OpenCloudOS-Kernel/crypto/algif_hash.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* algif_hash: User-space interface for hash algorithms
*
* This file provides the user-space API for hash algorithms.
*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
*/
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/if_alg.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
struct hash_ctx {
struct af_alg_sgl sgl;
u8 *result;
struct crypto_wait wait;
unsigned int len;
bool more;
struct ahash_request req;
};
static int hash_alloc_result(struct sock *sk, struct hash_ctx *ctx)
{
unsigned ds;
if (ctx->result)
return 0;
ds = crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(&ctx->req));
ctx->result = sock_kmalloc(sk, ds, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->result)
return -ENOMEM;
memset(ctx->result, 0, ds);
return 0;
}
static void hash_free_result(struct sock *sk, struct hash_ctx *ctx)
{
unsigned ds;
if (!ctx->result)
return;
ds = crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(&ctx->req));
sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->result, ds);
ctx->result = NULL;
}
static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t ignored)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
ssize_t copied = 0;
size_t len, max_pages, npages;
bool continuing, need_init = false;
int err;
max_pages = min_t(size_t, ALG_MAX_PAGES,
DIV_ROUND_UP(sk->sk_sndbuf, PAGE_SIZE));
lock_sock(sk);
continuing = ctx->more;
if (!continuing) {
crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE) If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped. Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg() function. If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be ignored. Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen. Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Reported-by: syzbot+13a08c0bf4d212766c3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b928f705fdeb873a@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+14234ccf6d0ef629ec1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000c047db05fdeb8790@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+4e2e47f32607d0f72d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000bcca3205fdeb87fb@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+472626bb5e7c59fb768f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b55d8805fdeb8385@google.com/ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6efc50cc1f8d718d6cb7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/427646.1686913832@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-06-16 19:10:32 +08:00
/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */
hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
if (!msg_data_left(msg))
goto done; /* Zero-length; don't start new req */
need_init = true;
crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE) If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped. Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg() function. If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be ignored. Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen. Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Reported-by: syzbot+13a08c0bf4d212766c3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b928f705fdeb873a@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+14234ccf6d0ef629ec1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000c047db05fdeb8790@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+4e2e47f32607d0f72d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000bcca3205fdeb87fb@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+472626bb5e7c59fb768f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b55d8805fdeb8385@google.com/ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6efc50cc1f8d718d6cb7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/427646.1686913832@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-06-16 19:10:32 +08:00
} else if (!msg_data_left(msg)) {
/*
* No data - finalise the prev req if MSG_MORE so any error
* comes out here.
*/
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
if (err)
goto unlock_free;
ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL,
ctx->result, 0);
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req),
&ctx->wait);
if (err)
goto unlock_free;
}
goto done_more;
}
while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = ctx->sgl.sgl;
ctx->sgl.sgt.nents = 0;
ctx->sgl.sgt.orig_nents = 0;
err = -EIO;
npages = iov_iter_npages(&msg->msg_iter, max_pages);
if (npages == 0)
goto unlock_free;
sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, npages);
ctx->sgl.need_unpin = iov_iter_extract_will_pin(&msg->msg_iter);
err = extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, LONG_MAX,
&ctx->sgl.sgt, npages, 0);
if (err < 0)
goto unlock_free;
len = err;
sg_mark_end(ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl + ctx->sgl.sgt.nents - 1);
if (!msg_data_left(msg)) {
err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
if (err)
goto unlock_free;
}
ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl,
ctx->result, len);
if (!msg_data_left(msg) && !continuing &&
!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
err = crypto_ahash_digest(&ctx->req);
} else {
if (need_init) {
