2022-05-18 21:23:45 +08:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0-only OR BSD-3-Clause) */
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/* Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
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siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF
SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a
cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast,
and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a
general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG
chaining.
For the first usage:
There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an
attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the
same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is
a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently
hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of
rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant
as a replacement for jhash in these cases.
There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to
hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network
vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the
moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually
getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then
we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate.
While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function,
it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the
difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage
poses a real security risk.
For the second usage:
A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure
sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers.
SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5
in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is
obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch
series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy.
Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash
tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels.
SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of
problems, and it's time we catch-up.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 20:54:00 +08:00
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*
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* SipHash: a fast short-input PRF
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* https://131002.net/siphash/
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*
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siphash: implement HalfSipHash1-3 for hash tables
HalfSipHash, or hsiphash, is a shortened version of SipHash, which
generates 32-bit outputs using a weaker 64-bit key. It has *much* lower
security margins, and shouldn't be used for anything too sensitive, but
it could be used as a hashtable key function replacement, if the output
is never exposed, and if the security requirement is not too high.
The goal is to make this something that performance-critical jhash users
would be willing to use.
On 64-bit machines, HalfSipHash1-3 is slower than SipHash1-3, so we alias
SipHash1-3 to HalfSipHash1-3 on those systems.
64-bit x86_64:
[ 0.509409] test_siphash: SipHash2-4 cycles: 4049181
[ 0.510650] test_siphash: SipHash1-3 cycles: 2512884
[ 0.512205] test_siphash: HalfSipHash1-3 cycles: 3429920
[ 0.512904] test_siphash: JenkinsHash cycles: 978267
So, we map hsiphash() -> SipHash1-3
32-bit x86:
[ 0.509868] test_siphash: SipHash2-4 cycles: 14812892
[ 0.513601] test_siphash: SipHash1-3 cycles: 9510710
[ 0.515263] test_siphash: HalfSipHash1-3 cycles: 3856157
[ 0.515952] test_siphash: JenkinsHash cycles: 1148567
So, we map hsiphash() -> HalfSipHash1-3
hsiphash() is roughly 3 times slower than jhash(), but comes with a
considerable security improvement.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 20:54:01 +08:00
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* This implementation is specifically for SipHash2-4 for a secure PRF
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* and HalfSipHash1-3/SipHash1-3 for an insecure PRF only suitable for
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* hashtables.
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siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF
SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a
cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast,
and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a
general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG
chaining.
For the first usage:
There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an
attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the
same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is
a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently
hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of
rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant
as a replacement for jhash in these cases.
There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to
hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network
vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the
moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually
getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then
we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate.
While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function,
it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the
difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage
poses a real security risk.
For the second usage:
A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure
sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers.
SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5
in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is
obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch
series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy.
Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash
tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels.
SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of
problems, and it's time we catch-up.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 20:54:00 +08:00
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*/
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#ifndef _LINUX_SIPHASH_H
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#define _LINUX_SIPHASH_H
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#define SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT __alignof__(u64)
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typedef struct {
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u64 key[2];
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} siphash_key_t;
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2021-11-16 01:23:03 +08:00
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#define siphash_aligned_key_t siphash_key_t __aligned(16)
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2019-03-28 03:40:33 +08:00
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static inline bool siphash_key_is_zero(const siphash_key_t *key)
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{
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return !(key->key[0] | key->key[1]);
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}
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siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF
SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a
cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast,
and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a
general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG
chaining.
For the first usage:
There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an
attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the
same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is
a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently
hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of
rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant
as a replacement for jhash in these cases.
There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to
hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network
vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the
moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually
getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then
we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate.
While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function,
it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the
difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage
poses a real security risk.
For the second usage:
A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure
sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers.
SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5
in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is
obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch
series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy.
Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash
tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels.
SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of
problems, and it's time we catch-up.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 20:54:00 +08:00
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u64 __siphash_aligned(const void *data, size_t len, const siphash_key_t *key);
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u64 __siphash_unaligned(const void *data, size_t len, const siphash_key_t *key);
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u64 siphash_1u64(const u64 a, const siphash_key_t *key);
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u64 siphash_2u64(const u64 a, const u64 b, const siphash_key_t *key);
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u64 siphash_3u64(const u64 a, const u64 b, const u64 c,
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const siphash_key_t *key);
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u64 siphash_4u64(const u64 a, const u64 b, const u64 c, const u64 d,
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const siphash_key_t *key);
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u64 siphash_1u32(const u32 a, const siphash_key_t *key);
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u64 siphash_3u32(const u32 a, const u32 b, const u32 c,
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const siphash_key_t *key);
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static inline u64 siphash_2u32(const u32 a, const u32 b,
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const siphash_key_t *key)
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{
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return siphash_1u64((u64)b << 32 | a, key);
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}
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static inline u64 siphash_4u32(const u32 a, const u32 b, const u32 c,
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const u32 d, const siphash_key_t *key)
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{
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return siphash_2u64((u64)b << 32 | a, (u64)d << 32 | c, key);
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}
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static inline u64 ___siphash_aligned(const __le64 *data, size_t len,
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const siphash_key_t *key)
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{
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if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len == 4)
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return siphash_1u32(le32_to_cpup((const __le32 *)data), key);
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if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len == 8)
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return siphash_1u64(le64_to_cpu(data[0]), key);
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if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len == 16)
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return siphash_2u64(le64_to_cpu(data[0]), le64_to_cpu(data[1]),
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key);
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if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len == 24)
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return siphash_3u64(le64_to_cpu(data[0]), le64_to_cpu(data[1]),
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le64_to_cpu(data[2]), key);
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if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len == 32)
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return siphash_4u64(le64_to_cpu(data[0]), le64_to_cpu(data[1]),
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le64_to_cpu(data[2]), le64_to_cpu(data[3]),
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key);
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return __siphash_aligned(data, len, key);
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}
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/**
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* siphash - compute 64-bit siphash PRF value
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* @data: buffer to hash
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* @size: size of @data
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* @key: the siphash key
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*/
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static inline u64 siphash(const void *data, size_t len,
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const siphash_key_t *key)
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{
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siphash: use _unaligned version by default
On ARM v6 and later, we define CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
because the ordinary load/store instructions (ldr, ldrh, ldrb) can
tolerate any misalignment of the memory address. However, load/store
double and load/store multiple instructions (ldrd, ldm) may still only
be used on memory addresses that are 32-bit aligned, and so we have to
use the CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS macro with care, or we
may end up with a severe performance hit due to alignment traps that
require fixups by the kernel. Testing shows that this currently happens
with clang-13 but not gcc-11. In theory, any compiler version can
produce this bug or other problems, as we are dealing with undefined
behavior in C99 even on architectures that support this in hardware,
see also https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=100363.
Fortunately, the get_unaligned() accessors do the right thing: when
building for ARMv6 or later, the compiler will emit unaligned accesses
using the ordinary load/store instructions (but avoid the ones that
require 32-bit alignment). When building for older ARM, those accessors
will emit the appropriate sequence of ldrb/mov/orr instructions. And on
architectures that can truly tolerate any kind of misalignment, the
get_unaligned() accessors resolve to the leXX_to_cpup accessors that
operate on aligned addresses.
Since the compiler will in fact emit ldrd or ldm instructions when
building this code for ARM v6 or later, the solution is to use the
unaligned accessors unconditionally on architectures where this is
known to be fast. The _aligned version of the hash function is
however still needed to get the best performance on architectures
that cannot do any unaligned access in hardware.
This new version avoids the undefined behavior and should produce
the fastest hash on all architectures we support.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20181008211554.5355-4-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/CAK8P3a2KfmmGDbVHULWevB0hv71P2oi2ZCHEAqT=8dQfa0=cqQ@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Fixes: 2c956a60778c ("siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-11-29 23:39:29 +08:00
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ||
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!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)data, SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT))
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siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF
SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a
cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast,
and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a
general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG
chaining.
For the first usage:
There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an
attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the
same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is
a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently
hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of
rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant
as a replacement for jhash in these cases.
