License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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* linux/fs/attr.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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* changes by Thomas Schoebel-Theuer
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*/
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2011-11-17 12:57:37 +08:00
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#include <linux/export.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/time.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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2017-02-09 01:51:30 +08:00
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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2006-01-12 04:17:46 +08:00
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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[PATCH] inotify
inotify is intended to correct the deficiencies of dnotify, particularly
its inability to scale and its terrible user interface:
* dnotify requires the opening of one fd per each directory
that you intend to watch. This quickly results in too many
open files and pins removable media, preventing unmount.
* dnotify is directory-based. You only learn about changes to
directories. Sure, a change to a file in a directory affects
the directory, but you are then forced to keep a cache of
stat structures.
* dnotify's interface to user-space is awful. Signals?
inotify provides a more usable, simple, powerful solution to file change
notification:
* inotify's interface is a system call that returns a fd, not SIGIO.
You get a single fd, which is select()-able.
* inotify has an event that says "the filesystem that the item
you were watching is on was unmounted."
* inotify can watch directories or files.
Inotify is currently used by Beagle (a desktop search infrastructure),
Gamin (a FAM replacement), and other projects.
See Documentation/filesystems/inotify.txt.
Signed-off-by: Robert Love <rml@novell.com>
Cc: John McCutchan <ttb@tentacle.dhs.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-07-13 05:06:03 +08:00
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#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/fcntl.h>
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2022-11-20 22:15:34 +08:00
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#include <linux/filelock.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/security.h>
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2011-03-10 03:39:57 +08:00
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#include <linux/evm.h>
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2011-03-10 11:57:53 +08:00
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2022-10-17 23:06:34 +08:00
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#include "internal.h"
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2022-10-17 23:06:36 +08:00
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/**
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* setattr_should_drop_sgid - determine whether the setgid bit needs to be
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* removed
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2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
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* @idmap: idmap of the mount @inode was found from
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2022-10-17 23:06:36 +08:00
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* @inode: inode to check
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*
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* This function determines whether the setgid bit needs to be removed.
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* We retain backwards compatibility and require setgid bit to be removed
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* unconditionally if S_IXGRP is set. Otherwise we have the exact same
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* requirements as setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy().
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*
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* Return: ATTR_KILL_SGID if setgid bit needs to be removed, 0 otherwise.
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*/
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2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
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int setattr_should_drop_sgid(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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2022-10-17 23:06:36 +08:00
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const struct inode *inode)
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{
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umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
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if (!(mode & S_ISGID))
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return 0;
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if (mode & S_IXGRP)
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return ATTR_KILL_SGID;
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2023-01-13 19:49:30 +08:00
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if (!in_group_or_capable(idmap, inode, i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode)))
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2022-10-17 23:06:36 +08:00
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return ATTR_KILL_SGID;
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return 0;
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}
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2023-03-14 19:51:10 +08:00
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_should_drop_sgid);
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2022-10-17 23:06:36 +08:00
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attr: use consistent sgid stripping checks
Currently setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid()
helper is inconsistent with other parts of the vfs. Specifically, it only
raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the
inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the
inode although we require this already in setattr_prepare() and
setattr_copy() and so all filesystem implement this requirement implicitly
because they have to use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway.
But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs in
xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686,
generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping works
correctly when performing various write-like operations as an unprivileged
user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.):
echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb"
setup_testfile
chmod a+rws $junk_file
commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k
The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the file has
the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP set. On a
regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> setattr_copy()
In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised
unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set.
But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the file
is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for
ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised.
So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE. Now notify_change() sees that
ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does:
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely
update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID.
Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which will
end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will hit:
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group of the
inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped.
But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised which
has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits are stripped
even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't in the caller's
groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode.
If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and the bug
shows up more clearly. When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from
ovl_fallocate()'s call to file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and
ATTR_KILL_SGID might be raised but because the check in notify_change() is
questioning the ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be
stripped the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> ovl_fallocate()
-> file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> ovl_setattr()
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> ovl_do_notify_change()
-> notify_change()
// GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill;
-> notify_change()
The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s
should_remove_suid() helper to perform the same checks as we already
require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have notify_change()
not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't make any sense in the
first place because the caller must calculate the flags via
should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise ATTR_KILL_SGID.
While we're at it we move should_remove_suid() from inode.c to attr.c
where it belongs with the rest of the iattr helpers. Especially since it
returns ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID flags. We also rename it to
setattr_should_drop_suidgid() to better reflect that it indicates both
setuid and setgid bit removal and also that it returns attr flags.
Running xfstests with this doesn't report any regressions. We should really
try and use consistent checks.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-10-17 23:06:37 +08:00
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/**
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* setattr_should_drop_suidgid - determine whether the set{g,u}id bit needs to
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* be dropped
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2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
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* @idmap: idmap of the mount @inode was found from
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attr: use consistent sgid stripping checks
Currently setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid()
helper is inconsistent with other parts of the vfs. Specifically, it only
raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the
inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the
inode although we require this already in setattr_prepare() and
setattr_copy() and so all filesystem implement this requirement implicitly
because they have to use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway.
But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs in
xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686,
generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping works
correctly when performing various write-like operations as an unprivileged
user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.):
echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb"
setup_testfile
chmod a+rws $junk_file
commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k
The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the file has
the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP set. On a
regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> setattr_copy()
In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised
unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set.
But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the file
is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for
ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised.
So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE. Now notify_change() sees that
ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does:
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely
update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID.
Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which will
end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will hit:
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group of the
inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped.
But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised which
has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits are stripped
even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't in the caller's
groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode.
If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and the bug
shows up more clearly. When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from
ovl_fallocate()'s call to file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and
ATTR_KILL_SGID might be raised but because the check in notify_change() is
questioning the ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be
stripped the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> ovl_fallocate()
-> file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> ovl_setattr()
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> ovl_do_notify_change()
-> notify_change()
// GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill;
-> notify_change()
The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s
should_remove_suid() helper to perform the same checks as we already
require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have notify_change()
not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't make any sense in the
first place because the caller must calculate the flags via
should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise ATTR_KILL_SGID.
While we're at it we move should_remove_suid() from inode.c to attr.c
where it belongs with the rest of the iattr helpers. Especially since it
returns ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID flags. We also rename it to
setattr_should_drop_suidgid() to better reflect that it indicates both
setuid and setgid bit removal and also that it returns attr flags.
Running xfstests with this doesn't report any regressions. We should really
try and use consistent checks.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-10-17 23:06:37 +08:00
|
|
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* @inode: inode to check
|
2022-10-17 23:06:35 +08:00
|
|
|
*
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attr: use consistent sgid stripping checks
Currently setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid()
helper is inconsistent with other parts of the vfs. Specifically, it only
raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the
inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the
inode although we require this already in setattr_prepare() and
setattr_copy() and so all filesystem implement this requirement implicitly
because they have to use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway.
But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs in
xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686,
generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping works
correctly when performing various write-like operations as an unprivileged
user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.):
echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb"
setup_testfile
chmod a+rws $junk_file
commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k
The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the file has
the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP set. On a
regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> setattr_copy()
In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised
unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set.
But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the file
is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for
ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised.
So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE. Now notify_change() sees that
ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does:
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely
update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID.
Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which will
end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will hit:
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group of the
inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped.
But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised which
has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits are stripped
even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't in the caller's
groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode.
If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and the bug
shows up more clearly. When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from
ovl_fallocate()'s call to file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and
ATTR_KILL_SGID might be raised but because the check in notify_change() is
questioning the ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be
stripped the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> ovl_fallocate()
-> file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> ovl_setattr()
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> ovl_do_notify_change()
-> notify_change()
// GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill;
-> notify_change()
The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s
should_remove_suid() helper to perform the same checks as we already
require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have notify_change()
not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't make any sense in the
first place because the caller must calculate the flags via
should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise ATTR_KILL_SGID.
While we're at it we move should_remove_suid() from inode.c to attr.c
where it belongs with the rest of the iattr helpers. Especially since it
returns ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID flags. We also rename it to
setattr_should_drop_suidgid() to better reflect that it indicates both
setuid and setgid bit removal and also that it returns attr flags.
