with references to them. Unfortunately, this leads to boot loaders abusing these "known" addresses even when they are *explicitly* told that they "should look at the ELF header to find this address, as it may change in the future". And even when the address in question *has* actually been changed in the past, without fanfare or thought to compatibility. Thus we have bootloaders doing stunningly broken things like jumping to offset 0x200 in the kernel startup code in 64-bit mode, *hoping* that startup_64 is still there (it has moved at least once before). And hoping that it's actually a 64-bit kernel despite the fact that we don't give them any indication of that fact. This patch should hopefully remove the temptation to abuse internal addresses in future, where sternly worded comments have not sufficed. Instead of having hard-coded addresses and saying "please don't abuse these", we actually pull the addresses out of the ELF payload into zoffset.h, and make build.c shove them back into the right places in the bzImage header. Rather than including zoffset.h into build.c and thus having to rebuild the tool for every kernel build, we parse it instead. The parsing code is small and simple. This patch doesn't actually move any of the interesting entry points, so any offending bootloader will still continue to "work" after this patch is applied. For some version of "work" which includes jumping into the compressed payload and crashing, if the bzImage it's given is a 32-bit kernel. No change there then. [ hpa: some of the issues in the description are addressed or retconned by the 2.12 boot protocol. This patch has been edited to only remove fixed addresses that were *not* thus retconned. ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358513837.2397.247.camel@shinybook.infradead.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-10 22:31:59 +08:00
PARSE_ZOFS(p, efi_pe_entry);
PARSE_ZOFS(p, startup_64);
p = strchr(p, '\n');
while (p && (*p == '\r' || *p == '\n'))
p++;
}
}
int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
unsigned int i, sz, setup_sectors, init_sz;
int c;
u32 sys_size;
struct stat sb;
FILE *file, *dest;
int fd;
void *kernel;
u32 crc = 0xffffffffUL;
efi_stub_defaults();
x86, build: Dynamically find entry points in compressed startup code We have historically hard-coded entry points in head.S just so it's easy to build the executable/bzImage headers with references to them. Unfortunately, this leads to boot loaders abusing these "known" addresses even when they are *explicitly* told that they "should look at the ELF header to find this address, as it may change in the future". And even when the address in question *has* actually been changed in the past, without fanfare or thought to compatibility. Thus we have bootloaders doing stunningly broken things like jumping to offset 0x200 in the kernel startup code in 64-bit mode, *hoping* that startup_64 is still there (it has moved at least once before). And hoping that it's actually a 64-bit kernel despite the fact that we don't give them any indication of that fact. This patch should hopefully remove the temptation to abuse internal addresses in future, where sternly worded comments have not sufficed. Instead of having hard-coded addresses and saying "please don't abuse these", we actually pull the addresses out of the ELF payload into zoffset.h, and make build.c shove them back into the right places in the bzImage header. Rather than including zoffset.h into build.c and thus having to rebuild the tool for every kernel build, we parse it instead. The parsing code is small and simple. This patch doesn't actually move any of the interesting entry points, so any offending bootloader will still continue to "work" after this patch is applied. For some version of "work" which includes jumping into the compressed payload and crashing, if the bzImage it's given is a 32-bit kernel. No change there then. [ hpa: some of the issues in the description are addressed or retconned by the 2.12 boot protocol. This patch has been edited to only remove fixed addresses that were *not* thus retconned. ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358513837.2397.247.camel@shinybook.infradead.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-10 22:31:59 +08:00
if (argc != 5)
usage();
parse_zoffset(argv[3]);
dest = fopen(argv[4], "w");
if (!dest)
die("Unable to write `%s': %m", argv[4]);
/* Copy the setup code */
file = fopen(argv[1], "r");
if (!file)
die("Unable to open `%s': %m", argv[1]);
c = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), file);
if (ferror(file))
die("read-error on `setup'");
if (c < 1024)
die("The setup must be at least 1024 bytes");
if (get_unaligned_le16(&buf[510]) != 0xAA55)
die("Boot block hasn't got boot flag (0xAA55)");
fclose(file);
c += reserve_pecoff_reloc_section(c);
/* Pad unused space with zeros */
setup_sectors = (c + 511) / 512;
if (setup_sectors < SETUP_SECT_MIN)
setup_sectors = SETUP_SECT_MIN;
i = setup_sectors*512;
memset(buf+c, 0, i-c);
update_pecoff_setup_and_reloc(i);
/* Set the default root device */
put_unaligned_le16(DEFAULT_ROOT_DEV, &buf[508]);
printf("Setup is %d bytes (padded to %d bytes).\n", c, i);
/* Open and stat the kernel file */
fd = open(argv[2], O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
die("Unable to open `%s': %m", argv[2]);
if (fstat(fd, &sb))
die("Unable to stat `%s': %m", argv[2]);
sz = sb.st_size;
printf("System is %d kB\n", (sz+1023)/1024);
kernel = mmap(NULL, sz, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if (kernel == MAP_FAILED)
die("Unable to mmap '%s': %m", argv[2]);
/* Number of 16-byte paragraphs, including space for a 4-byte CRC */
sys_size = (sz + 15 + 4) / 16;
/* Patch the setup code with the appropriate size parameters */
buf[0x1f1] = setup_sectors-1;
put_unaligned_le32(sys_size, &buf[0x1f4]);
update_pecoff_text(setup_sectors * 512, i + (sys_size * 16));
init_sz = get_unaligned_le32(&buf[0x260]);
update_pecoff_bss(i + (sys_size * 16), init_sz);
