2019-06-04 16:11:33 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2011 Novell Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc.
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*/
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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2017-02-03 00:54:15 +08:00
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#include <linux/cred.h>
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2017-11-01 16:13:51 +08:00
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/exportfs.h>
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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#include "overlayfs.h"
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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struct ovl_lookup_data {
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ovl: detect overlapping layers
Overlapping overlay layers are not supported and can cause unexpected
behavior, but overlayfs does not currently check or warn about these
configurations.
User is not supposed to specify the same directory for upper and
lower dirs or for different lower layers and user is not supposed to
specify directories that are descendants of each other for overlay
layers, but that is exactly what this zysbot repro did:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=12c7a94f400000
Moving layer root directories into other layers while overlayfs
is mounted could also result in unexpected behavior.
This commit places "traps" in the overlay inode hash table.
Those traps are dummy overlay inodes that are hashed by the layers
root inodes.
On mount, the hash table trap entries are used to verify that overlay
layers are not overlapping. While at it, we also verify that overlay
layers are not overlapping with directories "in-use" by other overlay
instances as upperdir/workdir.
On lookup, the trap entries are used to verify that overlay layers
root inodes have not been moved into other layers after mount.
Some examples:
$ ./run --ov --samefs -s
...
( mkdir -p base/upper/0/u base/upper/0/w base/lower lower upper mnt
mount -o bind base/lower lower
mount -o bind base/upper upper
mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w)
$ umount mnt
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=base,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 94.434900] overlayfs: overlapping upperdir path
mount: mount overlay on mnt failed: Too many levels of symbolic links
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=upper/0/u,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 151.350132] overlayfs: conflicting lowerdir path
mount: none is already mounted or mnt busy
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower:lower/a,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 201.205045] overlayfs: overlapping lowerdir path
mount: mount overlay on mnt failed: Too many levels of symbolic links
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
$ mv base/upper/0/ base/lower/
$ find mnt/0
mnt/0
mnt/0/w
find: 'mnt/0/w/work': Too many levels of symbolic links
find: 'mnt/0/u': Too many levels of symbolic links
Reported-by: syzbot+9c69c282adc4edd2b540@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-04-18 22:42:08 +08:00
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struct super_block *sb;
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2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
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struct vfsmount *mnt;
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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struct qstr name;
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bool is_dir;
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bool opaque;
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bool stop;
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bool last;
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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char *redirect;
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2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
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bool metacopy;
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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};
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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2022-08-05 01:11:15 +08:00
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static int ovl_check_redirect(const struct path *path, struct ovl_lookup_data *d,
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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size_t prelen, const char *post)
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{
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int res;
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2018-05-11 23:49:32 +08:00
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char *buf;
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2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
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struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(d->sb);
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
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buf = ovl_get_redirect_xattr(ofs, path, prelen + strlen(post));
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2018-05-11 23:49:32 +08:00
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if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(buf))
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return PTR_ERR(buf);
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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if (buf[0] == '/') {
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ovl: fix lookup with middle layer opaque dir and absolute path redirects
As of now if we encounter an opaque dir while looking for a dentry, we set
d->last=true. This means that there is no need to look further in any of
the lower layers. This works fine as long as there are no redirets or
relative redircts. But what if there is an absolute redirect on the
children dentry of opaque directory. We still need to continue to look into
next lower layer. This patch fixes it.
Here is an example to demonstrate the issue. Say you have following setup.
upper: /redirect (redirect=/a/b/c)
lower1: /a/[b]/c ([b] is opaque) (c has absolute redirect=/a/b/d/)
lower0: /a/b/d/foo
Now "redirect" dir should merge with lower1:/a/b/c/ and lower0:/a/b/d.
Note, despite the fact lower1:/a/[b] is opaque, we need to continue to look
into lower0 because children c has an absolute redirect.
Following is a reproducer.
Watch me make foo disappear:
$ mkdir lower middle upper work work2 merged
$ mkdir lower/origin
$ touch lower/origin/foo
$ mount -t overlay none merged/ \
-olowerdir=lower,upperdir=middle,workdir=work2
$ mkdir merged/pure
$ mv merged/origin merged/pure/redirect
$ umount merged
$ mount -t overlay none merged/ \
-olowerdir=middle:lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work
$ mv merged/pure/redirect merged/redirect
Now you see foo inside a twice redirected merged dir:
$ ls merged/redirect
foo
$ umount merged
$ mount -t overlay none merged/ \
-olowerdir=middle:lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work
After mount cycle you don't see foo inside the same dir:
$ ls merged/redirect
During middle layer lookup, the opaqueness of middle/pure is left in
the lookup state and then middle/pure/redirect is wrongly treated as
opaque.
Fixes: 02b69b284cd7 ("ovl: lookup redirects")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.10
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-03-12 22:30:41 +08:00
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/*
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* One of the ancestor path elements in an absolute path
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* lookup in ovl_lookup_layer() could have been opaque and
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* that will stop further lookup in lower layers (d->stop=true)
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2022-07-29 09:57:26 +08:00
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* But we have found an absolute redirect in descendant path
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ovl: fix lookup with middle layer opaque dir and absolute path redirects
As of now if we encounter an opaque dir while looking for a dentry, we set
d->last=true. This means that there is no need to look further in any of
the lower layers. This works fine as long as there are no redirets or
relative redircts. But what if there is an absolute redirect on the
children dentry of opaque directory. We still need to continue to look into
next lower layer. This patch fixes it.
Here is an example to demonstrate the issue. Say you have following setup.
upper: /redirect (redirect=/a/b/c)
lower1: /a/[b]/c ([b] is opaque) (c has absolute redirect=/a/b/d/)
lower0: /a/b/d/foo
Now "redirect" dir should merge with lower1:/a/b/c/ and lower0:/a/b/d.
Note, despite the fact lower1:/a/[b] is opaque, we need to continue to look
into lower0 because children c has an absolute redirect.
Following is a reproducer.
Watch me make foo disappear:
$ mkdir lower middle upper work work2 merged
$ mkdir lower/origin
$ touch lower/origin/foo
$ mount -t overlay none merged/ \
-olowerdir=lower,upperdir=middle,workdir=work2
$ mkdir merged/pure
$ mv merged/origin merged/pure/redirect
$ umount merged
$ mount -t overlay none merged/ \
-olowerdir=middle:lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work
$ mv merged/pure/redirect merged/redirect
Now you see foo inside a twice redirected merged dir:
$ ls merged/redirect
foo
$ umount merged
$ mount -t overlay none merged/ \
-olowerdir=middle:lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work
After mount cycle you don't see foo inside the same dir:
$ ls merged/redirect
During middle layer lookup, the opaqueness of middle/pure is left in
the lookup state and then middle/pure/redirect is wrongly treated as
opaque.
Fixes: 02b69b284cd7 ("ovl: lookup redirects")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.10
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-03-12 22:30:41 +08:00
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* element and that should force continue lookup in lower
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* layers (reset d->stop).
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*/
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d->stop = false;
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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} else {
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2018-05-11 23:49:32 +08:00
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res = strlen(buf) + 1;
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2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
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memmove(buf + prelen, buf, res);
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memcpy(buf, d->name.name, prelen);
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}
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strcat(buf, post);
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kfree(d->redirect);
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d->redirect = buf;
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d->name.name = d->redirect;
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d->name.len = strlen(d->redirect);
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return 0;
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}
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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static int ovl_acceptable(void *ctx, struct dentry *dentry)
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{
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2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
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/*
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* A non-dir origin may be disconnected, which is fine, because
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* we only need it for its unique inode number.