Running xfstests with this doesn't report any regressions. We should really
try and use consistent checks.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-10-17 23:06:37 +08:00
|
|
|
* This function determines whether the set{g,u}id bits need to be removed.
|
|
|
|
* If the setuid bit needs to be removed ATTR_KILL_SUID is returned. If the
|
|
|
|
* setgid bit needs to be removed ATTR_KILL_SGID is returned. If both
|
|
|
|
* set{g,u}id bits need to be removed the corresponding mask of both flags is
|
|
|
|
* returned.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: A mask of ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID indicating which - if any - setid bits
|
|
|
|
* to remove, 0 otherwise.
|
2022-10-17 23:06:35 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
int setattr_should_drop_suidgid(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
|
attr: use consistent sgid stripping checks
Currently setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid()
helper is inconsistent with other parts of the vfs. Specifically, it only
raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the
inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the
inode although we require this already in setattr_prepare() and
setattr_copy() and so all filesystem implement this requirement implicitly
because they have to use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway.
But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs in
xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686,
generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping works
correctly when performing various write-like operations as an unprivileged
user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.):
echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb"
setup_testfile
chmod a+rws $junk_file
commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k
The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the file has
the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP set. On a
regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> setattr_copy()
In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised
unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set.
But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the file
is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for
ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised.
So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE. Now notify_change() sees that
ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does:
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely
update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID.
Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which will
end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will hit:
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group of the
inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped.
But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised which
has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits are stripped
even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't in the caller's
groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode.
If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and the bug
shows up more clearly. When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from
ovl_fallocate()'s call to file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and
ATTR_KILL_SGID might be raised but because the check in notify_change() is
questioning the ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be
stripped the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> ovl_fallocate()
-> file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> ovl_setattr()
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> ovl_do_notify_change()
-> notify_change()
// GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill;
-> notify_change()
The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s
should_remove_suid() helper to perform the same checks as we already
require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have notify_change()
not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't make any sense in the
first place because the caller must calculate the flags via
should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise ATTR_KILL_SGID.
While we're at it we move should_remove_suid() from inode.c to attr.c
where it belongs with the rest of the iattr helpers. Especially since it
returns ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID flags. We also rename it to
setattr_should_drop_suidgid() to better reflect that it indicates both
setuid and setgid bit removal and also that it returns attr flags.
Running xfstests with this doesn't report any regressions. We should really
try and use consistent checks.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-10-17 23:06:37 +08:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode)
|
2022-10-17 23:06:35 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
attr: use consistent sgid stripping checks
Currently setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid()
helper is inconsistent with other parts of the vfs. Specifically, it only
raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the
inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the
inode although we require this already in setattr_prepare() and
setattr_copy() and so all filesystem implement this requirement implicitly
because they have to use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway.
But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs in
xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686,
generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping works
correctly when performing various write-like operations as an unprivileged
user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.):
echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb"
setup_testfile
chmod a+rws $junk_file
commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k
The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the file has
the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP set. On a
regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> setattr_copy()
In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised
unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set.
But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the file
is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for
ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised.
So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE. Now notify_change() sees that
ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does:
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely
update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID.
Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which will
end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will hit:
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group of the
inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped.
But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised which
has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits are stripped
even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't in the caller's
groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode.
If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and the bug
shows up more clearly. When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from
ovl_fallocate()'s call to file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and
ATTR_KILL_SGID might be raised but because the check in notify_change() is
questioning the ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be
stripped the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> ovl_fallocate()
-> file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> ovl_setattr()
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> ovl_do_notify_change()
-> notify_change()
// GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill;
-> notify_change()
The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s
should_remove_suid() helper to perform the same checks as we already
require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have notify_change()
not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't make any sense in the
first place because the caller must calculate the flags via
should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise ATTR_KILL_SGID.
While we're at it we move should_remove_suid() from inode.c to attr.c
where it belongs with the rest of the iattr helpers. Especially since it
returns ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID flags. We also rename it to
setattr_should_drop_suidgid() to better reflect that it indicates both
setuid and setgid bit removal and also that it returns attr flags.
Running xfstests with this doesn't report any regressions. We should really
try and use consistent checks.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-10-17 23:06:37 +08:00
|
|
|
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
|
2022-10-17 23:06:35 +08:00
|
|
|
int kill = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* suid always must be killed */
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(mode & S_ISUID))
|
|
|
|
kill = ATTR_KILL_SUID;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
kill |= setattr_should_drop_sgid(idmap, inode);
|
2022-10-17 23:06:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(kill && !capable(CAP_FSETID) && S_ISREG(mode)))
|
|
|
|
return kill;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
attr: use consistent sgid stripping checks
Currently setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid()
helper is inconsistent with other parts of the vfs. Specifically, it only
raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the
inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the
inode although we require this already in setattr_prepare() and
setattr_copy() and so all filesystem implement this requirement implicitly
because they have to use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway.
But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs in
xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686,
generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping works
correctly when performing various write-like operations as an unprivileged
user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.):
echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb"
setup_testfile
chmod a+rws $junk_file
commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k
The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the file has
the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP set. On a
regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> setattr_copy()
In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised
unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set.
But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the file
is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for
ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised.
So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE. Now notify_change() sees that
ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does:
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely
update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID.
Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which will
end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will hit:
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group of the
inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped.
But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised which
has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits are stripped
even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't in the caller's
groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode.
If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and the bug
shows up more clearly. When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from
ovl_fallocate()'s call to file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and
ATTR_KILL_SGID might be raised but because the check in notify_change() is
questioning the ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be
stripped the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> ovl_fallocate()
-> file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> ovl_setattr()
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> ovl_do_notify_change()
-> notify_change()
// GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill;
-> notify_change()
The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s
should_remove_suid() helper to perform the same checks as we already
require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have notify_change()
not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't make any sense in the
first place because the caller must calculate the flags via
should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise ATTR_KILL_SGID.
While we're at it we move should_remove_suid() from inode.c to attr.c
where it belongs with the rest of the iattr helpers. Especially since it
returns ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID flags. We also rename it to
setattr_should_drop_suidgid() to better reflect that it indicates both
setuid and setgid bit removal and also that it returns attr flags.
Running xfstests with this doesn't report any regressions. We should really
try and use consistent checks.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-10-17 23:06:37 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_should_drop_suidgid);
|
2022-10-17 23:06:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* chown_ok - verify permissions to chown inode
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
* @idmap: idmap of the mount @inode was found from
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* @inode: inode to check permissions on
|
2022-06-27 21:40:45 +08:00
|
|
|
* @ia_vfsuid: uid to chown @inode to
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the idmap of
|
|
|
|
* the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
|
|
|
|
* take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
* performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
static bool chown_ok(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
const struct inode *inode, vfsuid_t ia_vfsuid)
|
2016-10-16 07:36:59 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-13 19:49:30 +08:00
|
|
|
vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()) &&
|
|
|
|
vfsuid_eq(ia_vfsuid, vfsuid))
|
2016-10-16 07:36:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(idmap, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
|
2016-10-16 07:36:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!vfsuid_valid(vfsuid) &&
|
2016-10-16 07:36:59 +08:00
|
|
|
ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* chgrp_ok - verify permissions to chgrp inode
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
* @idmap: idmap of the mount @inode was found from
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* @inode: inode to check permissions on
|
2022-06-27 21:40:45 +08:00
|
|
|
* @ia_vfsgid: gid to chown @inode to
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the idmap of
|
|
|
|
* the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
|
|
|
|
* take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
* performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
static bool chgrp_ok(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
const struct inode *inode, vfsgid_t ia_vfsgid)
|
2016-10-16 07:36:59 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-13 19:49:30 +08:00
|
|
|
vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode);
|
|
|
|
vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid())) {
|
|
|
|
if (vfsgid_eq(ia_vfsgid, vfsgid))
|
2022-06-13 19:15:17 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (vfsgid_in_group_p(ia_vfsgid))
|
2022-06-13 19:15:17 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(idmap, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
|
2016-10-16 07:36:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!vfsgid_valid(vfsgid) &&
|
2016-10-16 07:36:59 +08:00
|
|
|
ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2016-05-26 22:55:18 +08:00
|
|
|
* setattr_prepare - check if attribute changes to a dentry are allowed
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
* @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
|
2016-05-26 22:55:18 +08:00
|
|
|
* @dentry: dentry to check
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
* @attr: attributes to change
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Check if we are allowed to change the attributes contained in @attr
|
2016-05-26 22:55:18 +08:00
|
|
|
* in the given dentry. This includes the normal unix access permission
|
|
|
|
* checks, as well as checks for rlimits and others. The function also clears
|
|
|
|
* SGID bit from mode if user is not allowed to set it. Also file capabilities
|
|
|
|
* and IMA extended attributes are cleared if ATTR_KILL_PRIV is set.