err = crypto_wait_req(
crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req),
&ctx->wait);
if (err)
goto unlock_free;
need_init = false;
}
if (msg_data_left(msg) || (msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
err = crypto_ahash_update(&ctx->req);
else
err = crypto_ahash_finup(&ctx->req);
continuing = true;
}
err = crypto_wait_req(err, &ctx->wait);
if (err)
goto unlock_free;
copied += len;
af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
}
crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE) If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped. Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg() function. If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be ignored. Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen. Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Reported-by: syzbot+13a08c0bf4d212766c3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b928f705fdeb873a@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+14234ccf6d0ef629ec1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000c047db05fdeb8790@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+4e2e47f32607d0f72d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000bcca3205fdeb87fb@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+472626bb5e7c59fb768f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b55d8805fdeb8385@google.com/ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6efc50cc1f8d718d6cb7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/427646.1686913832@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-06-16 19:10:32 +08:00
done_more:
ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE;
crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE) If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped. Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg() function. If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be ignored. Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen. Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Reported-by: syzbot+13a08c0bf4d212766c3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b928f705fdeb873a@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+14234ccf6d0ef629ec1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000c047db05fdeb8790@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+4e2e47f32607d0f72d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000bcca3205fdeb87fb@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+472626bb5e7c59fb768f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b55d8805fdeb8385@google.com/ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6efc50cc1f8d718d6cb7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/427646.1686913832@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-06-16 19:10:32 +08:00
done:
err = 0;
unlock:
release_sock(sk);
return copied ?: err;
unlock_free:
af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE) If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped. Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg() function. If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be ignored. Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen. Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Reported-by: syzbot+13a08c0bf4d212766c3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b928f705fdeb873a@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+14234ccf6d0ef629ec1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000c047db05fdeb8790@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+4e2e47f32607d0f72d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000bcca3205fdeb87fb@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+472626bb5e7c59fb768f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b55d8805fdeb8385@google.com/ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6efc50cc1f8d718d6cb7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/427646.1686913832@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-06-16 19:10:32 +08:00
hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
ctx->more = false;
goto unlock;
}
static int hash_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
unsigned ds = crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(&ctx->req));
bool result;
int err;
if (len > ds)
len = ds;
else if (len < ds)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
lock_sock(sk);
result = ctx->result;
err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
if (err)
goto unlock;
ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL, ctx->result, 0);
if (!result && !ctx->more) {
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req),
&ctx->wait);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
if (!result || ctx->more) {
ctx->more = false;
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req),
&ctx->wait);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
err = memcpy_to_msg(msg, ctx->result, len);
unlock:
hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
release_sock(sk);
return err ?: len;
}