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*/
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if (!d_is_dir(dentry))
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return 1;
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/* Don't decode a deleted empty directory */
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if (d_unhashed(dentry))
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return 0;
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/* Check if directory belongs to the layer we are decoding from */
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return is_subdir(dentry, ((struct vfsmount *)ctx)->mnt_root);
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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}
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2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
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/*
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* Check validity of an overlay file handle buffer.
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*
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* Return 0 for a valid file handle.
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* Return -ENODATA for "origin unknown".
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* Return <0 for an invalid file handle.
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*/
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2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
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int ovl_check_fb_len(struct ovl_fb *fb, int fb_len)
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2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
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{
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2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
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if (fb_len < sizeof(struct ovl_fb) || fb_len < fb->len)
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2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
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return -EINVAL;
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2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
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if (fb->magic != OVL_FH_MAGIC)
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2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Treat larger version and unknown flags as "origin unknown" */
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2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
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if (fb->version > OVL_FH_VERSION || fb->flags & ~OVL_FH_FLAG_ALL)
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2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
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return -ENODATA;
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/* Treat endianness mismatch as "origin unknown" */
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2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
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if (!(fb->flags & OVL_FH_FLAG_ANY_ENDIAN) &&
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(fb->flags & OVL_FH_FLAG_BIG_ENDIAN) != OVL_FH_FLAG_CPU_ENDIAN)
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2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
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return -ENODATA;
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return 0;
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}
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2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
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static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *upperdentry,
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2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
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enum ovl_xattr ox)
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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{
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2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
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int res, err;
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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struct ovl_fh *fh = NULL;
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2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
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res = ovl_getxattr_upper(ofs, upperdentry, ox, NULL, 0);
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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if (res < 0) {
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if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP)
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return NULL;
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goto fail;
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}
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/* Zero size value means "copied up but origin unknown" */
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if (res == 0)
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return NULL;
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2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
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fh = kzalloc(res + OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET, GFP_KERNEL);
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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if (!fh)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
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res = ovl_getxattr_upper(ofs, upperdentry, ox, fh->buf, res);
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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if (res < 0)
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goto fail;
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2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
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err = ovl_check_fb_len(&fh->fb, res);
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2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
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if (err < 0) {
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if (err == -ENODATA)
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goto out;
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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goto invalid;
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2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
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}
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
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return fh;
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out:
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kfree(fh);
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return NULL;
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fail:
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2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
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pr_warn_ratelimited("failed to get origin (%i)\n", res);
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2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
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goto out;
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invalid:
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2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
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pr_warn_ratelimited("invalid origin (%*phN)\n", res, fh);
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2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
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goto out;
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}
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2020-10-13 22:59:53 +08:00
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struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh,
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struct vfsmount *mnt, bool connected)
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2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
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{
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2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
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struct dentry *real;
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2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
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int bytes;
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2020-12-14 22:26:14 +08:00
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if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
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return NULL;
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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/*
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* Make sure that the stored uuid matches the uuid of the lower
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* layer where file handle will be decoded.
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ovl: introduce new "uuid=off" option for inodes index feature
This replaces uuid with null in overlayfs file handles and thus relaxes
uuid checks for overlay index feature. It is only possible in case there is
only one filesystem for all the work/upper/lower directories and bare file
handles from this backing filesystem are unique. In other case when we have
multiple filesystems lets just fallback to "uuid=on" which is and
equivalent of how it worked before with all uuid checks.
This is needed when overlayfs is/was mounted in a container with index
enabled (e.g.: to be able to resolve inotify watch file handles on it to
paths in CRIU), and this container is copied and started alongside with the
original one. This way the "copy" container can't have the same uuid on the
superblock and mounting the overlayfs from it later would fail.
That is an example of the problem on top of loop+ext4:
dd if=/dev/zero of=loopbackfile.img bs=100M count=10
losetup -fP loopbackfile.img
losetup -a
#/dev/loop0: [64768]:35 (/loop-test/loopbackfile.img)
mkfs.ext4 loopbackfile.img
mkdir loop-mp
mount -o loop /dev/loop0 loop-mp
mkdir loop-mp/{lower,upper,work,merged}
mount -t overlay overlay -oindex=on,lowerdir=loop-mp/lower,\
upperdir=loop-mp/upper,workdir=loop-mp/work loop-mp/merged
umount loop-mp/merged
umount loop-mp
e2fsck -f /dev/loop0
tune2fs -U random /dev/loop0
mount -o loop /dev/loop0 loop-mp
mount -t overlay overlay -oindex=on,lowerdir=loop-mp/lower,\
upperdir=loop-mp/upper,workdir=loop-mp/work loop-mp/merged
#mount: /loop-test/loop-mp/merged:
#mount(2) system call failed: Stale file handle.
If you just change the uuid of the backing filesystem, overlay is not
mounting any more. In Virtuozzo we copy container disks (ploops) when
create the copy of container and we require fs uuid to be unique for a new
container.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-10-13 22:59:54 +08:00
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* In case of uuid=off option just make sure that stored uuid is null.
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2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
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*/
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ovl: introduce new "uuid=off" option for inodes index feature
This replaces uuid with null in overlayfs file handles and thus relaxes
uuid checks for overlay index feature. It is only possible in case there is
only one filesystem for all the work/upper/lower directories and bare file
handles from this backing filesystem are unique. In other case when we have
multiple filesystems lets just fallback to "uuid=on" which is and
equivalent of how it worked before with all uuid checks.
This is needed when overlayfs is/was mounted in a container with index
enabled (e.g.: to be able to resolve inotify watch file handles on it to
paths in CRIU), and this container is copied and started alongside with the
original one. This way the "copy" container can't have the same uuid on the
superblock and mounting the overlayfs from it later would fail.
That is an example of the problem on top of loop+ext4:
dd if=/dev/zero of=loopbackfile.img bs=100M count=10
losetup -fP loopbackfile.img
losetup -a
#/dev/loop0: [64768]:35 (/loop-test/loopbackfile.img)
mkfs.ext4 loopbackfile.img
mkdir loop-mp
mount -o loop /dev/loop0 loop-mp
mkdir loop-mp/{lower,upper,work,merged}
mount -t overlay overlay -oindex=on,lowerdir=loop-mp/lower,\
upperdir=loop-mp/upper,workdir=loop-mp/work loop-mp/merged
umount loop-mp/merged
umount loop-mp
e2fsck -f /dev/loop0
tune2fs -U random /dev/loop0
mount -o loop /dev/loop0 loop-mp
mount -t overlay overlay -oindex=on,lowerdir=loop-mp/lower,\
upperdir=loop-mp/upper,workdir=loop-mp/work loop-mp/merged
#mount: /loop-test/loop-mp/merged:
#mount(2) system call failed: Stale file handle.