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the idmap of
|
|
|
|
* the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
|
|
|
|
* take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
* performed on the raw inode simply passs @nop_mnt_idmap.
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
* Should be called as the first thing in ->setattr implementations,
|
|
|
|
* possibly after taking additional locks.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
int setattr_prepare(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
struct iattr *attr)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-05-26 22:55:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* First check size constraints. These can't be overriden using
|
|
|
|
* ATTR_FORCE.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
int error = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If force is set do it anyway. */
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
|
2016-05-26 23:21:32 +08:00
|
|
|
goto kill_priv;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
!chown_ok(idmap, inode, attr->ia_vfsuid))
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
!chgrp_ok(idmap, inode, attr->ia_vfsgid))
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
vfsgid_t vfsgid;
|
2022-06-13 19:15:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-13 19:49:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
2022-06-13 19:15:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
vfsgid = attr->ia_vfsgid;
|
2022-06-13 19:15:17 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2023-01-13 19:49:30 +08:00
|
|
|
vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode);
|
2022-06-13 19:15:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Also check the setgid bit! */
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!in_group_or_capable(idmap, inode, vfsgid))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check for setting the inode time. */
|
2008-07-01 21:01:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
|
2023-01-13 19:49:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 23:21:32 +08:00
|
|
|
kill_priv:
|
|
|
|
/* User has permission for the change */
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-13 19:49:23 +08:00
|
|
|
error = security_inode_killpriv(idmap, dentry);
|
2016-05-26 23:21:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-05-26 22:55:18 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_prepare);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-21 00:35:05 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* inode_newsize_ok - may this inode be truncated to a given size
|
|
|
|
* @inode: the inode to be truncated
|
|
|
|
* @offset: the new size to assign to the inode
|
|
|
|
*
|
fs: introduce new truncate sequence
Introduce a new truncate calling sequence into fs/mm subsystems. Rather than
setattr > vmtruncate > truncate, have filesystems call their truncate sequence
from ->setattr if filesystem specific operations are required. vmtruncate is
deprecated, and truncate_pagecache and inode_newsize_ok helpers introduced
previously should be used.
simple_setattr is introduced for simple in-ram filesystems to implement
the new truncate sequence. Eventually all filesystems should be converted
to implement a setattr, and the default code in notify_change should go
away.
simple_setsize is also introduced to perform just the ATTR_SIZE portion
of simple_setattr (ie. changing i_size and trimming pagecache).
To implement the new truncate sequence:
- filesystem specific manipulations (eg freeing blocks) must be done in
the setattr method rather than ->truncate.
- vmtruncate can not be used by core code to trim blocks past i_size in
the event of write failure after allocation, so this must be performed
in the fs code.
- convert usage of helpers block_write_begin, nobh_write_begin,
cont_write_begin, and *blockdev_direct_IO* to use _newtrunc postfixed
variants. These avoid calling vmtruncate to trim blocks (see previous).
- inode_setattr should not be used. generic_setattr is a new function
to be used to copy simple attributes into the generic inode.
- make use of the better opportunity to handle errors with the new sequence.
Big problem with the previous calling sequence: the filesystem is not called
until i_size has already changed. This means it is not allowed to fail the
call, and also it does not know what the previous i_size was. Also, generic
code calling vmtruncate to truncate allocated blocks in case of error had
no good way to return a meaningful error (or, for example, atomically handle
block deallocation).
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-26 23:05:33 +08:00
|
|
|
* inode_newsize_ok must be called with i_mutex held.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2009-08-21 00:35:05 +08:00
|
|
|
* inode_newsize_ok will check filesystem limits and ulimits to check that the
|
|
|
|
* new inode size is within limits. inode_newsize_ok will also send SIGXFSZ
|
|
|
|
* when necessary. Caller must not proceed with inode size change if failure is
|
|
|
|
* returned. @inode must be a file (not directory), with appropriate
|
|
|
|
* permissions to allow truncate (inode_newsize_ok does NOT check these
|
|
|
|
* conditions).
|
2018-07-03 23:08:34 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: 0 on success, -ve errno on failure
|
2009-08-21 00:35:05 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int inode_newsize_ok(const struct inode *inode, loff_t offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-08-08 16:52:35 +08:00
|
|
|
if (offset < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2009-08-21 00:35:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (inode->i_size < offset) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long limit;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-03-06 05:42:42 +08:00
|
|
|
limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE);
|
2009-08-21 00:35:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
|
|
|
|
goto out_sig;
|
|
|
|
if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
|
|
|
|
goto out_big;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* truncation of in-use swapfiles is disallowed - it would
|
|
|
|
* cause subsequent swapout to scribble on the now-freed
|
|
|
|
* blocks.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode))
|
|
|
|
return -ETXTBSY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
out_sig:
|
|
|
|
send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
|
|
|
|
out_big:
|
|
|
|
return -EFBIG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_newsize_ok);
|
|
|
|
|
fs: introduce new truncate sequence
Introduce a new truncate calling sequence into fs/mm subsystems. Rather than
setattr > vmtruncate > truncate, have filesystems call their truncate sequence
from ->setattr if filesystem specific operations are required. vmtruncate is
deprecated, and truncate_pagecache and inode_newsize_ok helpers introduced
previously should be used.
simple_setattr is introduced for simple in-ram filesystems to implement
the new truncate sequence. Eventually all filesystems should be converted
to implement a setattr, and the default code in notify_change should go
away.
simple_setsize is also introduced to perform just the ATTR_SIZE portion
of simple_setattr (ie. changing i_size and trimming pagecache).
To implement the new truncate sequence:
- filesystem specific manipulations (eg freeing blocks) must be done in
the setattr method rather than ->truncate.
- vmtruncate can not be used by core code to trim blocks past i_size in
the event of write failure after allocation, so this must be performed
in the fs code.
- convert usage of helpers block_write_begin, nobh_write_begin,
cont_write_begin, and *blockdev_direct_IO* to use _newtrunc postfixed
variants. These avoid calling vmtruncate to trim blocks (see previous).
- inode_setattr should not be used. generic_setattr is a new function
to be used to copy simple attributes into the generic inode.
- make use of the better opportunity to handle errors with the new sequence.
Big problem with the previous calling sequence: the filesystem is not called
until i_size has already changed. This means it is not allowed to fail the
call, and also it does not know what the previous i_size was. Also, generic
code calling vmtruncate to truncate allocated blocks in case of error had
no good way to return a meaningful error (or, for example, atomically handle
block deallocation).
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-26 23:05:33 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2010-06-04 17:30:00 +08:00
|
|
|
* setattr_copy - copy simple metadata updates into the generic inode
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
* @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
|
fs: introduce new truncate sequence
Introduce a new truncate calling sequence into fs/mm subsystems. Rather than
setattr > vmtruncate > truncate, have filesystems call their truncate sequence
from ->setattr if filesystem specific operations are required. vmtruncate is
deprecated, and truncate_pagecache and inode_newsize_ok helpers introduced
previously should be used.
simple_setattr is introduced for simple in-ram filesystems to implement
the new truncate sequence. Eventually all filesystems should be converted
to implement a setattr, and the default code in notify_change should go
away.
simple_setsize is also introduced to perform just the ATTR_SIZE portion
of simple_setattr (ie. changing i_size and trimming pagecache).
To implement the new truncate sequence:
- filesystem specific manipulations (eg freeing blocks) must be done in
the setattr method rather than ->truncate.
