OpenCloudOS-Kernel/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* sysctl_net_ipv4.c: sysctl interface to net IPV4 subsystem.
*
* Begun April 1, 1996, Mike Shaver.
* Added /proc/sys/net/ipv4 directory entry (empty =) ). [MS]
*/
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/igmp.h>
#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
#include <linux/seqlock.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <net/snmp.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
#include <net/inet_frag.h>
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
#include <net/ping.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/netevent.h>
static int zero;
static int one = 1;
net-tcp: extend tcp_tw_reuse sysctl to enable loopback only optimization This changes the /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tw_reuse from a boolean to an integer. It now takes the values 0, 1 and 2, where 0 and 1 behave as before, while 2 enables timewait socket reuse only for sockets that we can prove are loopback connections: ie. bound to 'lo' interface or where one of source or destination IPs is 127.0.0.0/8, ::ffff:127.0.0.0/104 or ::1. This enables quicker reuse of ephemeral ports for loopback connections - where tcp_tw_reuse is 100% safe from a protocol perspective (this assumes no artificially induced packet loss on 'lo'). This also makes estblishing many loopback connections *much* faster (allocating ports out of the first half of the ephemeral port range is significantly faster, then allocating from the second half) Without this change in a 32K ephemeral port space my sample program (it just establishes and closes [::1]:ephemeral -> [::1]:server_port connections in a tight loop) fails after 32765 connections in 24 seconds. With it enabled 50000 connections only take 4.7 seconds. This is particularly problematic for IPv6 where we only have one local address and cannot play tricks with varying source IP from 127.0.0.0/8 pool. Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Change-Id: I0377961749979d0301b7b62871a32a4b34b654e1 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-06-04 01:41:17 +08:00
static int two = 2;
tcp: Tail loss probe (TLP) This patch series implement the Tail loss probe (TLP) algorithm described in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dukkipati-tcpm-tcp-loss-probe-01. The first patch implements the basic algorithm. TLP's goal is to reduce tail latency of short transactions. It achieves this by converting retransmission timeouts (RTOs) occuring due to tail losses (losses at end of transactions) into fast recovery. TLP transmits one packet in two round-trips when a connection is in Open state and isn't receiving any ACKs. The transmitted packet, aka loss probe, can be either new or a retransmission. When there is tail loss, the ACK from a loss probe triggers FACK/early-retransmit based fast recovery, thus avoiding a costly RTO. In the absence of loss, there is no change in the connection state. PTO stands for probe timeout. It is a timer event indicating that an ACK is overdue and triggers a loss probe packet. The PTO value is set to max(2*SRTT, 10ms) and is adjusted to account for delayed ACK timer when there is only one oustanding packet. TLP Algorithm On transmission of new data in Open state: -> packets_out > 1: schedule PTO in max(2*SRTT, 10ms). -> packets_out == 1: schedule PTO in max(2*RTT, 1.5*RTT + 200ms) -> PTO = min(PTO, RTO) Conditions for scheduling PTO: -> Connection is in Open state. -> Connection is either cwnd limited or no new data to send. -> Number of probes per tail loss episode is limited to one. -> Connection is SACK enabled. When PTO fires: new_segment_exists: -> transmit new segment. -> packets_out++. cwnd remains same. no_new_packet: -> retransmit the last segment. Its ACK triggers FACK or early retransmit based recovery. ACK path: -> rearm RTO at start of ACK processing. -> reschedule PTO if need be. In addition, the patch includes a small variation to the Early Retransmit (ER) algorithm, such that ER and TLP together can in principle recover any N-degree of tail loss through fast recovery. TLP is controlled by the same sysctl as ER, tcp_early_retrans sysctl. tcp_early_retrans==0; disables TLP and ER. ==1; enables RFC5827 ER. ==2; delayed ER. ==3; TLP and delayed ER. [DEFAULT] ==4; TLP only. The TLP patch series have been extensively tested on Google Web servers. It is most effective for short Web trasactions, where it reduced RTOs by 15% and improved HTTP response time (average by 6%, 99th percentile by 10%). The transmitted probes account for <0.5% of the overall transmissions. Signed-off-by: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-03-11 18:00:43 +08:00
static int four = 4;
static int thousand = 1000;
tcp: TSO packets automatic sizing After hearing many people over past years complaining against TSO being bursty or even buggy, we are proud to present automatic sizing of TSO packets. One part of the problem is that tcp_tso_should_defer() uses an heuristic relying on upcoming ACKS instead of a timer, but more generally, having big TSO packets makes little sense for low rates, as it tends to create micro bursts on the network, and general consensus is to reduce the buffering amount. This patch introduces a per socket sk_pacing_rate, that approximates the current sending rate, and allows us to size the TSO packets so that we try to send one packet every ms. This field could be set by other transports. Patch has no impact for high speed flows, where having large TSO packets makes sense to reach line rate. For other flows, this helps better packet scheduling and ACK clocking. This patch increases performance of TCP flows in lossy environments. A new sysctl (tcp_min_tso_segs) is added, to specify the minimal size of a TSO packet (default being 2). A follow-up patch will provide a new packet scheduler (FQ), using sk_pacing_rate as an input to perform optional per flow pacing. This explains why we chose to set sk_pacing_rate to twice the current rate, allowing 'slow start' ramp up. sk_pacing_rate = 2 * cwnd * mss / srtt v2: Neal Cardwell reported a suspect deferring of last two segments on initial write of 10 MSS, I had to change tcp_tso_should_defer() to take into account tp->xmit_size_goal_segs Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Van Jacobson <vanj@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-27 20:46:32 +08:00