If you just change the uuid of the backing filesystem, overlay is not
mounting any more. In Virtuozzo we copy container disks (ploops) when
create the copy of container and we require fs uuid to be unique for a new
container.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-10-13 22:59:54 +08:00
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if (ofs->config.uuid ? !uuid_equal(&fh->fb.uuid, &mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid) :
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!uuid_is_null(&fh->fb.uuid))
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
|
|
|
bytes = (fh->fb.len - offsetof(struct ovl_fb, fid));
|
|
|
|
real = exportfs_decode_fh(mnt, (struct fid *)fh->fb.fid,
|
|
|
|
bytes >> 2, (int)fh->fb.type,
|
2018-03-09 21:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
connected ? ovl_acceptable : NULL, mnt);
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(real)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Treat stale file handle to lower file as "origin unknown".
|
|
|
|
* upper file handle could become stale when upper file is
|
|
|
|
* unlinked and this information is needed to handle stale
|
|
|
|
* index entries correctly.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (real == ERR_PTR(-ESTALE) &&
|
2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
|
|
|
!(fh->fb.flags & OVL_FH_FLAG_PATH_UPPER))
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
real = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return real;
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ovl_dentry_weird(real)) {
|
|
|
|
dput(real);
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
return real;
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-05 01:11:15 +08:00
|
|
|
static bool ovl_is_opaquedir(struct ovl_fs *ofs, const struct path *path)
|
2017-05-11 21:42:26 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
|
|
|
return ovl_path_check_dir_xattr(ofs, path, OVL_XATTR_OPAQUE);
|
2017-05-11 21:42:26 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-04 18:51:52 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct dentry *ovl_lookup_positive_unlocked(struct ovl_lookup_data *d,
|
|
|
|
const char *name,
|
2020-05-26 09:35:57 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *base, int len,
|
|
|
|
bool drop_negative)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-04-04 18:51:52 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *ret = lookup_one_unlocked(mnt_user_ns(d->mnt), name, base, len);
|
2020-05-26 09:35:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(ret) && d_flags_negative(smp_load_acquire(&ret->d_flags))) {
|
|
|
|
if (drop_negative && ret->d_lockref.count == 1) {
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&ret->d_lock);
|
|
|
|
/* Recheck condition under lock */
|
|
|
|
if (d_is_negative(ret) && ret->d_lockref.count == 1)
|
|
|
|
__d_drop(ret);
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&ret->d_lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dput(ret);
|
|
|
|
ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
static int ovl_lookup_single(struct dentry *base, struct ovl_lookup_data *d,
|
|
|
|
const char *name, unsigned int namelen,
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t prelen, const char *post,
|
2020-05-26 09:35:57 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry **ret, bool drop_negative)
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *this;
|
2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
|
|
|
struct path path;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
2018-03-10 04:44:43 +08:00
|
|
|
bool last_element = !post[0];
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-04-04 18:51:52 +08:00
|
|
|
this = ovl_lookup_positive_unlocked(d, name, base, namelen, drop_negative);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(this)) {
|
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(this);
|
|
|
|
this = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (err == -ENOENT || err == -ENAMETOOLONG)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ovl_dentry_weird(this)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Don't support traversing automounts and other weirdness */
|
|
|
|
err = -EREMOTE;
|
|
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ovl_is_whiteout(this)) {
|
|
|
|
d->stop = d->opaque = true;
|
|
|
|
goto put_and_out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This dentry should be a regular file if previous layer lookup
|
|
|
|
* found a metacopy dentry.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (last_element && d->metacopy && !d_is_reg(this)) {
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
d->stop = true;
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
goto put_and_out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
path.dentry = this;
|
|
|
|
path.mnt = d->mnt;
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!d_can_lookup(this)) {
|
|
|
|
if (d->is_dir || !last_element) {
|
|
|
|
d->stop = true;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
goto put_and_out;
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(OVL_FS(d->sb), &path);
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out_err;
|
2018-04-12 18:04:49 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
d->metacopy = err;
|
|
|
|
d->stop = !d->metacopy;
|
2018-05-11 23:49:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!d->metacopy || d->last)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2018-05-11 23:49:31 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
ovl: detect overlapping layers
Overlapping overlay layers are not supported and can cause unexpected
behavior, but overlayfs does not currently check or warn about these
configurations.
User is not supposed to specify the same directory for upper and
lower dirs or for different lower layers and user is not supposed to
specify directories that are descendants of each other for overlay
layers, but that is exactly what this zysbot repro did:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=12c7a94f400000
Moving layer root directories into other layers while overlayfs
is mounted could also result in unexpected behavior.
This commit places "traps" in the overlay inode hash table.
Those traps are dummy overlay inodes that are hashed by the layers
root inodes.
On mount, the hash table trap entries are used to verify that overlay
layers are not overlapping. While at it, we also verify that overlay
layers are not overlapping with directories "in-use" by other overlay
instances as upperdir/workdir.
On lookup, the trap entries are used to verify that overlay layers
root inodes have not been moved into other layers after mount.
Some examples:
$ ./run --ov --samefs -s
...
( mkdir -p base/upper/0/u base/upper/0/w base/lower lower upper mnt
mount -o bind base/lower lower
mount -o bind base/upper upper
mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w)
$ umount mnt
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=base,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 94.434900] overlayfs: overlapping upperdir path
mount: mount overlay on mnt failed: Too many levels of symbolic links
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=upper/0/u,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 151.350132] overlayfs: conflicting lowerdir path
mount: none is already mounted or mnt busy
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower:lower/a,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 201.205045] overlayfs: overlapping lowerdir path
mount: mount overlay on mnt failed: Too many levels of symbolic links
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
$ mv base/upper/0/ base/lower/
$ find mnt/0
mnt/0
mnt/0/w
find: 'mnt/0/w/work': Too many levels of symbolic links
find: 'mnt/0/u': Too many levels of symbolic links
Reported-by: syzbot+9c69c282adc4edd2b540@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-04-18 22:42:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ovl_lookup_trap_inode(d->sb, this)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Caught in a trap of overlapping layers */
|
|
|
|
err = -ELOOP;
|
|
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-10 04:44:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (last_element)
|
2018-05-11 23:49:31 +08:00
|
|
|
d->is_dir = true;
|
|
|
|
if (d->last)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ovl_is_opaquedir(OVL_FS(d->sb), &path)) {
|
2018-05-11 23:49:31 +08:00
|
|
|
d->stop = true;
|
|
|
|
if (last_element)
|
|
|
|
d->opaque = true;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_check_redirect(&path, d, prelen, post);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto out_err;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
*ret = this;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_and_out:
|
|
|
|
dput(this);
|
|
|
|
this = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_err:
|
|
|
|
dput(this);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int ovl_lookup_layer(struct dentry *base, struct ovl_lookup_data *d,
|
2020-05-26 09:35:57 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry **ret, bool drop_negative)
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-01-18 22:19:54 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Counting down from the end, since the prefix can change */
|
|
|
|
size_t rem = d->name.len - 1;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-18 22:19:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (d->name.name[0] != '/')
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
return ovl_lookup_single(base, d, d->name.name, d->name.len,
|
2020-05-26 09:35:57 +08:00
|
|
|
0, "", ret, drop_negative);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-01-18 22:19:54 +08:00
|
|
|
while (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(base) && d_can_lookup(base)) {
|
|
|
|
const char *s = d->name.name + d->name.len - rem;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
const char *next = strchrnul(s, '/');
|
2017-01-18 22:19:54 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t thislen = next - s;
|
|
|
|
bool end = !next[0];
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-01-18 22:19:54 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Verify we did not go off the rails */
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(s[-1] != '/'))
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-18 22:19:54 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_lookup_single(base, d, s, thislen,
|
2020-05-26 09:35:57 +08:00
|
|
|
d->name.len - rem, next, &base,
|
|
|
|
drop_negative);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(dentry);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
dentry = base;
|
2017-01-18 22:19:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (end)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rem -= thislen + 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(rem >= d->name.len))
|
|
|
|
return -EIO;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*ret = dentry;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-09 21:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
int ovl_check_origin_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh, bool connected,
|
2018-01-20 03:33:44 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *upperdentry, struct ovl_path **stackp)
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-06-21 20:28:34 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *origin = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 20:12:40 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < ofs->numlayer; i++) {
|
2019-11-15 04:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If lower fs uuid is not unique among lower fs we cannot match
|
|
|
|
* fh->uuid to layer.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-11-15 20:12:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ofs->layers[i].fsid &&
|
|
|
|
ofs->layers[i].fs->bad_uuid)
|
2019-11-15 04:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-13 22:59:53 +08:00
|
|
|
origin = ovl_decode_real_fh(ofs, fh, ofs->layers[i].mnt,
|
2018-03-09 21:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
connected);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:34 +08:00
|
|
|
if (origin)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!origin)
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
return -ESTALE;
|
|
|
|
else if (IS_ERR(origin))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(origin);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-20 03:33:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (upperdentry && !ovl_is_whiteout(upperdentry) &&
|
2021-03-02 09:37:10 +08:00
|
|
|
inode_wrong_type(d_inode(upperdentry), d_inode(origin)->i_mode))
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
goto invalid;
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!*stackp)
|
2017-07-24 14:57:54 +08:00
|
|
|
*stackp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ovl_path), GFP_KERNEL);
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!*stackp) {
|
|
|
|
dput(origin);
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-12-13 04:40:46 +08:00
|
|
|
**stackp = (struct ovl_path){
|
|
|
|
.dentry = origin,
|
2019-11-15 20:12:40 +08:00
|
|
|
.layer = &ofs->layers[i]
|
2017-12-13 04:40:46 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
invalid:
|
2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("invalid origin (%pd2, ftype=%x, origin ftype=%x).\n",
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
upperdentry, d_inode(upperdentry)->i_mode & S_IFMT,
|
|
|
|
d_inode(origin)->i_mode & S_IFMT);
|
|
|
|
dput(origin);
|
2021-04-27 18:28:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return -ESTALE;
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-13 04:40:46 +08:00
|
|
|
static int ovl_check_origin(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *upperdentry,
|
2020-06-21 20:50:01 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_path **stackp)
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_fh *fh = ovl_get_fh(ofs, upperdentry, OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN);
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(fh))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(fh);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-09 21:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_check_origin_fh(ofs, fh, false, upperdentry, stackp);
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(fh);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
if (err == -ESTALE)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-01-11 14:25:32 +08:00
|
|
|
* Verify that @fh matches the file handle stored in xattr @name.
