OpenCloudOS-Kernel/lib/digsig.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation
* Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation
*
* Author:
* Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
* <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
*
* File: sign.c
* implements signature (RSA) verification
* pkcs decoding is based on LibTomCrypt code
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <linux/mpi.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
static struct crypto_shash *shash;
static const char *pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(const unsigned char *msg,
unsigned long msglen,
unsigned long modulus_bitlen,
unsigned long *outlen)
{
unsigned long modulus_len, ps_len, i;
modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0);
/* test message size */
if ((msglen > modulus_len) || (modulus_len < 11))
return NULL;
/* separate encoded message */
if (msg[0] != 0x00 || msg[1] != 0x01)
return NULL;
for (i = 2; i < modulus_len - 1; i++)
if (msg[i] != 0xFF)
break;
/* separator check */
if (msg[i] != 0)
/* There was no octet with hexadecimal value 0x00
to separate ps from m. */
return NULL;
ps_len = i - 2;
*outlen = (msglen - (2 + ps_len + 1));
return msg + 2 + ps_len + 1;
}
/*
* RSA Signature verification with public key
*/
static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key,
const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *h, int hlen)
{
int err = -EINVAL;
unsigned long len;
unsigned long mlen, mblen;
unsigned nret, l;
int head, i;
unsigned char *out1 = NULL;
const char *m;
MPI in = NULL, res = NULL, pkey[2];
uint8_t *p, *datap;
const uint8_t *endp;
const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
struct pubkey_hdr *pkh;
down_read(&key->sem);
KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in two different, incompatible ways: (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used to protect the key. (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is used to protect the key and the may be being modified. Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce: (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked: dereference_key_locked() user_key_payload_locked() (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock: dereference_key_rcu() user_key_payload_rcu() This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W ------------------------------- ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable) lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190 nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4] nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4] nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc] call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc] __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc] rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc] nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4] _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4] nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4] nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4] nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4] nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4] nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 do_mount+0x254/0xf70 SyS_mount+0x94/0x100 system_call+0x38/0xe0 Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-01 23:11:23 +08:00
ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
if (!ukp) {
/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
err = -EKEYREVOKED;
goto err1;
}
if (ukp->datalen < sizeof(*pkh))
goto err1;
pkh = (struct pubkey_hdr *)ukp->data;
if (pkh->version != 1)
goto err1;
if (pkh->algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA)
goto err1;
if (pkh->nmpi != 2)
goto err1;
datap = pkh->mpi;
endp = ukp->data + ukp->datalen;
for (i = 0; i < pkh->nmpi; i++) {
unsigned int remaining = endp - datap;
pkey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(datap, &remaining);
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if (IS_ERR(pkey[i])) {
err = PTR_ERR(pkey[i]);
goto err;
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}
datap += remaining;
}
mblen = mpi_get_nbits(pkey[0]);
mlen = DIV_ROUND_UP(mblen, 8);
if (mlen == 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
err = -ENOMEM;
out1 = kzalloc(mlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!out1)
goto err;
nret = siglen;
in = mpi_read_from_buffer(sig, &nret);
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if (IS_ERR(in)) {
err = PTR_ERR(in);
goto err;
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}
res = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(in) * 2);
if (!res)
goto err;
err = mpi_powm(res, in, pkey[1], pkey[0]);
if (err)
goto err;
if (mpi_get_nlimbs(res) * BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB > mlen) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
p = mpi_get_buffer(res, &l, NULL);
if (!p) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
len = mlen;
head = len - l;
memset(out1, 0, head);
memcpy(out1 + head, p, l);
kfree(p);
m = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(out1, len, mblen, &len);
if (!m || len != hlen || memcmp(m, h, hlen))
err = -EINVAL;
err:
mpi_free(in);
mpi_free(res);
kfree(out1);
while (--i >= 0)
mpi_free(pkey[i]);
err1:
up_read(&key->sem);
return err;
}
/**
* digsig_verify() - digital signature verification with public key
* @keyring: keyring to search key in
* @sig: digital signature
* @siglen: length of the signature
* @data: data
* @datalen: length of the data
*
* Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
*
* Verifies data integrity against digital signature.
* Currently only RSA is supported.
* Normally hash of the content is used as a data for this function.
*
*/
int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *data, int datalen)
{
int err = -ENOMEM;
struct signature_hdr *sh = (struct signature_hdr *)sig;
struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
struct key *key;
char name[20];
if (siglen < sizeof(*sh) + 2)
return -EINVAL;
if (sh->algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA)
return -ENOTSUPP;
sprintf(name, "%llX", __be64_to_cpup((uint64_t *)sh->keyid));
if (keyring) {
/* search in specific keyring */
key_ref_t kref;
kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1UL),
&key_type_user, name, true);
if (IS_ERR(kref))
key = ERR_CAST(kref);
else
key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref);
} else {
key = request_key(&key_type_user, name, NULL);
}
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
pr_err("key not found, id: %s\n", name);
return PTR_ERR(key);
}
desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(shash),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
goto err;
desc->tfm = shash;
crypto_shash_init(desc);
crypto_shash_update(desc, data, datalen);
crypto_shash_update(desc, sig, sizeof(*sh));
crypto_shash_final(desc, hash);
kfree(desc);
/* pass signature mpis address */
err = digsig_verify_rsa(key, sig + sizeof(*sh), siglen - sizeof(*sh),
hash, sizeof(hash));
err:
key_put(key);
return err ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(digsig_verify);
static int __init digsig_init(void)
{
shash = crypto_alloc_shash("sha1", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(shash)) {
pr_err("shash allocation failed\n");
return PTR_ERR(shash);
}
return 0;
}
static void __exit digsig_cleanup(void)
{
crypto_free_shash(shash);
}
module_init(digsig_init);
module_exit(digsig_cleanup);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");