static int gso_max_segs = GSO_MAX_SEGS;
static int tcp_retr1_max = 255;
static int ip_local_port_range_min[] = { 1, 1 };
static int ip_local_port_range_max[] = { 65535, 65535 };
static int tcp_adv_win_scale_min = -31;
static int tcp_adv_win_scale_max = 31;
static int ip_privileged_port_min;
static int ip_privileged_port_max = 65535;
static int ip_ttl_min = 1;
static int ip_ttl_max = 255;
static int tcp_syn_retries_min = 1;
static int tcp_syn_retries_max = MAX_TCP_SYNCNT;
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
static int ip_ping_group_range_min[] = { 0, 0 };
static int ip_ping_group_range_max[] = { GID_T_MAX, GID_T_MAX };
static int comp_sack_nr_max = 255;
/* obsolete */
static int sysctl_tcp_low_latency __read_mostly;
/* Update system visible IP port range */
static void set_local_port_range(struct net *net, int range[2])
{
bool same_parity = !((range[0] ^ range[1]) & 1);
ipv4: disable BH when changing ip local port range This fixes the following lockdep warning: [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.3.0-rc7+ #1197 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-R} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. sysctl/1019 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.lock)->seqcount){+.+-..}, at: [<ffffffff81921de7>] ipv4_local_port_range+0xb4/0x12a {IN-SOFTIRQ-R} state was registered at: [<ffffffff810bd682>] __lock_acquire+0x2f6/0xdf0 [<ffffffff810be6d5>] lock_acquire+0x11c/0x1a4 [<ffffffff818e599c>] inet_get_local_port_range+0x4e/0xae [<ffffffff8166e8e3>] udp_flow_src_port.constprop.40+0x23/0x116 [<ffffffff81671cb9>] vxlan_xmit_one+0x219/0xa6a [<ffffffff81672f75>] vxlan_xmit+0xa6b/0xaa5 [<ffffffff817f2deb>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2ae/0x465 [<ffffffff817f35ed>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x531/0x633 [<ffffffff817f3702>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x15 [<ffffffff818004a5>] neigh_resolve_output+0x12f/0x14d [<ffffffff81959cfa>] ip6_finish_output2+0x344/0x39f [<ffffffff8195bf58>] ip6_finish_output+0x88/0x8e [<ffffffff8195bfef>] ip6_output+0x91/0xe5 [<ffffffff819792ae>] dst_output_sk+0x47/0x4c [<ffffffff81979392>] NF_HOOK_THRESH.constprop.30+0x38/0x82 [<ffffffff8197981e>] mld_sendpack+0x189/0x266 [<ffffffff8197b28b>] mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x1ef/0x223 [<ffffffff810de581>] call_timer_fn+0xfb/0x28c [<ffffffff810ded1e>] run_timer_softirq+0x1c7/0x1f1 Fixes: b8f1a55639e6 ("udp: Add function to make source port for UDP tunnels") Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-04 06:32:57 +08:00
write_seqlock_bh(&net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.lock);
if (same_parity && !net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.warned) {
net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.warned = true;
pr_err_ratelimited("ip_local_port_range: prefer different parity for start/end values.\n");
}
net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[0] = range[0];
net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[1] = range[1];
ipv4: disable BH when changing ip local port range This fixes the following lockdep warning: [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.3.0-rc7+ #1197 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-R} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. sysctl/1019 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.lock)->seqcount){+.+-..}, at: [<ffffffff81921de7>] ipv4_local_port_range+0xb4/0x12a {IN-SOFTIRQ-R} state was registered at: [<ffffffff810bd682>] __lock_acquire+0x2f6/0xdf0 [<ffffffff810be6d5>] lock_acquire+0x11c/0x1a4 [<ffffffff818e599c>] inet_get_local_port_range+0x4e/0xae [<ffffffff8166e8e3>] udp_flow_src_port.constprop.40+0x23/0x116 [<ffffffff81671cb9>] vxlan_xmit_one+0x219/0xa6a [<ffffffff81672f75>] vxlan_xmit+0xa6b/0xaa5 [<ffffffff817f2deb>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2ae/0x465 [<ffffffff817f35ed>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x531/0x633 [<ffffffff817f3702>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x15 [<ffffffff818004a5>] neigh_resolve_output+0x12f/0x14d [<ffffffff81959cfa>] ip6_finish_output2+0x344/0x39f [<ffffffff8195bf58>] ip6_finish_output+0x88/0x8e [<ffffffff8195bfef>] ip6_output+0x91/0xe5 [<ffffffff819792ae>] dst_output_sk+0x47/0x4c [<ffffffff81979392>] NF_HOOK_THRESH.constprop.30+0x38/0x82 [<ffffffff8197981e>] mld_sendpack+0x189/0x266 [<ffffffff8197b28b>] mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x1ef/0x223 [<ffffffff810de581>] call_timer_fn+0xfb/0x28c [<ffffffff810ded1e>] run_timer_softirq+0x1c7/0x1f1 Fixes: b8f1a55639e6 ("udp: Add function to make source port for UDP tunnels") Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-04 06:32:57 +08:00
write_sequnlock_bh(&net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.lock);
}
/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
static int ipv4_local_port_range(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net =
container_of(table->data, struct net, ipv4.ip_local_ports.range);
int ret;
int range[2];
struct ctl_table tmp = {
.data = &range,
.maxlen = sizeof(range),
.mode = table->mode,
.extra1 = &ip_local_port_range_min,
.extra2 = &ip_local_port_range_max,
};
inet_get_local_port_range(net, &range[0], &range[1]);
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0) {
/* Ensure that the upper limit is not smaller than the lower,
* and that the lower does not encroach upon the privileged
* port limit.
*/
if ((range[1] < range[0]) ||
(range[0] < net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock))
ret = -EINVAL;
else
set_local_port_range(net, range);
}
return ret;
}
/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
static int ipv4_privileged_ports(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock);
int ret;
int pports;
int range[2];
struct ctl_table tmp = {
.data = &pports,
.maxlen = sizeof(pports),
.mode = table->mode,
.extra1 = &ip_privileged_port_min,
.extra2 = &ip_privileged_port_max,
};
pports = net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock;
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0) {
inet_get_local_port_range(net, &range[0], &range[1]);
/* Ensure that the local port range doesn't overlap with the
* privileged port range.
*/