x86, build: Dynamically find entry points in compressed startup code We have historically hard-coded entry points in head.S just so it's easy to build the executable/bzImage headers with references to them. Unfortunately, this leads to boot loaders abusing these "known" addresses even when they are *explicitly* told that they "should look at the ELF header to find this address, as it may change in the future". And even when the address in question *has* actually been changed in the past, without fanfare or thought to compatibility. Thus we have bootloaders doing stunningly broken things like jumping to offset 0x200 in the kernel startup code in 64-bit mode, *hoping* that startup_64 is still there (it has moved at least once before). And hoping that it's actually a 64-bit kernel despite the fact that we don't give them any indication of that fact. This patch should hopefully remove the temptation to abuse internal addresses in future, where sternly worded comments have not sufficed. Instead of having hard-coded addresses and saying "please don't abuse these", we actually pull the addresses out of the ELF payload into zoffset.h, and make build.c shove them back into the right places in the bzImage header. Rather than including zoffset.h into build.c and thus having to rebuild the tool for every kernel build, we parse it instead. The parsing code is small and simple. This patch doesn't actually move any of the interesting entry points, so any offending bootloader will still continue to "work" after this patch is applied. For some version of "work" which includes jumping into the compressed payload and crashing, if the bzImage it's given is a 32-bit kernel. No change there then. [ hpa: some of the issues in the description are addressed or retconned by the 2.12 boot protocol. This patch has been edited to only remove fixed addresses that were *not* thus retconned. ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358513837.2397.247.camel@shinybook.infradead.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-10 22:31:59 +08:00
efi_stub_entry_update();
x86, efi: EFI boot stub support There is currently a large divide between kernel development and the development of EFI boot loaders. The idea behind this patch is to give the kernel developers full control over the EFI boot process. As H. Peter Anvin put it, "The 'kernel carries its own stub' approach been very successful in dealing with BIOS, and would make a lot of sense to me for EFI as well." This patch introduces an EFI boot stub that allows an x86 bzImage to be loaded and executed by EFI firmware. The bzImage appears to the firmware as an EFI application. Luckily there are enough free bits within the bzImage header so that it can masquerade as an EFI application, thereby coercing the EFI firmware into loading it and jumping to its entry point. The beauty of this masquerading approach is that both BIOS and EFI boot loaders can still load and run the same bzImage, thereby allowing a single kernel image to work in any boot environment. The EFI boot stub supports multiple initrds, but they must exist on the same partition as the bzImage. Command-line arguments for the kernel can be appended after the bzImage name when run from the EFI shell, e.g. Shell> bzImage console=ttyS0 root=/dev/sdb initrd=initrd.img v7: - Fix checkpatch warnings. v6: - Try to allocate initrd memory just below hdr->inird_addr_max. v5: - load_options_size is UTF-16, which needs dividing by 2 to convert to the corresponding ASCII size. v4: - Don't read more than image->load_options_size v3: - Fix following warnings when compiling CONFIG_EFI_STUB=n arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c: In function ‘main’: arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c:138:24: warning: unused variable ‘pe_header’ arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c:138:15: warning: unused variable ‘file_sz’ - As reported by Matthew Garrett, some Apple machines have GOPs that don't have hardware attached. We need to weed these out by searching for ones that handle the PCIIO protocol. - Don't allocate memory if no initrds are on cmdline - Don't trust image->load_options_size Maarten Lankhorst noted: - Don't strip first argument when booted from efibootmgr - Don't allocate too much memory for cmdline - Don't update cmdline_size, the kernel considers it read-only - Don't accept '\n' for initrd names v2: - File alignment was too large, was 8192 should be 512. Reported by Maarten Lankhorst on LKML. - Added UGA support for graphics - Use VIDEO_TYPE_EFI instead of hard-coded number. - Move linelength assignment until after we've assigned depth - Dynamically fill out AddressOfEntryPoint in tools/build.c - Don't use magic number for GDT/TSS stuff. Requested by Andi Kleen - The bzImage may need to be relocated as it may have been loaded at a high address address by the firmware. This was required to get my macbook booting because the firmware loaded it at 0x7cxxxxxx, which triggers this error in decompress_kernel(), if (heap > ((-__PAGE_OFFSET-(128<<20)-1) & 0x7fffffff)) error("Destination address too large"); Cc: Mike Waychison <mikew@google.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Tested-by: Henrik Rydberg <rydberg@euromail.se> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1321383097.2657.9.camel@mfleming-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2011-12-13 05:27:52 +08:00
crc = partial_crc32(buf, i, crc);
if (fwrite(buf, 1, i, dest) != i)
die("Writing setup failed");
/* Copy the kernel code */
crc = partial_crc32(kernel, sz, crc);
if (fwrite(kernel, 1, sz, dest) != sz)
die("Writing kernel failed");
/* Add padding leaving 4 bytes for the checksum */
while (sz++ < (sys_size*16) - 4) {
crc = partial_crc32_one('\0', crc);
if (fwrite("\0", 1, 1, dest) != 1)
die("Writing padding failed");
}
/* Write the CRC */
printf("CRC %x\n", crc);
put_unaligned_le32(crc, buf);
if (fwrite(buf, 1, 4, dest) != 4)
die("Writing CRC failed");
/* Catch any delayed write failures */
if (fclose(dest))
die("Writing image failed");
close(fd);
/* Everything is OK */
return 0;
}