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
* Return 0 on match, -ESTALE on mismatch, < 0 on error.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
static int ovl_verify_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
enum ovl_xattr ox, const struct ovl_fh *fh)
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_fh *ofh = ovl_get_fh(ofs, dentry, ox);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ofh)
|
|
|
|
return -ENODATA;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ofh))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(ofh);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (fh->fb.len != ofh->fb.len || memcmp(&fh->fb, &ofh->fb, fh->fb.len))
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -ESTALE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(ofh);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-01-11 14:25:32 +08:00
|
|
|
* Verify that @real dentry matches the file handle stored in xattr @name.
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2018-01-11 14:25:32 +08:00
|
|
|
* If @set is true and there is no stored file handle, encode @real and store
|
|
|
|
* file handle in xattr @name.
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2018-01-11 14:25:32 +08:00
|
|
|
* Return 0 on match, -ESTALE on mismatch, -ENODATA on no xattr, < 0 on error.
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
int ovl_verify_set_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
enum ovl_xattr ox, struct dentry *real, bool is_upper,
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
bool set)
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
|
|
struct ovl_fh *fh;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-13 22:59:53 +08:00
|
|
|
fh = ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, real, is_upper);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(fh);
|
2018-10-11 00:10:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(fh)) {
|
|
|
|
fh = NULL;
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2018-10-11 00:10:06 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_verify_fh(ofs, dentry, ox, fh);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if (set && err == -ENODATA)
|
2022-04-04 18:51:42 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_setxattr(ofs, dentry, ox, fh->buf, fh->fb.len);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
kfree(fh);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
2018-01-11 14:25:32 +08:00
|
|
|
inode = d_inode(real);
|
2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("failed to verify %s (%pd2, ino=%lu, err=%i)\n",
|
2018-01-11 14:25:32 +08:00
|
|
|
is_upper ? "upper" : "origin", real,
|
|
|
|
inode ? inode->i_ino : 0, err);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:37 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Get upper dentry from index */
|
2017-12-25 00:42:16 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *ovl_index_upper(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *index)
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ovl_fh *fh;
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *upper;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!d_is_dir(index))
|
|
|
|
return dget(index);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
fh = ovl_get_fh(ofs, index, OVL_XATTR_UPPER);
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(fh))
|
|
|
|
return ERR_CAST(fh);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-13 22:59:53 +08:00
|
|
|
upper = ovl_decode_real_fh(ofs, fh, ovl_upper_mnt(ofs), true);
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(fh);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(upper))
|
|
|
|
return upper ?: ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!d_is_dir(upper)) {
|
2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("invalid index upper (%pd2, upper=%pd2).\n",
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
index, upper);
|
|
|
|
dput(upper);
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return upper;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Verify that an index entry name matches the origin file handle stored in
|
|
|
|
* OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN and that origin file handle can be decoded to lower path.
|
|
|
|
* Return 0 on match, -ESTALE on mismatch or stale origin, < 0 on error.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-12-13 04:40:46 +08:00
|
|
|
int ovl_verify_index(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *index)
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ovl_fh *fh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
2017-07-24 14:57:54 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_path origin = { };
|
|
|
|
struct ovl_path *stack = &origin;
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *upper = NULL;
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!d_inode(index))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-24 17:24:11 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (index->d_name.len < sizeof(struct ovl_fb)*2)
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
len = index->d_name.len / 2;
|
2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
|
|
|
fh = kzalloc(len + OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!fh)
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hex2bin(fh->buf, index->d_name.name, len))
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_check_fb_len(&fh->fb, len);
|
2017-10-24 20:12:15 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 17:03:13 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Whiteout index entries are used as an indication that an exported
|
|
|
|
* overlay file handle should be treated as stale (i.e. after unlink
|
|
|
|
* of the overlay inode). These entries contain no origin xattr.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ovl_is_whiteout(index))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Verifying directory index entries are not stale is expensive, so
|
|
|
|
* only verify stale dir index if NFS export is enabled.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (d_is_dir(index) && !ofs->config.nfs_export)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Directory index entries should have 'upper' xattr pointing to the
|
|
|
|
* real upper dir. Non-dir index entries are hardlinks to the upper
|
|
|
|
* real inode. For non-dir index, we can read the copy up origin xattr
|
|
|
|
* directly from the index dentry, but for dir index we first need to
|
|
|
|
* decode the upper directory.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
upper = ovl_index_upper(ofs, index);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(upper)) {
|
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(upper);
|
2018-01-11 21:33:51 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Directory index entries with no 'upper' xattr need to be
|
|
|
|
* removed. When dir index entry has a stale 'upper' xattr,
|
|
|
|
* we assume that upper dir was removed and we treat the dir
|
|
|
|
* index as orphan entry that needs to be whited out.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (err == -ESTALE)
|
|
|
|
goto orphan;
|
|
|
|
else if (!err)
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -ESTALE;
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_verify_fh(ofs, upper, OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN, fh);
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(upper);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Check if non-dir index is orphan and don't warn before cleaning it */
|
|
|
|
if (!d_is_dir(index) && d_inode(index)->i_nlink == 1) {
|
2018-03-09 21:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_check_origin_fh(ofs, fh, false, index, &stack);
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ovl_get_nlink(ofs, origin.dentry, index, 0) == 0)
|
2018-01-11 21:33:51 +08:00
|
|
|
goto orphan;
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-21 18:46:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2018-01-11 17:33:24 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(origin.dentry);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(fh);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("failed to verify index (%pd2, ftype=%x, err=%i)\n",
|
2017-07-19 02:07:42 +08:00
|
|
|
index, d_inode(index)->i_mode & S_IFMT, err);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2018-01-11 21:33:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
orphan:
|
2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("orphan index entry (%pd2, ftype=%x, nlink=%u)\n",
|
2018-01-11 21:33:51 +08:00
|
|
|
index, d_inode(index)->i_mode & S_IFMT,
|
|
|
|
d_inode(index)->i_nlink);
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2017-06-21 20:28:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-29 02:23:05 +08:00
|
|
|
static int ovl_get_index_name_fh(struct ovl_fh *fh, struct qstr *name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *n, *s;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
|
|
|
n = kcalloc(fh->fb.len, 2, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2017-12-29 02:23:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!n)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-15 19:33:03 +08:00
|
|
|
s = bin2hex(n, fh->buf, fh->fb.len);
|
2017-12-29 02:23:05 +08:00
|
|
|
*name = (struct qstr) QSTR_INIT(n, s - n);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Lookup in indexdir for the index entry of a lower real inode or a copy up
|
|
|
|
* origin inode. The index entry name is the hex representation of the lower
|
|
|
|
* inode file handle.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the index dentry in negative, then either no lower aliases have been
|
|
|
|
* copied up yet, or aliases have been copied up in older kernels and are
|
|
|
|
* not indexed.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the index dentry for a copy up origin inode is positive, but points
|
|
|
|
* to an inode different than the upper inode, then either the upper inode
|
|
|
|