if (range[0] < pports)
ret = -EINVAL;
else
net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock = pports;
}
return ret;
}
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
static void inet_get_ping_group_range_table(struct ctl_table *table, kgid_t *low, kgid_t *high)
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
{
kgid_t *data = table->data;
struct net *net =
container_of(table->data, struct net, ipv4.ping_group_range.range);
unsigned int seq;
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
do {
seq = read_seqbegin(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock);
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
*low = data[0];
*high = data[1];
} while (read_seqretry(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock, seq));
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
}
/* Update system visible IP port range */
static void set_ping_group_range(struct ctl_table *table, kgid_t low, kgid_t high)
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
{
kgid_t *data = table->data;
struct net *net =
container_of(table->data, struct net, ipv4.ping_group_range.range);
write_seqlock(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock);
data[0] = low;
data[1] = high;
write_sequnlock(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock);
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
}
/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
static int ipv4_ping_group_range(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
void __user *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
int ret;
gid_t urange[2];
kgid_t low, high;
struct ctl_table tmp = {
.data = &urange,
.maxlen = sizeof(urange),
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
.mode = table->mode,
.extra1 = &ip_ping_group_range_min,
.extra2 = &ip_ping_group_range_max,
};
inet_get_ping_group_range_table(table, &low, &high);
urange[0] = from_kgid_munged(user_ns, low);
urange[1] = from_kgid_munged(user_ns, high);
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0) {
low = make_kgid(user_ns, urange[0]);
high = make_kgid(user_ns, urange[1]);
if (!gid_valid(low) || !gid_valid(high))
return -EINVAL;
if (urange[1] < urange[0] || gid_lt(high, low)) {
low = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, 1);
high = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, 0);
}
set_ping_group_range(table, low, high);
}
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
return ret;
}
static int ipv4_fwd_update_priority(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net;
int ret;
net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_update_priority);
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
call_netevent_notifiers(NETEVENT_IPV4_FWD_UPDATE_PRIORITY_UPDATE,
net);
return ret;
}
static int proc_tcp_congestion_control(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(ctl->data, struct net,
ipv4.tcp_congestion_control);
char val[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
struct ctl_table tbl = {
.data = val,
.maxlen = TCP_CA_NAME_MAX,
};
int ret;
tcp_get_default_congestion_control(net, val);
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
ret = tcp_set_default_congestion_control(net, val);
return ret;
}
static int proc_tcp_available_congestion_control(struct ctl_table *ctl,
int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX, };
int ret;
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_USER);
if (!tbl.data)
return -ENOMEM;
tcp_get_available_congestion_control(tbl.data, TCP_CA_BUF_MAX);
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
kfree(tbl.data);
return ret;
}
static int proc_allowed_congestion_control(struct ctl_table *ctl,
int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX };
int ret;
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_USER);
if (!tbl.data)
return -ENOMEM;
tcp_get_allowed_congestion_control(tbl.data, tbl.maxlen);
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
ret = tcp_set_allowed_congestion_control(tbl.data);
kfree(tbl.data);
return ret;
}
static int proc_tcp_fastopen_key(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen);
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = (TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH * 2 + 10) };
struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctxt;
u32 user_key[4]; /* 16 bytes, matching TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH */
__le32 key[4];
int ret, i;
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tbl.data)
return -ENOMEM;
rcu_read_lock();
ctxt = rcu_dereference(net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx);
if (ctxt)
memcpy(key, ctxt->key, TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH);
else
memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
rcu_read_unlock();
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(key); i++)
user_key[i] = le32_to_cpu(key[i]);
snprintf(tbl.data, tbl.maxlen, "%08x-%08x-%08x-%08x",
user_key[0], user_key[1], user_key[2], user_key[3]);
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0) {
if (sscanf(tbl.data, "%x-%x-%x-%x", user_key, user_key + 1,
user_key + 2, user_key + 3) != 4) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bad_key;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(user_key); i++)
key[i] = cpu_to_le32(user_key[i]);
tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(net, NULL, key,
TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH);
}
bad_key:
pr_debug("proc FO key set 0x%x-%x-%x-%x <- 0x%s: %u\n",
user_key[0], user_key[1], user_key[2], user_key[3],
(char *)tbl.data, ret);
kfree(tbl.data);
return ret;
}
static void proc_configure_early_demux(int enabled, int protocol)
{
struct net_protocol *ipprot;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
struct inet6_protocol *ip6prot;
#endif
rcu_read_lock();
ipprot = rcu_dereference(inet_protos[protocol]);
if (ipprot)
ipprot->early_demux = enabled ? ipprot->early_demux_handler :
NULL;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
ip6prot = rcu_dereference(inet6_protos[protocol]);
if (ip6prot)
ip6prot->early_demux = enabled ? ip6prot->early_demux_handler :
NULL;
#endif
rcu_read_unlock();
}
static int proc_tcp_early_demux(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret = 0;
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && !ret) {
int enabled = init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_demux;