net: Work around lockdep limitation in sockets that use sockets Lockdep issues a circular dependency warning when AFS issues an operation through AF_RXRPC from a context in which the VFS/VM holds the mmap_sem. The theory lockdep comes up with is as follows: (1) If the pagefault handler decides it needs to read pages from AFS, it calls AFS with mmap_sem held and AFS begins an AF_RXRPC call, but creating a call requires the socket lock: mmap_sem must be taken before sk_lock-AF_RXRPC (2) afs_open_socket() opens an AF_RXRPC socket and binds it. rxrpc_bind() binds the underlying UDP socket whilst holding its socket lock. inet_bind() takes its own socket lock: sk_lock-AF_RXRPC must be taken before sk_lock-AF_INET (3) Reading from a TCP socket into a userspace buffer might cause a fault and thus cause the kernel to take the mmap_sem, but the TCP socket is locked whilst doing this: sk_lock-AF_INET must be taken before mmap_sem However, lockdep's theory is wrong in this instance because it deals only with lock classes and not individual locks. The AF_INET lock in (2) isn't really equivalent to the AF_INET lock in (3) as the former deals with a socket entirely internal to the kernel that never sees userspace. This is a limitation in the design of lockdep. Fix the general case by: (1) Double up all the locking keys used in sockets so that one set are used if the socket is created by userspace and the other set is used if the socket is created by the kernel. (2) Store the kern parameter passed to sk_alloc() in a variable in the sock struct (sk_kern_sock). This informs sock_lock_init(), sock_init_data() and sk_clone_lock() as to the lock keys to be used. Note that the child created by sk_clone_lock() inherits the parent's kern setting. (3) Add a 'kern' parameter to ->accept() that is analogous to the one passed in to ->create() that distinguishes whether kernel_accept() or sys_accept4() was the caller and can be passed to sk_alloc(). Note that a lot of accept functions merely dequeue an already allocated socket. I haven't touched these as the new socket already exists before we get the parameter. Note also that there are a couple of places where I've made the accepted socket unconditionally kernel-based: irda_accept() rds_rcp_accept_one() tcp_accept_from_sock() because they follow a sock_create_kern() and accept off of that. Whilst creating this, I noticed that lustre and ocfs don't create sockets through sock_create_kern() and thus they aren't marked as for-kernel, though they appear to be internal. I wonder if these should do that so that they use the new set of lock keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-09 16:09:05 +08:00
static int hash_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags,
bool kern)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
struct ahash_request *req = &ctx->req;
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
struct sock *sk2;
struct alg_sock *ask2;
struct hash_ctx *ctx2;
char *state;
bool more;
int err;
tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
state = kmalloc(crypto_ahash_statesize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!state)
goto out;
lock_sock(sk);
more = ctx->more;
err = more ? crypto_ahash_export(req, state) : 0;
release_sock(sk);
if (err)
goto out_free_state;
net: Work around lockdep limitation in sockets that use sockets Lockdep issues a circular dependency warning when AFS issues an operation through AF_RXRPC from a context in which the VFS/VM holds the mmap_sem. The theory lockdep comes up with is as follows: (1) If the pagefault handler decides it needs to read pages from AFS, it calls AFS with mmap_sem held and AFS begins an AF_RXRPC call, but creating a call requires the socket lock: mmap_sem must be taken before sk_lock-AF_RXRPC (2) afs_open_socket() opens an AF_RXRPC socket and binds it. rxrpc_bind() binds the underlying UDP socket whilst holding its socket lock. inet_bind() takes its own socket lock: sk_lock-AF_RXRPC must be taken before sk_lock-AF_INET (3) Reading from a TCP socket into a userspace buffer might cause a fault and thus cause the kernel to take the mmap_sem, but the TCP socket is locked whilst doing this: sk_lock-AF_INET must be taken before mmap_sem However, lockdep's theory is wrong in this instance because it deals only with lock classes and not individual locks. The AF_INET lock in (2) isn't really equivalent to the AF_INET lock in (3) as the former deals with a socket entirely internal to the kernel that never sees userspace. This is a limitation in the design of lockdep. Fix the general case by: (1) Double up all the locking keys used in sockets so that one set are used if the socket is created by userspace and the other set is used if the socket is created by the kernel. (2) Store the kern parameter passed to sk_alloc() in a variable in the sock struct (sk_kern_sock). This informs sock_lock_init(), sock_init_data() and sk_clone_lock() as to the lock keys to be used. Note that the child created by sk_clone_lock() inherits the parent's kern setting. (3) Add a 'kern' parameter to ->accept() that is analogous to the one passed in to ->create() that distinguishes whether kernel_accept() or sys_accept4() was the caller and can be passed to sk_alloc(). Note that a lot of accept functions merely dequeue an already allocated socket. I haven't touched these as the new socket already exists before we get the parameter. Note also that there are a couple of places where I've made the accepted socket unconditionally kernel-based: irda_accept() rds_rcp_accept_one() tcp_accept_from_sock() because they follow a sock_create_kern() and accept off of that. Whilst creating this, I noticed that lustre and ocfs don't create sockets through sock_create_kern() and thus they aren't marked as for-kernel, though they appear to be internal. I wonder if these should do that so that they use the new set of lock keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-09 16:09:05 +08:00