- vmtruncate can not be used by core code to trim blocks past i_size in
the event of write failure after allocation, so this must be performed
in the fs code.
- convert usage of helpers block_write_begin, nobh_write_begin,
cont_write_begin, and *blockdev_direct_IO* to use _newtrunc postfixed
variants. These avoid calling vmtruncate to trim blocks (see previous).
- inode_setattr should not be used. generic_setattr is a new function
to be used to copy simple attributes into the generic inode.
- make use of the better opportunity to handle errors with the new sequence.
Big problem with the previous calling sequence: the filesystem is not called
until i_size has already changed. This means it is not allowed to fail the
call, and also it does not know what the previous i_size was. Also, generic
code calling vmtruncate to truncate allocated blocks in case of error had
no good way to return a meaningful error (or, for example, atomically handle
block deallocation).
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-26 23:05:33 +08:00
|
|
|
* @inode: the inode to be updated
|
|
|
|
* @attr: the new attributes
|
|
|
|
*
|
2010-06-04 17:30:00 +08:00
|
|
|
* setattr_copy must be called with i_mutex held.
|
fs: introduce new truncate sequence
Introduce a new truncate calling sequence into fs/mm subsystems. Rather than
setattr > vmtruncate > truncate, have filesystems call their truncate sequence
from ->setattr if filesystem specific operations are required. vmtruncate is
deprecated, and truncate_pagecache and inode_newsize_ok helpers introduced
previously should be used.
simple_setattr is introduced for simple in-ram filesystems to implement
the new truncate sequence. Eventually all filesystems should be converted
to implement a setattr, and the default code in notify_change should go
away.
simple_setsize is also introduced to perform just the ATTR_SIZE portion
of simple_setattr (ie. changing i_size and trimming pagecache).
To implement the new truncate sequence:
- filesystem specific manipulations (eg freeing blocks) must be done in
the setattr method rather than ->truncate.
- vmtruncate can not be used by core code to trim blocks past i_size in
the event of write failure after allocation, so this must be performed
in the fs code.
- convert usage of helpers block_write_begin, nobh_write_begin,
cont_write_begin, and *blockdev_direct_IO* to use _newtrunc postfixed
variants. These avoid calling vmtruncate to trim blocks (see previous).
- inode_setattr should not be used. generic_setattr is a new function
to be used to copy simple attributes into the generic inode.
- make use of the better opportunity to handle errors with the new sequence.
Big problem with the previous calling sequence: the filesystem is not called
until i_size has already changed. This means it is not allowed to fail the
call, and also it does not know what the previous i_size was. Also, generic
code calling vmtruncate to truncate allocated blocks in case of error had
no good way to return a meaningful error (or, for example, atomically handle
block deallocation).
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-26 23:05:33 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2010-06-04 17:30:00 +08:00
|
|
|
* setattr_copy updates the inode's metadata with that specified
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
* in attr on idmapped mounts. Necessary permission checks to determine
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* whether or not the S_ISGID property needs to be removed are performed with
|
|
|
|
* the correct idmapped mount permission helpers.
|
|
|
|
* Noticeably missing is inode size update, which is more complex
|
2010-06-04 17:30:04 +08:00
|
|
|
* as it requires pagecache updates.
|
fs: introduce new truncate sequence
Introduce a new truncate calling sequence into fs/mm subsystems. Rather than
setattr > vmtruncate > truncate, have filesystems call their truncate sequence
from ->setattr if filesystem specific operations are required. vmtruncate is
deprecated, and truncate_pagecache and inode_newsize_ok helpers introduced
previously should be used.
simple_setattr is introduced for simple in-ram filesystems to implement
the new truncate sequence. Eventually all filesystems should be converted
to implement a setattr, and the default code in notify_change should go
away.
simple_setsize is also introduced to perform just the ATTR_SIZE portion
of simple_setattr (ie. changing i_size and trimming pagecache).
To implement the new truncate sequence:
- filesystem specific manipulations (eg freeing blocks) must be done in
the setattr method rather than ->truncate.
- vmtruncate can not be used by core code to trim blocks past i_size in
the event of write failure after allocation, so this must be performed
in the fs code.
- convert usage of helpers block_write_begin, nobh_write_begin,
cont_write_begin, and *blockdev_direct_IO* to use _newtrunc postfixed
variants. These avoid calling vmtruncate to trim blocks (see previous).
- inode_setattr should not be used. generic_setattr is a new function
to be used to copy simple attributes into the generic inode.
- make use of the better opportunity to handle errors with the new sequence.
Big problem with the previous calling sequence: the filesystem is not called
until i_size has already changed. This means it is not allowed to fail the
call, and also it does not know what the previous i_size was. Also, generic
code calling vmtruncate to truncate allocated blocks in case of error had
no good way to return a meaningful error (or, for example, atomically handle
block deallocation).
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-26 23:05:33 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the idmap of
|
|
|
|
* the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
|
|
|
|
* take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
* performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
fs: introduce new truncate sequence
Introduce a new truncate calling sequence into fs/mm subsystems. Rather than
setattr > vmtruncate > truncate, have filesystems call their truncate sequence
from ->setattr if filesystem specific operations are required. vmtruncate is
deprecated, and truncate_pagecache and inode_newsize_ok helpers introduced
previously should be used.
simple_setattr is introduced for simple in-ram filesystems to implement
the new truncate sequence. Eventually all filesystems should be converted
to implement a setattr, and the default code in notify_change should go
away.
simple_setsize is also introduced to perform just the ATTR_SIZE portion
of simple_setattr (ie. changing i_size and trimming pagecache).
To implement the new truncate sequence:
- filesystem specific manipulations (eg freeing blocks) must be done in
the setattr method rather than ->truncate.
- vmtruncate can not be used by core code to trim blocks past i_size in
the event of write failure after allocation, so this must be performed
in the fs code.
- convert usage of helpers block_write_begin, nobh_write_begin,
cont_write_begin, and *blockdev_direct_IO* to use _newtrunc postfixed
variants. These avoid calling vmtruncate to trim blocks (see previous).
- inode_setattr should not be used. generic_setattr is a new function
to be used to copy simple attributes into the generic inode.
- make use of the better opportunity to handle errors with the new sequence.
Big problem with the previous calling sequence: the filesystem is not called
until i_size has already changed. This means it is not allowed to fail the
call, and also it does not know what the previous i_size was. Also, generic
code calling vmtruncate to truncate allocated blocks in case of error had
no good way to return a meaningful error (or, for example, atomically handle
block deallocation).
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-26 23:05:33 +08:00
|
|
|
* The inode is not marked as dirty after this operation. The rationale is
|
|
|
|
* that for "simple" filesystems, the struct inode is the inode storage.
|
|
|
|
* The caller is free to mark the inode dirty afterwards if needed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
void setattr_copy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
const struct iattr *attr)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
|
2006-01-08 17:02:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-13 19:49:29 +08:00
|
|
|
i_uid_update(idmap, attr, inode);
|
|
|
|
i_gid_update(idmap, attr, inode);
|
2019-11-25 03:31:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
|
|
|
|
inode->i_atime = attr->ia_atime;
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
|
|
|
|
inode->i_mtime = attr->ia_mtime;
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
|
2023-07-06 03:00:50 +08:00
|
|
|
inode_set_ctime_to_ts(inode, attr->ia_ctime);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
|
|
|
|
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
|
2023-01-13 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!in_group_or_capable(idmap, inode,
|
2023-01-13 19:49:30 +08:00
|
|
|
i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode)))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
|
|
|
|
inode->i_mode = mode;
|
|
|
|
}
|
fs: introduce new truncate sequence
Introduce a new truncate calling sequence into fs/mm subsystems. Rather than
setattr > vmtruncate > truncate, have filesystems call their truncate sequence
from ->setattr if filesystem specific operations are required. vmtruncate is
deprecated, and truncate_pagecache and inode_newsize_ok helpers introduced
previously should be used.
simple_setattr is introduced for simple in-ram filesystems to implement
the new truncate sequence. Eventually all filesystems should be converted
to implement a setattr, and the default code in notify_change should go
away.
simple_setsize is also introduced to perform just the ATTR_SIZE portion
of simple_setattr (ie. changing i_size and trimming pagecache).