proc_configure_early_demux(enabled, IPPROTO_TCP);
}
return ret;
}
static int proc_udp_early_demux(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret = 0;
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && !ret) {
int enabled = init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_early_demux;
proc_configure_early_demux(enabled, IPPROTO_UDP);
}
return ret;
}
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related reports from Apple: https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped. C ---> syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C (accept & write) C <---- data ------- S C ----- ACK -> X S [retry and timeout] https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped after 3WHS. C ---- syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C ---- ack --------> S S (accept & write) C? X <- data ------ S [retry and timeout] This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO again, and the process repeats indefinitely. The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the following circumstances: 1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN 2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ... And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened on loopback has successfully received data segs from server. And we examine this condition during close(). The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens, application running on the client should eventually close the socket as it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any response from client. In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those frames. And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to fail. Also, add a debug sysctl: tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec: the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens. This can be set and read. When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-21 05:45:46 +08:00
static int proc_tfo_blackhole_detect_timeout(struct ctl_table *table,
int write,
void __user *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout);
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related reports from Apple: https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped. C ---> syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C (accept & write) C <---- data ------- S C ----- ACK -> X S [retry and timeout] https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped after 3WHS. C ---- syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C ---- ack --------> S S (accept & write) C? X <- data ------ S [retry and timeout] This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO again, and the process repeats indefinitely. The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the following circumstances: 1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN 2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ... And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened on loopback has successfully received data segs from server. And we examine this condition during close(). The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens, application running on the client should eventually close the socket as it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any response from client. In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those frames. And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to fail. Also, add a debug sysctl: tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec: the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens. This can be set and read. When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-21 05:45:46 +08:00
int ret;
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
atomic_set(&net->ipv4.tfo_active_disable_times, 0);
return ret;
}
static int proc_tcp_available_ulp(struct ctl_table *ctl,
int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = TCP_ULP_BUF_MAX, };
int ret;
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_USER);
if (!tbl.data)
return -ENOMEM;
tcp_get_available_ulp(tbl.data, TCP_ULP_BUF_MAX);
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
kfree(tbl.data);
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related reports from Apple: https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped. C ---> syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C (accept & write) C <---- data ------- S C ----- ACK -> X S [retry and timeout] https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped after 3WHS. C ---- syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C ---- ack --------> S S (accept & write) C? X <- data ------ S [retry and timeout] This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO again, and the process repeats indefinitely. The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the following circumstances: 1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN 2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ... And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened on loopback has successfully received data segs from server. And we examine this condition during close(). The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens, application running on the client should eventually close the socket as it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any response from client. In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those frames. And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to fail. Also, add a debug sysctl: tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec: the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens. This can be set and read. When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-21 05:45:46 +08:00
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH
static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_policy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_policy);
int ret;
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
call_netevent_notifiers(NETEVENT_IPV4_MPATH_HASH_UPDATE, net);
return ret;
}
#endif
static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = {
{
.procname = "tcp_max_orphans",
.data = &sysctl_tcp_max_orphans,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "inet_peer_threshold",
.data = &inet_peer_threshold,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "inet_peer_minttl",