* has been copied up and not indexed or it was indexed, but since then
|
2022-07-29 09:57:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* index dir was cleared. Either way, that index cannot be used to identify
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
* the overlay inode.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-10-13 22:59:53 +08:00
|
|
|
int ovl_get_index_name(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *origin,
|
|
|
|
struct qstr *name)
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ovl_fh *fh;
|
2017-12-29 02:23:05 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-10-13 22:59:53 +08:00
|
|
|
fh = ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, origin, false);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(fh))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(fh);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-29 02:23:05 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_get_index_name_fh(fh, name);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-12-29 02:23:05 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(fh);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2017-12-29 02:23:05 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Lookup index by file handle for NFS export */
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *ovl_get_index_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *index;
|
|
|
|
struct qstr name;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = ovl_get_index_name_fh(fh, &name);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(err);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-10-31 13:21:58 +08:00
|
|
|
index = lookup_positive_unlocked(name.name, ofs->indexdir, name.len);
|
2017-12-29 02:23:05 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(name.name);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(index)) {
|
|
|
|
if (PTR_ERR(index) == -ENOENT)
|
|
|
|
index = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return index;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-10-31 13:21:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ovl_is_whiteout(index))
|
2017-12-29 02:23:05 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -ESTALE;
|
|
|
|
else if (ovl_dentry_weird(index))
|
|
|
|
err = -EIO;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return index;
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-12-29 02:23:05 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(index);
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(err);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-17 20:40:27 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *ovl_lookup_index(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *upper,
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *origin, bool verify)
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *index;
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
|
|
struct qstr name;
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
bool is_dir = d_is_dir(origin);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-13 22:59:53 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_get_index_name(ofs, origin, &name);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(err);
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-04 18:51:52 +08:00
|
|
|
index = lookup_one_positive_unlocked(ovl_upper_mnt_userns(ofs), name.name,
|
|
|
|
ofs->indexdir, name.len);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(index)) {
|
2017-09-24 18:01:35 +08:00
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(index);
|
2017-10-20 22:19:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err == -ENOENT) {
|
|
|
|
index = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("failed inode index lookup (ino=%lu, key=%.*s, err=%i);\n"
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
"overlayfs: mount with '-o index=off' to disable inodes index.\n",
|
|
|
|
d_inode(origin)->i_ino, name.len, name.name,
|
|
|
|
err);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-19 02:07:43 +08:00
|
|
|
inode = d_inode(index);
|
2019-10-31 13:21:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ovl_is_whiteout(index) && !verify) {
|
2018-01-17 20:40:27 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* When index lookup is called with !verify for decoding an
|
|
|
|
* overlay file handle, a whiteout index implies that decode
|
|
|
|
* should treat file handle as stale and no need to print a
|
|
|
|
* warning about it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
dput(index);
|
|
|
|
index = ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2017-07-19 02:07:43 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (ovl_dentry_weird(index) || ovl_is_whiteout(index) ||
|
2021-03-02 09:37:10 +08:00
|
|
|
inode_wrong_type(inode, d_inode(origin)->i_mode)) {
|
2017-07-19 02:07:43 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Index should always be of the same file type as origin
|
|
|
|
* except for the case of a whiteout index. A whiteout
|
|
|
|
* index should only exist if all lower aliases have been
|
|
|
|
* unlinked, which means that finding a lower origin on lookup
|
|
|
|
* whose index is a whiteout should be treated as an error.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("bad index found (index=%pd2, ftype=%x, origin ftype=%x).\n",
|
2017-07-19 02:07:43 +08:00
|
|
|
index, d_inode(index)->i_mode & S_IFMT,
|
|
|
|
d_inode(origin)->i_mode & S_IFMT);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2018-01-17 20:40:27 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (is_dir && verify) {
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!upper) {
|
2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("suspected uncovered redirected dir found (origin=%pd2, index=%pd2).\n",
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
origin, index);
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Verify that dir index 'upper' xattr points to upper dir */
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_verify_upper(ofs, index, upper, false);
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
if (err == -ESTALE) {
|
2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("suspected multiply redirected dir found (upper=%pd2, origin=%pd2, index=%pd2).\n",
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
upper, origin, index);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (upper && d_inode(upper) != inode) {
|
|
|
|
goto out_dput;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
kfree(name.name);
|
|
|
|
return index;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-13 00:03:04 +08:00
|
|
|
out_dput:
|
|
|
|
dput(index);
|
|
|
|
index = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
|
|
dput(index);
|
|
|
|
index = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Returns next layer in stack starting from top.
|
|
|
|
* Returns -1 if this is the last layer.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int ovl_path_next(int idx, struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ovl_entry *oe = dentry->d_fsdata;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(idx < 0);
|
|
|
|
if (idx == 0) {
|
|
|
|
ovl_path_upper(dentry, path);
|
|
|
|
if (path->dentry)
|
|
|
|
return oe->numlower ? 1 : -1;
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(idx > oe->numlower);
|
2017-07-24 14:57:54 +08:00
|
|
|
path->dentry = oe->lowerstack[idx - 1].dentry;
|
|
|
|
path->mnt = oe->lowerstack[idx - 1].layer->mnt;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (idx < oe->numlower) ? idx + 1 : -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-04 01:34:45 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Fix missing 'origin' xattr */
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
static int ovl_fix_origin(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *lower, struct dentry *upper)
|
2018-01-04 01:34:45 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ovl_check_origin_xattr(ofs, upper))
|
2018-01-04 01:34:45 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-19 17:26:17 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_set_origin(ofs, lower, upper);
|
2018-01-04 01:34:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
|
|
err = ovl_set_impure(dentry->d_parent, upper->d_parent);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ovl_entry *oe;
|
|
|
|
const struct cred *old_cred;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_fs *ofs = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_entry *poe = dentry->d_parent->d_fsdata;
|
2017-04-27 04:40:52 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_entry *roe = dentry->d_sb->s_root->d_fsdata;
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_path *stack = NULL, *origin_path = NULL;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *upperdir, *upperdentry = NULL;
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *origin = NULL;
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *index = NULL;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int ctr = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = NULL;
|
|
|
|
bool upperopaque = false;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
char *upperredirect = NULL;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *this;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
2020-06-01 23:56:51 +08:00
|
|
|
bool uppermetacopy = false;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_lookup_data d = {
|
ovl: detect overlapping layers
Overlapping overlay layers are not supported and can cause unexpected
behavior, but overlayfs does not currently check or warn about these
configurations.
User is not supposed to specify the same directory for upper and
lower dirs or for different lower layers and user is not supposed to
specify directories that are descendants of each other for overlay
layers, but that is exactly what this zysbot repro did:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=12c7a94f400000
Moving layer root directories into other layers while overlayfs
is mounted could also result in unexpected behavior.