To implement the new truncate sequence:
- filesystem specific manipulations (eg freeing blocks) must be done in
the setattr method rather than ->truncate.
- vmtruncate can not be used by core code to trim blocks past i_size in
the event of write failure after allocation, so this must be performed
in the fs code.
- convert usage of helpers block_write_begin, nobh_write_begin,
cont_write_begin, and *blockdev_direct_IO* to use _newtrunc postfixed
variants. These avoid calling vmtruncate to trim blocks (see previous).
- inode_setattr should not be used. generic_setattr is a new function
to be used to copy simple attributes into the generic inode.
- make use of the better opportunity to handle errors with the new sequence.
Big problem with the previous calling sequence: the filesystem is not called
until i_size has already changed. This means it is not allowed to fail the
call, and also it does not know what the previous i_size was. Also, generic
code calling vmtruncate to truncate allocated blocks in case of error had
no good way to return a meaningful error (or, for example, atomically handle
block deallocation).
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-26 23:05:33 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-06-04 17:30:00 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_copy);
|
fs: introduce new truncate sequence
Introduce a new truncate calling sequence into fs/mm subsystems. Rather than
setattr > vmtruncate > truncate, have filesystems call their truncate sequence
from ->setattr if filesystem specific operations are required. vmtruncate is
deprecated, and truncate_pagecache and inode_newsize_ok helpers introduced
previously should be used.
simple_setattr is introduced for simple in-ram filesystems to implement
the new truncate sequence. Eventually all filesystems should be converted
to implement a setattr, and the default code in notify_change should go
away.
simple_setsize is also introduced to perform just the ATTR_SIZE portion
of simple_setattr (ie. changing i_size and trimming pagecache).
To implement the new truncate sequence:
- filesystem specific manipulations (eg freeing blocks) must be done in
the setattr method rather than ->truncate.
- vmtruncate can not be used by core code to trim blocks past i_size in
the event of write failure after allocation, so this must be performed
in the fs code.
- convert usage of helpers block_write_begin, nobh_write_begin,
cont_write_begin, and *blockdev_direct_IO* to use _newtrunc postfixed
variants. These avoid calling vmtruncate to trim blocks (see previous).
- inode_setattr should not be used. generic_setattr is a new function
to be used to copy simple attributes into the generic inode.
- make use of the better opportunity to handle errors with the new sequence.
Big problem with the previous calling sequence: the filesystem is not called
until i_size has already changed. This means it is not allowed to fail the
call, and also it does not know what the previous i_size was. Also, generic
code calling vmtruncate to truncate allocated blocks in case of error had
no good way to return a meaningful error (or, for example, atomically handle
block deallocation).
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-26 23:05:33 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-13 19:49:22 +08:00
|
|
|
int may_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
|
2021-07-28 20:47:33 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int ia_valid)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
|
|
|
|
if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If utimes(2) and friends are called with times == NULL (or both
|
|
|
|
* times are UTIME_NOW), then we need to check for write permission
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_TOUCH) {
|
|
|
|
if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-13 19:49:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode)) {
|
2023-01-13 19:49:22 +08:00
|
|
|
error = inode_permission(idmap, inode, MAY_WRITE);
|
2021-07-28 20:47:33 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(may_setattr);
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-21 05:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* notify_change - modify attributes of a filesytem object
|
2023-01-13 19:49:10 +08:00
|
|
|
* @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
|
2011-09-21 05:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* @dentry: object affected
|
2018-07-03 23:08:34 +08:00
|
|
|
* @attr: new attributes
|
2011-09-21 05:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* @delegated_inode: returns inode, if the inode is delegated
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The caller must hold the i_mutex on the affected object.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If notify_change discovers a delegation in need of breaking,
|
|
|
|
* it will return -EWOULDBLOCK and return a reference to the inode in
|
|
|
|
* delegated_inode. The caller should then break the delegation and
|
|
|
|
* retry. Because breaking a delegation may take a long time, the
|
|
|
|
* caller should drop the i_mutex before doing so.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Alternatively, a caller may pass NULL for delegated_inode. This may
|
|
|
|
* be appropriate for callers that expect the underlying filesystem not
|
|
|
|
* to be NFS exported. Also, passing NULL is fine for callers holding
|
|
|
|
* the file open for write, as there can be no conflicting delegation in
|
|
|
|
* that case.
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2023-01-13 19:49:10 +08:00
|
|
|
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the idmap of
|
|
|
|
* the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
|
|
|
|
* take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
|
2023-01-13 19:49:10 +08:00
|
|
|
* performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
|
2011-09-21 05:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-13 19:49:10 +08:00
|
|
|
int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
struct iattr *attr, struct inode **delegated_inode)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
|
2011-07-25 11:21:59 +08:00
|
|
|
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
vfs: change inode times to use struct timespec64
struct timespec is not y2038 safe. Transition vfs to use
y2038 safe struct timespec64 instead.
The change was made with the help of the following cocinelle
script. This catches about 80% of the changes.
All the header file and logic changes are included in the
first 5 rules. The rest are trivial substitutions.
I avoid changing any of the function signatures or any other
filesystem specific data structures to keep the patch simple
for review.
The script can be a little shorter by combining different cases.
But, this version was sufficient for my usecase.
virtual patch
@ depends on patch @
identifier now;
@@
- struct timespec
+ struct timespec64
current_time ( ... )
{
- struct timespec now = current_kernel_time();
+ struct timespec64 now = current_kernel_time64();
...
- return timespec_trunc(
+ return timespec64_trunc(
... );
}
@ depends on patch @
identifier xtime;
@@
struct \( iattr \| inode \| kstat \) {
...
- struct timespec xtime;
+ struct timespec64 xtime;
...
}
@ depends on patch @
identifier t;
@@
struct inode_operations {
...
int (*update_time) (...,
- struct timespec t,
+ struct timespec64 t,
...);
...
}
@ depends on patch @
identifier t;
identifier fn_update_time =~ "update_time$";
@@
fn_update_time (...,
- struct timespec *t,
+ struct timespec64 *t,
...) { ... }
@ depends on patch @
identifier t;
@@
lease_get_mtime( ... ,
- struct timespec *t
+ struct timespec64 *t
) { ... }
@te depends on patch forall@
identifier ts;
local idexpression struct inode *inode_node;
identifier i_xtime =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
identifier fn_update_time =~ "update_time$";
identifier fn;
expression e, E3;
local idexpression struct inode *node1;
local idexpression struct inode *node2;
local idexpression struct iattr *attr1;
local idexpression struct iattr *attr2;
local idexpression struct iattr attr;
identifier i_xtime1 =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier i_xtime2 =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime1 =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime2 =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
@@
(
(
- struct timespec ts;
+ struct timespec64 ts;
|
- struct timespec ts = current_time(inode_node);
+ struct timespec64 ts = current_time(inode_node);
)
<+... when != ts
(
- timespec_equal(&inode_node->i_xtime, &ts)
+ timespec64_equal(&inode_node->i_xtime, &ts)
|
- timespec_equal(&ts, &inode_node->i_xtime)
+ timespec64_equal(&ts, &inode_node->i_xtime)
|
- timespec_compare(&inode_node->i_xtime, &ts)
+ timespec64_compare(&inode_node->i_xtime, &ts)
|
- timespec_compare(&ts, &inode_node->i_xtime)
+ timespec64_compare(&ts, &inode_node->i_xtime)
|
ts = current_time(e)
|
fn_update_time(..., &ts,...)
|
inode_node->i_xtime = ts
|
node1->i_xtime = ts
|
ts = inode_node->i_xtime
|
<+... attr1->ia_xtime ...+> = ts
|
ts = attr1->ia_xtime
|
ts.tv_sec
|
ts.tv_nsec
|
btrfs_set_stack_timespec_sec(..., ts.tv_sec)
|
btrfs_set_stack_timespec_nsec(..., ts.tv_nsec)
|
- ts = timespec64_to_timespec(
+ ts =
...
-)
|
- ts = ktime_to_timespec(
+ ts = ktime_to_timespec64(
...)
|
- ts = E3
+ ts = timespec_to_timespec64(E3)
|
- ktime_get_real_ts(&ts)
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&ts)
|
fn(...,
- ts
+ timespec64_to_timespec(ts)
,...)