.data = &inet_peer_minttl,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "inet_peer_maxttl",
.data = &inet_peer_maxttl,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_mem",
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_tcp_mem),
.data = &sysctl_tcp_mem,
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_low_latency",
.data = &sysctl_tcp_low_latency,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
{
.procname = "cipso_cache_enable",
.data = &cipso_v4_cache_enabled,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "cipso_cache_bucket_size",
.data = &cipso_v4_cache_bucketsize,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "cipso_rbm_optfmt",
.data = &cipso_v4_rbm_optfmt,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "cipso_rbm_strictvalid",
.data = &cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
{
.procname = "tcp_available_congestion_control",
.maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_available_congestion_control,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_allowed_congestion_control",
.maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX,
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_allowed_congestion_control,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_available_ulp",
.maxlen = TCP_ULP_BUF_MAX,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_available_ulp,
},
{
.procname = "icmp_msgs_per_sec",
.data = &sysctl_icmp_msgs_per_sec,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
},
{
.procname = "icmp_msgs_burst",
.data = &sysctl_icmp_msgs_burst,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
},
{
.procname = "udp_mem",
.data = &sysctl_udp_mem,
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_udp_mem),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
},
{ }
};
static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = {
{
.procname = "icmp_echo_ignore_all",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "icmp_ratelimit",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratelimit,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "icmp_ratemask",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratemask,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
{
.procname = "ping_group_range",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.ping_group_range.range,
.maxlen = sizeof(gid_t)*2,
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 18:01:00 +08:00
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = ipv4_ping_group_range,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_ecn",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
tcp: add rfc3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback This work as a follow-up of commit f7b3bec6f516 ("net: allow setting ecn via routing table") and adds RFC3168 section 6.1.1.1. fallback for outgoing ECN connections. In other words, this work adds a retry with a non-ECN setup SYN packet, as suggested from the RFC on the first timeout: [...] A host that receives no reply to an ECN-setup SYN within the normal SYN retransmission timeout interval MAY resend the SYN and any subsequent SYN retransmissions with CWR and ECE cleared. [...] Schematic client-side view when assuming the server is in tcp_ecn=2 mode, that is, Linux default since 2009 via commit 255cac91c3c9 ("tcp: extend ECN sysctl to allow server-side only ECN"): 1) Normal ECN-capable path: SYN ECE CWR -----> <----- SYN ACK ECE ACK -----> 2) Path with broken middlebox, when client has fallback: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN -----> <----- SYN ACK ACK -----> In case we would not have the fallback implemented, the middlebox drop point would basically end up as: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) In any case, it's rather a smaller percentage of sites where there would occur such additional setup latency: it was found in end of 2014 that ~56% of IPv4 and 65% of IPv6 servers of Alexa 1 million list would negotiate ECN (aka tcp_ecn=2 default), 0.42% of these webservers will fail to connect when trying to negotiate with ECN (tcp_ecn=1) due to timeouts, which the fallback would mitigate with a slight latency trade-off. Recent related paper on this topic: Brian Trammell, Mirja Kühlewind, Damiano Boppart, Iain Learmonth, Gorry Fairhurst, and Richard Scheffenegger: "Enabling Internet-Wide Deployment of Explicit Congestion Notification." Proc. PAM 2015, New York. http://ecn.ethz.ch/ecn-pam15.pdf Thus, when net.ipv4.tcp_ecn=1 is being set, the patch will perform RFC3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback on timeout. For users explicitly not wanting this which can be in DC use case, we add a net.ipv4.tcp_ecn_fallback knob that allows for disabling the fallback. tp->ecn_flags are not being cleared in tcp_ecn_clear_syn() on output, but rather we let tcp_ecn_rcv_synack() take that over on input path in case a SYN ACK ECE was delayed. Thus a spurious SYN retransmission will not prevent ECN being negotiated eventually in that case. Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-iccrg-1.pdf Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-tsvarea-1.pdf Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Dave That <dave.taht@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 03:04:22 +08:00
{
.procname = "tcp_ecn_fallback",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "ip_dynaddr",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "ip_early_demux",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_early_demux,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "udp_early_demux",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_early_demux,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_udp_early_demux
},
{
.procname = "tcp_early_demux",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_demux,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_early_demux
},
{
.procname = "ip_default_ttl",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_default_ttl,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &ip_ttl_min,
.extra2 = &ip_ttl_max,
},
{
.procname = "ip_local_port_range",
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.ip_local_ports.range),
.data = &init_net.ipv4.ip_local_ports.range,
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = ipv4_local_port_range,
},
{