err = af_alg_accept(ask->parent, newsock, kern);
if (err)
goto out_free_state;
sk2 = newsock->sk;
ask2 = alg_sk(sk2);
ctx2 = ask2->private;
ctx2->more = more;
if (!more)
goto out_free_state;
err = crypto_ahash_import(&ctx2->req, state);
if (err) {
sock_orphan(sk2);
sock_put(sk2);
}
out_free_state:
kfree_sensitive(state);
out:
return err;
}
static struct proto_ops algif_hash_ops = {
.family = PF_ALG,
.connect = sock_no_connect,
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair,
.getname = sock_no_getname,
.ioctl = sock_no_ioctl,
.listen = sock_no_listen,
.shutdown = sock_no_shutdown,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.bind = sock_no_bind,
.release = af_alg_release,
.sendmsg = hash_sendmsg,
.recvmsg = hash_recvmsg,
.accept = hash_accept,
};
static int hash_check_key(struct socket *sock)
{
int err = 0;
struct sock *psk;
struct alg_sock *pask;
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-04 03:16:27 +08:00
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
if (!atomic_read(&ask->nokey_refcnt))
goto unlock_child;
psk = ask->parent;
pask = alg_sk(ask->parent);
tfm = pask->private;
err = -ENOKEY;
lock_sock_nested(psk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-04 03:16:27 +08:00
if (crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
goto unlock;
atomic_dec(&pask->nokey_refcnt);
atomic_set(&ask->nokey_refcnt, 0);
err = 0;
unlock:
release_sock(psk);
unlock_child:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
static int hash_sendmsg_nokey(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size)
{
int err;
err = hash_check_key(sock);
if (err)
return err;
return hash_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
}
static int hash_recvmsg_nokey(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t ignored, int flags)
{
int err;
err = hash_check_key(sock);
if (err)
return err;
return hash_recvmsg(sock, msg, ignored, flags);
}
static int hash_accept_nokey(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock,
net: Work around lockdep limitation in sockets that use sockets Lockdep issues a circular dependency warning when AFS issues an operation through AF_RXRPC from a context in which the VFS/VM holds the mmap_sem. The theory lockdep comes up with is as follows: (1) If the pagefault handler decides it needs to read pages from AFS, it calls AFS with mmap_sem held and AFS begins an AF_RXRPC call, but creating a call requires the socket lock: mmap_sem must be taken before sk_lock-AF_RXRPC (2) afs_open_socket() opens an AF_RXRPC socket and binds it. rxrpc_bind() binds the underlying UDP socket whilst holding its socket lock. inet_bind() takes its own socket lock: sk_lock-AF_RXRPC must be taken before sk_lock-AF_INET (3) Reading from a TCP socket into a userspace buffer might cause a fault and thus cause the kernel to take the mmap_sem, but the TCP socket is locked whilst doing this: sk_lock-AF_INET must be taken before mmap_sem However, lockdep's theory is wrong in this instance because it deals only with lock classes and not individual locks. The AF_INET lock in (2) isn't really equivalent to the AF_INET lock in (3) as the former deals with a socket entirely internal to the kernel that never sees userspace. This is a limitation in the design of lockdep. Fix the general case by: (1) Double up all the locking keys used in sockets so that one set are used if the socket is created by userspace and the other set is used if the socket is created by the kernel. (2) Store the kern parameter passed to sk_alloc() in a variable in the sock struct (sk_kern_sock). This informs sock_lock_init(), sock_init_data() and sk_clone_lock() as to the lock keys to be used. Note that the child created by sk_clone_lock() inherits the parent's kern setting. (3) Add a 'kern' parameter to ->accept() that is analogous to the one passed in to ->create() that distinguishes whether kernel_accept() or sys_accept4() was the caller and can be passed to sk_alloc(). Note that a lot of accept functions merely dequeue an already allocated socket. I haven't touched these as the new socket already exists before we get the parameter. Note also that there are a couple of places where I've made the accepted socket unconditionally kernel-based: irda_accept() rds_rcp_accept_one() tcp_accept_from_sock() because they follow a sock_create_kern() and accept off of that. Whilst creating this, I noticed that lustre and ocfs don't create sockets through sock_create_kern() and thus they aren't marked as for-kernel, though they appear to be internal. I wonder if these should do that so that they use the new set of lock keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-09 16:09:05 +08:00
int flags, bool kern)
{
int err;
err = hash_check_key(sock);
if (err)
return err;