)
...+>
(
<... when != ts
- return ts;
+ return timespec64_to_timespec(ts);
...>
)
|
- timespec_equal(&node1->i_xtime1, &node2->i_xtime2)
+ timespec64_equal(&node1->i_xtime2, &node2->i_xtime2)
|
- timespec_equal(&node1->i_xtime1, &attr2->ia_xtime2)
+ timespec64_equal(&node1->i_xtime2, &attr2->ia_xtime2)
|
- timespec_compare(&node1->i_xtime1, &node2->i_xtime2)
+ timespec64_compare(&node1->i_xtime1, &node2->i_xtime2)
|
node1->i_xtime1 =
- timespec_trunc(attr1->ia_xtime1,
+ timespec64_trunc(attr1->ia_xtime1,
...)
|
- attr1->ia_xtime1 = timespec_trunc(attr2->ia_xtime2,
+ attr1->ia_xtime1 = timespec64_trunc(attr2->ia_xtime2,
...)
|
- ktime_get_real_ts(&attr1->ia_xtime1)
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&attr1->ia_xtime1)
|
- ktime_get_real_ts(&attr.ia_xtime1)
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&attr.ia_xtime1)
)
@ depends on patch @
struct inode *node;
struct iattr *attr;
identifier fn;
identifier i_xtime =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
expression e;
@@
(
- fn(node->i_xtime);
+ fn(timespec64_to_timespec(node->i_xtime));
|
fn(...,
- node->i_xtime);
+ timespec64_to_timespec(node->i_xtime));
|
- e = fn(attr->ia_xtime);
+ e = fn(timespec64_to_timespec(attr->ia_xtime));
)
@ depends on patch forall @
struct inode *node;
struct iattr *attr;
identifier i_xtime =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
identifier fn;
@@
{
+ struct timespec ts;
<+...
(
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(node->i_xtime);
fn (...,
- &node->i_xtime,
+ &ts,
...);
|
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(attr->ia_xtime);
fn (...,
- &attr->ia_xtime,
+ &ts,
...);
)
...+>
}
@ depends on patch forall @
struct inode *node;
struct iattr *attr;
struct kstat *stat;
identifier ia_xtime =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
identifier i_xtime =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier xtime =~ "^[acm]time$";
identifier fn, ret;
@@
{
+ struct timespec ts;
<+...
(
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(node->i_xtime);
ret = fn (...,
- &node->i_xtime,
+ &ts,
...);
|
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(node->i_xtime);
ret = fn (...,
- &node->i_xtime);
+ &ts);
|
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(attr->ia_xtime);
ret = fn (...,
- &attr->ia_xtime,
+ &ts,
...);
|
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(attr->ia_xtime);
ret = fn (...,
- &attr->ia_xtime);
+ &ts);
|
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(stat->xtime);
ret = fn (...,
- &stat->xtime);
+ &ts);
)
...+>
}
@ depends on patch @
struct inode *node;
struct inode *node2;
identifier i_xtime1 =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier i_xtime2 =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier i_xtime3 =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
struct iattr *attrp;
struct iattr *attrp2;
struct iattr attr ;
identifier ia_xtime1 =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime2 =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
struct kstat *stat;
struct kstat stat1;
struct timespec64 ts;
identifier xtime =~ "^[acmb]time$";
expression e;
@@
(
( node->i_xtime2 \| attrp->ia_xtime2 \| attr.ia_xtime2 \) = node->i_xtime1 ;
|
node->i_xtime2 = \( node2->i_xtime1 \| timespec64_trunc(...) \);
|
node->i_xtime2 = node->i_xtime1 = node->i_xtime3 = \(ts \| current_time(...) \);
|
node->i_xtime1 = node->i_xtime3 = \(ts \| current_time(...) \);
|
stat->xtime = node2->i_xtime1;
|
stat1.xtime = node2->i_xtime1;
|
( node->i_xtime2 \| attrp->ia_xtime2 \) = attrp->ia_xtime1 ;
|
( attrp->ia_xtime1 \| attr.ia_xtime1 \) = attrp2->ia_xtime2;
|
- e = node->i_xtime1;
+ e = timespec64_to_timespec( node->i_xtime1 );
|
- e = attrp->ia_xtime1;
+ e = timespec64_to_timespec( attrp->ia_xtime1 );
|
node->i_xtime1 = current_time(...);
|
node->i_xtime2 = node->i_xtime1 = node->i_xtime3 =
- e;
+ timespec_to_timespec64(e);
|
node->i_xtime1 = node->i_xtime3 =
- e;
+ timespec_to_timespec64(e);
|
- node->i_xtime1 = e;
+ node->i_xtime1 = timespec_to_timespec64(e);
)
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <anton@tuxera.com>
Cc: <balbi@kernel.org>
Cc: <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Cc: <jack@suse.com>
Cc: <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu>
Cc: <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <nico@linaro.org>
Cc: <reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <richard@nod.at>
Cc: <sage@redhat.com>
Cc: <sfrench@samba.org>
Cc: <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-05-09 10:36:02 +08:00
|
|
|
struct timespec64 now;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-23 04:40:57 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(inode));
|
2012-06-20 07:55:58 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-13 19:49:22 +08:00
|
|
|
error = may_setattr(idmap, inode, ia_valid);
|
2021-07-28 20:47:33 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
2016-09-16 18:44:20 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-05-28 23:25:51 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
|
attr: block mode changes of symlinks
Changing the mode of symlinks is meaningless as the vfs doesn't take the
mode of a symlink into account during path lookup permission checking.
However, the vfs doesn't block mode changes on symlinks. This however,
has lead to an untenable mess roughly classifiable into the following
two categories:
(1) Filesystems that don't implement a i_op->setattr() for symlinks.
Such filesystems may or may not know that without i_op->setattr()
defined, notify_change() falls back to simple_setattr() causing the
inode's mode in the inode cache to be changed.
That's a generic issue as this will affect all non-size changing
inode attributes including ownership changes.
Example: afs
(2) Filesystems that fail with EOPNOTSUPP but change the mode of the
symlink nonetheless.
Some filesystems will happily update the mode of a symlink but still
return EOPNOTSUPP. This is the biggest source of confusion for
userspace.
The EOPNOTSUPP in this case comes from POSIX ACLs. Specifically it
comes from filesystems that call posix_acl_chmod(), e.g., btrfs via
if (!err && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
err = posix_acl_chmod(idmap, dentry, inode->i_mode);
Filesystems including btrfs don't implement i_op->set_acl() so
posix_acl_chmod() will report EOPNOTSUPP.
When posix_acl_chmod() is called, most filesystems will have
finished updating the inode.
Perversely, this has the consequences that this behavior may depend
on two kconfig options and mount options:
* CONFIG_POSIX_ACL={y,n}
* CONFIG_${FSTYPE}_POSIX_ACL={y,n}
* Opt_acl, Opt_noacl
Example: btrfs, ext4, xfs
The only way to change the mode on a symlink currently involves abusing
an O_PATH file descriptor in the following manner:
fd = openat(-1, "/path/to/link", O_CLOEXEC | O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW);
char path[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
chmod(path, 0000);
But for most major filesystems with POSIX ACL support such as btrfs,
ext4, ceph, tmpfs, xfs and others this will fail with EOPNOTSUPP with
the mode still updated due to the aforementioned posix_acl_chmod()
nonsense.
So, given that for all major filesystems this would fail with EOPNOTSUPP
and that both glibc (cf. [1]) and musl (cf. [2]) outright block mode
changes on symlinks we should just try and block mode changes on
symlinks directly in the vfs and have a clean break with this nonsense.
If this causes any regressions, we do the next best thing and fix up all
filesystems that do return EOPNOTSUPP with the mode updated to not call
posix_acl_chmod() on symlinks.
But as usual, let's try the clean cut solution first. It's a simple
patch that can be easily reverted. Not marking this for backport as I'll
do that manually if we're reasonably sure that this works and there are
no strong objections.
We could block this in chmod_common() but it's more appropriate to do it
notify_change() as it will also mean that we catch filesystems that
change symlink permissions explicitly or accidently.
Similar proposals were floated in the past as in [3] and [4] and again
recently in [5]. There's also a couple of bugs about this inconsistency
as in [6] and [7].