.procname = "ip_local_reserved_ports",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports,
.maxlen = 65536,
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_do_large_bitmap,
},
{
.procname = "ip_no_pmtu_disc",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 17:01:15 +08:00
{
.procname = "ip_forward_use_pmtu",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "ip_forward_update_priority",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_update_priority,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = ipv4_fwd_update_priority,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &one,
},
{
.procname = "ip_nonlocal_bind",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "fwmark_reflect",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fwmark_reflect,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fwmark_accept",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV
{
.procname = "tcp_l3mdev_accept",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_l3mdev_accept,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &one,
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tcp_mtu_probing",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_base_mss",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_probe_threshold",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_probe_interval",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_interval,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
IGMP: Inhibit reports for local multicast groups The range of addresses between 224.0.0.0 and 224.0.0.255 inclusive, is reserved for the use of routing protocols and other low-level topology discovery or maintenance protocols, such as gateway discovery and group membership reporting. Multicast routers should not forward any multicast datagram with destination addresses in this range, regardless of its TTL. Currently, IGMP reports are generated for this reserved range of addresses even though a router will ignore this information since it has no purpose. However, the presence of reserved group addresses in an IGMP membership report uses up network bandwidth and can also obscure addresses of interest when inspecting membership reports using packet inspection or debug messages. Although the RFCs for the various version of IGMP (e.g.RFC 3376 for v3) do not specify that the reserved addresses be excluded from membership reports, it should do no harm in doing so. In particular there should be no adverse effect in any IGMP snooping functionality since 224.0.0.x is specifically excluded as per RFC 4541 (IGMP and MLD Snooping Switches Considerations) section 2.1.2. Data Forwarding Rules: 2) Packets with a destination IP (DIP) address in the 224.0.0.X range which are not IGMP must be forwarded on all ports. IGMP reports for local multicast groups can now be optionally inhibited by means of a system control variable (by setting the value to zero) e.g.: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/igmp_link_local_mcast_reports To retain backwards compatibility the previous behaviour is retained by default on system boot or reverted by setting the value back to non-zero e.g.: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/igmp_link_local_mcast_reports Signed-off-by: Philip Downey <pdowney@brocade.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-27 23:46:26 +08:00
{
.procname = "igmp_link_local_mcast_reports",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports,
IGMP: Inhibit reports for local multicast groups The range of addresses between 224.0.0.0 and 224.0.0.255 inclusive, is reserved for the use of routing protocols and other low-level topology discovery or maintenance protocols, such as gateway discovery and group membership reporting. Multicast routers should not forward any multicast datagram with destination addresses in this range, regardless of its TTL. Currently, IGMP reports are generated for this reserved range of addresses even though a router will ignore this information since it has no purpose. However, the presence of reserved group addresses in an IGMP membership report uses up network bandwidth and can also obscure addresses of interest when inspecting membership reports using packet inspection or debug messages. Although the RFCs for the various version of IGMP (e.g.RFC 3376 for v3) do not specify that the reserved addresses be excluded from membership reports, it should do no harm in doing so. In particular there should be no adverse effect in any IGMP snooping functionality since 224.0.0.x is specifically excluded as per RFC 4541 (IGMP and MLD Snooping Switches Considerations) section 2.1.2. Data Forwarding Rules: 2) Packets with a destination IP (DIP) address in the 224.0.0.X range which are not IGMP must be forwarded on all ports. IGMP reports for local multicast groups can now be optionally inhibited by means of a system control variable (by setting the value to zero) e.g.: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/igmp_link_local_mcast_reports To retain backwards compatibility the previous behaviour is retained by default on system boot or reverted by setting the value back to non-zero e.g.: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/igmp_link_local_mcast_reports Signed-off-by: Philip Downey <pdowney@brocade.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-27 23:46:26 +08:00
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "igmp_max_memberships",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_max_memberships,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "igmp_max_msf",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_max_msf,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
{
.procname = "igmp_qrv",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &one
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tcp_congestion_control",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control,
.mode = 0644,
.maxlen = TCP_CA_NAME_MAX,
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_congestion_control,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_keepalive_time",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_keepalive_time,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_keepalive_probes",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_keepalive_probes,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_keepalive_intvl",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_keepalive_intvl,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_syn_retries",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syn_retries,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &tcp_syn_retries_min,