This commit places "traps" in the overlay inode hash table.
Those traps are dummy overlay inodes that are hashed by the layers
root inodes.
On mount, the hash table trap entries are used to verify that overlay
layers are not overlapping. While at it, we also verify that overlay
layers are not overlapping with directories "in-use" by other overlay
instances as upperdir/workdir.
On lookup, the trap entries are used to verify that overlay layers
root inodes have not been moved into other layers after mount.
Some examples:
$ ./run --ov --samefs -s
...
( mkdir -p base/upper/0/u base/upper/0/w base/lower lower upper mnt
mount -o bind base/lower lower
mount -o bind base/upper upper
mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w)
$ umount mnt
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=base,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 94.434900] overlayfs: overlapping upperdir path
mount: mount overlay on mnt failed: Too many levels of symbolic links
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=upper/0/u,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 151.350132] overlayfs: conflicting lowerdir path
mount: none is already mounted or mnt busy
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower:lower/a,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 201.205045] overlayfs: overlapping lowerdir path
mount: mount overlay on mnt failed: Too many levels of symbolic links
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
$ mv base/upper/0/ base/lower/
$ find mnt/0
mnt/0
mnt/0/w
find: 'mnt/0/w/work': Too many levels of symbolic links
find: 'mnt/0/u': Too many levels of symbolic links
Reported-by: syzbot+9c69c282adc4edd2b540@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-04-18 22:42:08 +08:00
|
|
|
.sb = dentry->d_sb,
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
.name = dentry->d_name,
|
|
|
|
.is_dir = false,
|
|
|
|
.opaque = false,
|
|
|
|
.stop = false,
|
2018-03-10 04:44:41 +08:00
|
|
|
.last = ofs->config.redirect_follow ? false : !poe->numlower,
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
.redirect = NULL,
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
.metacopy = false,
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (dentry->d_name.len > ofs->namelen)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
|
2017-07-05 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry->d_parent);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (upperdir) {
|
2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
|
|
|
d.mnt = ovl_upper_mnt(ofs);
|
2020-05-26 09:35:57 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_lookup_layer(upperdir, &d, &upperdentry, true);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-17 22:04:22 +08:00
|
|
|
if (upperdentry && upperdentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REAL) {
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(upperdentry);
|
|
|
|
err = -EREMOTE;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (upperdentry && !d.is_dir) {
|
2017-06-21 20:28:34 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Lookup copy up origin by decoding origin file handle.
|
|
|
|
* We may get a disconnected dentry, which is fine,
|
|
|
|
* because we only need to hold the origin inode in
|
|
|
|
* cache and use its inode number. We may even get a
|
|
|
|
* connected dentry, that is not under any of the lower
|
|
|
|
* layers root. That is also fine for using it's inode
|
|
|
|
* number - it's the same as if we held a reference
|
|
|
|
* to a dentry in lower layer that was moved under us.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-06-21 20:50:01 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_check_origin(ofs, upperdentry, &origin_path);
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
2017-11-02 03:37:22 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out_put_upper;
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (d.metacopy)
|
2020-06-01 23:56:51 +08:00
|
|
|
uppermetacopy = true;
|
2017-04-30 19:46:31 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (d.redirect) {
|
2017-09-23 04:45:18 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
upperredirect = kstrdup(d.redirect, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!upperredirect)
|
|
|
|
goto out_put_upper;
|
|
|
|
if (d.redirect[0] == '/')
|
2017-04-27 04:40:52 +08:00
|
|
|
poe = roe;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
upperopaque = d.opaque;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!d.stop && poe->numlower) {
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
2019-11-15 20:12:40 +08:00
|
|
|
stack = kcalloc(ofs->numlayer - 1, sizeof(struct ovl_path),
|
2017-09-14 07:28:29 +08:00
|
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!stack)
|
|
|
|
goto out_put_upper;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; !d.stop && i < poe->numlower; i++) {
|
2017-07-24 14:57:54 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_path lower = poe->lowerstack[i];
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-10 04:44:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ofs->config.redirect_follow)
|
|
|
|
d.last = i == poe->numlower - 1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
d.last = lower.layer->idx == roe->numlower;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
|
|
|
d.mnt = lower.layer->mnt;
|
2020-05-26 09:35:57 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_lookup_layer(lower.dentry, &d, &this, false);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out_put;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!this)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-01 23:56:51 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((uppermetacopy || d.metacopy) && !ofs->config.metacopy) {
|
2021-03-30 00:49:07 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(this);
|
2020-06-01 23:56:51 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("refusing to follow metacopy origin for (%pd2)\n", dentry);
|
|
|
|
goto out_put;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-04 01:34:45 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If no origin fh is stored in upper of a merge dir, store fh
|
|
|
|
* of lower dir and set upper parent "impure".
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (upperdentry && !ctr && !ofs->noxattr && d.is_dir) {
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_fix_origin(ofs, dentry, this, upperdentry);
|
2018-01-04 01:34:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
dput(this);
|
|
|
|
goto out_put;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 04:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* When "verify_lower" feature is enabled, do not merge with a
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
* lower dir that does not match a stored origin xattr. In any
|
|
|
|
* case, only verified origin is used for index lookup.
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For non-dir dentry, if index=on, then ensure origin
|
|
|
|
* matches the dentry found using path based lookup,
|
|
|
|
* otherwise error out.
|
2018-01-11 04:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (upperdentry && !ctr &&
|
|
|
|
((d.is_dir && ovl_verify_lower(dentry->d_sb)) ||
|
|
|
|
(!d.is_dir && ofs->config.index && origin_path))) {
|
2020-09-02 16:58:49 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_verify_origin(ofs, upperdentry, this, false);
|
2018-01-11 04:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
dput(this);
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (d.is_dir)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
goto out_put;
|
2018-01-11 04:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
origin = this;
|
2018-01-11 04:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ovl: fix redirect traversal on metacopy dentries
Amir pointed me to metacopy test cases in unionmount-testsuite and I
decided to run "./run --ov=10 --meta" and it failed while running test
"rename-mass-5.py".
Problem is w.r.t absolute redirect traversal on intermediate metacopy
dentry. We do not store intermediate metacopy dentries and also skip
current loop/layer and move onto lookup in next layer. But at the end of
loop, we have logic to reset "poe" and layer index if currnently looked up
dentry has absolute redirect. We skip all that and that means lookup in
next layer will fail.
Following is simple test case to reproduce this.
- mkdir -p lower upper work merged lower/a lower/b
- touch lower/a/foo.txt
- mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work,metacopy=on none merged
# Following will create absolute redirect "/a/foo.txt" on upper/b/bar.txt.
- mv merged/a/foo.txt merged/b/bar.txt
# unmount overlay and use upper as lower layer (lower2) for next mount.
- umount merged
- mv upper lower2
- rm -rf work; mkdir -p upper work
- mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower2:lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work,metacopy=on none merged
# Force a metacopy copy-up
- chown bin:bin merged/b/bar.txt
# unmount overlay and use upper as lower layer (lower3) for next mount.
- umount merged
- mv upper lower3
- rm -rf work; mkdir -p upper work
- mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower3:lower2:lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work,metacopy=on none merged
# ls merged/b/bar.txt
ls: cannot access 'bar.txt': Input/output error
Intermediate lower layer (lower2) has metacopy dentry b/bar.txt with
absolute redirect "/a/foo.txt". We skipped redirect processing at the end
of loop which sets poe to roe and sets the appropriate next lower layer
index. And that means lookup failed in next layer.