Link: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/fchmodat.c;h=99527a3727e44cb8661ee1f743068f108ec93979;hb=HEAD [1]
Link: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/stat/fchmodat.c [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20200911065733.GA31579@infradead.org [3]
Link: https://sourceware.org/legacy-ml/libc-alpha/2020-02/msg00518.html [4]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87lefmbppo.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com [5]
Link: https://sourceware.org/legacy-ml/libc-alpha/2020-02/msg00467.html [6]
Link: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14578#c17 [7]
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # please backport to all LTSes but not before v6.6-rc2 is tagged
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Suggested-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20230712-vfs-chmod-symlinks-v2-1-08cfb92b61dd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-07-13 02:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Don't allow changing the mode of symlinks:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* (1) The vfs doesn't take the mode of symlinks into account
|
|
|
|
* during permission checking.
|
|
|
|
* (2) This has never worked correctly. Most major filesystems
|
|
|
|
* did return EOPNOTSUPP due to interactions with POSIX ACLs
|
|
|
|
* but did still updated the mode of the symlink.
|
|
|
|
* This inconsistency led system call wrapper providers such
|
|
|
|
* as libc to block changing the mode of symlinks with
|
|
|
|
* EOPNOTSUPP already.
|
|
|
|
* (3) To even do this in the first place one would have to use
|
|
|
|
* specific file descriptors and quite some effort.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
|
|
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-28 23:25:51 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Flag setting protected by i_mutex */
|
attr: block mode changes of symlinks
Changing the mode of symlinks is meaningless as the vfs doesn't take the
mode of a symlink into account during path lookup permission checking.
However, the vfs doesn't block mode changes on symlinks. This however,
has lead to an untenable mess roughly classifiable into the following
two categories:
(1) Filesystems that don't implement a i_op->setattr() for symlinks.
Such filesystems may or may not know that without i_op->setattr()
defined, notify_change() falls back to simple_setattr() causing the
inode's mode in the inode cache to be changed.
That's a generic issue as this will affect all non-size changing
inode attributes including ownership changes.
Example: afs
(2) Filesystems that fail with EOPNOTSUPP but change the mode of the
symlink nonetheless.
Some filesystems will happily update the mode of a symlink but still
return EOPNOTSUPP. This is the biggest source of confusion for
userspace.
The EOPNOTSUPP in this case comes from POSIX ACLs. Specifically it
comes from filesystems that call posix_acl_chmod(), e.g., btrfs via
if (!err && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
err = posix_acl_chmod(idmap, dentry, inode->i_mode);
Filesystems including btrfs don't implement i_op->set_acl() so
posix_acl_chmod() will report EOPNOTSUPP.
When posix_acl_chmod() is called, most filesystems will have
finished updating the inode.
Perversely, this has the consequences that this behavior may depend
on two kconfig options and mount options:
* CONFIG_POSIX_ACL={y,n}
* CONFIG_${FSTYPE}_POSIX_ACL={y,n}
* Opt_acl, Opt_noacl
Example: btrfs, ext4, xfs
The only way to change the mode on a symlink currently involves abusing
an O_PATH file descriptor in the following manner:
fd = openat(-1, "/path/to/link", O_CLOEXEC | O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW);
char path[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
chmod(path, 0000);
But for most major filesystems with POSIX ACL support such as btrfs,
ext4, ceph, tmpfs, xfs and others this will fail with EOPNOTSUPP with
the mode still updated due to the aforementioned posix_acl_chmod()
nonsense.
So, given that for all major filesystems this would fail with EOPNOTSUPP
and that both glibc (cf. [1]) and musl (cf. [2]) outright block mode
changes on symlinks we should just try and block mode changes on
symlinks directly in the vfs and have a clean break with this nonsense.
If this causes any regressions, we do the next best thing and fix up all
filesystems that do return EOPNOTSUPP with the mode updated to not call
posix_acl_chmod() on symlinks.
But as usual, let's try the clean cut solution first. It's a simple
patch that can be easily reverted. Not marking this for backport as I'll
do that manually if we're reasonably sure that this works and there are
no strong objections.
We could block this in chmod_common() but it's more appropriate to do it
notify_change() as it will also mean that we catch filesystems that
change symlink permissions explicitly or accidently.
Similar proposals were floated in the past as in [3] and [4] and again
recently in [5]. There's also a couple of bugs about this inconsistency
as in [6] and [7].
Link: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/fchmodat.c;h=99527a3727e44cb8661ee1f743068f108ec93979;hb=HEAD [1]
Link: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/stat/fchmodat.c [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20200911065733.GA31579@infradead.org [3]
Link: https://sourceware.org/legacy-ml/libc-alpha/2020-02/msg00518.html [4]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87lefmbppo.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com [5]
Link: https://sourceware.org/legacy-ml/libc-alpha/2020-02/msg00467.html [6]
Link: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14578#c17 [7]
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # please backport to all LTSes but not before v6.6-rc2 is tagged
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Suggested-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20230712-vfs-chmod-symlinks-v2-1-08cfb92b61dd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-07-13 02:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
if (is_sxid(attr->ia_mode))
|
2011-05-28 23:25:51 +08:00
|
|
|
inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-09-14 22:48:06 +08:00
|
|
|
now = current_time(inode);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
attr->ia_ctime = now;
|
|
|
|
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME_SET))
|
|
|
|
attr->ia_atime = now;
|
2019-11-25 03:31:45 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
attr->ia_atime = timestamp_truncate(attr->ia_atime, inode);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET))
|
|
|
|
attr->ia_mtime = now;
|
2019-11-25 03:31:45 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
attr->ia_mtime = timestamp_truncate(attr->ia_mtime, inode);
|
|
|
|
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:31:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
|
|
|
|
error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
|
2016-05-26 23:21:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:31:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
2016-05-26 23:21:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:31:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
VFS: make notify_change pass ATTR_KILL_S*ID to setattr operations
When an unprivileged process attempts to modify a file that has the setuid or
setgid bits set, the VFS will attempt to clear these bits. The VFS will set
the ATTR_KILL_SUID or ATTR_KILL_SGID bits in the ia_valid mask, and then call
notify_change to clear these bits and set the mode accordingly.
With a networked filesystem (NFS and CIFS in particular but likely others),
the client machine or process may not have credentials that allow for setting
the mode. In some situations, this can lead to file corruption, an operation
failing outright because the setattr fails, or to races that lead to a mode
change being reverted.
In this situation, we'd like to just leave the handling of this to the server
and ignore these bits. The problem is that by the time the setattr op is
called, the VFS has already reinterpreted the ATTR_KILL_* bits into a mode
change. The setattr operation has no way to know its intent.
The following patch fixes this by making notify_change no longer clear the
ATTR_KILL_SUID and ATTR_KILL_SGID bits in the ia_valid before handing it off
to the setattr inode op. setattr can then check for the presence of these
bits, and if they're set it can assume that the mode change was only for the
purposes of clearing these bits.
This means that we now have an implicit assumption that notify_change is never
called with ATTR_MODE and either ATTR_KILL_S*ID bit set. Nothing currently
enforces that, so this patch also adds a BUG() if that occurs.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: "Vladimir V. Saveliev" <vs@namesys.com>
Cc: Josef 'Jeff' Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-18 18:05:20 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We now pass ATTR_KILL_S*ID to the lower level setattr function so
|
|
|
|
* that the function has the ability to reinterpret a mode change
|
|
|
|
* that's due to these bits. This adds an implicit restriction that
|
|
|
|
* no function will ever call notify_change with both ATTR_MODE and
|
|
|
|
* ATTR_KILL_S*ID set.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID)) &&
|
|
|
|
(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE))
|
|
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SUID) {
|
|
|
|
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
|
VFS: make notify_change pass ATTR_KILL_S*ID to setattr operations
When an unprivileged process attempts to modify a file that has the setuid or
setgid bits set, the VFS will attempt to clear these bits. The VFS will set
the ATTR_KILL_SUID or ATTR_KILL_SGID bits in the ia_valid mask, and then call
notify_change to clear these bits and set the mode accordingly.