.extra2 = &tcp_syn_retries_max
},
{
.procname = "tcp_synack_retries",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_synack_retries,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
{
.procname = "tcp_syncookies",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tcp_reordering",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_retries1",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries1,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra2 = &tcp_retr1_max
},
{
.procname = "tcp_retries2",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_orphan_retries",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_orphan_retries,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fin_timeout",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fin_timeout,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_notsent_lowat",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_notsent_lowat,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_douintvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_tw_reuse",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tw_reuse,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
net-tcp: extend tcp_tw_reuse sysctl to enable loopback only optimization This changes the /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tw_reuse from a boolean to an integer. It now takes the values 0, 1 and 2, where 0 and 1 behave as before, while 2 enables timewait socket reuse only for sockets that we can prove are loopback connections: ie. bound to 'lo' interface or where one of source or destination IPs is 127.0.0.0/8, ::ffff:127.0.0.0/104 or ::1. This enables quicker reuse of ephemeral ports for loopback connections - where tcp_tw_reuse is 100% safe from a protocol perspective (this assumes no artificially induced packet loss on 'lo'). This also makes estblishing many loopback connections *much* faster (allocating ports out of the first half of the ephemeral port range is significantly faster, then allocating from the second half) Without this change in a 32K ephemeral port space my sample program (it just establishes and closes [::1]:ephemeral -> [::1]:server_port connections in a tight loop) fails after 32765 connections in 24 seconds. With it enabled 50000 connections only take 4.7 seconds. This is particularly problematic for IPv6 where we only have one local address and cannot play tricks with varying source IP from 127.0.0.0/8 pool. Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Change-Id: I0377961749979d0301b7b62871a32a4b34b654e1 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-06-04 01:41:17 +08:00
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &two,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_max_tw_buckets",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.tcp_death_row.sysctl_max_tw_buckets,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_max_syn_backlog",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fastopen",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fastopen_key",
.mode = 0600,
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen,
.maxlen = ((TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH * 2) + 10),
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_fastopen_key,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout_sec",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_tfo_blackhole_detect_timeout,
.extra1 = &zero,
},
net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not select a hop that is known to be failed. Example: [h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5 | | 3| 3| [SP1] [SP2]--+ 1 2 1 2 | | /-------------+ | | \ / | | X | | / \ | | / \---------------\ | 1 2 1 2 12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3 4 4 \ / \ / \ / -------| |-----/ 1 2 [TOR3] 3| | [h1] 12.0.0.1 host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5: root@h1:~# ip ro ls ... 12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1 15.0.0.0/16 nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1 nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1 ... If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1 and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the 12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable: root@h1:~# ip neigh show ... 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED ... The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to what fib_detect_death does. To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 22:21:00 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH
{
.procname = "fib_multipath_use_neigh",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &one,
},
{
.procname = "fib_multipath_hash_policy",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_policy,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_fib_multipath_hash_policy,
net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not select a hop that is known to be failed. Example: [h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5 | | 3| 3| [SP1] [SP2]--+ 1 2 1 2 | | /-------------+ | | \ / | | X | | / \ | | / \---------------\ | 1 2 1 2 12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3 4 4 \ / \ / \ / -------| |-----/ 1 2 [TOR3] 3| | [h1] 12.0.0.1 host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5: root@h1:~# ip ro ls ... 12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1 15.0.0.0/16 nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1 nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1 ... If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1 and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the 12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable: root@h1:~# ip neigh show ... 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED ... The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to what fib_detect_death does. To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 22:21:00 +08:00
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &one,
},
#endif
{
.procname = "ip_unprivileged_port_start",