There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to
hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network
vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the
moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually
getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then
we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate.
While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function,
it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the
difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage
poses a real security risk.
For the second usage:
A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure
sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers.
SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5
in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is
obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch
series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy.
Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash
tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels.
SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of
problems, and it's time we catch-up.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 20:54:00 +08:00
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return __siphash_unaligned(data, len, key);
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return ___siphash_aligned(data, len, key);
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}
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siphash: implement HalfSipHash1-3 for hash tables
HalfSipHash, or hsiphash, is a shortened version of SipHash, which
generates 32-bit outputs using a weaker 64-bit key. It has *much* lower
security margins, and shouldn't be used for anything too sensitive, but
it could be used as a hashtable key function replacement, if the output
is never exposed, and if the security requirement is not too high.
The goal is to make this something that performance-critical jhash users
would be willing to use.
On 64-bit machines, HalfSipHash1-3 is slower than SipHash1-3, so we alias
SipHash1-3 to HalfSipHash1-3 on those systems.
64-bit x86_64:
[ 0.509409] test_siphash: SipHash2-4 cycles: 4049181
[ 0.510650] test_siphash: SipHash1-3 cycles: 2512884
[ 0.512205] test_siphash: HalfSipHash1-3 cycles: 3429920
[ 0.512904] test_siphash: JenkinsHash cycles: 978267
So, we map hsiphash() -> SipHash1-3
32-bit x86:
[ 0.509868] test_siphash: SipHash2-4 cycles: 14812892
[ 0.513601] test_siphash: SipHash1-3 cycles: 9510710
[ 0.515263] test_siphash: HalfSipHash1-3 cycles: 3856157
[ 0.515952] test_siphash: JenkinsHash cycles: 1148567
So, we map hsiphash() -> HalfSipHash1-3
hsiphash() is roughly 3 times slower than jhash(), but comes with a
considerable security improvement.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 20:54:01 +08:00
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#define HSIPHASH_ALIGNMENT __alignof__(unsigned long)
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typedef struct {
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unsigned long key[2];
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} hsiphash_key_t;
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u32 __hsiphash_aligned(const void *data, size_t len,
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const hsiphash_key_t *key);
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u32 __hsiphash_unaligned(const void *data, size_t len,
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const hsiphash_key_t *key);
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u32 hsiphash_1u32(const u32 a, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
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u32 hsiphash_2u32(const u32 a, const u32 b, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
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u32 hsiphash_3u32(const u32 a, const u32 b, const u32 c,
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const hsiphash_key_t *key);
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u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 a, const u32 b, const u32 c, const u32 d,
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const hsiphash_key_t *key);
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static inline u32 ___hsiphash_aligned(const __le32 *data, size_t len,
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const hsiphash_key_t *key)
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{
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if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len == 4)
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return hsiphash_1u32(le32_to_cpu(data[0]), key);
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if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len == 8)
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return hsiphash_2u32(le32_to_cpu(data[0]), le32_to_cpu(data[1]),
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key);
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if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len == 12)
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return hsiphash_3u32(le32_to_cpu(data[0]), le32_to_cpu(data[1]),
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le32_to_cpu(data[2]), key);
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if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len == 16)
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return hsiphash_4u32(le32_to_cpu(data[0]), le32_to_cpu(data[1]),
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le32_to_cpu(data[2]), le32_to_cpu(data[3]),
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key);
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return __hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
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}
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/**
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* hsiphash - compute 32-bit hsiphash PRF value
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* @data: buffer to hash
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* @size: size of @data
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* @key: the hsiphash key
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*/
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static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len,
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const hsiphash_key_t *key)
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{
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siphash: use _unaligned version by default
On ARM v6 and later, we define CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
because the ordinary load/store instructions (ldr, ldrh, ldrb) can
tolerate any misalignment of the memory address. However, load/store
double and load/store multiple instructions (ldrd, ldm) may still only
be used on memory addresses that are 32-bit aligned, and so we have to
use the CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS macro with care, or we
may end up with a severe performance hit due to alignment traps that
require fixups by the kernel. Testing shows that this currently happens
with clang-13 but not gcc-11. In theory, any compiler version can
produce this bug or other problems, as we are dealing with undefined
behavior in C99 even on architectures that support this in hardware,
see also https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=100363.