net: Work around lockdep limitation in sockets that use sockets Lockdep issues a circular dependency warning when AFS issues an operation through AF_RXRPC from a context in which the VFS/VM holds the mmap_sem. The theory lockdep comes up with is as follows: (1) If the pagefault handler decides it needs to read pages from AFS, it calls AFS with mmap_sem held and AFS begins an AF_RXRPC call, but creating a call requires the socket lock: mmap_sem must be taken before sk_lock-AF_RXRPC (2) afs_open_socket() opens an AF_RXRPC socket and binds it. rxrpc_bind() binds the underlying UDP socket whilst holding its socket lock. inet_bind() takes its own socket lock: sk_lock-AF_RXRPC must be taken before sk_lock-AF_INET (3) Reading from a TCP socket into a userspace buffer might cause a fault and thus cause the kernel to take the mmap_sem, but the TCP socket is locked whilst doing this: sk_lock-AF_INET must be taken before mmap_sem However, lockdep's theory is wrong in this instance because it deals only with lock classes and not individual locks. The AF_INET lock in (2) isn't really equivalent to the AF_INET lock in (3) as the former deals with a socket entirely internal to the kernel that never sees userspace. This is a limitation in the design of lockdep. Fix the general case by: (1) Double up all the locking keys used in sockets so that one set are used if the socket is created by userspace and the other set is used if the socket is created by the kernel. (2) Store the kern parameter passed to sk_alloc() in a variable in the sock struct (sk_kern_sock). This informs sock_lock_init(), sock_init_data() and sk_clone_lock() as to the lock keys to be used. Note that the child created by sk_clone_lock() inherits the parent's kern setting. (3) Add a 'kern' parameter to ->accept() that is analogous to the one passed in to ->create() that distinguishes whether kernel_accept() or sys_accept4() was the caller and can be passed to sk_alloc(). Note that a lot of accept functions merely dequeue an already allocated socket. I haven't touched these as the new socket already exists before we get the parameter. Note also that there are a couple of places where I've made the accepted socket unconditionally kernel-based: irda_accept() rds_rcp_accept_one() tcp_accept_from_sock() because they follow a sock_create_kern() and accept off of that. Whilst creating this, I noticed that lustre and ocfs don't create sockets through sock_create_kern() and thus they aren't marked as for-kernel, though they appear to be internal. I wonder if these should do that so that they use the new set of lock keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-09 16:09:05 +08:00
return hash_accept(sock, newsock, flags, kern);
}
static struct proto_ops algif_hash_ops_nokey = {
.family = PF_ALG,
.connect = sock_no_connect,
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair,
.getname = sock_no_getname,
.ioctl = sock_no_ioctl,
.listen = sock_no_listen,
.shutdown = sock_no_shutdown,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.bind = sock_no_bind,
.release = af_alg_release,
.sendmsg = hash_sendmsg_nokey,
.recvmsg = hash_recvmsg_nokey,
.accept = hash_accept_nokey,
};
static void *hash_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-04 03:16:27 +08:00
return crypto_alloc_ahash(name, type, mask);
}
static void hash_release(void *private)
{
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-04 03:16:27 +08:00
crypto_free_ahash(private);
}
static int hash_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-04 03:16:27 +08:00
return crypto_ahash_setkey(private, key, keylen);
}
static void hash_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len);
af_alg_release_parent(sk);
}
static int hash_accept_parent_nokey(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-04 03:16:27 +08:00
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = private;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-04 03:16:27 +08:00
struct hash_ctx *ctx;
unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm);
ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->result = NULL;
ctx->len = len;
ctx->more = false;
crypto_init_wait(&ctx->wait);
ask->private = ctx;
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-04 03:16:27 +08:00
ahash_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, tfm);
ahash_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
crypto_req_done, &ctx->wait);
sk->sk_destruct = hash_sock_destruct;
return 0;
}
static int hash_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-04 03:16:27 +08:00
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = private;
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-04 03:16:27 +08:00
if (crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
return -ENOKEY;
return hash_accept_parent_nokey(private, sk);
}
static const struct af_alg_type algif_type_hash = {
.bind = hash_bind,
.release = hash_release,
.setkey = hash_setkey,
.accept = hash_accept_parent,
.accept_nokey = hash_accept_parent_nokey,
.ops = &algif_hash_ops,
.ops_nokey = &algif_hash_ops_nokey,
.name = "hash",
.owner = THIS_MODULE
};
static int __init algif_hash_init(void)
{
return af_alg_register_type(&algif_type_hash);
}
static void __exit algif_hash_exit(void)
{
int err = af_alg_unregister_type(&algif_type_hash);
BUG_ON(err);
}
module_init(algif_hash_init);
module_exit(algif_hash_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");