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock,
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = ipv4_privileged_ports,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV
{
.procname = "udp_l3mdev_accept",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &one,
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tcp_sack",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_window_scaling",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_timestamps",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_early_retrans",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_retrans,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &four,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_recovery",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_recovery,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_thin_linear_timeouts",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_thin_linear_timeouts,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_slow_start_after_idle",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_retrans_collapse",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retrans_collapse,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_stdurg",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_stdurg,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_rfc1337",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rfc1337,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_abort_on_overflow",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_abort_on_overflow,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fack",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fack,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_max_reordering",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_dsack",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_app_win",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_app_win,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_adv_win_scale",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &tcp_adv_win_scale_min,
.extra2 = &tcp_adv_win_scale_max,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_frto",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_frto,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_no_metrics_save",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_moderate_rcvbuf",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_tso_win_divisor",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tso_win_divisor,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_workaround_signed_windows",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_limit_output_bytes",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_challenge_ack_limit",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_min_tso_segs",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &one,
.extra2 = &gso_max_segs,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_min_rtt_wlen",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_autocorking",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_autocorking,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &one,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_invalid_ratelimit",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_pacing_ss_ratio",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_pacing_ss_ratio,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &thousand,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_pacing_ca_ratio",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_pacing_ca_ratio,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &thousand,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_wmem",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem,
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &one,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_rmem",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem,
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &one,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_comp_sack_nr",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &comp_sack_nr_max,
},
{
.procname = "udp_rmem_min",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_rmem_min,
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_rmem_min),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &one
},
{
.procname = "udp_wmem_min",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_wmem_min,
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_wmem_min),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &one
},
{ }
};
static __net_init int ipv4_sysctl_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *table;
table = ipv4_net_table;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) {
int i;
table = kmemdup(table, sizeof(ipv4_net_table), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!table)
goto err_alloc;
/* Update the variables to point into the current struct net */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ipv4_net_table) - 1; i++)
table[i].data += (void *)net - (void *)&init_net;
}
net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr = register_net_sysctl(net, "net/ipv4", table);
if (!net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr)
goto err_reg;
net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports = kzalloc(65536 / 8, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports)
goto err_ports;
return 0;
err_ports:
unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr);
err_reg:
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
kfree(table);
err_alloc:
return -ENOMEM;
}
static __net_exit void ipv4_sysctl_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *table;
kfree(net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports);
table = net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr->ctl_table_arg;
unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr);
kfree(table);
}
static __net_initdata struct pernet_operations ipv4_sysctl_ops = {
.init = ipv4_sysctl_init_net,
.exit = ipv4_sysctl_exit_net,
};
static __init int sysctl_ipv4_init(void)
{
struct ctl_table_header *hdr;
hdr = register_net_sysctl(&init_net, "net/ipv4", ipv4_table);
if (!hdr)
return -ENOMEM;
if (register_pernet_subsys(&ipv4_sysctl_ops)) {
unregister_net_sysctl_table(hdr);
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
__initcall(sysctl_ipv4_init);