Fix this by continuing the loop for any intermediate dentries. We still do
not save these at lower stack. With this fix applied unionmount-testsuite,
"./run --ov-10 --meta" now passes.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-06-02 23:23:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (d.metacopy && ctr) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Do not store intermediate metacopy dentries in
|
|
|
|
* lower chain, except top most lower metacopy dentry.
|
|
|
|
* Continue the loop so that if there is an absolute
|
|
|
|
* redirect on this dentry, poe can be reset to roe.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
dput(this);
|
|
|
|
this = NULL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
stack[ctr].dentry = this;
|
|
|
|
stack[ctr].layer = lower.layer;
|
|
|
|
ctr++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-12-11 18:28:10 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Following redirects can have security consequences: it's like
|
|
|
|
* a symlink into the lower layer without the permission checks.
|
|
|
|
* This is only a problem if the upper layer is untrusted (e.g
|
|
|
|
* comes from an USB drive). This can allow a non-readable file
|
|
|
|
* or directory to become readable.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Only following redirects when redirects are enabled disables
|
|
|
|
* this attack vector when not necessary.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
err = -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
if (d.redirect && !ofs->config.redirect_follow) {
|
2019-12-16 19:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("refusing to follow redirect for (%pd2)\n",
|
2017-12-18 20:25:56 +08:00
|
|
|
dentry);
|
2017-12-11 18:28:10 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out_put;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ovl: redirect_dir=nofollow should not follow redirect for opaque lower
redirect_dir=nofollow should not follow a redirect. But in a specific
configuration it can still follow it. For example try this.
$ mkdir -p lower0 lower1/foo upper work merged
$ touch lower1/foo/lower-file.txt
$ setfattr -n "trusted.overlay.opaque" -v "y" lower1/foo
$ mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower1:lower0,workdir=work,upperdir=upper,redirect_dir=on none merged
$ cd merged
$ mv foo foo-renamed
$ umount merged
# mount again. This time with redirect_dir=nofollow
$ mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower1:lower0,workdir=work,upperdir=upper,redirect_dir=nofollow none merged
$ ls merged/foo-renamed/
# This lists lower-file.txt, while it should not have.
Basically, we are doing redirect check after we check for d.stop. And
if this is not last lower, and we find an opaque lower, d.stop will be
set.
ovl_lookup_single()
if (!d->last && ovl_is_opaquedir(this)) {
d->stop = d->opaque = true;
goto out;
}
To fix this, first check redirect is allowed. And after that check if
d.stop has been set or not.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Fixes: 438c84c2f0c7 ("ovl: don't follow redirects if redirect_dir=off")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.15
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-02-02 23:23:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if (d.stop)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-27 04:40:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (d.redirect && d.redirect[0] == '/' && poe != roe) {
|
|
|
|
poe = roe;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Find the current layer on the root dentry */
|
2017-11-09 01:23:36 +08:00
|
|
|
i = lower.layer->idx - 1;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-01 23:56:51 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For regular non-metacopy upper dentries, there is no lower
|
|
|
|
* path based lookup, hence ctr will be zero. If a dentry is found
|
|
|
|
* using ORIGIN xattr on upper, install it in stack.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For metacopy dentry, path based lookup will find lower dentries.
|
|
|
|
* Just make sure a corresponding data dentry has been found.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (d.metacopy || (uppermetacopy && !ctr)) {
|
2020-08-23 22:38:17 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("metacopy with no lower data found - abort lookup (%pd2)\n",
|
|
|
|
dentry);
|
2020-06-01 23:56:51 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -EIO;
|
|
|
|
goto out_put;
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (!d.is_dir && upperdentry && !ctr && origin_path) {
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(stack != NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EIO;
|
|
|
|
goto out_put;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stack = origin_path;
|
|
|
|
ctr = 1;
|
ovl: simplify setting of origin for index lookup
overlayfs can keep index of copied up files and directories and it seems to
serve two primary puroposes. For regular files, it avoids breaking lower
hardlinks over copy up. For directories it seems to be used for various
error checks.
During ovl_lookup(), we lookup for index using lower dentry in many a
cases. That lower dentry is called "origin" and following is a summary of
current logic.
If there is no upperdentry, always lookup for index using lower dentry.
For regular files it helps avoiding breaking hard links over copyup and for
directories it seems to be just error checks.
If there is an upperdentry, then there are 3 possible cases.
- For directories, lower dentry is found using two ways. One is regular
path based lookup in lower layers and second is using ORIGIN xattr on
upper dentry. First verify that path based lookup lower dentry matches
the one pointed by upper ORIGIN xattr. If yes, use this verified origin
for index lookup.
- For regular files (non-metacopy), there is no path based lookup in lower
layers as lookup stops once we find upper dentry. So there is no origin
verification. If there is ORIGIN xattr present on upper, use that to
lookup index otherwise don't.
- For regular metacopy files, again lower dentry is found using path based
lookup as well as ORIGIN xattr on upper. Path based lookup is continued
in this case to find lower data dentry for metacopy upper. So like
directories we only use verified origin. If ORIGIN xattr is not present
(Either because lower did not support file handles or because this is
hardlink copied up with index=off), then don't use path lookup based
lower dentry as origin. This is same as regular non-metacopy file case.
Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-06-01 23:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
origin = origin_path->dentry;
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
origin_path = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
ovl: simplify setting of origin for index lookup
overlayfs can keep index of copied up files and directories and it seems to
serve two primary puroposes. For regular files, it avoids breaking lower
hardlinks over copy up. For directories it seems to be used for various
error checks.
During ovl_lookup(), we lookup for index using lower dentry in many a
cases. That lower dentry is called "origin" and following is a summary of
current logic.
If there is no upperdentry, always lookup for index using lower dentry.
For regular files it helps avoiding breaking hard links over copyup and for
directories it seems to be just error checks.
If there is an upperdentry, then there are 3 possible cases.
- For directories, lower dentry is found using two ways. One is regular
path based lookup in lower layers and second is using ORIGIN xattr on
upper dentry. First verify that path based lookup lower dentry matches
the one pointed by upper ORIGIN xattr. If yes, use this verified origin
for index lookup.
- For regular files (non-metacopy), there is no path based lookup in lower
layers as lookup stops once we find upper dentry. So there is no origin
verification. If there is ORIGIN xattr present on upper, use that to
lookup index otherwise don't.
- For regular metacopy files, again lower dentry is found using path based
lookup as well as ORIGIN xattr on upper. Path based lookup is continued
in this case to find lower data dentry for metacopy upper. So like
directories we only use verified origin. If ORIGIN xattr is not present
(Either because lower did not support file handles or because this is
hardlink copied up with index=off), then don't use path lookup based
lower dentry as origin. This is same as regular non-metacopy file case.
Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-06-01 23:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
* Always lookup index if there is no-upperdentry.
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
ovl: simplify setting of origin for index lookup
overlayfs can keep index of copied up files and directories and it seems to
serve two primary puroposes. For regular files, it avoids breaking lower
hardlinks over copy up. For directories it seems to be used for various
error checks.
During ovl_lookup(), we lookup for index using lower dentry in many a
cases. That lower dentry is called "origin" and following is a summary of
current logic.
If there is no upperdentry, always lookup for index using lower dentry.
For regular files it helps avoiding breaking hard links over copyup and for
directories it seems to be just error checks.
If there is an upperdentry, then there are 3 possible cases.
- For directories, lower dentry is found using two ways. One is regular
path based lookup in lower layers and second is using ORIGIN xattr on
upper dentry. First verify that path based lookup lower dentry matches
the one pointed by upper ORIGIN xattr. If yes, use this verified origin
for index lookup.
- For regular files (non-metacopy), there is no path based lookup in lower
layers as lookup stops once we find upper dentry. So there is no origin
verification. If there is ORIGIN xattr present on upper, use that to
lookup index otherwise don't.