With a networked filesystem (NFS and CIFS in particular but likely others),
the client machine or process may not have credentials that allow for setting
the mode. In some situations, this can lead to file corruption, an operation
failing outright because the setattr fails, or to races that lead to a mode
change being reverted.
In this situation, we'd like to just leave the handling of this to the server
and ignore these bits. The problem is that by the time the setattr op is
called, the VFS has already reinterpreted the ATTR_KILL_* bits into a mode
change. The setattr operation has no way to know its intent.
The following patch fixes this by making notify_change no longer clear the
ATTR_KILL_SUID and ATTR_KILL_SGID bits in the ia_valid before handing it off
to the setattr inode op. setattr can then check for the presence of these
bits, and if they're set it can assume that the mode change was only for the
purposes of clearing these bits.
This means that we now have an implicit assumption that notify_change is never
called with ATTR_MODE and either ATTR_KILL_S*ID bit set. Nothing currently
enforces that, so this patch also adds a BUG() if that occurs.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: "Vladimir V. Saveliev" <vs@namesys.com>
Cc: Josef 'Jeff' Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-18 18:05:20 +08:00
|
|
|
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE;
|
|
|
|
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SGID) {
|
attr: use consistent sgid stripping checks
Currently setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid()
helper is inconsistent with other parts of the vfs. Specifically, it only
raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the
inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the
inode although we require this already in setattr_prepare() and
setattr_copy() and so all filesystem implement this requirement implicitly
because they have to use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway.
But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs in
xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686,
generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping works
correctly when performing various write-like operations as an unprivileged
user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.):
echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb"
setup_testfile
chmod a+rws $junk_file
commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k
The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the file has
the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP set. On a
regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> setattr_copy()
In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised
unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set.
But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the file
is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for
ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised.
So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE. Now notify_change() sees that
ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does:
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely
update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID.
Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which will
end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will hit:
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group of the
inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped.
But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised which
has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits are stripped
even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't in the caller's
groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode.
If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and the bug
shows up more clearly. When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from
ovl_fallocate()'s call to file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and
ATTR_KILL_SGID might be raised but because the check in notify_change() is
questioning the ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be
stripped the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> ovl_fallocate()
-> file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> ovl_setattr()
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> ovl_do_notify_change()
-> notify_change()
// GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill;
-> notify_change()
The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s
should_remove_suid() helper to perform the same checks as we already
require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have notify_change()
not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't make any sense in the
first place because the caller must calculate the flags via
should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise ATTR_KILL_SGID.
While we're at it we move should_remove_suid() from inode.c to attr.c
where it belongs with the rest of the iattr helpers. Especially since it
returns ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID flags. We also rename it to
setattr_should_drop_suidgid() to better reflect that it indicates both
setuid and setgid bit removal and also that it returns attr flags.
Running xfstests with this doesn't report any regressions. We should really
try and use consistent checks.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-10-17 23:06:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if (mode & S_ISGID) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
|
|
|
|
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE;
|
|
|
|
attr->ia_mode = inode->i_mode;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
VFS: make notify_change pass ATTR_KILL_S*ID to setattr operations
When an unprivileged process attempts to modify a file that has the setuid or
setgid bits set, the VFS will attempt to clear these bits. The VFS will set
the ATTR_KILL_SUID or ATTR_KILL_SGID bits in the ia_valid mask, and then call
notify_change to clear these bits and set the mode accordingly.
With a networked filesystem (NFS and CIFS in particular but likely others),
the client machine or process may not have credentials that allow for setting
the mode. In some situations, this can lead to file corruption, an operation
failing outright because the setattr fails, or to races that lead to a mode
change being reverted.
In this situation, we'd like to just leave the handling of this to the server
and ignore these bits. The problem is that by the time the setattr op is
called, the VFS has already reinterpreted the ATTR_KILL_* bits into a mode
change. The setattr operation has no way to know its intent.
The following patch fixes this by making notify_change no longer clear the
ATTR_KILL_SUID and ATTR_KILL_SGID bits in the ia_valid before handing it off
to the setattr inode op. setattr can then check for the presence of these
bits, and if they're set it can assume that the mode change was only for the
purposes of clearing these bits.
This means that we now have an implicit assumption that notify_change is never
called with ATTR_MODE and either ATTR_KILL_S*ID bit set. Nothing currently
enforces that, so this patch also adds a BUG() if that occurs.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: "Vladimir V. Saveliev" <vs@namesys.com>
Cc: Josef 'Jeff' Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-18 18:05:20 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(attr->ia_valid & ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID)))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-27 03:36:25 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Verify that uid/gid changes are valid in the target
|
|
|
|
* namespace of the superblock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID &&
|
2023-01-13 19:49:32 +08:00
|
|
|
!vfsuid_has_fsmapping(idmap, inode->i_sb->s_user_ns,
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
attr->ia_vfsuid))
|
2016-04-27 03:36:25 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
|
|
if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID &&
|
2023-01-13 19:49:32 +08:00
|
|
|
!vfsgid_has_fsmapping(idmap, inode->i_sb->s_user_ns,
|
2022-06-21 22:14:54 +08:00
|
|
|
attr->ia_vfsgid))
|
2016-04-27 03:36:25 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-30 03:54:46 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Don't allow modifications of files with invalid uids or
|
|
|
|
* gids unless those uids & gids are being made valid.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
|
2023-01-13 19:49:30 +08:00
|
|
|
!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode)))
|
2016-06-30 03:54:46 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
2021-01-21 21:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
|
2023-01-13 19:49:30 +08:00
|
|
|
!vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode)))
|
2016-06-30 03:54:46 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
error = security_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
|
2011-09-21 05:19:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode);
|
2008-07-30 20:06:22 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-06-04 17:30:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (inode->i_op->setattr)
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
error = inode->i_op->setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
|
2010-06-04 17:30:01 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2023-01-13 19:49:11 +08:00
|
|
|
error = simple_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-03-10 03:39:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!error) {
|
[PATCH] inotify
inotify is intended to correct the deficiencies of dnotify, particularly
its inability to scale and its terrible user interface:
* dnotify requires the opening of one fd per each directory
that you intend to watch. This quickly results in too many
open files and pins removable media, preventing unmount.
* dnotify is directory-based. You only learn about changes to
directories. Sure, a change to a file in a directory affects
the directory, but you are then forced to keep a cache of
stat structures.
* dnotify's interface to user-space is awful. Signals?
inotify provides a more usable, simple, powerful solution to file change
notification:
* inotify's interface is a system call that returns a fd, not SIGIO.
You get a single fd, which is select()-able.
* inotify has an event that says "the filesystem that the item
you were watching is on was unmounted."
* inotify can watch directories or files.
Inotify is currently used by Beagle (a desktop search infrastructure),
Gamin (a FAM replacement), and other projects.
See Documentation/filesystems/inotify.txt.
Signed-off-by: Robert Love <rml@novell.com>
Cc: John McCutchan <ttb@tentacle.dhs.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-07-13 05:06:03 +08:00
|
|
|
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
|
2023-01-13 19:49:23 +08:00
|
|
|
ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry);
|
2011-03-10 03:39:57 +08:00
|
|
|
evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
|
|
|
|
}
|
[PATCH] inotify
inotify is intended to correct the deficiencies of dnotify, particularly
its inability to scale and its terrible user interface:
* dnotify requires the opening of one fd per each directory
that you intend to watch. This quickly results in too many
open files and pins removable media, preventing unmount.
* dnotify is directory-based. You only learn about changes to
directories. Sure, a change to a file in a directory affects
the directory, but you are then forced to keep a cache of
stat structures.
* dnotify's interface to user-space is awful. Signals?
inotify provides a more usable, simple, powerful solution to file change
notification:
* inotify's interface is a system call that returns a fd, not SIGIO.
You get a single fd, which is select()-able.
* inotify has an event that says "the filesystem that the item
you were watching is on was unmounted."
* inotify can watch directories or files.
Inotify is currently used by Beagle (a desktop search infrastructure),
Gamin (a FAM replacement), and other projects.
See Documentation/filesystems/inotify.txt.
Signed-off-by: Robert Love <rml@novell.com>
Cc: John McCutchan <ttb@tentacle.dhs.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-07-13 05:06:03 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(notify_change);
|