Fortunately, the get_unaligned() accessors do the right thing: when
building for ARMv6 or later, the compiler will emit unaligned accesses
using the ordinary load/store instructions (but avoid the ones that
require 32-bit alignment). When building for older ARM, those accessors
will emit the appropriate sequence of ldrb/mov/orr instructions. And on
architectures that can truly tolerate any kind of misalignment, the
get_unaligned() accessors resolve to the leXX_to_cpup accessors that
operate on aligned addresses.
Since the compiler will in fact emit ldrd or ldm instructions when
building this code for ARM v6 or later, the solution is to use the
unaligned accessors unconditionally on architectures where this is
known to be fast. The _aligned version of the hash function is
however still needed to get the best performance on architectures
that cannot do any unaligned access in hardware.
This new version avoids the undefined behavior and should produce
the fastest hash on all architectures we support.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20181008211554.5355-4-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/CAK8P3a2KfmmGDbVHULWevB0hv71P2oi2ZCHEAqT=8dQfa0=cqQ@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Fixes: 2c956a60778c ("siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-11-29 23:39:29 +08:00
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ||
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!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)data, HSIPHASH_ALIGNMENT))
|
siphash: implement HalfSipHash1-3 for hash tables
HalfSipHash, or hsiphash, is a shortened version of SipHash, which
generates 32-bit outputs using a weaker 64-bit key. It has *much* lower
security margins, and shouldn't be used for anything too sensitive, but
it could be used as a hashtable key function replacement, if the output
is never exposed, and if the security requirement is not too high.
The goal is to make this something that performance-critical jhash users
would be willing to use.
On 64-bit machines, HalfSipHash1-3 is slower than SipHash1-3, so we alias
SipHash1-3 to HalfSipHash1-3 on those systems.
64-bit x86_64:
[ 0.509409] test_siphash: SipHash2-4 cycles: 4049181
[ 0.510650] test_siphash: SipHash1-3 cycles: 2512884
[ 0.512205] test_siphash: HalfSipHash1-3 cycles: 3429920
[ 0.512904] test_siphash: JenkinsHash cycles: 978267
So, we map hsiphash() -> SipHash1-3
32-bit x86:
[ 0.509868] test_siphash: SipHash2-4 cycles: 14812892
[ 0.513601] test_siphash: SipHash1-3 cycles: 9510710
[ 0.515263] test_siphash: HalfSipHash1-3 cycles: 3856157
[ 0.515952] test_siphash: JenkinsHash cycles: 1148567
So, we map hsiphash() -> HalfSipHash1-3
hsiphash() is roughly 3 times slower than jhash(), but comes with a
considerable security improvement.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 20:54:01 +08:00
|
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|
return __hsiphash_unaligned(data, len, key);
|
|
|
|
return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-07 20:03:46 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations.
|
|
|
|
* Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them,
|
|
|
|
* be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
|
|
|
|
(a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \
|
|
|
|
(c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \
|
|
|
|
(a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \
|
|
|
|
(c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL
|
|
|
|
#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL
|
|
|
|
#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL
|
|
|
|
#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
|
|
|
|
(a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \
|
|
|
|
(c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \
|
|
|
|
(a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \
|
|
|
|
(c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U
|
|
|
|
#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U
|
|
|
|
#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U
|
|
|
|
#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U
|
|
|
|
|
siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF
SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a
cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast,
and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a
general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG
chaining.
For the first usage:
There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an
attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the
same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is
a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently
hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of
rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant
as a replacement for jhash in these cases.
There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to
hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network
vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the
moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually
getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then
we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate.
While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function,
it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the
difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage
poses a real security risk.
For the second usage:
A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure
sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers.
SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5
in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is
obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch
series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy.
Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash
tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels.
SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of
problems, and it's time we catch-up.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 20:54:00 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */
|