- For regular metacopy files, again lower dentry is found using path based
lookup as well as ORIGIN xattr on upper. Path based lookup is continued
in this case to find lower data dentry for metacopy upper. So like
directories we only use verified origin. If ORIGIN xattr is not present
(Either because lower did not support file handles or because this is
hardlink copied up with index=off), then don't use path lookup based
lower dentry as origin. This is same as regular non-metacopy file case.
Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-06-01 23:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
* For the case of upperdentry, we have set origin by now if it
|
|
|
|
* needed to be set. There are basically three cases.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For directories, lookup index by lower inode and verify it matches
|
|
|
|
* upper inode. We only trust dir index if we verified that lower dir
|
|
|
|
* matches origin, otherwise dir index entries may be inconsistent
|
|
|
|
* and we ignore them.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For regular upper, we already set origin if upper had ORIGIN
|
|
|
|
* xattr. There is no verification though as there is no path
|
|
|
|
* based dentry lookup in lower in this case.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For metacopy upper, we set a verified origin already if index
|
|
|
|
* is enabled and if upper had an ORIGIN xattr.
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
ovl: simplify setting of origin for index lookup
overlayfs can keep index of copied up files and directories and it seems to
serve two primary puroposes. For regular files, it avoids breaking lower
hardlinks over copy up. For directories it seems to be used for various
error checks.
During ovl_lookup(), we lookup for index using lower dentry in many a
cases. That lower dentry is called "origin" and following is a summary of
current logic.
If there is no upperdentry, always lookup for index using lower dentry.
For regular files it helps avoiding breaking hard links over copyup and for
directories it seems to be just error checks.
If there is an upperdentry, then there are 3 possible cases.
- For directories, lower dentry is found using two ways. One is regular
path based lookup in lower layers and second is using ORIGIN xattr on
upper dentry. First verify that path based lookup lower dentry matches
the one pointed by upper ORIGIN xattr. If yes, use this verified origin
for index lookup.
- For regular files (non-metacopy), there is no path based lookup in lower
layers as lookup stops once we find upper dentry. So there is no origin
verification. If there is ORIGIN xattr present on upper, use that to
lookup index otherwise don't.
- For regular metacopy files, again lower dentry is found using path based
lookup as well as ORIGIN xattr on upper. Path based lookup is continued
in this case to find lower data dentry for metacopy upper. So like
directories we only use verified origin. If ORIGIN xattr is not present
(Either because lower did not support file handles or because this is
hardlink copied up with index=off), then don't use path lookup based
lower dentry as origin. This is same as regular non-metacopy file case.
Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-06-01 23:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!upperdentry && ctr)
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
origin = stack[0].dentry;
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 16:47:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (origin && ovl_indexdir(dentry->d_sb) &&
|
|
|
|
(!d.is_dir || ovl_index_all(dentry->d_sb))) {
|
2018-01-17 20:40:27 +08:00
|
|
|
index = ovl_lookup_index(ofs, upperdentry, origin, true);
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(index)) {
|
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(index);
|
|
|
|
index = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_put;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
oe = ovl_alloc_entry(ctr);
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
if (!oe)
|
|
|
|
goto out_put;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-24 14:57:54 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(oe->lowerstack, stack, sizeof(struct ovl_path) * ctr);
|
2017-07-05 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
dentry->d_fsdata = oe;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-01-15 01:25:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (upperopaque)
|
|
|
|
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(dentry);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-05 04:03:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (upperdentry)
|
|
|
|
ovl_dentry_set_upper_alias(dentry);
|
2018-05-11 23:49:32 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (index) {
|
2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
|
|
|
struct path upperpath = {
|
|
|
|
.dentry = upperdentry = dget(index),
|
|
|
|
.mnt = ovl_upper_mnt(ofs),
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
upperredirect = ovl_get_redirect_xattr(ofs, &upperpath, 0);
|
2018-05-11 23:49:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(upperredirect)) {
|
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(upperredirect);
|
|
|
|
upperredirect = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_free_oe;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-04-04 18:51:50 +08:00
|
|
|
err = ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(ofs, &upperpath);
|
2020-07-15 21:38:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out_free_oe;
|
|
|
|
uppermetacopy = err;
|
2018-05-11 23:49:32 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-05 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
if (upperdentry || ctr) {
|
2018-05-08 21:27:21 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ovl_inode_params oip = {
|
|
|
|
.upperdentry = upperdentry,
|
|
|
|
.lowerpath = stack,
|
|
|
|
.index = index,
|
|
|
|
.numlower = ctr,
|
2018-05-11 23:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
.redirect = upperredirect,
|
2018-05-11 23:49:30 +08:00
|
|
|
.lowerdata = (ctr > 1 && !d.is_dir) ?
|
|
|
|
stack[ctr - 1].dentry : NULL,
|
2018-05-08 21:27:21 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
inode = ovl_get_inode(dentry->d_sb, &oip);
|
2017-07-05 04:03:17 +08:00
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(inode))
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out_free_oe;
|
2020-06-01 23:56:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (upperdentry && !uppermetacopy)
|
|
|
|
ovl_set_flag(OVL_UPPERDATA, inode);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-17 22:04:22 +08:00
|
|
|
ovl_dentry_update_reval(dentry, upperdentry,
|
|
|
|
DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE | DCACHE_OP_WEAK_REVALIDATE);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (origin_path) {
|
|
|
|
dput(origin_path->dentry);
|
|
|
|
kfree(origin_path);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(index);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(stack);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(d.redirect);
|
2017-09-30 02:43:07 +08:00
|
|
|
return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_free_oe:
|
2017-07-05 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
dentry->d_fsdata = NULL;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(oe);
|
|
|
|
out_put:
|
2017-06-21 20:28:41 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(index);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ctr; i++)
|
|
|
|
dput(stack[i].dentry);
|
|
|
|
kfree(stack);
|
|
|
|
out_put_upper:
|
2018-05-11 23:49:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (origin_path) {
|
|
|
|
dput(origin_path->dentry);
|
|
|
|
kfree(origin_path);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(upperdentry);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(upperredirect);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(d.redirect);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ovl_entry *poe = dentry->d_parent->d_fsdata;
|
|
|
|
const struct qstr *name = &dentry->d_name;
|
2017-11-10 19:18:07 +08:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *old_cred;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
|
|
bool positive = false;
|
|
|
|
bool done = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If dentry is negative, then lower is positive iff this is a
|
|
|
|
* whiteout.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!dentry->d_inode)
|
2018-01-15 01:25:31 +08:00
|
|
|
return ovl_dentry_is_opaque(dentry);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Negative upper -> positive lower */
|
2017-07-05 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry))
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-10 19:18:07 +08:00
|
|
|
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Positive upper -> have to look up lower to see whether it exists */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; !done && !positive && i < poe->numlower; i++) {
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *this;
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *lowerdir = poe->lowerstack[i].dentry;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-04 18:51:52 +08:00
|
|
|
this = lookup_one_positive_unlocked(mnt_user_ns(poe->lowerstack[i].layer->mnt),
|
|
|
|
name->name, lowerdir, name->len);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(this)) {
|
|
|
|
switch (PTR_ERR(this)) {
|
|
|
|
case -ENOENT:
|
|
|
|
case -ENAMETOOLONG:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Assume something is there, we just couldn't
|
|
|
|
* access it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
positive = true;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2019-10-31 13:21:58 +08:00
|
|
|
positive = !ovl_is_whiteout(this);
|
|
|
|
done = true;
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(this);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-11-10 19:18:07 +08:00
|
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
2016-12-16 18:02:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return positive;
|
|
|
|
}
|