OpenCloudOS-Kernel/fs/sysfs/mount.c

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/*
* fs/sysfs/symlink.c - operations for initializing and mounting sysfs
*
* Copyright (c) 2001-3 Patrick Mochel
* Copyright (c) 2007 SUSE Linux Products GmbH
* Copyright (c) 2007 Tejun Heo <teheo@suse.de>
*
* This file is released under the GPLv2.
*
* Please see Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.txt for more information.
*/
#define DEBUG
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include "sysfs.h"
sysfs, kernfs: implement kernfs_create/destroy_root() There currently is single kernfs hierarchy in the whole system which is used for sysfs. kernfs needs to support multiple hierarchies to allow other users. This patch introduces struct kernfs_root which serves as the root of each kernfs hierarchy and implements kernfs_create/destroy_root(). * Each kernfs_root is associated with a root sd (sysfs_dentry). The root is freed when the root sd is released and kernfs_destory_root() simply invokes kernfs_remove() on the root sd. sysfs_remove_one() is updated to handle release of the root sd. Note that ps_iattr update in sysfs_remove_one() is trivially updated for readability. * Root sd's are now dynamically allocated using sysfs_new_dirent(). Update sysfs_alloc_ino() so that it gives out ino from 1 so that the root sd still gets ino 1. * While kernfs currently only points to the root sd, it'll soon grow fields which are specific to each hierarchy. As determining a given sd's root will be necessary, sd->s_dir.root is added. This backlink fits better as a separate field in sd; however, sd->s_dir is inside union with space to spare, so use it to save space and provide kernfs_root() accessor to determine the root sd. * As hierarchies may be destroyed now, each mount needs to hold onto the hierarchy it's attached to. Update sysfs_fill_super() and sysfs_kill_sb() so that they get and put the kernfs_root respectively. * sysfs_root is replaced with kernfs_root which is dynamically created by invoking kernfs_create_root() from sysfs_init(). This patch doesn't introduce any visible behavior changes. v2: kernfs_create_root() forgot to set @sd->priv. Fixed. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-11-29 03:54:40 +08:00
static struct kernfs_root *sysfs_root;
struct kernfs_node *sysfs_root_kn;
static struct dentry *sysfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
struct dentry *root;
void *ns;
bool new_sb;
if (!(flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)) {
sysfs: drop kobj_ns_type handling, take #2 The way namespace tags are implemented in sysfs is more complicated than necessary. As each tag is a pointer value and required to be non-NULL under a namespace enabled parent, there's no need to record separately what type each tag is. If multiple namespace types are needed, which currently aren't, we can simply compare the tag to a set of allowed tags in the superblock assuming that the tags, being pointers, won't have the same value across multiple types. This patch rips out kobj_ns_type handling from sysfs. sysfs now has an enable switch to turn on namespace under a node. If enabled, all children are required to have non-NULL namespace tags and filtered against the super_block's tag. kobject namespace determination is now performed in lib/kobject.c::create_dir() making sysfs_read_ns_type() unnecessary. The sanity checks are also moved. create_dir() is restructured to ease such addition. This removes most kobject namespace knowledge from sysfs proper which will enable proper separation and layering of sysfs. This is the second try. The first one was cb26a311578e ("sysfs: drop kobj_ns_type handling") which tried to automatically enable namespace if there are children with non-NULL namespace tags; however, it was broken for symlinks as they should inherit the target's tag iff namespace is enabled in the parent. This led to namespace filtering enabled incorrectly for wireless net class devices through phy80211 symlinks and thus network configuration failure. a1212d278c05 ("Revert "sysfs: drop kobj_ns_type handling"") reverted the commit. This shouldn't introduce any behavior changes, for real. v2: Dummy implementation of sysfs_enable_ns() for !CONFIG_SYSFS was missing and caused build failure. Reported by kbuild test robot. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-11-24 07:01:46 +08:00
if (!kobj_ns_current_may_mount(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
}
ns = kobj_ns_grab_current(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET);
root = kernfs_mount_ns(fs_type, flags, sysfs_root,
SYSFS_MAGIC, &new_sb, ns);
if (IS_ERR(root) || !new_sb)
kobj_ns_drop(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET, ns);
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs. Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs. Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems. Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and enforce that flag. Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the execute bit is cleared. The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects. This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs. Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions). Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-06-30 03:42:03 +08:00
else if (new_sb)
root->d_sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE;
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs. Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs. Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems. Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and enforce that flag. Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the execute bit is cleared. The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects. This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs. Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions). Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-06-30 03:42:03 +08:00
return root;
}
static void sysfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
{
void *ns = (void *)kernfs_super_ns(sb);
kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
kobj_ns_drop(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET, ns);
}
static struct file_system_type sysfs_fs_type = {
.name = "sysfs",
.mount = sysfs_mount,
.kill_sb = sysfs_kill_sb,
.fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
};
int __init sysfs_init(void)
{
int err;
2014-05-13 01:56:27 +08:00
sysfs_root = kernfs_create_root(NULL, KERNFS_ROOT_EXTRA_OPEN_PERM_CHECK,
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(sysfs_root))
return PTR_ERR(sysfs_root);
sysfs_root_kn = sysfs_root->kn;
sysfs, kernfs: implement kernfs_create/destroy_root() There currently is single kernfs hierarchy in the whole system which is used for sysfs. kernfs needs to support multiple hierarchies to allow other users. This patch introduces struct kernfs_root which serves as the root of each kernfs hierarchy and implements kernfs_create/destroy_root(). * Each kernfs_root is associated with a root sd (sysfs_dentry). The root is freed when the root sd is released and kernfs_destory_root() simply invokes kernfs_remove() on the root sd. sysfs_remove_one() is updated to handle release of the root sd. Note that ps_iattr update in sysfs_remove_one() is trivially updated for readability. * Root sd's are now dynamically allocated using sysfs_new_dirent(). Update sysfs_alloc_ino() so that it gives out ino from 1 so that the root sd still gets ino 1. * While kernfs currently only points to the root sd, it'll soon grow fields which are specific to each hierarchy. As determining a given sd's root will be necessary, sd->s_dir.root is added. This backlink fits better as a separate field in sd; however, sd->s_dir is inside union with space to spare, so use it to save space and provide kernfs_root() accessor to determine the root sd. * As hierarchies may be destroyed now, each mount needs to hold onto the hierarchy it's attached to. Update sysfs_fill_super() and sysfs_kill_sb() so that they get and put the kernfs_root respectively. * sysfs_root is replaced with kernfs_root which is dynamically created by invoking kernfs_create_root() from sysfs_init(). This patch doesn't introduce any visible behavior changes. v2: kernfs_create_root() forgot to set @sd->priv. Fixed. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-11-29 03:54:40 +08:00
err = register_filesystem(&sysfs_fs_type);
if (err) {
kernfs_destroy_root(sysfs_root);
return err;
}
return 0;
}